


INTERNATIONAL POLITY
SUMMER SCHOOL
REPORT



Cornell University Library
Ithaca, New York

FROM

Anonymous


Cornell University Library
JX 1931 1914 .I61

International Polity Summer School, Old



3 1924 007 360 278

clin



Cornell University Library

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

Report
of certain discussions at the

International Polity
Summer School

held at Old Jordans Hostel, Beaconsfield
July 17th to July 27th, 1914

NORMAN ANGELL



*Ever through high Valhalla Gate the Patient Angel goes,
He opens the eyes that are blind with hate—he joins the hands of foes,
The Sack of the Gods.*

International Policy Summer School

OLD JORDANS HOSTEL
BEACONSFIELD

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF

THE GARTON FOUNDATION

July 17th to July 27th, 1914

HARRISON & SONS

Printers in Ordinary to His Majesty and to Queen Alexandra
ST. MARTIN'S LANE, LONDON, W.C.

1915

PREFACE

WITHIN ten days of the break-up of our Summer School the prevailing doctrines of international relations which we had hoped, given but a few more years, to overthrow, had worked their crowning mischief, and half the world was at war.

In the first shock of the catastrophe it was felt that to issue as originally intended a report of our discussions would be, to say the least, incongruous. It seemed, moreover, as though through the text there must inevitably run, in the light of altered circumstance, a vein of unconscious irony calculated rather to embitter than to reinspire. The first impulse was therefore to abandon the project.

A later perusal of the manuscript sufficed to dispel any such misgivings. In its pages the principles underlying our deliberations at that fateful juncture in the world's history stood out in accentuated relief against the sombre background of the war and assumed a new importance. So far from those principles having suffered eclipse by the passage of events they now stand revealed as the only foundations upon which a stable International Polity can be established and a worthier fabric of human civilisation erected out of the wreckage of war. If here and there a passage rings ironically a thousand others will give new courage for the task to which we have set our hands and will serve to restore faith in the possibility of an eventual community of nations cleansed from the baleful doctrines of antagonism and domination. Thus no apology is needed for issuing a report of discussions that echo from what already seems to be a bygone age.

In due season we shall resume our interrupted labours and bring them, in the not too distant future, to full fruition ; and in after times it will be useful to us and others to be able to see from these pages exactly where our movement stood on the eve of the war. For the present the volume will remind us that we have nothing whatsoever to retract, and nothing to regret except that time was not vouchsafed us to permeate Europe with those ideas which would have averted the catastrophe.

Although every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the reports it has not been possible to submit the contributions for correction to the various speakers, and the views expressed should not be quoted except with the confirmation and consent of the speaker concerned.

Our thanks are due to Mr. E. X. Kapp for the privilege of reproducing his excellent caricatures of certain of our number.

J. H.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Preface	v
List of Guests	x
What is Norman-Angellism	1
Pacifist Doctrine and the Difficulty of Applying it ...	11
Some Dangers of the Movement	47
Are Wars Economic in Origin ?	76
The Abolition of the Right of Capture at Sea	96
The Yellow Peril and the Unemployment Arguments...	116
What is Credit	142
Fundamental Points of Agreement between the Aims of the Garton Foundation and of the National Service League	168
Concerning Study Circles	195
Organise the World !	208
Stronger or the Weaker ? The Control of Labour by the Conqueror ; Non-Resistance	223
The Movement and the Universities	259
Reasoning	283
Socialism and Angellism	305
Norman-Alchemism	321
The Poetry of the Sword	333
The Colonial Point of View	364
Stocktaking... ..	386
The Care of a Conference	397
Index	399

ILLUSTRATIONS

Mr. Norman Angell	<i>Frontispiece</i>	
Captain Brett	<i>Facing page</i>	10
Miss Pease	" "	32
Mr. George Nasmyth	" "	62
Prof. Manley Hudson	" "	90
Mr. Norman Angell	" "	122
Mr. John Hilton	" "	142
Mr. S. V. Bracher, Mr. J. B. Martindale				" "	184
Mr. A. W. Haycock	" "	190
Mr. Harold Wright	" "	196
Mr. Edwin D. Mead	" "	208
Mr. Fred Blythe, M. G. Lasselin			...	" "	236
Mr. Norman Angell, Mr. H. H. O'Farrell, Mr. Maurice Leveque, Prof. F. E. Weiss	<i>Facing page</i>	240
Mr. B. N. Langdon-Davies		" "	276
Mr. George Benson	" "	306
Mr. Dennis Robertson	" "	322
Mr. Dennis Robertson (in the text)			...	" "	333
Mr. G. K. Chesterton	" "	334
Mr. R. O. Kapp, Mr. C. E. Fayle, Mr. W. Whiting, Mr. Gerald Shove	<i>Facing page</i>	344
Mr. H. M. Hyndman	" "	352
Prof. Manley Hudson	" "	394

LIST OF GUESTS

- ALLEN, John, Jesus College, Cambridge.
- ANGELL, Norman, 4, King's Bench Walk, Temple, E.C.
- BAKER, Philip, Donnington, Harlesden, N.W.
- BARLOW, The Hon. Lady, Torkington Lodge, Hazelgrove, Cheshire (Visitor).
- BARTHOLOMEW, Reginald, 4, Gunton Road, Tooting Junction, S.W.
Member, Civil Union.
- BEALE, Dr. Arthur A., Moorfield House, Stanningley, Leeds.
Hon. Sec., Leeds Norman Angell League.
- BEDFORD, R. H., Holme Hall, Victoria Park, Manchester.
Hon. Sec., Manchester University War and Peace Society.
- BEHRENS, Leonard F., Holly Royde, Withington, Manchester.
Hon. Sec., Manchester Norman Angell League.
- BENNETT, J. B. Sterndale, 97, Esmond Road, Bedford Park, Chiswick.
- BENSON, George, 8, York Street, Manchester.
Member, Manchester Norman Angell League.
- BLOYE, Herbert, 80, Strathyre Avenue, Norbury, S.W.
Garton Foundation Occasional Lecturer.
- BLYTHE, Fred B., Columbia University.
Columbia University, Livingston Hall, New York City.
- BRACHER, S. V., 35-37, Upper Bedford Place, Russell Square, W.C.
- BRANDT, S., University Union, Manchester.
Ex. Hon. Sec., Manchester University War and Peace Society.
- BRETT, Captain the Hon. Maurice V., M.V.O.
Secretary, Garton Foundation.
- BUSVINE, E., Woodhouse, N. Finchley, N.
Member of Civil Union.
- CALDICOTT, Leonard, 8, Newhall Street, Birmingham.
Organiser of Birmingham Society.
- CERVESATO, Professor Arnaldo, Casella Postale 468, Rome.
Editor, Italian Edition of "Great Illusion" and "Int. Polity."
- CHESTERTON, G. K., Overroads, Beaconsfield (Visitor).
- COCKS, F. Seymour, 23, Dornton Road, Balham, S.W.
Member, Civil Union.
- COLLINSON, E. W., St. John's Place, Halifax.
Organiser of Halifax Study Circles.
- COTTERELL, A. P. J., Newlyn, Gerrard's Cross, Bucks. (Visitor).
- DAVIES, H. Barrs, Witheridge, Beaconsfield, Bucks. (Visitor).

- FAYLE, C. E., 9, Southwood Avenue, Highgate.
Private Secretary to Norman Angell, author of "The New Patriotism."
- FISHER, Harold, 48, Southcroft Road, Tooting, S.W.
Member of Civil Union.
- FRASER, Leon, Columbia University, New York City.
Columbia College and School of Journalism.
- FULTON, E. A., 12, St. George's Road, Golder's Green, N.W.
Oxford and London Universities.
- GRAHAM, R. B., Magdalen College, Oxford.
Member, Oxford University War and Peace Society.
- HANNAN, P. J., 11, Victoria Street, Westminster, S.W.
Secretary, The Navy League.
- HAY, Woodhull, 5, Rue Jose Maria de Heredia, Paris VII, France.
- HAYCOCK, A. W., 66, Oxney Road, Rusholme, Manchester.
Organiser and Lecturer, Manchester Norman Angell League.
- HILTON, John, The Datcha, Woodside Avenue, Beaconsfield.
Organiser and Lecturer to the Garton Foundation.
- HOLMAN, Percy, 55, Talbot Road, Highgate, N.
Member of Civil Union.
- HUDSON, Manley O., William Jewel College, Harvard University.
Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
- HUGINS, Roland B., 414E, Seneca Street, Ithaca, New York.
President of Cornell University International Polity Club.
- HYNDMAN, H. M., London (Visitor).
- JORDAN, Dr. David Starr, Chancellor, Leland Stanford Junior University, U.S.A.
- KAPP, R. O., Toynbee Hall, 28, Commercial Street, E.C.
Member of Civil Union.
- KAPP, Edmund, The Studio, 72, West End Lane, Hampstead, N.W.
- KNOLLENBERG, B. H., Earlham College, Harvard Graduate School and Law School, U.S.A.
President of Harvard International Polity Club.
- LANGDON-DAVIES, B. N., Whitehall House, Whitehall, S.W.
- LASSELIN, GEORGES, 8, Rue Ramette, Cambrai, France.
- LEVEQUE, Maurice, 32, Rue M. le Prince, Paris VI, France.
Editor, "Jeune Europe."
- LUBTOW, E. VON, Christ's College, Cambridge.
- LUNNON, R. G., 11, Grove Road, New Southgate, N.
Hon. Sec., London University War and Peace Society.
- LYTTELTON, The Hon. R. G., Trinity College, Cambridge.
Hon. Sec., Cambridge University War and Peace Society.
- MARCHAND, Geoffrey, Martindale, Little Heath, Potter's Bar, Herts.
- MARTINDALE, J. B., Lansdown, Wilmston, Cheshire.
Member, Manchester Norman Angell League.

MAWSON, E. G., 18, Slaty Road, Birkenhead.

Hon. Sec., Liverpool University War and Peace Society.

MEAD, Edwin D.

Secretary, World Peace Foundation, Boston, U.S.A.

MEAD, Mrs., Boston, U.S.A.

MEZ, John, Ph.D., 407, West 117th Street, Sub-Station 84, New York.
Munich University, President, "Corda Fratres."

NASMYTH, Dr. Geo., 40, Mount Vernon Street, Boston, U.S.A.

Of Harvard University and World Peace Foundation. Organiser
American International Polity Clubs.

NIXON, F. H., 17, Worsley Road, Hampstead.

O'FARRELL, H. H., 61, The Avenue, Kew Gardens, Surrey.

Author of "The Franco-German Indemnity."

PITTMAN, Alfred, 407, West 117th Street, Sub-Station 84, New York.

Telegraph Editor of "Kansas City Star," Kansas, U.S.A. Concilia-
tion.

QUINTANA, Monsieur Orzabal de la, 2, Rue de Buenos Ayres, Paris VIIe,
France.

RAPHAEL, J. E., 5, Essex Court, Temple, E.C.

Lecturer in Garton Foundation Lecture Courses.

RHODES, Cyril, 16A, John Street, Adelphi, W.C.

Hon. Secretary, British-German Friendship Society.

ROBERTSON, J. M., M.P., Knight's Place, Pembury, Kent.

ROBERTSON, Dennis, Trinity College, Cambridge.

Member, Cambridge War and Peace Society.

ROMANES, E. G. R., Magdalen College, Oxford.

Hon. Secretary, Oxford War and Peace Society.

ROTHWELL, C. H., 57, Snowden Road, Eccles.

SHOVE, G. F., 38, Brunswick Square, W.C.

SPARKES, Malcolm, Long Gable, South Park, Gerrard's Cross (Visitor).

STURGIS, Roland, Whitehall House, Whitehall, S.W.

Of "War and Peace."

THORPE, Joseph, 15, Prince of Wales' Mansions, Battersea, S.W.

TINKLER, J., 3, Stanley Road, East Finchley, N.

Organiser of East Finchley Lectures.

TOULMIN, Geoffrey, Toynbee Hall, 28, Commercial Street, E.C.

TOWNROE, Lieutenant B. S.

Representing the National Service League.

WHITING, William, "Elberton," West Park, Leeds.

Chairman, Leeds Norman Angell League.

WEISS, Professor, 30, Brunswick Road, Withington, Manchester.

Acting Vice-Chancellor, Manchester University.

WHITNEY, G. G., 54, Priory Road, Kew Green, Surrey.

Organiser, Kew Green Study Circle.

WILLETT, Edward, 49, Spring Gardens, Manchester.

Secretary, Manchester Norman Angell League.

WILLIAMS, Roland, Grappenhall Lodge, near Warrington.

Member, Liverpool International Polity Club.

WRIGHT, Harold, Eirene, De Burgh Park, Banstead, Surrey.

Ex-President, Cambridge War and Peace Society.

WRIGHT, Charles, Fairmead, Worcester Road, Sutton.

Member of Lloyds.

WILSON, the Rev. James, of New Zealand.

A BALLADE OF JORDANS.

To reach the heart of a weighty theme
The gods have shown us one only way :
Tell me, which of us dared to dream
We could learn so much from so short a stay ?
We have talked all night ; we have talked all day ;
We have aped the sage ; we have played the fool ;
We have run the gamut from grave to gay ;
These are the fruits of a Summer School.

Of "milk for babes" we have whipped the cream
"Strong meat for men" we have made our prey ;
In all discussions where questions teem
We shall plunge henceforward with small delay ;
We shall utter boldly our "yea" and "nay" ;
We have mastered many a useful rule
To bring success in the wordy fray ;
These are the fruits of a Summer School.

Of intuition we've caught a gleam,
Though reason's mandates we all obey ;
Though ¹Mr. Hannon may blandly beam,
Of him and Chesterton *we* made hay.
Manchester, Halifax, Oxford—yea
Harvard, Munich and Lille and ²Goole
Proved good comrades in work and play ;
These are the fruits of a Summer School.

ENVOI.

Captain Brett, when they bid you pay
For the shivered pane and the splintered stool,
Sign the cheque with a smile and say—
"These are the fruits of a Summer School."

MACFLECKNOE.

¹ Secretary of the Navy League—most genial of opponents.

² The delegate from Goole does not figure on the official list, but the claims of rhyme are imperative. We believe MacFlecknoe comes from Goole any way.

WHAT IS NORMAN-ANGELLISM?

Morning Session : July 18th

MR. NORMAN ANGELL IN THE CHAIR

MR. ANGELL : The scheme laid down for our discussions is broadly this. We propose to divide as much talk as we can stand into two main sections : (1) how to study the thesis ourselves, and (2) how to get it home to the public. As a general thing the mornings are scheduled for the first and the evenings for the second division.

Here is the method of the morning session. Whoever is conducting the session will ask one of the students either to state our case in general or to state a particular part of that case—the conductor of the session will then criticise or get others to criticise the statement ; or a question will be asked of one student, and others will be asked to criticise the reply to that question, after which the director of the class will criticise the whole process. I think the first kind of case we should be able to state is this : When Professor Hudson gets back to America and some of his students in that very attractive University of Missouri which I have had the pleasure and honour of visiting, ask “ What is this Norman-Angellism ? What is it all about ? ” how should Professor Hudson reply ?

Professor HUDSON : Do you want me to answer that ?

Mr. ANGELL : I do. What will you reply when someone asks you " What is Norman-Angellism ? "

Professor HUDSON : I shall say that Norman-Angellism is a movement to study the things which lead to war, and to international hostility in general ; to analyse the soundness of the position which the man in the street takes towards the present war system and the attitude various nations take in dealing with each other. It is a movement to study the view people take of society in general and of their relations to each other, with a view to understanding the attitude of nations towards other nations.

Mr. ANGELL : How would you reply to this definite question " But why a separate movement ? How does it differ from other Peace movements ? "

Professor HUDSON : The word peace has certain associations, certain connotations which are unfortunate and which are not well received. Peace advocacy as commonly understood meets with a certain opposition in the mind of the ordinary member of the public. He does not regard it as a thing which has any place in his practical life or in the practical politics of his country. This movement on the other hand is designed to study the actualities of international politics and it differs from the other movements in that it puts emphasis in other places.

Mr. ANGELL : How would the Secretary of the Manchester Norman Angell League deal with these two questions : " What is Norman-Angellism ? " and " Why is not the Manchester Norman Angell League an out-right Peace Society ? "

Mr. BEHRENS : The Manchester idea of Norman-Angellism is slightly different from Professor Hudson's

idea, because it has the direct object of promoting peace. The best way to promote peace is by appealing not to sentiment but to reason, and not only to economic reason, but to reason generally ; to the pros and cons of the whole business. We set out to discuss it as an intellectual question, and we believe we have there the solution to the whole problem.

Mr. ANGELL : That disposes of one question, "What is Norman-Angellism ?" but now : "How does it differ from the peace movement generally ?"

Mr. BEHRENS : It differs from peace movements in being rather a realistic movement than an idealistic movement ; in dealing with facts as they are, and not as they might be if the world were other than what it is. We trust reason more than intuition.

Mr. ANGELL : Mr. Benson, imagine I am a heckler in one of your audiences : "What is Norman-Angellism ?"

Mr. BENSON : Norman-Angellism is a convenient label which one applies to a series of ideas of war and armaments in general, and particularly of their utility. I suppose, that a nation, as a rational being, goes to war with the object of achieving some end. Norman-Angellism says that whatever these ends may be war is about the worst method you can adopt to achieve them. If you want to gain trade by war you will find you are only damaging your own trade. If you want to extend the power of your nation you will find the only effect of your colonising is to put so much more of the earth's surface out of the range of your power and the possibility of your coercion. Norman - Angellism deals with the interdependence of nations—their linking in various ways, economic, psychological, physical, and a nation using force against other nations is practically using force against itself, owing to this interdependence. Norman-Angellism says

that nations are now all one and therefore it is futile to use force against another as in doing so you injure yourself.

Mr. HAYCOCK: In answer to such a question I would advise the questioner to read a book called "The Great Illusion." It is impossible to bovrilise the thesis in two minutes.

Dr. MEZ: Norman-Angellism is a method of considering the basic assumptions about war and peace in relation to the question of material welfare and national advantage. This thesis does not primarily aim at peace, but at exposing the wrong thinking we are led into by adhering to old misconceptions. The older pacifists admitted that it was sometimes advantageous to have armies and to conquer but Norman-Angellism did not admit this.

Mr. BRACHER: Norman-Angellism is the application of the ordinary common sense of the plain man to the affairs of nations. If war is contrary to common sense it will be safe to leave those who disagree as to its moral or religious value to quarrel among themselves, and for Norman-Angellists to content themselves with proving its futility.

Mr. ANGELL to Mr. HAYCOCK: Why do we not call ourselves peace men?

Mr. HAYCOCK: For the simple reason that peace, as hawked about on platforms for years, is considered to be a religious mania. The average man will listen to it on Sunday afternoons, but not on weekdays. The old pacifists tried to prove that war was a heart disease, we are trying to prove that it is an international brain disease. Pacifists say war is wrong, we say war is silly.

Mr. SEYMOUR COCKS : The Norman Angell movement means the introduction of sanity into the discussion of international affairs. The old pacifist said that if a man hits you on one cheek you have to turn the other cheek. We say that it is impossible to hit another man on the cheek without hitting yourself. Owing to the interdependence of nations it is impossible to injure another nation without injuring yourself.

Mr. HOLMAN : We differ from the older pacifists in three different points. (1) The older pacifism aimed directly at the abolition of war and armaments. We demand rational understanding about the relations of societies to one another. (2) The older pacifist based their claims on moral grounds. We make out a coherent case on economic, psychological and biological grounds. (3) The old pacifists by appealing to emotion got a powerful temporary reaction. We appeal to the reason and get men to question any statement of a jingoistic nature, thus making a permanent change in his attitude.

Mr. NORMAN ANGELL : We ought not to disparage the older pacifism. As knowledge accumulates, fresh factors come into play in the world, the credit system, the gradual increase of intercommunication, the gradual increase of the division of labour. We get new conditions and we have to state it in new terms. The older pacifists may not have stated these things in the same terms because the material was not there. They had not our developed modern Europe with its credit system and its improved intercommunication. We must not disparage the older pacifists. We do not know that they failed. What is failure in this matter? Morley says that although Cobden's work did not prevent the Crimean war it prevented three wars that would otherwise have taken place. The older pacifist prepared the way for us, we

have furnished him with additional grounds for his faith. He appealed to your conscience, to your intuition, but he did not explain things. People's consciences differ. The Jingo has a conscience too. He believes it is his duty to defend his country. His intention is just as good as yours. The old peace people did not always recognise that the man to whom they were appealing had just as good intentions as theirs, but his conscience permitted an action quite different to theirs. Our movement is based on a desire to explain why, how and in what manner war cannot benefit a country. When you asked the older peace man what he proposed to do about the fact that Germany would have to possess Canada because she wanted the wheat of Canada for her starving babies, he was not able to explain what Germany was to do. In fact he said that it might be necessary for a nation to sacrifice itself in the interests of morality. Now we are explaining how it is that Germany does not need to take Canada, that the whole trouble about war is a failure of understanding. We explain that the German can have the wheat of Canada now by paying for it. If he conquered Canada he would still have to pay for it. When the peace man was asked what we were to do if the Germans came in and took our country he did not reply. We say that the Germans cannot take our country and our wealth and we demonstrate why. The old pacifist asked you to believe that the Germans are too good to come. The Germans are not any better than we are. We have been in several countries in the world.

We are hoping that as these ideas grow the Germans will see that that kind of thing does not pay and we believe that as the knowledge of these facts spreads that will be our security. We explain—the old pacifists did not explain. Ours is a matter of the mind, theirs is a matter of emotion—not that emotion is bad but the direc-

tion your emotion will take depends upon your conception of your own interest and the general interest of those about you. We seek to direct our emotion towards the general interest and to base it on that because we cannot base it on anything else.

The older pacifists appeal to religion, to the Bible, to Christianity. Most people to-day are not agreed about these things. We must therefore appeal to something upon which everybody will agree—and we find that in the general good. Say that war does not pay if you like, but when you hear that war does not pay you immediately think of money lenders, coupons, bank rate, &c., and the question is a great deal wider than that. Norman-Angellism is not merely a demonstration of detached facts, of demolishing a particular case that the Germans could by taking a colony make money out of it; but a demonstration that no group can in the long run profit by the exercise of power over another group. Norman-Angellism is a definite clearing-up of the misunderstanding that is current in the whole world as to what military power can do. It attempts to explain exactly what you can do and what you cannot do with force. It is an appeal to facts and an appeal to the mind. The old pacifism appealed to something which would have been quite effective if we could have all agreed upon that something: but we do not agree upon the thing to which the appeal was made. We Norman-Angellists do look to a something upon which we can all agree and that is the general good; and we declare that when tested by the general good it is impossible for one nation to benefit by the conquest of another. That is the difference between the old and the new pacifism.

The other day at a luncheon of Jingoists, one of the company said, in reply to a remark that Norman-Angellism was trying to correct certain economic misconcep-

tions: "What economic misconceptions? Nobody believes that war pays. The whole business of Norman-Angellism is futile because nobody believes that war pays." Mr. BENSON, how would you deal with a statement like that?

Mr. BENSON: I should say that people do believe that war pays. All our war scares are based on the belief that the Germans believe that war pays. People believe that the Germans want our trade and our colonies. People believe that the Germans must have our trade and must have our colonies. That belief is rooted in men's minds.

Mr. ANGELL: The evident reply to that line of attack is "Then what are the Germans coming for? Are they coming here for our good, to improve us morally?" That is the reply. But it shows how the answering of a criticism is not a matter of an extensive knowledge of the detail of the subject at all but of how to group your question into just the one or two fundamental divisions. That falls into the second division which I have indicated in the grammar: "thinking of the thing in terms of two parties." No Jingo, British or German, will admit "We are going to make war in order to make money out of it"; but both will say, "It is the other people who are going to make war with us so that they may make money out of us." That question falls clearly into the second division of the grammar.

Mr. MAWSON: History does not show any case of a war being fought for making money.

Mr. ANGELL: Do you really believe that all these country gentlemen, the parsons and the rest of them interested in the maintenance of our prestige in India, were not concerned with the defence of India for what we might get out of it? The Crimean war was gone into

because we thought that Russia threatened our hold on India. When we get the question "Does war pay," make it clear at once that we know perfectly well no nation declares war saying "We will make so many million pounds and the cost of war will be so much, and we shall make profit out of." When we go to war we believe that unless we can check the power of the other man or unless we can impose our point of view upon him our general interest or national interest will in some way suffer. We made war in the Transvaal from precisely that motive.

You will hear much about the North and South war in America. We have just had Dr. Scharer, a Southerner from America, showing clearly that the causes of that war were purely economic in the sense that the primary cause was the extension of the slave-owning area. Before that time the South had been as much opposed to slave-owning as the North, but it was only afterwards, when cotton growing became so profitable, that they began to buy slaves. Thus slaves became a great financial interest. These men were pushing the interest of this particular form of property. The Northerners having no interest in slavery were disposed to place limits on the practice; and that was the real cause of the conflict. It was an economic question. Partly involved in this is the "terms of two factors." Suppose that the impulse from the North was largely moral, which of course it largely was, that moral conflict would not have taken place if the Southerners were not protecting the institution of slavery. When interest is taken as not merely a question of dividends but of general interest then you will find that nearly all wars have their origin in interest—real or assumed.

Herr von LUBTOW mentioned that he had lived for some time in France, where there was a strong general feeling

for revenge on Germany for the Franco-German war. The French were aware they would be unable to gain any advantage, but the mere desire for revenge was sufficient to provoke war.

Mr. ANGELL: If some fellow comes along and robs me of my fortune (which I do not possess) and reduces me to poverty, I want to kill him and if I am a high-tempered man I probably will kill him. This conflict surely arises from an economic cause.

War is not for the common good, and if we could get this established in public opinion we should get the abolition of war. You say men do not judge by the common good, and we say on what basis can they possibly go. Religious sanction, intuition and emotional grounds are not grounds on which there is a general understanding. The general interest is the only starting point. We choose that basis because there is no other upon which six or sixty people could start with any hope of agreement.

To the men who say this is sordid we reply that his comment is hypocritical. Before our movement started everybody said that the Germans were coming to get something for themselves. Now they say that nations do not go to war because it pays. It is not sordid to assert that the basis of understanding between nations is the common good.



*May such Captains still increase,
Eminent in War and Peace.*
MacFlecknoe.

PACIFIST DOCTRINE AND THE DIFFICULTY OF APPLYING IT

PAPER BY MR. E. A. FULTON

Morning Session : Sunday, July 19th

MR. NORMAN ANGELL IN THE CHAIR

MR. FULTON : Those who take a new faith seriously can generally be divided into idealists and historians. The former regard it as a basis of life : the latter regard it as an event, asking first not whether the new view is true but under what conditions it is true. In this the historically-minded people are in accord with military men and diplomatists ; for military men have first and foremost to estimate not the easiest but the hardest cases, and the diplomatists have to keep clearly in sight the problems most remote from the normal questions of their respective countries. While an avowed propagandist of pacifism therefore would aim rightly at drawing most attention to the cases where war is less justifiable, such as the United States and Canada, Argentine and Chile, or Belgium and Holland, the responsible military organiser will insist on considering as most vital those to do with savage or

less civilised peoples, and the diplomatist will be pre-occupied with Albania or Armenia when apparently concerned with France or Germany. In the main, historians will probably be with the military and the diplomatists in dealing with the problems of pacifism, since past experience of large movements must induce a strong suspicion that the effective scope of a general idea or a doctrine will in each case prove narrower, perhaps much narrower, than might fairly be anticipated. For example, Christianity in its earliest form was as direct an appeal to human beings however circumstanced as anything could well be. Yet almost at once Christianity assumed a definite form, it acquired a constructive programme, it took on gradually local characteristics and became in fact virtually a European religion. Again, nothing would appear more logical and practically reasonable than the medieval conception of a single Christendom, a community of mankind on the essential matters of life and death. Yet actually Christendom dissolved into a group of separate societies owing largely to the increasing richness and elaboration of local life.

Later still the French revolutionists acquired a clear idea that individual men had rights as men prior to rights derived from any established institution. They certainly believed that they were out to assert the liberty, equality and brotherhood of humanity over the world at large. They were a little successful in stirring up considerable sections of people in Europe, but also paved the way for military despotism and the infliction on this part of the earth of a vast amount of suffering irrelevant to liberty or equality or fraternity, and the present armed peace can justly be counted as one of their productions. Yet the idea of the individual as an end in himself was a lucid and apparently universally applicable idea which we might fairly suppose would be calculated to find ready recog-

nition. In America the secession party threw off allegiance to the British Crown, to maintain what they considered their rights as Englishmen and the assertion that they had fought for the Rights of Man was pure embroidery. In the first enthusiasm of discovery that aristocracies were not defensible many of the Revolutionists really thought of the "people" as a final substitute. Very soon the "people" relapsed merely into the electoral majority of a given country and although "democratic" is still a term widely used in a reverential way it may be doubted whether it is not rapidly losing its impressiveness.

Examples such as these give pause to those who are conscious of not being idealists. They keep suggesting that world states and universal ideas are not to be expected in practice and that 99 people out of 100 must continue to act in real or apparent contradiction to ideas whose truth they would not undertake to deny. Not that there is much fear of an overwhelming number of persons taking up truth with excessive haste or premature wisdom, but it points to a necessity of judging who are and who are not the best target for the preachers of a new truth.

Perhaps the most noticeable fact that a cautious realist would pounce on is the origin of universal ideas. From *his* standpoint Christianity could be described as provoked by the Roman Empire, as an assertion of the value of man against an organisation such as the Jewish religious community or the Empire. Catholic Christendom again seems clearly a result of the Roman Empire and the conditions of Western Europe at a special period, not to mention some peculiar details about the position of the Bishop of Rome, in Italy. What is even more obvious is the source of the French theory about the equality of men. In France society was glaringly

artificial and privilege and responsibility had become curiously divorced. No wonder some Frenchman formulated the theory that man apart from class was good and that the people (*i.e.*, all except the aristocracy) ought to rule. How little the French idea applies to Turkestan or Uganda anyone can see after a moment's consideration and yet we have prominent politicians who seem not to see this, or else as idealists refuse to allow that the difference of conditions is the vital point.

I would suggest that there is something of practical importance in this local inspiration of general views which I maintain is real for it gives some clue to the enormous resisting power of rational and well informed people, to rational and logically convincing propositions. Pacifism in the sense understood by those present seems to me a characteristically English movement. This many (possibly nearly all) critics would deny, but argument may be stated in this way. The French origin of the Rights of the People does not make the theory false. However, it almost certainly points to the need of considering certain conditions to make it as applicable outside France as within that country. A democracy is possible where a very considerable portion of the people take an intelligent interest in politics, otherwise manifestly it is not. England in this case has some peculiar features. The most striking being the sharp distinction between the industrial classes and the imperial army. Militarism in this country is a profession apart from the national life ; and the average taxpayer can easily regard the army as an expense, as primarily an economic problem. Elsewhere in Europe, the contrast between the military and the civilian ways of living is not nearly so dramatic and obvious. Sir Edward Grey has pointed out that Continental Powers refuse to discuss armaments as they consider them questions of domestic

concern. In England the navy and army are always thought of as weapons of foreign relations and it is readily maintained that the abolition of international resort to wars would make armaments superfluous. Here consequently Pacifists can discuss the armament question freely without touching on problems of class relations, socialism or capitalism, and the average member of an audience needs no special effort of imagination to get at the real issue. In any Anglo-Saxon country, in fact, armaments could be abolished and no change in the order of society take place. Hence the difficulty of presenting the very same issue in Germany, still more in Austria, and more still in Russia. Certainly in the two latter states the army is rather an internal social affair than a matter of foreign policy. The chief use of the army of Austria-Hungary is neither to invade other territories nor to resist invasion, but to educate the inhabitants of a very diversified population in the sense of common interests. The government of that country, therefore, cannot discuss the military establishment as simply an economic burden, though a burden it is, and Austro-Hungarians are as able to see that as any other persons. The fact that they had no illusions or misunderstandings as to the economic value of war would not therefore cause them to disarm unless some other equally strong bond of unity (of which there appears no present prospect) could replace militarism. In brief it is just as possible to understand pacifism and practice militarism as to be a Christian and practice statecraft, or to believe in liberty of the citizen and organise bureaucratic republics.

It may be contended that a great advance has been made if the idea has been grasped even if still other considerations prevent people from putting the idea into practice. No one could deny that it *is* an advance, but

it does not follow that the idea will then steadily increase in its control of action. Before the ascendancy of Russia, Germany was eminently the home of men who thought of universality. Then Prussianism came in and nationalism was almost desperately sought as a release from humanity. In the Balkans now, nationalism is rampant and seems to be held to cover any sins or crimes done in its name. Incidentally Balkan nationalism has stiffened the militarism of Austria and Germany, therefore also of Russia and France all four probably for purely defensive reasons even, allowing carefully for the acceleration of developments due to modern means of communication and economic interdependence. This gradual arrival of belated societies at the stage of feeling that the West of Europe attained 300 years ago, remains a constant drag on the pacific progress of the more civilised sections of the race. At present Albanian, Servian, Greek and Bulgarian audiences would be somewhat less responsive to pacifist common sense than Anglo-Saxon audiences. In dealing with the Balkans it is only just to speak of the nations as more right than the Turks since no doubt they will in time become industrious and ultimately pacific, but we have to admit that we cannot speak of the world or even of Europe as having arrived at a new position because the most developed countries have arrived at it. Historians have unavoidably written general histories of Europe round the main events and we are apt to think for instance of the Renaissance as a European movement, whereas it belonged to the south and west of this peninsula. The Crusades were not a European, but mainly a French enterprise. Nowadays no one knows where Europe ends. There never was, nor is there now, on the earth any definite international region of which we can assert that it has reached a certain clear stage of civilisation. To

travel from London to Constantinople is to pass back through different epochs and practical arrangements have to be made accordingly. It does not appear that financial interdependence has brought societies to a common footing much as it has extended and hastened the development towards it. Only with many modifications can we seriously speak of the earth as unified.

For a warning we need not look further afield than the British island which lies close to Lancashire itself wonderfully indifferent to what Manchester thinks to-day. Ireland (we can all offer explanations) is certainly not on a line with Industrial England or even with 18th century Whig England for that matter. It had been suggested in an English pacifist journal known to those here, that the difficulty in Ireland is due to misunderstanding. It may be, but many of us besides the protagonists found it tempting to ask "*Whose* misunderstanding," for the lack of knowledge can plausibly be ascribed to any of the parties concerned. All sorts and degrees of pacifists have been recently challenged to throw some light on a situation with which practical statesmen found it necessary to deal by emergency measure, and it is safe to say that the answers given (if any) must have been as varied as those of politicians or militarists. The English having realised two centuries and a half ago that within their nation the incidents and achievements of war were mainly irrelevant are for the most part distinctly pacifist in this matter, but at a loss to know how their own common sense applies in a place so utterly unlike England and amongst people who manifestly do not regard compromise as virtuous in itself.

It is unsatisfactory to any of us to stand wholly aside from the actual problem and adhere firmly to the assertions of fundamental principles—though in the long run that may well be the wisest course. Weak-minded

people of the historical party may, however, be forgiven for not restraining altogether those who first proposed to use violence to settle things in Ireland. The trouble is that no agreement on this has been reached. The British garrison (as the Covenanters are called by themselves and their opponents) can argue that the Westminster majority indicated an intention to employ violence by proceeding with a policy over their heads for long in disregard of their existence. The established civil power can properly assert its formal right to overbear any opposition. The Irish Nationalists can claim that the Protestants are a recalcitrant minority rightly suppressible according to the code of democracy. All three groups would consider themselves champions of self-government. What is therefore worth consideration is that there is apparent agreement on the general principle and object and yet a danger of any and every party resorting to violence on its behalf.

One of the parties happens to be the State, that is the formal authority in the British Isles and the British "Empire" as it is called for lack of an appropriate designation in the English (or any other) language. A facile solution of the problem therefore for those who respect the word "State" is that any opposition to the decision of the State must be put down, and that no question must be asked about the State itself. Verbally, the majority of the Westminster House of Commons is a final authority because owing to the developments of English practical experience, up to date, an assembly which nominally represents the people as distinct from the *hereditary* rich, cannot be mistaken about any policy. This is only democracy. It has nothing to do with Pacifism; but a great excitement occurred in this country when a short time back it was learnt that the Imperial Army was reluctant to take any part in transforming Ulstermen into Irishmen as opposed to the British.

Only disciplinarians were surprised. All doctrinaries here, and in other countries, were taken aback. As a matter of fact, the refusal of the Army in England to be used by the technically legal government is a conventional incident. In 1688 the Revolution in England was a "glorious Revolution" just because a very momentous constitutional change was affected without bloodshed. The absence of war and consequently the glorious reputation of the event was due simply to the action of the army in playing a political and not a military part.

In many quarters and especially among pacifists the recent recurrence of an army crisis here was regarded as a grave affair and all manner of startling explanations of it were offered. To us the essential question is whether we think it right whenever a military group differs from the existing civilian power to support the latter without further enquiry. A democrat is entitled to maintain that an army or navy must in all cases submit to the orders of the Civil Power if that Power is, or seems to be, upheld by the active or passive favour of the majority of an electorate. I would assert without hesitation that a pacifist has no such easy course. The real question is not which group of persons is officially a civilian majority and which an army, but which is promoting war on a given occasion and which is promoting peace. And it is not at all certain that the civilians will be found to be on the side of peace even when they are prominent and well known advocates of Pacifism and denounce all persons who are accustomed to manipulate weapons. If Mr. Angell were to keep a black list of pacifists who have intermittently advocated the use of violence and armed methods there are few of us who would not appear on it.

The Irish problem is peculiarly opportune, since it raises almost every imaginable obstacle to the successful application of civilist doctrines. The issue is not between

the State and the armed forces but between profoundly divergent views about the State in one part of the earth, —the British Isles. Here all the opponents with pretty obvious sincerity wish no war to occur and desire by holding force in reserve to prevent it, but they disagree as to the civil authority which ought to use force eventually. The difficulty seems to lie in the very existence of sovereign independent powers and nationalities, the cause of the armed peace with which we are burdened. Here we come up against nationalism as a disconcerting fact. Obviously the Nationalist in Ireland as elsewhere is not content with the desire for good government. Pride or vanity (or whatever it is) makes him insist on having a government whose source of authority he approves quite apart from its merits or demerits as a form of administration. The same feeling can be seen in Albania, in Poland and in many other places, and there does not appear to be any likelihood of it disappearing from human experience in any measureable time, so long as sovereign independence exists and there is no State but only a number of states and peoples not yet at the stage of state making.

In Ireland to all seeming the pacifist is just like the politician bound to dispense with formulas and doctrines, because the case is *sui generis* and the soundest general doctrine does not give a guidance to a practical policy however true it is ultimately. So far as I can see the utmost a pacifist can rightly suggest in this case is that the theory of the infallible civil power is heresy and that the majority of the House of Commons is not warranted in enforcing even its mature decision if that decision promotes war. At this particular period of history our chief intellectual danger is idolatry of democratically constituent states, and there is little hope of any rapid progress of pacifism if it is widely confused with totally different

things like republicanism or democracy. That the confusion is very often made will, I think, be agreed, and it is specially likely to be made in societies where militarism is or appears to be a bulwark of privileged classes. Class hostility is easily aroused and very often is disingenuously expressed as anti-militarism.

A quite different difficulty is suggested by India. Many thorough pacifists do justify the British Raj on the correct ground that it signifies more and not less law and order in India. Owing to the backward condition of parts of that territory the maintenance of order requires the Anglo-Indian Army—an army in the most professional sense. If we once say that we approve of the British Raj we are committing ourselves to a good deal. It means that if we are candid we must admit that we think war right to-day in some places, that we make no protest against men making a career of militarism and that our general pacifist doctrines are in reserve. It is formally consistent to find the Anglo-Indian Army in the category of police forces, but, of course, it is an army in the most uncompromising sense of the term and the operations it is prepared to undertake are those of real war.

This, it seems to me, it is necessary to admit with the utmost frankness because amongst the more civilised peoples who are ripe for the appreciation of pacifist views there is clearly a tendency to avoid the trouble of considering just how much that means. For instance, as Mr. H. G. Wells has pointed out, the advocates of universal service in this country have forgotten to think how they can get a corps of officers competent to command, and, he asserts (probably rightly), that they could not now get them. Then recently there was a heated controversy in Canada about the proposed contribution to the British Navy. Some, at any rate, of the spokesmen of the Liberal party which claimed to repre-

sent Canadian dignity in demanding that Canada should build and man the ships herself, apparently abstained from asking themselves how a fleet can be built without suitable plant or men and how the personnel of a navy can be suddenly produced. The notion seemed to be in some people's minds that an efficient army and navy can be purchased like wheat, that sufficient money can get anything, that militarism is only a financial matter at base. This is a decision to which men who are occupied in business transactions are particularly prone, and advanced communities generally are apt to indulge in it. Many political speakers of the progressive side certainly refer to military affairs as though these were in fact only passing incidents like wars. We have orators who say that citizens of an invaded country would fight like tigers if the need came, though military men hold that such fighting would be worse than useless. It is in fact the careless language of a civilised politician, addressing an audience as indifferent to the realities of war as himself. This indifference is to be condemned, but it is extremely tempting to industrial populations and speakers who seek their goodwill, a class whose numbers increase naturally with the extension of electoral privileges in democratic societies. I would submit that there is a serious danger in this of democratic and advanced communities coming more under the control of persons who decline to consider coolly that civilism is still only in an early stage of development so far as the world at large is concerned. Perhaps the hardest task of a pacifist is, in consequence, to assert the civilist view without flattering the mistaken self-sufficiency of peaceful and industrial citizens.

To the avowal of misgivings or difficulties such as the above there is of course one simple retort—that if a doctrine is true it is right to declare it whatever happens. In point of fact that means leaving to statesmen the task

of dealing with the many unforeseen and undesired results. It may for instance be safe for a democratic politician to say that what is good for England is good for India and preaching West European democracy in Bengal, because he can probably rely on the Government of India to cope with the situation produced ; but the fact that the responsibility will be assumed by other persons than the speaker is properly to be counted as of some significance. Not many of us are so apprehensive of mistakes that we should deprecate the assertion of general principles for fear of error—that would be absurd—but it is well worth while considering that circumstances make a doctrine inapplicable. In the sphere of politics we can easily detect the superficiality of the view that a form of government that suits one country would equally suit another. Similarly with pacifism. There are parts of the earth in which a pacifist propaganda would at present be not merely unavailing but probably injurious if it had effect, certainly many countries in which it would be generally misunderstood. It is, perhaps, a pessimistic or at any rate an excessively patient view to hold, but I would suggest that societies have to attain nationality before they are capable of international sense. An outsider might hazard the view that on broad grounds of interest it would be well for the Balkan peoples all to be included in the Hapsburg frontiers—but that seems to be the last thing to meet with the concurrence of those involved ; and as the Balkan nationalities are not yet disentangled more war seems probable, until the borders are clear and satisfactory like those of England and Scotland. Whether or not economic interest will surmount the passions of nationalism remains to be seen, but it can hardly be calculated on as a certain victory.

I looked for the hard cases in the British Empire because the same set of people are responsible in the last

resort for dealing with them, and are therefore placed in a peculiarly difficult position to accept doctrines or to openly announce their adherence to them. The reluctance of Englishmen (which is notorious) to believe in any general principles in public affairs is almost certainly a result mainly of the existence of the Empire as it includes societies at every stage of barbarism and civilisation, and no principles seem applicable to all. This affects, it is true, mainly the minds of the governing class and affects very little the majority of the nations, but it unquestionably influences the conduct of public business and makes the British Government one of the most elusive powers to approach. Hard cases make bad laws and incoherent doctrine. In practice the hard case such as India may invalidate a doctrine practical enough in Canada, Australia or England, and statesmen have the hard cases in mind whenever they are asked to pronounce a candid judgment on the theory that we have to reckon with, and it is one of the difficulties in the way of disarmament from the point of view of Europe that Britain is an imperial country. Opinions will differ as to the necessity of British Imperialism. One sees it politely hinted sometimes that it is a work of supererogation, but given the immediate outlook this complicated obstacle to the establishment of consistent principles is enough to make many otherwise promising pacifists into backsliders, most of all amongst responsible men.

If I secure any agreement to the suggestion that the new pacifism is as essentially Anglo-Saxon in motive force as the French Revolution was French, I should be greatly interested to know the opinions of any critic more optimistic than myself as to the surmounting of such difficulties as I would submit are really formidable. In the Indian and Irish cases, to mention no others, I can see no short cut and little guidance from any formula.

Is it actually the only way for pacifists to stand firmly by fundamental ideas and leave the solution of these problems to statesmen and soldiers? Or is there any chance of taking a hand in the effort to find a straight policy without losing hold of the basic principles. I have not been equal to answering those questions to my own satisfaction, and should be glad to elicit the views of others present who are better satisfied.

MR. ANGELL: In organising our course one of our difficulties was to get people who would not object to being used as corpses for dissection. Mr. Fulton has on this occasion very kindly accepted the rôle of corpse and given us excellent material to dissect. I propose this morning to ask two members to reply to Mr. Fulton's criticism, and then I shall ask two members to criticise those replies. Are there any volunteers to reply to Mr. Fulton's criticism?

DR. NASMYTH: I was so much interested in particular phases of Mr. Fulton's paper that I feel rather incompetent to reply to the whole or any considerable part of it. I was particularly interested in the parts that touched America. Anyone who has been through our excitement over the Mexican situation would not have any possibility in his mind that mercenary objects, such as the middle west getting high prices for grain in case of war, would ever prevent that part of the country rising to repel a foreign invader. We had there a perfect flare-up of what is called patriotism. We had the president of Harvard University making an appeal to the students to defend their country. There was not the slightest question of their country being in danger or needing defence, but the whole public opinion of the country was in danger of seeing red in the way that the single man does when he gets excited. When you have fundamental

instincts like that ready at call it seems inconceivable to me that we have a real danger of pacifism making a nation non-homogeneous when it comes to actual defence.

The question whether the Indian Army is an army or a police force can be stated thus: The Indian army is in part a police force, the great function it has performed in a constructive way is to prevent the use of force between the different tribes of India. Mixed up with this is the military function of imposing British civilisation upon India. We have that question in every country—in the United States where our army is used for preventing excesses, such as we have had in Colorado and in Germany, where there is support for militarism on the part of people who fear the coming of the great black night of Socialism. An element of police force is always present, mixed up with the much larger element of military power. We must try to transform the army more and more in the direction of a police force—decreasing its military functions, increasing its police functions.

In regard to the incompetence of untrained military forces, it seems to me that the Boer war is an answer to the statement that such forces are of no value. There you had a Boer population of 100,000, and you know what had to be opposed to them to obtain a sort of a victory. When you take the proportions in that problem and apply them to Great Britain and the United States you get impossible figures.

Mr. BLOYE: I have listened with interest and appreciation and the feeling that the difficulties suggested in the paper were very real. One which especially struck me was the reference to the view taken in Eastern European countries of the use of the army and the fact that pacifism would be regarded as subversive of the

interests of the State as it exists in these parts of Europe. Two criticisms of that come into my mind. First of all that could not refer in any sense to the question of a navy—the preservation of internal peace can only be accomplished by military force and not by a naval force. Secondly, military tactics are of an entirely different nature in the case of a force which is practically doing police operations against a crowd and in the case when it acts against an organised army; and modern European armies are not of a sort that is best cut out for repressing internal uprisings.

There is one case where I cannot find any method of applying Angellism satisfactorily, I mean, to a country like Australia. I think of the yellow menace, which seems to me to apply there as it does not apply to the western State of America. The country is not occupied in any real sense. When you draw a line across the south-eastern corner of Australia, taking in the capitals of the four States, it is a mere corner of Australia. You have then, in the rest of Australia, a population of very much under a million. I do not see how the Australians can refuse to admit the Japanese to that area for mere political reasons, and I do not see how the Angell doctrine affords any solution of the Australian-Japanese problem.

Mr. ANGELL : Dr. Mez, will you criticise the critics ?

Dr. MEZ : The proposition of the paper is that pacifism does not enable us to solve the practical problems which arise in the world. I notice that both previous speakers made the mistake of dealing with the question in the terms of one party. It can only be dealt with in terms of two parties. Of course, it is not difficult to prove that pacifism is bound to fail in certain cases, so long as education is not complete. We have to educate the

whole of the nations and to promote the idea of pacifism not only within one party or national group, but within all parties and groups ; then I think we can reach with our methods a state of things in which these difficulties will not arise any more.

Even difficulties like the Ulster problems may pass away when we get a people of saner thought who have given up the old ideas of force. It is wrong to admit the necessity of keeping up great armies. Mr. Angell has shown that it is quite sufficient to have half-dozen policemen to look after a body of one hundred thousand people. At present we must not take a pessimistic view because we see the difficulties arising.

I have to admit, at present, when the world is subdued to the militarist, there are some difficulties, but it is not right to admit that these difficulties have arisen, and at the present moment there may be some detailed question in which pacifism is still bound to fail, but I say, looking to the future, that we are on the right lines and working in the right direction. If pacifism still fails it fails because old views are allowed to remain predominant in the politics of the day.

Mr. ANGELL : Will Herr Von Lübtow criticise the critics ?

Herr VON LÜBTOW : I think I ought to explain why we in Germany cannot transform our army into a police force. Let me say first of all that I believe no one of us who goes to Russia will have great success. Russia increased her army in the last year by about half a million men on peace footing. Therefore, I wonder how we should be able to convince the German public that our army ought to be abolished and, instead of an army we ought to have a police force.

It is no use convincing one nation as long as the others are not convinced. If I were a German militarist I might say: "Your ideas are all right, but Russia does not believe in them, therefore in the case of war Russia would sweep us away." The previous critics failed to give any hint as to how we could get an answer to this difficult problem.

Mr. NORMAN ANGELL: I am afraid the process has not been quite clear. I want the subsequent speakers to point out how the first two speakers had failed. We are trying to teach one another how to get this thing home to the public, and we can always see one another's faults more easily than correct our own. Mr. Fulton's paper was complex, difficult, and dealt with obscure points: if you are to clear the thing up to your public the first thing to do is to take hold of the paper and see what the author is really driving at, for your average public would only have understood one-half or one-third of it just as they only understand one-half or one-third of what any of us say. In replying to the paper I think it is a necessary part in dealing with it to say: Mr. Fulton makes such-and-such points. He says, for instance, that pacifism does not properly take into account the difficulties of the practical statesman. Here is a statesman confronting actual conditions and you do not deal with these conditions, you do not tell the statesman what to do, you merely go on laying down theories. Well, now, surely our reply to that is this: that the statesman's work is to deal with public opinion as he finds it; our work is to create a new public opinion, which is quite a different thing. The work of the statesman is not to carry on a propaganda; our work is. The work of the statesman is not to point out what might be, and to arrive at it; our work is. We admit

that public opinion will not tolerate a given policy because it is uninformed—we want so to inform it that it will tolerate that policy on the part of the statesmen who are at present dealing with practical politics. It is true we do not point out to the statesman how he can proceed because ours and his are two quite different objects. We are saying to the statesman: We know quite well you cannot reduce your navy because of public opinion, but in five years we are going to bring you a new public opinion. That is what we are doing, and that is a fact which Mr. Fulton has not properly taken into account. We are working on different planes. The statesman is dealing with the existing public opinion; we are re-making public opinion, which is not the statesman's work.

Mr. Fulton says that many of the policies which honest pacifists adopt have led to war, and that we may pursue a line which we believe to be right and yet the outcome of that may be war. Whatever may be the case with the older pacifists it is the distinguishing note of our movement that we are not primarily concerned with avoiding fighting, we are primarily concerned with establishing the right relationship between men. Take the case of the religious wars. Here were the Huguenots in France not allowed to discuss their faith, not allowed to urge their criticisms of Catholic dogma, or when they did so they were imprisoned and harassed. They thought (and we agree) that they were right to do so, and you had as a result a hundred years of religious wars. You had a condition of peace relatively before the religious wars, but the religious wars which followed—that hundred years of conflict—were preferable to the peace which preceded. Since the result of that resistance was to nullify the effect of force in religious affairs we had the right kind of peace afterwards. The fact that

we have had religious peace during a century or so, and the religious wars were the condition of peace we have now got, does not involve our defence of the present situation. The kind of toleration that exists in Europe to-day between the religious groups is the kind of situation we are trying to create between the political groups. We may have to resist pressure in the process of getting peace between the political forces. As pacifists we should have been in favour of the resistance of the Huguenots just as pacifists we were in favour of the first Balkan war, because it was an attempt to bring a system of force to an end. In the case of the religious groups that has been entirely successful. The resistance of the reformers destroyed the prevailing understanding that religious faith is under the dictation of physical force. By the elimination of force in the religious field we have now achieved the right relations between the religious groups. We want to do the same between the political groups.

We have not a perfectly watertight doctrine, with suggestions for every emergency and answers to every question. There are all sorts of difficulties in applying to different cases, but the events I have just been indicating, the final triumph of religious freedom after the resistance to religious force, shows that your doctrine does not have to be made so as to meet every case ; the case for toleration was not made out by any operation of the reformers. The case for imposing faith by physical force is an extremely strong one, and as far as I know no one has met the case brought by the Catholic, that religious faith should be imposed by law. Chesterton and Belloc would make a brilliant case against the vague toleration that obtains to-day. We got religious toleration by the instinctive realisation by all parties concerned, that force was futile. After thirty years' war the original

combatants in these wars found that they had got to keep military force out of religious difference if their States were to survive.

While I have not answered the paper as I would like to see it done, I have taken up four distinct points and dealt with them.

Mr. HILTON : Mr. Fulton's paper appears to me to be based on a complete misconception, and I think that misconception was revealed at the outset by one of the words of his title—"application." We have nothing to do with application : it is not our concern ; it is not our job. Our one aim (and this is just what distinguishes us from other schools of pacifist thought) is to set up a new mental attitude towards the relations of men. Mr. Fulton and subsequent speakers have used, in connection with our work, such words as "success," "failure," and "breakdown" ; and have used them according to whether peace has been maintained or war has broken out in this or that corner of the earth. I tell you candidly that to me such words have no meaning in such a connection. The "success" or "failure" of our work must be tested by whether we have or have not changed the minds of men, and to what degree we have done it. Whether that change is sufficient to prevent war breaking out here or there is another matter. It does not mean because war breaks out that pacifism has failed. A thing like war comes generally as a result of a quite trifling balance of forces for and against. If the forces making for war are 51 per cent. as against 49 per cent. of forces making for peace you will get war and vice versa. Very well, suppose by the time the next crisis comes we have so changed the public mind that the forces making for peace have risen from a fairly low present percentage to that 49 per cent. ; there would



She is a perfect stenographer. Thanks to her discretion, I often find I have been talking sense when I least suspected it.
The Lady of the Keyboard—Act I.

still be war, but despite that fact our work would have been successful. We should have done a greater thing than prevent a particular war; we should have given the public mind a permanent set by an effort which, if persisted in, would swing the balance down on the other side for good. I refuse to be a pessimist where any effort to improve public understanding is concerned, however unfruitful for the moment it may appear to be; for we may rest convinced that however little we may have changed for good the mind of our time that change will work itself out eventually in good results.

For just the same reason it is not necessary to convert the whole world to our faith for that faith to become the guiding principle of public policy. If we can bring a balance of influence over to our side we may succeed in establishing a pacific international policy, even though a substantial minority remain on the other side.

Mr. Fulton's paper sees the difference between pacifism and militarism as the difference between a world at peace and a world at war. It is nothing of the kind. You might have a society of distinctly civilist temper frequently at war; or you might have a society of equally pronounced militarist temper for the most part at peace. Peace or war would depend upon the external circumstances; but I put it to you that none the less the nation with the civilist outlook would, because of its civilist views, be a freer, more humane, more tolerable nation than the other; and that, transient circumstances notwithstanding, it would have in it more of the germs of ultimate peace. Thus I urge strongly that the civilist attitude of mind is a good in itself, an absolute good, and the success of efforts to create it must not be measured by immediate events in one particular field. Certainly such events should not be quoted as being the "success" or the "failure" of pacifism.

One point of basic importance Mr. Fulton raised and Mr. Angell has not dealt with it. It concerned the relation of the State to the people, and involved the question of the use of the army in enforcing the dictates of autocracy or of the majority in a democratic state. That question is one that touches the foundations of our doctrine, and we must deal with it. But here again Mr. Fulton has asked us to deliver judgment on particular cases, to choose between "yes" and "no." That is not what we are for. We do not profess to have a formula which will serve as a key to solve all political cryptograms. Our object is to show that coercion in any sphere of life is fatuous and unprofitable, and this applies to the relations between governments and peoples just as much as to the relations between States and States. We seek to show that a Government cannot serve the best interests of the State by coercing the governed, nay, that it cannot serve its own best interest. If we can make that clear and get autocracies and majorities thinking along those lines we destroy the motive behind coercion. We have no patent cure for conditions that have arisen; but we can prevent them arising. We say to the potential coercer as to the potential aggressor, "It's no good." If we can show him that it is no good he won't try it. That is our contribution to the problem of political oppression.

Mr. Fulton says our doctrine does not give us a ready-made course of action to suit particular emergencies; but that same criticism has been levelled in every age at every good principle. Imagine the kind of society where people try to settle disagreements by stabbing each other in the back. Now Mr. Angell might go to such people and show that to settle quarrels that way is futile and silly. He would be right; but there would be sure to be someone who would ask, in Mr. Fulton's terms,

“How can your theories prevent one man stabbing another in the back if he wants to?” They can’t, of course; but what they can do is to influence public opinion so that, bit by bit, people cease to want to. And, in fact, societies have so ascended by minute stages until to-day in Britain stabbing in the back is not an approved or common way of settling disputes. It is not that a device has been discovered to prevent us from doing it. We don’t want to do it. It isn’t the thing.

Mr. Fulton gave two illustrations. One was Ulster. He considers that it is almost impossible to apply Norman-Angellism at the present stage of that controversy. Of course it is. But that stage has been reached just because the false ideas which Norman Angell challenges have been in the minds of men in Ireland for a generation. The very first thing I remember about Ulster was a certain rhyme: “Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right.” The politicians who have been mainly concerned for the resistance to Home Rule have from the beginning of the controversy repeated that silly rhyme and encouraged its repetition. It indicates that these particular men’s minds have been filled with the idea of fighting from the moment the controversy arose. Very well, if you have the notion of fighting at the back of your mind there will be fighting sooner or later. Norman Angell has no patent cure for the situation in Ulster which this philosophy of fight has produced, but if throughout the controversy his ideas could have been instilled into people’s minds instead of the fighting idea the present situation would never have arisen.

The second illustration was India, and here again Mr. Fulton demands that we shall make our choice between absolute yes and no. He says we must choose whether we will sanction the presence of British soldiers in India or insist on their being withdrawn. That is a false

dilemma. We may be civilists and at the same time recognise the need for the presence of armed force as a safeguard against the use of armed force. It is essential that order shall be maintained in India. If British authority, backed by military power, were suddenly removed it is likely that either India would be torn by internal conflict or that another Power, probably more militarist in its colonial policy than ourselves, would take our place there. Of two evils we, as practical men, choose the lesser. Our choice as pacifists is not between soldiers or no soldiers but between two attitudes of mind. Do we wish to see our rule in India intensified in its militarism or do we wish to see the militarist element slowly diminish and the soldier become more and more a policeman. It is the drift that matters. The realisation of ideals is not accomplished by big jumps but by infinite gradations, and if we exert our influence to push the administration of India up the scale towards civilism and prevent it slipping down the scale towards militarism we shall have acted consistently with the ideals we profess.

Mr. BENSON : In regard to Mr. Fulton's idea that the army in Austria-Hungary is a bond. It is really used for the purpose of protecting the State against Socialism. It is used by one half of the nation against the other half. You cannot say that an organisation which is used by one section of the country against another section is a bond of union.

Mr. RAPHAEL : The idea Mr. Fulton gave us was not so much criticism as that he pointed out certain difficulties which lay before us, and for that we can be very grateful. What was his first great point ? It was that at the present time there are certain sections of the community to which the pacifist doctrines will not make an appeal,

even if they be logical. Why is this? It is because people are still self-hypnotised by old ideas, because they have formed their opinions upon wrong bases. As regards the question of militarism perhaps one great reason why the militarist conception has had such a strong hold is because it appears to be the most efficient solution of the problems that have to be dealt with—efficient very possibly because in a sense the readiest solution. It is the solution that suggests itself first. The pacifist solution is a sort of milk and water business. You get angry—you have to restrain your anger, to most of us a very much more difficult thing than having a go at a person straight away. That is where the new pacifism comes in, that we do make it easier for ourselves to control that inclination to hit the other fellow, because if we think for a single second we know that if we hit him we shall get our knuckles injured ourselves. It needs a greater sense of anger on our part to hit that other fellow when we realise we are going to hurt ourselves in doing it. There is another point on which I do not think Mr. Fulton laid enough stress. If civilisation means anything at all—if we take the history of the world in general—we shall see that in those periods when what might be called civilisation most triumphed, the greatest effort was being directed towards the elimination of force. We can help that elimination by pointing out the futility of its use.

One other point. I should like to venture a criticism on the question of nationalism. There was a time when men liked to picture what the world might have been if Christianity had been accepted literally. Later there came the idea of a cosmopolitan state, of a universal state, and that idea of cosmopolitanism was strengthened and brought very prominently to the front during the French Revolution. Now what do we find? We find

that in one sense there is this great movement towards universality, but at the same time we find that nationalism, so far from being lessened in its intensity, is getting more intense than it has been in the history of the world. Thus there are two contradictory forces working against each other. I would submit, however, that if we look at the way in which the interdependence of the nations is more and more coming about we shall see that what is now happening is not that we are tending away from cosmopolitanism and towards nationalism; but that we are coming together now with a different constitution from that of the old cosmopolitanism, more as members of our own particular states; that we are associating with the members of other states from the point of view of co-operating with them for various purposes, but not with the idea of a universal state, of which we shall all be members.

MR. R. O. KAPP: I think that after what the previous speakers have said Mr. Fulton will still have something to answer back. To the contention that it is not our job to deal with the application of Norman-Angellism to practical politics, Mr. Fulton may answer that he meant that application as a matter of theory. When we urge Norman-Angellism, we shall still be asked: How do you apply your theories to this or that case, and the question is one that presents many difficulties. We must concede Mr. Fulton's arguments on this point to a great extent. Two of these difficulties were the difficulty of application to people who disapproved of the form of government, even though the form of government be good; and the application of the argument that we need a certain force, military or police force, or what you like to call it, because of internal troubles in a community which is only partly civilised. If we say our doctrine is true we must say it is true in all cases. It is either

true or it is not true. Mr. Fulton made it clear that there are a good many problems that we cannot answer.

Mr. BLOYE: There are few things which have dispirited me more than Mr. Hilton's remarks or Mr. Angell's blessing upon those remarks. Mr. Hilton said that Norman-Angellism was not a formula, it was a way of thinking. I quite realise it is primarily a way of thinking. But if it is merely a way of thinking, and not in some sense a formula; if there are no results of our thinking; if we are not able to reduce the results of Mr. Norman Angell's thinking to some practical shape I fear I have grossly misunderstood his work. In the summary of the grammar there is an axiom that to annex a province and its inhabitants is not to annex wealth for the inhabitants possess the wealth. That is tantamount to a formula, in which the words are carefully and precisely chosen. This is one of the phrases which summarise the main teaching of Mr. Angell. Are these axioms applicable universally or not? I quite saw the point you gave us, the important distinction between our position, as creators of public opinion, and that of the statesman who has to put the will of the public into practice. But even in the creation of public opinion we shall have to say: "Now these are the things we hold"; and it won't do to say these things hold here but not in Australia. Mr. Norman Angell has limited himself very carefully in some respects; in time, space, and circumstance; but if we carry that too far we lose all authority. If, for instance, we take Australia to-day, will this doctrine apply? Mr. Hilton says it does not matter if it applies or not—it is a way of thinking; but I fear it would be a sign of immense weakness in our cause if we could not show that our ideas were of universal application.

Mr. HAYCOCK : You want to convince people, and in order to do this you have to be dogmatic, and there is not one argument that can be brought against Mr. Angell's thesis that you cannot find an answer for. The whole tone of Mr. Fulton's address was pessimistic. The points raised, and the impression given, by Mr. Fulton's address was that you cannot do anything. Ulster is going to fight to-morrow—do not do anything ; Angellism has not any application to things as they are. We have to be a little more dogmatic, get busy and get after everybody. Let us have the note of optimism and the note of fighting. Don't let us have, "I agree with you partly." We want to hit, and to hit hard.

Mr. ANGELL : Though I do not like the word formula, I believe that we have a doctrine which is an absolute law and that it is impregnable. We do not in every case know exactly how it would work. We believe that if we were capable enough we could apply it to every case that arose : Ulster, Russia, Japan, Australia, every one. But when we say that the world as a whole probably will not ever be able to apply it on the basis of experience, it is not necessary that the world should be able to see every application of it in order for it to affect practical politics. Compare the history of religious toleration. As a result of the religious wars you had brought to the religious consciousness of Europe that toleration was the best way to secure religious life and religious faith. Not everyone was converted ; even to-day we see great difficulties in applying it. If someone were to start the worship of Aphrodite in London we should suppress it. In the United States they suppress polygamous sects. There are cases in which religious toleration is very difficult of application. In spite of this, the world is definitely won over to the liberty of religious faith. The man defending religious

toleration would have to make exceptions, but he would still believe in the wisdom of religious toleration. Be dogmatic. Say that water does not flow uphill. It would be useless and unnecessary to explain that water does flow uphill every time you suck it up a straw. We believe we have an absolute unchallengable truth similar to the physical truth that water will not run uphill, similar to the moral truth that the best safeguard for religious faith is toleration. We do not pretend even to ourselves that it is possible to apply this doctrine in every single case or in every single objection, or that it is necessary for the world in general to make that application. It is not necessary.

Mr. BLOYE : However religious toleration came about it did not come about by the agency of societies formed for that purpose. No meetings were held in the parks to proclaim religious toleration. We are occupied in proclaiming Norman-Angellism, which is a more or less definite form of international doctrine, and we shall have opponents in our audience intervening, as I intervened, in connection with Mr. Hilton's remarks this morning, asking how our doctrine applies. Mr. Fulton seemed to think you could not apply Angellism universally. I, being a keen believer in Angellism, think that you can, though my intellectual capabilities might not always be equal to doing it. I find I can apply it as far as I am able or have time to think, and my feeling is that the more time I can give to thinking of it the more I can show it to be of universal application. But you and Mr. Hilton suggest that it is not of universal application, but a way of thinking rather than a doctrine.

NORMAN ANGELL : There it is that you err. I did not gather Mr. Hilton said it was not of universal application, but that it was not necessary for the whole

world to see it for it to be of universal application. It does not follow that it is necessary for *every* Japanese or Australian to be convinced.

Mr. BLOYE : I quite realise that ; but we could not give that answer to a man in an English audience who raises the objection.

NORMAN ANGELL : I think we could and must. We must not allow the man to run away with the supposition that we have to convince everybody in the world before we can get Norman-Angellism accepted.

Herr VON LUBTOW : Norman-Angellism is a way of thinking, but the method of application is not always easy. My difficulty is that if I get a militarist to speak to me he says : "How about Russia and Germany." How can one get a solution of the problem between Russia and Germany ? In Germany there are three or four million people opposed to aggression. In Russia there is not. If Russia is determined to invade Germany, where is the German way of thinking ? Is it not wrong to preach this doctrine in Germany when in Russia they do not think so ? "

NORMAN ANGELL : We are reaching Russia to-day, not through the distribution of "The Great Illusion," but through the facts with which the "Great Illusion" deals. Russia has borrowed twenty-five millions from the city of London. Russia has to give definite promise that certain acts of aggression shall not be undertaken. The Russian bureaucracy knows that if it wants money in London it will have to conform to certain conditions as to the use of this money in its foreign policy. Russia's foreign policy is being transformed through the need of finding capital in Western Europe. It is a question of economic forces, not of propaganda. We admit that Russia is a difficult case ; but if England, France

and Germany were acting in common, this acting in common would enable them to dictate to Russia. The first problem is the reconciliation between Germany and England.

Herr VON LUBTOW : That does not exist to-day. You cannot change the *entente*. An alliance between France and Russia does exist.

NORMAN ANGELL : The tendency to reconciliation with Germany also exists. No opinion is absolutely stationary. You have in France to-day at least the beginning of a movement towards reconciliation with Germany and the same movement in Germany towards a reconciliation with France. That movement may grow in spite of the visit of the French President to Russia. We say there are forces which are in action, and the dissemination of our ideas in Germany and France will increase their influence. In ten years the spread of our ideas will have brought about the possibility of a co-operation between the Great Powers. When we have that co-operation we have the possibility of bringing pressure on Russia, and if Russia wants to cause disturbance, France, England and Germany will not supply the capital which Russia so urgently needs. Ten years hence the question of financing Russia will be a question of practical policy in England, France and Germany. You say Russia may invade Germany to-morrow. No remedy we may apply will act in twenty-four hours. Give us ten years and our movement will produce a change in public opinion. The difficulty of this is not an argument for leaving the case alone but for working all the harder.

Herr VON LUBTOW : You admit that those economic ideas about Russia not having enough money to fight against Germany do not apply where the passion of

Russia is against another nation. In the case of war the Government does not care if it has money or not.

NORMAN ANGELL : Every day they have to consider this factor more and more. We are dealing with forces that are growing more and more. If there is any movement at all the practical consideration is, "Can we accelerate that movement?" We can do that by helping on Anglo-German relations and using that as a step towards controlling Russia. Russia is applying to Western Europe for money, and it is through that application that Western Europe can act upon Russia. Inasmuch as our movement influences the public opinion of Western Europe our movement can act on Russia. Russia is not outside the forces of opinion and the manipulation of economic factors. The problem is how we can obtain security against 175,000,000 bureaucratically governed people who may constitute a danger against Europe. There are six million men in Russia able to go to war without the industrial disorganisation you have in the case of Germany. It is a real danger you have to face. We say Europe can influence Russia through economic factors. Therefore we have to have a reconciliation between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.

Mr. RAPHAEL : I do not quite gather what you said about the British Government and its control over Russian loans. Did you say the British Government had taken some action in the matter of these loans ?

NORMAN ANGELL : They have already taken definite action in similar cases. You know what was attempted in the Five Power loan in China ? Russia comes to London for five millions sterling. The Government passes round a private intimation to a city group that it would be useful if the flotation of that loan was held

up until the negotiations which we were having with the Russian Government are concluded. The flotation is accordingly held up. Russia must have a care for the opinions of the investors in Russian stock. Investors want to know about the movements of Russia. It is quite possible to imagine an extra-legal arbitration between Russia and the outside investors. Even at present there is a strong feeling in France against Russian business. As the tendency to reconciliation with Germany grows the natural movement of Western Europe checking the more barbarian power is going to be the great division of the Powers.

Mr. FULTON: I find that several speakers really, in the main, see the difficulties almost as acutely as I do. It seems to me that there are positive obstacles which may be underrated. It is not true in practice that Norman-Angellism is only a way of thinking, for its advocates sometimes put forward and defend political proposals. Everybody who does take up this way of thinking proceeds to use it and to apply it. In the case of Ireland I found that every pacifist is against Ulster and not against the Nationalists. I consider that in that case the British army was pacifist and the majority of British people was not. That is a point for actual dispute and a difficult one, not easy to surmount. I admit Mr. Hilton's point that the prime object of the pacifist is to deal with practical politics indirectly. Mr. Hilton exaggerated by contrast between the state of war and the state of peace. The contrast I had in mind was between the British part and the Asiatic part of the British Empire. We would have to say we advocated a military establishment in one part while hoping there was no necessity for it in another. But Mr. Hilton's point of view upon the broader issues was one which I think every propagandist ought to adopt.

We ought to try and wrestle with the difficult cases. I quite follow the gradual process of transforming the means of control in Russia, but we have in history, I think, a proof of the tendency to constant reaction, even with a movement destined to succeed. There are certain reactions in human nature to balance outside influences. We have to watch these reactions. Russia's position is difficult, because it will keep us waiting some time. It is the length of time and the difficulty of the process which makes me pessimistic.

SOME DANGERS OF THE MOVEMENT

PAPER BY MR. P. J. HANNAN

Morning Session : Monday, July 20th

MR. NORMAN ANGELL IN THE CHAIR

NORMAN ANGELL : Ladies and gentlemen, we are very lucky in having Mr. Hannan of the Navy League to-day to tell us the kind of criticism we have got to meet. As I explained, part of our scheme of work in this particular laboratory is to provide a certain number of corpses in order that the students may dissect them. Mr. Hannan is the corpse this morning. The students will proceed, after the exposition of your case, sir, to dissect it, and we could not have a better statement of it than that which you will give us. Mr. Hannan has come to break up the newest kind of peace movement and to demonstrate that it is all futile, and that we cannot do better than join the Navy League. I hope he will come very near to succeeding in that. That is the kind of stimulus we want.

MR. HANNAN : I cannot say how much honoured I am for the invitation extended to me to be present at this interesting gathering. I hope, Mr. Angell, these experiments of yours will become a permanent institution in

bringing a number of young men together who are trying to understand more clearly, more definitely and in all their bearings international relationships. They cannot but be of distinct advantage to thought on the big problems in this country. In this delightful spot, which you have selected as the scene of intellectual activity, and, of course, physical activity too, you have selected also a locality which has been identified down among generations with the cause of English liberty, and when we talk of English liberty, after all we mean those conceptions of human relationship which have influenced the march of civilisation throughout the whole world. Now, Mr. Angell, in the main, takes his stand against the confused view of international politics which exists at present. I think even among Members of Parliament, who are supposed to have a monopoly of economic and political intelligence, there are no very clear conceptions of our relations towards foreign communities and I do say this at once that I think Mr. Norman Angell's work has, during the past few years, done an enormous amount to make people, firstly, think more about these great questions and, secondly, to think a great deal more clearly about them than they did before. Mr. Angell desires to carry out a process which, in his own words, is the correction of deep-seated error in human relationship. He declares his policy to be one of peace, but he tells us that he does not seek peace for the mere cessation of human conflict, he does not even seek peace because he desires to establish some kind of cosmopolitanism which will submerge national ideas and which will more or less destroy those great and cherished feelings which have been the quality of nationality down the ages. He aims at something higher than this. He aims at the creation of such an understanding on the basis of material considerations, on economic foundations

which will materially affect all attempts at the instance of any community to disturb the peace of nations in the future. As I understand that is fairly putting the great principle which you, sir, contend. There are three arguments which Mr. Angell submits to the thought of the day as supporting the ultimate achievement of his aim. Firstly, he denies that economic advantage accrues to the possession of political power. There I suggest that Mr. Angell is at variance with the whole of international philosophy, if one may use the expression, since almost the very beginning of civilisation. It has been the feeling, attribute it to whatsoever causes you please—it has been the instinct of every self-centred community which has called itself a nation during the whole of human evolution, that they did regard the possession of force as the means of acquiring and maintaining economic power. If you examine all the theories of war and conquest and the achievement of economic influence from the days of the Greek Republic down to Alexander Hamilton, or from Pitt down to our friend Winston Churchill to-day you will find they have all based their desire to create power on the claim that the acquisition and the enjoyment of power meant the enjoyment of distinct and progressive economic advantage as well. Mr. Angell also says that the irrelevance of wars, to the ends either moral or material for which States exist, is now apparent, he says war is an irrelevant consideration to the ends either moral or material, which they may desire to attain.

I am bound to say I do not like at all to put any direct and immediate controversial question to a mind so subtle and so clear as that of Mr. Angell, but I do say that that proposition also is at variance with all the influences which have been exercised in the progress of the world up to the present time. There is no doubt war has had

advantages for communities in the world. Let me take as an example: I suppose nobody can look back on that disastrous war in South Africa from 1899 to 1902 without feelings of regret. But even disastrous as the consequences have been, both from the point of view of the suffering inflicted upon great masses of people, from the inconvenience which took place in the usual current of the world commerce of the time and the economic disadvantage of the waste of two hundred and fifty millions of pounds, there has emerged the fact that we have united into solidified government the four original communities which made up South Africa, apart from Rhodesia. We have given them a civilised administration, and on the testimony of South African statesmen themselves, these four communities which previously, and even before the achievement of union, had been carrying on continuously an inter-colonial and inter-community struggle on the question of the railways, and customs and the extent of taxation and so on, are now one united government in the same way as the thirteen original states in the American Union had after the war of the Revolution and after the Civil War of the North and South resulted in the magnificent and world-wide influential Republic of the United States. Now, again, Mr. Angell contends, and nobody can deny the immense amount of justice there is in that contention, that owing to what he described as the intersection of political and economic boundaries under modern conditions, we are getting to the stage that war will not merely be unnecessary, but will be distinctly evil from the point of view of the material advance of any particular community. But then he said—and this, I think, is a most striking contribution to present-day thought on war and peace—in his paper read before the Institute of Bankers in 1912, that the systematic organisation of

credit was bound to bring about a profound change in human society. I agree, but I do not agree that it is desirable to place the ideal of nationhood, the aspirations of people who have a common language and common religion and common ambitions on this ground. I do not believe it is just or fair, or in the interests of humanity as a whole, that these things should be placed under the domination of Mammon and the desire of gain and the idea of profit. Now, if the influence of the organisation of credit, if the economic relations which Mr. Angell described in so delightful and so convincing a way, develop themselves into nerves which spread throughout the world, keep people together, mutually dependent on one another, if these are entirely to control future international relationships we have seen very little evidence of that power, the power of international finance, up to the present. When we were involved in trouble with Germany a few years ago owing to the appearance of a German gunboat on a remote part of the coast of Morocco and when for many weeks—I happen to know a good deal about it, I was day by day in the Admiralty—the French Ambassador and the German Foreign Minister were carrying on these so-called conversations at Berlin, I do not believe that any movement at the instance either of the City of London or of capitalists in any centre of Europe exercised itself for a moment to secure happy and satisfactory conclusions to these negotiations. I believe the consideration which we had most in view during the whole of that difficult time was the military and naval organisation possessed by the respective parties to the controversy and the consideration that the British fleet was supreme upon the sea. Again, in spite of the behaviour of conferences, in spite of all the delightful pledges which every day the papers gave, when it was thought indispensable for the cause of

peace to bring all the nations together at the Hague, Italy thought it quite desirable in her own interests and without reference to her financial position to attack Turkey at Tripoli. She did not call a convention of business men, but she sent her fleet to Tripoli to make sure she was successful in overcoming the Turk. I submit that in these conditions when there is something in the nation that cannot be controlled by money, that curious indefinable thing called the national idea, I submit that until your doctrine and your teaching produces a very profound change in the mind of the world, that that will always assert itself and in international controversy no financial considerations will prevent it being exercised and therefore bringing nations to war. Now Mr. Angell has, I think, in his paper before the Institute of Bankers in 1912 made by far the finest contribution, even taking into account his work in "The Great Illusion," that he has ever made to this particular question. He argues there—and he argues quite rightly—that without a motive for attack there cannot be war. I say that that motive has always presented itself: a nation which desires to attack another either for the purpose of economic gain or for the purpose of securing a national triumph or for the development of its people, having the power will always find a motive. That, I think, must be obvious, even though Mr. Angell urges that with all these ramifications of financial relationship a motive can hardly be apparent because whatever motive you suggest must directly affect the economic position not merely of the nation to be attacked, but of the nation which attacks. But in spite of that the nation that desires to go to war, until we substantially transform the present quality of human nature, will find a motive for doing so. We have other considerations which materially affect the play of international relations. We have to consider, for instance,

the question of religion, the question of the different conceptions of liberty which prevail in different communities, and there is the question of language. If international policy could take cognisance of the acceptance among the nations an international language, of an international religion, and of an international ideal in reference to the view of the race, we probably could get very much nearer to the acceptance of this doctrine. But these three gigantic proposals are not likely to be realised for a very considerable time to come.

Let me just call your attention to a people who have contrived by methods of practical politics to achieve to some extent the end which Mr. Angell has in view. When the first Hague Conference was in session and Lord Goschen, then Mr. Goschen, was at the Admiralty, the question was raised in the House of Commons whether in the event of the Great Powers accepting a reduced scale, a comparative scale for the creation of armaments, it would not be possible as a beginning to bring about a substantial reduction in England. Mr. Goschen said he was quite prepared, if the great Powers would indicate their willingness to follow, to make, subject to a careful consideration of the country's interests in every part of the world a substantial reduction which it was proposed to inaugurate in the financial year of armaments. At once these people declared that that was a question which had not come within the competence of the Conference at all, as it was a proposal which affected the national honour of nations. No doubt some nations did agree to consider it, but the Powers—Italy, Austria, Germany, France—Powers which really count in any scheme of the kind, gave it the cold shoulder. When the present Liberal Party came into office on a policy of peace, retrenchment and reform, when they declared in the House that the reduction of

armaments was an essential part of our national policy; when they desired with peace in the fulness of its bloom behind them, to convince Europe of its power to substitute some kind of millennium, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman did not merely make speeches in the House of Commons, did not merely propound theories, but he took the step of actually reducing the number of big ships which had to be built in accordance with the pre-arranged programme. He reduced our programme of big ships in 1906 to 3, in 1907 he built 3 ships instead of 4, and in 1908 he built 2 instead of 4. What was the response to that practical pacific proposal from the head of the British Government? That very year, 1906, the Admiral Von Tirpitz secured quite a new amendment of the German Navy Law of 1900, giving power to the German bureaucracy to build more ships. When we reduced a ship they increased a ship. They built three instead of two and four instead of two in successive years. Well, I am afraid it will take a long period of time—a great deal of energy on the part of peace propagandists, to convince the Great Powers, more especially the virile peoples, that it is not by power ultimately that peace in the world is to be maintained. While one admires the beauty of the theory and the magnificent range of the speculation, you will find that not in our time will the principles of Mr. Angell be universally accepted.

I hold that peace in the world is a most desirable thing, for which everyone of us should work, but I say that the experience of the ages, the lessons of history, the whole policy of peace and war up to the present is against the achievement and maintenance of peace on any other basis than that of great power. The greatest instrument which exists to-day for the peace of the world is the unity of the British Empire. I am convinced that the more closely we bring together the

scattered communities of this Empire, the more we establish our supremacy upon the sea in other quarters of the world, the more we are helping to the establishment of universal peace. Mr. Angell argued in his speech at Cambridge that there was no end to our contention that we should be stronger than the other fellow. He showed that as long as we keep saying we must be top dog we should go on piling up armaments. I quite agree it is not a policy which can in itself give any pleasure to reasonable people. But Mr. Angell criticised Mr. Churchill because he says it is only by the possession of an invulnerable power that we can be in a position to be free from attack. I am afraid that until you very profoundly change the prevalent schools of thought on the question of war and peace in Europe, the proposition will hold. Let us have peace by the strenuous cultivation of international good will. Nobody desires the cultivation of international good will more energetically than the members of the Navy League. What the Navy League has tried to do, according to its lights, is to pursue our policy on the lines of reason and moderation. We discount jingoism as much as you do. We object to blatant and wild statements about the British flag being carried through the world with a brush at the top to sweep people off the sea. We simply say that so long as there are great alliances, so long as sea power in Europe is accepted as an essential fact in international expansion, so long it is necessary for us to keep our range, and to keep that margin of supremacy which will secure us from being attacked, to maintain ourselves as the guarantors of so many small communities in the world, to preserve our function of guardians to those quasi-civilised states for whose enjoyment of liberty we are responsible. How much it means to these people if British power is to be interfered with! There is a

much bigger problem to be considered than the mere question whether England is to continue her international policy. I submit to you that it is all right in talking about these problems to the people with the analytical faculties sufficient to see both sides of the case, but I hold it is of serious consequence to send out a great number of young people to talk to the masses of the people without making it perfectly clear that you do not propose the reduction of armaments until you are in a position to offer them something in exchange which will equally keep those principles in hand.

NORMAN ANGELL: I express everyone's opinion when I say we are particularly fortunate in having you to address us, especially as you have stated a case which will furnish a good deal of exercise for our infantile teeth. Of course, you fellows have all been following and, of course, you have done what is the most difficult thing to do in following a case which one has to reply to briefly, you have grasped the crux of it. You will find that in every good speech like that of Mr. Hannan there is much that does not matter so far as the audience is concerned, but that there is some outstanding impression left which is the basis of that speech, which is its strong point. I have kept in my own mind pretty clearly, I think, what is the outstanding strength of Mr. Hannan's case. The tendency is to take up some small points of detail or fact—it may be the Moroccan business, and the fact that finance did not play any rôle in that. You may think that finance did play a very great rôle in it. You could make a good scoring point there, but the crux of the speech is not there. Think out where the crux of the speech is and how would you reply to it in five minutes.

Mr. LUNNON: The crux is that Mr. Hannan says we must take the military opinions and notions which

govern Europe at the present time and work on them. For instance, he said that the nation which desires to go to war will always find a motive. Now the ostensible motive does not concern us, but our point is that the nation will not desire to go to war if the prevalent notions at the bottom of its desires, which we believe to be false, are corrected. We do not believe in going ahead and taking current military philosophy as it is. As it is, we agree with the Navy League to a very large extent. we must have adequate protection at present—there is no obvious way of disarmament, but to go on these lines, to arm ourselves to keep a complete margin of supremacy is a futile policy because it will not land us anywhere. We are not content in the very least in taking the situation as it is. We are going on the lines which seem to you lines of theory. We say in the end it will touch practice; when we have altered public opinion in many countries the general point of view will be altered. You say it is necessary to produce deep radical changes in human nature in order to achieve this. There are alterations in methods of thinking and conceptions of national rights, at present widely prevalent, which are fairly easily made. There is considerable danger if the young men go out into the country and tell people that they have to act now on the assumption that war does not pay. If Germany thinks that she can gain by invading England we have to prepare accordingly. We are going to be thoroughly prepared until we have changed her thinking. That seems to me absolutely the crux of the matter. We are visionaries in this sense at the present time. We do not accept current military philosophy as inevitable. We propose to change the philosophy which we believe to be fundamentally wrong.

Dr. MEZ: The speaker has entirely misunderstood our aims, our movement, in so far as it does not interfere

with practical measures of armaments and building up navies. We want to create another conception throughout the world on all these things, and I do not quite agree with the first speaker that it is easy to convince people of another conception of these things. We all know that these conceptions are very deep seated errors, but we do not content ourselves in letting these errors continue because we have realised that it is no use taking the question up as an entirely British question. We realise that the prevailing policy must lead us to increasing our navies, but we cannot content ourselves with that policy, we must go ahead with our whole movement on quite another line; and the speaker generally has spoken on different lines to those on which we are working. We say that the facts dealt with in the "Great Illusion" had influence on policy. We do not discuss the question of armaments, and the speaker thinks we are in favour of disarmament, which we are not. Mr. Angell has laid it down we should spend our last farthing in order to keep our country safe. As long as we know that other nations have not got the conceptions that we are trying to bring about, we do not aim to abolish armaments.

NORMAN ANGELL: I think the issues dealt with are not quite sufficiently clear cut. If Dr. Mez had said, the speaker has told you this, how does he propose to get over that which follows as a sequence; he said that, how does he propose to get over this; it would have kept the difference between the other man and ourselves clearly in mind. Sometimes that is facilitated by a counter-question, such as this: Mr. Hannan says that the nations—my nation, Germany, and your nation, England—cannot, ought not, to concern themselves with these theories until their present theories are changed. How does he propose to change those theories if we are

not allowed to occupy ourselves with them? And then he might sit down.

Both the previous speakers have been hypnotised by the fact that we are forty people in a barn. Will Mr. Graham reply to Mr. Hannan's address in the sort of tone he would adopt if he were speaking to five thousand people who had been led grievously astray by Mr. Hannan's eloquence.

Mr. GRAHAM: Mr. Hannan said that there were three arguments in favour of Norman-Angellism. He said in the first place we held there was no economic gain to be got by war. That he admitted. He admitted our case that nations are so bound together at the present time that there is no economic gain to be got by one fighting against another. The second part of our case was that war was irrelevant to the issues for which we fought. He brought the instance of South Africa. The reason, he said, why we went to war was that we might have a United South Africa and not for such matters as the freedom of the Kaffirs. Whatever the reason was that we went to war with South Africa it was not that. The third point was that there was a great change going in the organisation of the world to-day owing to credit. This involved the clashing of nationality which would assert itself until Norman Angell had altered it. I appeal to Mr. Hannan to come over to us. He says that wars will go on until Norman Angell has altered conceptions of nationality. He admits that, why does he not come across to us?

Mr. Norman Angell has never said that there cannot be war. He has never said that nationality will never assert itself. What he has said is that while the present misconceptions last there will be war. Mr. Hannan seems to think that there are only misconceptions across the North Sea. While other virile nations Russia, Germany,

Austria, keep their present characteristics there will necessarily be war. I ask you men here to believe that we are not the only enlightened nation. Nobody can put his thoughts into book form in England without influencing people all over the world—even in the last resort in Belfast and St. Petersburg. Mr. Hannan went on to point out how attempts to reduce armaments had failed. He took the years 1896 to 1906. "The Great Illusion" was not published till 1909. If he wants convincing that alterations are taking place, I would not mind betting that Mr. Hannan before he read "The Great Illusion" was talking about what Germany can gain by war. He says *now* that Germany *thinks* she can gain by war. From his own speeches I can see there is an alteration in public opinion to-day. Finally he wants as secretary of the Navy League to advocate armaments as the only way to secure peace.

Armaments will not secure peace. The enormous strength of armaments to-day does nothing to secure peace. The relative strength is just as if we had a fraction of what we have. Strength is only relative, and if he is not suffering from the idea that we can consider this matter as a matter of one party only he must consider that strength as relative and if we are not stronger than we were how do armaments keep the peace? The bloated armaments of the present day are a danger to peace.

NORMAN ANGELL: Mr. Graham talked from a point of view which we include in our movement, but is not distinctively ours. He did not make our qualification that if needs be we are in favour of armaments. Yes, arm all you like. That won't settle the quarrel. That will only enable you to hold the other man in check. The longer you trust to that the more difficult to hold the other man in check.

Mr. TOULMIN : There is only one point I am going to try to make, but it is a point which shows the complete difference between the outlook of Mr. Hannan and ourselves. The crux of Mr. Hannan's speech when we get rid of the brilliant irrelevancies, was rivalry. When we come down to what he thought was his strongest point he said there were between nations different religion, different ideas, different patriotism. And those ideas do essentially imply rivalry. When he dealt out what seemed to me a half-hearted sympathy with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's attempt at a reduction of our armaments, he showed up his own case completely. So long as you say there must be an armament race between nations any attempt at progress or a proper change is impossible. Suppose you had an Olympic race that represents all nations taking place, a very long distance race, which we are told men take part in for ever. Suppose Great Britain was followed a good length behind by the United States and Germany together, and further behind by France trying to catch up, and while the competitors were putting their entire force into the race, ambassadors from different competitors went round asking them to moderate their speed but keep up the race, although going half as fast. The other competitors would say : that is all very well for England—she has got her start. We Angellists think we ought not to assume that the race should go on. We say it must stop. The way to stop it is to say : what are you running for ? What is the prize in this race ? Is it a bag of gold ? No. Is it a laurel wreath ? No. It is a mouldering grave.

When we make that point people will begin to wonder why they are making this struggle, and in time they will begin to hesitate, and I think they will stop. That brings me to the fundamental assumption of Angellism as opposed to the fundamental assumption of Mr. Hannan.

The crux of Mr. Hannan's arguments is rivalry, the crux of Mr. Angell's arguments is co-operation. Mr. Hannan thinks that nations oppose each other, we know that all the time nations are co-operating with each other in the struggle of mankind against nature. We are all taking part in this same fight. Whenever we allow our energies to be diverted by a struggle between man and man and nation against nation we are losing heavily in the task mankind is engaged in all the time. Until we abandon the idea of rivalry no progress can be made. This co-operation is the real fundamental fact of human nature, and it is our duty to realise that fact and to spread it.

Dr. NASMYTH: The crux of Mr. Hannan's argument to me is this: that Norman Angell and his disciples are putting this argument upon the lower ground instead of the higher. They are disregarding these comparatively high thoughts of nationality and patriotism, and are governed by sordid motives such as gain and economic advantage for their country. Mr. Hannan understands Mr. Angell's doctrine better than any militarist I have ever heard. He represents the usual attitude of people who do not understand Norman-Angellism as we do. This sordid charge we get coming up continually. Would you get forty young men from the universities of this country and other countries giving themselves to thankless work for the benefit of their country on any sordid basis? Because we understand the value of patriotism, because we value the qualities of liberty, that is why we are working so intensely for the study of these international problems. The misunderstanding in regard to Mr. Angell's plea as being a question of money or sordid policy come from the fact that people who study this question are not as a rule trained in political economy. When you analyse patriotism, nationalism, liberty and so on, you find they are based upon clearly



*Came the Whisper, came the Vision,
came the Power with the Need.
"We were Dreamers."*

discernible facts of sociology. Patriotism is an instinct that leads us to feel that we can protect our families, and that we can secure to the children things which they need for their lives. Patriotism has a very sound basis in the material wellbeing of the nation, and it is not because we want to raise material considerations above these ideal considerations, but because we believe ideal considerations can be analysed down to certain sociological facts, that we take the discussion of these facts out of the emotional plane and put it on the plane of science and real understanding of the facts. We want to preserve these great qualities of nationalism, patriotism, and to do that we believe that we must be, not non-resisters, but non-aggressors, and that is the whole keynote of Norman-Angellism, that aggression is futile, and if we want to protect the great qualities of British civilisation we should not attack other nations. If we want other nations to be non-aggressors to ourselves we must be non-aggressors to them. I submit war is irrelevant. You say it has had some results. The war of 1776, for example, did have the result of uniting the colonies. England did not embark upon that war for the purpose of uniting the American colonies. England did not enter upon the Boer war in order to achieve the result that actually came out of it. We had an example last spring in the war between Mexico and America. Under our threats we saw President Huerta becoming the national hero, the very thing which we did not aim at.

Mr. Hannan's ideas are applicable in an early state of civilisation in which you can use a lever to move a stone, but when you get to a complex civilisation with interdependent parts you cannot use this crude weapon. That is what we mean by irrelevant, examining the thing you want to do with military force, and seeing that you cannot do it.

The second ground of the speech is that pacificism in general, even our work in a way, endangers the safety of the country; that safety can only be maintained by armaments. Armaments alone are not enough. Not only are we relatively no stronger than before—we are weaker because of armaments. The other day we sailed past ninety-three ships of the British fleet. As I landed, and read things in the paper such as that in London there had just been placed an order for some goods with a German firm and so on, I felt that behind such things as this there is a real danger to England. Then I read the report of the Factory Commissioner and read the report of the Scottish Land Committee, and I began to see some of the causes of what is real decadence. The tremendous armaments at Spithead seemed to me to be a shell enclosing a carcase with some rotten spots in it. Your empire is being neglected because all the attention is being fixed on these things. If you want really to strengthen British nationality you must not consider an imaginary danger, you must give some attention to the heart of the empire. You must study the problems of your national life. You must see that the real danger to the empire lies to some extent within your borders, to get relief from the armament insanity. Mr. Hannan's plan leads either to bankruptcy or revolution. I say if you want the safety of the British Empire, add to your armaments the education of public opinion on the real factors of international relations.

NORMAN ANGELL: If I were personally handling this speaker before an audience of five thousand people, I would try and do it this way. I would get up and say: Mr. Hannan says that we shall not be able to reduce or abolish armaments until the opinion of the world is changed. He said at the conclusion of his speech that it is a very dangerous thing for us to go on

attempting to change the opinion. What would he have us do ?

MR. HANNAN : With regard to this question I am afraid I was misunderstood if I suggested that propagandist activity for which Mr. Angell is responsible should be stayed. I did venture to suggest at the conclusion of my remarks that in preaching your doctrine you ought to make it clear you did not desire to reduce our power until you are prepared to substitute a means of securing the preservation of our liberties otherwise. You all seem to think that I objected to Norman-Angellism. I do not in the least object. It is a magnificent thing that public opinion should be concentrated on things of this kind. But you are confronted with great difficulties, and I think it will take you years of struggle, years of energetic exposition all over the world, not only in this country but on the continent of Europe, before you succeed in substituting Norman-Angellism for the accepted facts of politics. I wish Mr. Angell to go on now in this cultivation of public opinion, in establishing a peace party on an economic foundation. I never intended to suggest there should be any opposition. If the world is to be improved at all, the sooner we take up the process of improvement the better for everybody. It is to be hoped it will not be a movement purely British, that it will be a universal movement. If you carry on your work in England you will do an immense amount of good. If you have other disciples in Germany or Bohemia or St. Petersburg, and somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Catskills, then I think you would arouse infinitely more public sympathy than perhaps you have secured for your work. You must secure an equally strong current of thought and opinion in other countries.

NORMAN ANGELL: Would anyone like to reply to that?

Mr. PITMAN: I should like to suggest at the beginning that all these places are represented in this conference. The crux of the speaker's argument is this, that he is dismayed by the weight of precedent. I do not see how he can say what is going to happen in his lifetime. If ten years ago it was said that half-a-dozen men would fly to Paris in a day that statement would have been met with derisive laughter. We must not say that a thing cannot come about in our lifetime. It may come in ten years or forty years. Even if it does not come in our lifetime that is no point for cutting down our efforts at the present time.

Herr VON LUBTOW: It is not enough to preach Norman-Angellism in England alone unless it is done in other countries. It *is* done in other countries. Mr. Angell visited seven universities in Germany and has spoken to very large crowds and with the exception of two places he had a hearty reception, and in many cases a majority voted in favour of his theory. In German towns, societies of German business men are springing up who are interested in this movement.

I was told yesterday that in France the idea of Norman-Angellism, started by Anatole France, is spreading immensely. People are beginning to wake up to the idea of an entente between Germany, England and France to fight the speedy increase of the present armaments.

NORMAN ANGELL: Arising out of this, how would you, Mr. Benson, give an illustration of the necessary internationalisation of ideas; and secondly, an example of the relatively rapid change of outlook—two points raised by Mr. Hannan. His first point was: That is all

right, but talk to the Germans ; and the second point, yes, but in the vague future a millennium, not in our lifetime.

Mr. BENSON : With regard to the question of Norman-Angellism coming merely in the future, quite possibly it will come in the future. It may be two hundred years before Norman-Angellism comes in, but if we start next year it will be two hundred and one before we get Norman-Angellism. What we have to do is to start right now. The fact that we have started three or four years ago, and we can see our work is bearing fruit, suggests it won't be so long as people think. With regard to the question of the internationalisation of ideas, I should deal with that particular point of view by giving examples. Take any movement you like of the present time you will find that that movement has a counterpart in other parts of the world. Woman's Suffrage has a hold in France, Germany, America, Australia and Finland, and you will find the movement growing in every country in the world. Socialism : sixty years ago you never heard of Socialism in Great Britain. It was a German idea. Now England, France, Russia, Australia, every country in the world, has a strong Socialist movement. The Insurance Act : made in Germany. Take any other big idea you like. You cannot point to any idea that is of any weight that is not international. It is not I that should give examples of ideas that are international ; it is for Mr. Hannan to give me one example of a big idea that is not international.

Mrs. MEAD, of Boston : Our English friend here in talking of national sentiment is helping to make English sentiment. Let me tell you a little bit about what the war traders are doing—the Krupps, etc. ; they are

creating a national sentiment which is an artificial sentiment. National sentiment is a very powerful force. We have been creating a national sentiment in the United States. Our militarism has been artificially created by the Hearst papers. In England the militarist sentiment has been created by the Harmsworth papers. We must always bear this artificial sentiment in mind when we hear talk about the forces of national sentiment.

Mr. WRIGHT: Mr. Hannan urged that this work ought to be international in its scope and you replied that all movements must necessarily be international. I wanted to add a question. How would Mr. Hannan propose to set about making an international movement of opinion? I fully believe that the intention of the Navy League throughout all its activities has been to create a great British Fleet, but suppose the intention of the Navy League had been to create a great German Fleet, could they have taken any more effective measures than the measures which they have taken?

Mr. HANNAN: I deny the subtle insinuation that the British Navy League is responsible for the creation of the German Fleet. The British Navy League is no doubt responsible for the creation of a considerable volume of public opinion in this country in the interests of increasing our sea power so that German development might not relatively gain. I think that Mr. Von Lubtow will agree that since the Bismarckian era in Germany, since she established a great material commonwealth there has been a steady addition to the consciousness of power and the consciousness of weakness in that power because the sea arm of their defence had not been sufficiently developed. The German Emperor said, in 1894-5, that Germany should direct its efforts in future to the sea. We obviously cannot conceal from ourselves

the menace of German sea power to our future interests ; it is necessary for us to keep the facts before our own people and urge our statesmen to the proper steps towards preserving our interests.

Mr. LANGDON DAVIES : What were the relative dates of the Kaiser's speech and the foundation of the Navy League ?

Mr. HANNAN : Exactly the same year.

Mr. BENSON : Is not the Kaiser's speech and the foundation of the Navy League in the same year a proof of the internationalisation of ideas ?

Mr. HANNAN : I agree at once that it is.

NORMAN ANGELL : There are one or two isolated points in this speech of Mr. Hannan's I should like to deal with. I have already said that the outstanding impression which would have been left by Mr. Hannan's speech was this : and the thing which the average person would feel was that there was a good deal in what Mr. Hannan says. This movement may be very dangerous. Your first point should have been in replying to it, that we are doing a work of national defence, that our whole object is to make the security of England's interests greater. It is his side which will necessarily render the position of England and all nations insecure if this process, if this concentration of all effort on his remedy is not offset by the countervailing factor of reason. Next he says your theories would be all right if you could change the way people think, and it will be all right when you have changed their opinions. Therefore the impression he left in his speech was that you had better not attempt the change of opinion. It is precisely the thought that is behind every militarist mind. Only sometimes we get lip service to what we are trying to

do. We know that at the bottom of his mind is this : He thinks we are not doing a useful work at all and we would be better at home doing nothing. He fails to meet the German by that. He does not sufficiently realise that somebody has got to begin—that Germany says exactly the same thing. “Let the English attend to the pacifist side of it.” It is precisely this impression which he is leaving, that it is safer not to do anything ; that is the whole trouble, we cannot get any headway until we get over that. There is no question of either nation beginning—nations do not think. It is the men in the nations that think. Nations do not carry on propaganda. It is the individuals who carry on propaganda. If you get one Englishman starting with a few fellows you may be sure you will get some foreigners starting also.

There were a thousand details that could have been attacked : The argument that South African Federation was the result of war. As against that, you would bring this fact : We went to war, we fought a great war for three years, we gave the lives of twenty-five thousand of our people, we spoiled the lives of fifty thousand more, we did great wrong. As a result, a few years after the collision we found that the Boer gentlemen who were in the field against us have become the rulers, not merely of the Transvaal, but of the whole of South Africa, including the English States and that these Boer gentlemen having become the rulers of this country finding a dozen Englishmen embarrassing politically to them, suspend, of their own authority, all civil law, proclaim martial law, have these men arrested in their houses and deported to the coast and dumped in London. The Governor-General, who, at least, is one official left in the country, could not prevent the proclamation of martial law. If the Boer gentlemen were to present His

Majesty's Governor-General with his death-warrant he would have to sign it. That is called conquering the Boers, and it is that we have got for our war in South Africa. In other words, a situation which gives us infinitely less power than we had over the Government of President Kruger. If Kruger had deported those men there would have been clamour for war. Because we have had war, and because we have conquered, we cannot do anything but submit. That is the result of war.

There were details as to the operation of economic factors in the Morocco crisis, in which, I think, Mr. Hannan has mis-stated the case. We know these factors operated very greatly to preserve peace. There were representations made by the business men in Germany that the menace of war was jeopardising commercial interests which overtopped any political interests Germany had in Morocco. It was precisely the case of Morocco which has justified the position of Germany in regard to the construction of its navy. They say: "Here is France's declining population; she cannot colonise her own country. We have a million added to our population every year. If as between France and Germany, either of these countries are entitled to territory, is it the country that has to find places for a million people or the one with a declining population? We put in our claim, and then we hear that England stands behind France. Why? Are we always to submit to this? There is nothing for us to do. We believe we have just as much right in Morocco as France; the British Government say we have to accept the position. We have to accept the dictation of a smaller people. Would you, as an Englishman, have your policy dictated by a smaller Power? We do not want to diminish your power but to furnish our diplomats with some means to say: You cannot dictate—we shall discuss—and

we cannot do that unless we have a naval power approximate to that of England."

"It is said that you want to introduce national service in order to make a military expedition out of the country. That can only be directed against Germany so that you, England, are going to take a part in the historic quarrel between us and France. We are unable to talk on equal terms with English diplomats unless we have a Navy. We are watching a growing-up of large expeditionary forces to the Continent. Wait till it comes. Is that your idea of defence?" The German, I believe, has a very good case.

Another point: In this matter, too, the question of Russian armaments is never brought out. The German says: "We have on our eastern flank one hundred and seventy million of barbaric people—an agricultural people whose industries are not disorganised by war as ours would be. How does it matter to the bureaucrats that they kill five million peasants? Here we are flanked by that real danger—the bulwark of civilisation against these barbarians. Have we not enough to do to protect ourselves against these without having England sending an expeditionary force to Germany. How could we attempt at the present with the French and Russian menace to invade you? Notwithstanding that you pretend we are plotting against you. What would become of us if we provoked a war with you and left these frontiers behind which lie Russia and France, knowing that we could not depend on the support of our allies in the triple alliance. You believe that the object of our navy is to be able to dictate to the world at large, to create a Europe which we can dominate. We would be partners with you but we do not intend that you should dominate. We propose to protect our interest in the only way it can be protected."

That is the real case for German armaments which the Navy League does not meet, and it can only be met by the clarification of public opinion which we try to make, showing that neither the one or the other could benefit by the domination of the one or the other, that the fear of dominion is irrelevant to the real point at issue, and we wish to bring back the question of national policy to the things that matter. If we can do that, if we can show what it is that men are striving for, and that political domination is not going to achieve these ends, we have created a public opinion that may make the international position better.

Mr. HANNAN : Mr. Angell, I am sure you will forgive me if I do not reply in a serious way to the various points that have been raised in the debate, but I would like to congratulate your audience on the extraordinarily able exposition which you have just given of fundamental considerations in international policy in Europe. I think as Secretary of the Navy League, and as one, I am afraid, beyond the hope of redemption, convinced that the future prosperity of Anglo-Saxon in the world is dependent upon force with the supremacy of the sea, and with our empire its highest and most valued consideration—as one who is full of that faith, I am bound to admit that although your statements must be subjected to criticism, your exposition of the view of Europe in the creation of naval power to-day is exactly right. But you must not put the German on a pedestal of lofty virtue as only defending himself against his enemies on his frontiers. You are too familiar with German policy to be carried away by any suggestion of that kind. Germany is a community which will be well able to take care of itself, and its diplomacy is much more far-reaching than the development of kindly intentions towards better relationship between England and herself ;

and her difficulties on the borders. A very recent incident is of the visit of the Kaiser to Archduke Ferdinand, and at that Conference (much as the official press in both countries tried to obscure the facts), there was certainly laid down a more definite relationship, closer co-operation between Austria and Germany and with that certain determined expansion at all events in the creation of naval power. Let me say at once that I cannot conceive any step being taken in what one might call the post-graduate education of England more excellent than Mr. Angell has inaugurated here.

I am engaged in a movement which aims at the closer co-operation of the various sections of the British Empire. I think it is necessary to unite the British Empire into harmonious government and policy as far as possible, while allowing each part to keep its right of self-government. I do believe we can in time apply something of the same principle in bringing together members of political circles in other countries to discuss these questions. I hope that the propaganda is not confined to one community. I hope that it extends all over Europe, as well as in America—that it is international in the best sense—that you will use the same arguments in every country as you do here. Peace protagonists usually appeal to the British Government, but we hope you will appeal to the other countries as well. We do not exercise as in the olden days those qualities of rapine and desire for territory which are attributed to us now because we wish to hold our place in the world.

You have my great sympathy in your work in bringing the facts of national responsibility before the minds of people in general—but you will have to bring about the change in opinion that is necessary before you bring about the result you wish.

I think Dr. Nasmyth's statement of the case was admirable—there was no arrogance about it—it was put precisely in the way that arguments of that kind should be put so as to have the best effect on the minds of the country.

NORMAN ANGELL : I express everyone's opinion, Mr. Hannan, when I say how much we appreciate your courtesy, kindness, and the model of fair exposition you have given.

The session ended with a rousing three cheers for Mr. Hannan.

ARE WARS ECONOMIC IN ORIGIN?

Morning Session : July 21st

MR. NORMAN ANGELL IN THE CHAIR

NORMAN ANGELL: What we need is a capacity to state our case briefly, because at the street corner you get a perpetually changing audience, and you can never state the basis of things too often. Most people have never heard of Pears' Soap, and nobody has read "The Great Illusion," and as for having read "International Polity," that is out of the question. Nobody in this room has read it. The method we adopted the other morning—a brief statement of the difference between the older and the newer statement of the case—was a good means of getting at what we are driving at, because if we believed that this is the most useful way of getting home the essential truths, we must be able to justify our position as a distinct movement. I think we had better have that over again, no statement to exceed five minutes. We will have about half to three-quarters of an hour of that, and then I have here about a hundred questions which have been put to myself or others, and I am going to fire these at selected students and they are to answer them right off to the minute. It is what

you have to do when you come into the field. I am going to put one specific question, with which we have already dealt in part, and which was put to me by one of our guests, and that specific question is this :—"How do you get over the fact that the causes of most wars are not economic at all? In Hungary the risk of conflict arises from the desire of one race to be predominant over the other races." An American student put a modified form of that question to me at breakfast. "How do you get over the fact that the Spanish-American War did not come from economic causes? It came from altruistic motives. The motive of the Balkan War was as altruistic as it could have been. It is doubtful whether economic causes do touch the real causes of most wars at all." It is that question I am going to put in your hands. I say in passing that I have dealt with it in the terms of our thesis in a book which do not suppose you have read. No statement I ever make is complete. All I have been able to do is to give a hint at certain forces at work, and how far they contribute to the interpretation of human social action. It is my hope that having given just a hint of the forces underlying the phenomena of human society, you will be able on the basis of that to make the demonstration better than I have done, and make it more clearly. As to this question of non-economic factors being the cause of most wars, I have dealt with this most specifically in applying it to the Balkan War, and I shall be interested to see how much has been remembered by students when we come to the definite statement of our case. Will Mr. Bracher tell us the difference between our position and that of the earlier pacifists?

MR. BRACHER: The older pacifists are accustomed to treat the question of war and peace mainly as a moral question. They say that war is wrong. They treat

it as a religious question, and say it is contrary to religion. We followers of Mr. Angell take a different line.

NORMAN ANGELL: I would avoid that label. You may have to talk of Norman Angell, but certainly you are not following a person, but you are following or developing an idea. If you like: "We who favour a more modern statement of the case." Put it that way.

Mr. BRACHER: We look at questions of war and peace pretty much as we look at the great social questions. We consider them in the same spirit as we consider housing room or the Insurance Act, or any great measure of social reform. Just as housing reformers do not accuse each other of being sordid or of immorality, we say that this accusation is quite beside the point. Instead of basing our ideas on moral conceptions upon which there is so much difference of opinion, we take the common ground of the general desire for the welfare of the whole of society. We find that aggressive war cannot in any way promote the general welfare of the nations that undertake it. It follows from that, that, seeing ultimately people will be guided by enlightened self-interest, there will be no more aggressive wars, so it would be impossible that there should be any wars for defence. We take the different motives, real or alleged, which are supposed to guide nations making aggressive war, and we show that the objects taken in turn cannot be achieved by war, or, if they can be achieved, they cannot promote the general welfare of the states undertaking it. Although a state can enlarge its boundaries by aggressive war, it cannot make its people any better off by so doing. We show that one nation cannot take the trade of another or increase its trade by that of another. The burden of armaments that nations carry to-day does not increase the trading powers of any of the nations. We answer

those who say that a state can in some way get an indemnity by means of a successful war by showing that it is an impossibility. Taking into account all the modern conditions intensified during the last forty years, we show how the interdependence of nations, financial, commercial, psychological, makes it impossible for one nation to wound another in any way without injuring itself more than can be counterbalanced by any possible or conceivable gain of the most successful war that can be waged; that to make war on another nation is such a futile thing that unless the human race is entirely devoid of reason it is entirely a question of time when wars will cease.

NORMAN ANGELL: In the last chapter of *Polity* I had attempted to deal with this question myself. Why a new movement, why a distinct movement at all? You cannot give that chapter in five minutes, and where you have five minutes it is perhaps well in most of our work to take one or two outstanding points which will illustrate all the rest and give them as separate distinct points. For instance, a questioner says: "Why do you not join a peace society, how are you different from the peace societies?" Suppose you get up and say: "For ten years we have been preparing to resist the aggression of the Germans, why do you suppose the Germans are coming? Are they coming for our good? Presumably, if they are really going to attack us—and for ten years our armament policy has been based on that assumption—it is because they are going to benefit themselves in some way. What is that benefit?"

Mr. HILTON: Suppose he says: Because they must fulfil their destiny.

NORMAN ANGELL: I say frankly I do not know what they mean. Thirty years ago an American was asked

what destiny meant. He said that destiny was mostly rum. If the Germans are the cool calculating people we give them credit for, they are going to challenge our power for some reason. What is that reason? The older pacifists, confronted by a question of that kind, did not answer. When people said we had got to fight the Germans because they were going to take our country, and conquer our colonies, all the older pacifists could say was that the Germans were too decent to do that. But you cannot say what 65,000,000 people will do.

What we can ask is—Could they do it? Could they get any advantage for their people by doing it? Could the 65,000,000 German people be advantaged by this war? That is the definite question we set ourselves to solve. The older pacifist did not attempt to solve that question. He made an appeal to the higher motives of man, the fact that avarice was not the only human motive force, and so forth. We put this definite question to the man who believes that Germany is coming. What is she coming for? You say she is going to take our trade. She cannot do it. You say she is going to take our colonies? It would not alter the problem of the "outlet" at all. You say she covets the wheat of Canada? We say the fact of the conquest of Canada would not alter the matter in the least. She can have the wheat of Canada now by paying for it. We say the fact of conquest is irrelevant. If she could wipe us out altogether Germany would be the worse for it. There is no such thing as wiping out a nation. If we conquered Germany to-morrow there would be still the 65,000,000 there.

That kind of distinct separate series of shocks is probably the best for a five-minute explanation of the difference between ourselves and the older pacifists.

Illustrate the difference rather than define it, because your illustration is both a definition and an explanation. In five minutes you cannot do the two. Try and tear the inside out of the last chapter of Polity and show first the irrelevance of war, then show its ineffectiveness. Show that to the Jingo, who thinks that this collision between Germany and England is an inevitable collision based on a rivalry of interests. Show to the man who believes this, that he has got it all wrong. If we beat Germany to-morrow, German competition would go on just the same as before.

The whole error lies in confounding the military and political power of a nation with its industrial power. This analysis of that error, which is the explanation of the irrelevance of war, was not systematically undertaken by the organised peace propaganda which existed ten years ago.

Then I cannot repeat too often : Be very careful not to disparage the work of the older pacifists. You can point out the emphasis of their efforts was not laid on that particular phase of the question, because until lately it has been difficult to establish the fact that political power has nothing to do with industrial development. It has been assumed that the two were very intimately connected, and until a generation or so ago they were intimately connected. Only to-day have we the very visible facts, that of international credit and so forth, which shows that the two have now become quite separate, and the terms in which we discuss this case were perhaps not available to the man who carried on a pacifist propaganda in the nineteenth century. In Cobden's time Europe had not the other collateral factors, the telegraph that developed international trade, railroads and so forth, necessary to make this principle of interdependence evident and apparent.

Let none of us disparage the work of the older pacifists. They formulated great moral truths which we do not challenge, and we do not say that the moral motives are not the main motives, but we say that if you can analyse these moral motives and show how the moral code strengthens the social fabric you have made a very useful contribution to morality. It is the whole modern tendency to see that morality is for the purpose of saving *this* world. The older conception was that morality and religion were for saving your own miserable soul. The New Testament is a social document. You have there a code of ethics formulated for the purpose of making the world a better place. To say that it is a social code is not to vulgarise the New Testament, is not to render it less spiritual. The older conception that the message of Christ had nothing to do with this world is not a finer conception than the social one. It is less inspired. I want you to make this reconciliation between the spiritual and social. You ought not to separate these things. The whole trend of moral feeling is to show these things cannot be crudely divided as some people divide them. We are giving a finer interpretation to a moral code like that of Christianity when we say that is a social document, a guide by which we can find the means to run our society. We are trying to analyse, in terms of these modern facts, which show the interdependence of men and nations, the moral motives, the great reasons, at which the older pacifists guessed, because the facts which explain the how and why were not yet available. They are now available, and being available we have to interpret them so as to come to the aid of those moral truths.

MR. BEDFORD: How would you reply to a man who said this: I know the Germans would gain nothing by taking London to-morrow, but the German soldiers

dying outside London would die happy in the fact that they were extending German sovereignty.

NORMAN ANGELL : That German sovereignty would be for him the emblem of those forces and institutions which ensure the well-being of himself and his fellows.

Mr. HAYCOCK : I believe in preaching that war is futile, but I also believe in telling exactly what has happened in the Balkans. I believe in mixing the moral and the material arguments.

NORMAN ANGELL : I expanded my five minutes into eight in order to try to make plain to this audience that you cannot separate the moral and the economic or social motive, that our feeling about the moral question, and our feeling of indignation at injustice is the social instinct coming out. We know that if that kind of thing is tolerated in society we shall be the victim to-morrow. This indignation we feel is a protective instinct rising up in us. These intuitions are often very crude. Because we do not know how they work we make all sorts of mistakes, but we who are trying to show that one of the main elements of society is interdependence hope to purify these intuitions and instincts of the tribe. We are trying to render rational these instincts which otherwise would be irrational and at times destructive.

You have got to investigate economic truths and to show how men are not rivals, how tribes are not rivals, and how these instincts, that now make one tribe hate another, are a barbaric survival, and as the process of analysis goes on we lose these hatreds. Take the Catholics and the Huguenots. Here 300 years ago we had these religious hatreds in Europe, due to misconceptions which were cleared up by an indirect means, the work of the Reformation. This religious hatred, which appeared to be quite instinctive, had an irrational cause.

The marvellous thing about the cessation of religious war, was not that men ceased massacring one another, but that they ceased wanting to. Of course we do not want to set up an economic motive as the only motive for national or human action. It is not the only motive. We do say that you cannot separate the two. Just as your loaf of bread is the necessary incident of your family life so national policies which look for the welfare of their people may be moral in their aim. Emotion by all means, but let your emotion be enlightened. All the motive force that you like in your car, but see that the man at the wheel is not blind. If he is blind, the more force he has in the engine the bigger will be the smash up when it inevitably comes.

MR. BENSON: I rather fancy you have not quite understood Haycock's question. The point is should not we make our propaganda more effective if we sprinkled it with a little more emotional appeal. Everybody realised how horrible the atrocities were in the Balkan War. Would it not increase the effect of our work if we appealed to the feelings of people at the same time that we were giving them mental food ?

NORMAN ANGELL: I can answer that best by a concrete illustration. Here yesterday Dr. Nasmyth, in reply to Mr. Hannan's case, got up and made a speech which I believe would appeal to all emotional people, but there was no expression of emotion in it. That I believe is the surest and soundest way of reaching the ordinary emotions of men and women, the most lasting way. By all means introduce a little horror if it adds to the effect of your work. While the facts of the horror will be momentarily great, when your man goes home and gets to work on Monday morning, it won't have changed his point of view. The moment after the impression has

passed there is no change of view. He does not see things explained in a different way, as he would if you explained that the Germans do not need to conquer Canada for her wheat. He has now an interpretation of facts which lasts. It is not a momentary stimulation which he might get from a glass of whiskey. It is a different point of view, and if you can combine that change of opinion with an appeal to the emotions which is indirect, such as Dr. Nasmyth made yesterday, there I believe you have got the right kind of vision in this matter. Remember this; that emotion is a luxury which as a matter of morals ought not to be too often indulged. You know the story of the Russian lady at the opera who wept her eyes out at the imaginary sufferings of the heroine while her coachman was starving to death on the box of her coach outside. Where the emotion is raised as matter of titillation of sensation and no action follows, I do not believe in its improvement of character. Emotion should be used as the motive force for driving your action in a quite definite direction. You cannot get the direction of that action save through the rational process. I again come back to the illustration of the motor car. Of course, you have to have a powerful engine, equally of course you have to have a man at the wheel who knows the direction in which he ought to go.

MR. HAYCOCK: The greatest economic change that any country has undergone has been the removal of the Corn Laws of this country. It was the emotional appeal of John Bright and Cobden, just as much as a question of whether they were right or wrong.

NORMAN ANGELL: I think the case of Cobden illustrates what I am getting at. Cobden did not merely talk about the hunger of his public. He showed how the Corn Laws were worsening it. His emotion was merely

used as a driving force for his rationalism. He put the rationalistic side first, and having done that, having shown a direction of action, he made his appeal to the emotions, but the two were combined and you cannot separate them.

How would Mr. Bedford answer the criticism that the causes of most wars are not economic at all ?

Mr. BEDFORD : I should defy the man to produce any war in history in which the nation was not actuated by economic motives.

NORMAN ANGELL : I think you would have to go on to explain what that means. You would have to illustrate that before your audience could catch it.

Mr. HUGINS : It seems to me, that the point is that, although most wars have some economic basis, men do not usually acknowledge that to themselves, but they disguise it in moral language. In the South, in the American Civil War, they were not talking about the right to have slaves, but of constitutional liberty. The North were talking about the immorality of one human soul owning another human soul. Then there is the war of the Revolution. Now certainly you would say that is purely economic. Here is England trying to impose taxes upon the Colonies which they resent, and therefore they revolt, and therefore the war is purely economic. But in Patrick Henry's great speech he said, "Give us liberty, or give us death." He used the moral stop. The basis is always economic, but men disguise it under moral names.

Mr. LUNNON : The point is this : the causes of war are not economic, wars are due to international rivalry. But although the economic factor may not be the ostensible cause, it is a relevant consideration. The fact

that my desire to swank over my neighbours will make me bankrupt is a relevant consideration, and if you show me that swanking does not command envy or esteem but only ends in ridicule and contempt I shall certainly change my manners. Two nations may hate each other ever so much, but the mode in which that is expressed will be changed. War is absolutely useless. Physical conflict is, we demonstrate, a useless and futile method of adjusting this rivalry. We do not say that the Hungarian races, if they learn this doctrine, will sit down and love each other, but they will realise that physical conflict will not be the slightest use.

Dr. NASMYTH : We are passing a little bit out of the international field, and coming into the field of revolution ; how far violent revolution succeeds. Was the French Revolution a success because it used violence, or because it was an idea ? If we had the process going on in Hungary now, would it succeed ? Take the example of Hungary now—Hungary is becoming Magyarised. But it is really due to the concentration of the people in the cities as the result of industrial revolution. If we take Bohemia, which has been under German military domination, we do not find Germanisation going on, but the exact opposite. The more a people is oppressed, the more that people is going to multiply. It is true in Poland and in Bohemia. If military force were of avail, why has it not Germanised Bohemia, instead of the Bohemians so increasing in numbers that they threaten to overwhelm the Germans ? Here is the dilemma. We have people becoming majorities who were formerly minorities. How is that majority to convince the minority that it is its turn for power ? It is the same situation as in the French Revolution. How was the great majority in favour of the Revolution ever to go about by intellectual persuasion to convince the minority to abdicate ? English

politics are in the same process. How are the majority of English Liberals to persuade the Tories that they are a minority? I do not know how far you can reason with people in that attitude of mind when they see red and will not argue. That is the only place where force has a vestige of common sense when an immense majority of people is being dominated by a minority, and that minority will not give way unless there is an inkling of the power which lies ready for use. Perhaps the show of the immense social forces which are moving among the people, by means of a threat of violence, has some use. We are getting out of the international field into the domestic field within the nations. The problem in Austria-Hungary is especially difficult because there has been no opportunity for a great democratic movement to grow up. The countries are divided by religion, philosophy, etc., and militarism has been its only salvation for holding it together. But the question is an international question and the vital thing is a thing which has been very rarely mentioned there. I do not feel satisfied with the statement as to the difference between the new and the older pacifism.

NORMAN ANGELL: I shall keep reverting to that because each day's problem throws light on that subject. As the discussion proceeds the difference will be clear in the minds of our students. I will repeat our case point by point. What are we to do about the determination of a race like the Slav race to say: "Our turn has come and we intend to rule." There is the problem.

Herr VON LUBTOW: The danger is there and we know it is international. The whole of Russia and Servia together tried to crush Austria-Hungary and they did not listen to argument or reason. What we have to do is not to prove the futility of armaments and so on,

but to find a solution to the question by trying to show them: "You hate each other. You want to destroy and to dominate, but you will not be able to achieve your end in that." Take the case of the murdered Archduke. The people of Bosnia had been annexed. The Austrian Army threatened the Servians in the place who began to hate them. When the Archduke, who inspired the whole thing, came to the place he was murdered. Did they reach their end? It is now worse in Bosnia than before. If you can show that you cannot alter things by compulsion it would perhaps be the solution.

Mr. TOULMIN: We have had raised the point of one race trying to be top dog over the other and a great portion of the population of Europe being actuated by the feeling that it must come to the front. We must answer this question by an appeal to history. The Slavs are not the first race who had set out to become the top dog. The Germans had the same idea. Fifty years ago Prussia set out to be top dog in Schleswig-Holstein. Now they have to stop a Danish merchant steamer going to port for fear that the Danish people in Schleswig-Holstein might be touched by the old spirit. In Russian and German Poland there is every obstacle put in the way of Polish nationality. In Russia also every obstacle is put in the way of Polish nationality; yet Polish nationality is as keen now as it ever has been. The Slavs know that when they go to war they will get a blow in the back from the nations in their midst. The Welsh are content because their nationality has not been crushed. If a very able race has not been able to subdue Schleswig-Holstein, to stamp out Danish nationality, how would it be able to do that to 7,000,000 Englishmen in London?

Professor HUDSON : I think there is one phase in this question which I have not heard dealt with. It seems to assume that there is the ever present danger of a barbarian invasion of more civilised countries. In other words, the promoter of this question tells us that there the great danger to the civilised nations of the world from the Slav people. In the United States we are told there is danger from Mexico. We are told there is a great danger from China and Japan. Admit we are in danger of attack from a semi-barbaric country, then you must admit that arguments of reason cannot appeal to the peoples of those countries. Here is the distinction between the cancellation of force and the use of force in the first instance. As long as there are semi-barbaric peoples in the world other nations have to have sufficient force to resist force by these people. By co-operation between nations we can reduce the amount of force it is necessary to use for the purpose of resistance.

Mr. BEDFORD : What I meant by political domination no one else seems to realise. Let me take three instances to show the kind of domination that men might want. Take the case of the Roman conquest of Greece. Rome never assimilated Greece. In the Middle Ages when the Christians for a time conquered Palestine they did not assimilate Palestine. England could not possibly assimilate India. It is quite conceivable that the Germans might be prepared to sacrifice a lot just for that intangible kind of sovereignty. A great many of the English are prepared to pay a great price just for the sake of exercising some kind of personal rule. An Englishman would rather rule 10,000 savages than represent 500 white ratepayers. The relations of Russia to this country have hardly ever been hostile. Ivan the Terrible was extremely anxious to have Englishmen trading with Russia. He was anxious to assimilate western civilisa-



Robert Anderson
U.S.A.

Kampff

*I never knew a creature so complete ;
His dress, his arguments, his hands and feet
His features and his humour—all were neat.*
Men and Manners.

tion. Peter the Great worked in the Greenwich dockyards and had a great respect for Englishmen and English ideas. I think it is hardly fair to Russia to say she had an ulterior motive in furthering the gigantic pan-Slav dominion. I do not think the danger from Russia is as great as we make out. I think it is possible that the Slav race is already played out.

MR. BRACHER: I think there is at least one more argument that might be tried upon them. Could not we say: Suppose we go to war, will you after all get domination? I would go further and say: May it not after all happen that instead of dominating the people you have conquered you will find they are dominating you. Our government some hundreds of years ago conquered Ireland, and time after time Irish politicians have been able to say such and such is the price of our support. The Irish question has made and unmade ministries and has distracted our attention from our own affairs. In the Austrian Empire you have a race held together by a dominating government and the life of the Governor is one of great anxiety. The race problems in Austria dominate Austrian politics even though the races do not dominate Austria. I read in "War and Peace" an article to the point which showed that if the United States attempted to dominate Mexico the result would be that the Mexican problem would dominate the United States for a great many years to come.

NORMAN ANGELL: If one could cover every point that has been brought out, detach it from all irrelevance, put it into one five minutes with the right emphasis given to the outstanding factor and the emphasis turned to the real problem in the speaker's mind, we should have answered the question. I shall put the points very

carefully. Here you have the Slav race saying: Our turn has come and we intend to rule. They do not want to get any economic advantage out of it. What are you to do about it? One visitor anticipated the reply that we should have to modify their opinion and pointed out the futility of this by emphasising there was no means practically of affecting their opinion, that it was a fact not to be got over in practical politics, that you had these people who formulated this desire, and that there was a great racial and historic momentum behind them and you had to face it. It is race pride and desire for domination that are being exploited by economic groups, and the question was put in these words: "How are you going to convert the people who are being so used?"

That was the crux which I marked with a big black cross: how to convert these people who allow themselves to be so used by these economic groups. What evidently is in people's minds is that there are no intellectual forces that we can use, that the intellectual forces in their case are not operative and that the opinion of the Slav world is something fixed. But national race feeling and the form in which it is expressed are not fixed static things that are not modified by circumstances and the general dissemination of ideas. They are so modified. You had a far more fixed and immutable thing in the sixteenth century in the trouble between the Catholic and the Huguenot. There was a Catholic insisting as a dogma in 1510 that never would men cease massacring each other for religious opinions. That change was brought about in a century. The time when the two great groups united was when Europe as a whole was far less in contact than is the Slav world with the Western world to-day. It was far more difficult to bring about

a modification of opinion in the sixteenth century than to modify the opinion of the Slav race to-day.

If the Slav or yellow people are to impose their will upon the rest of the world by military achievement they will have to do it by perfecting their machinery, which means scientific training and education and much money, which means the development of their country, and by that means their civilisation is affected because it is exposed to the introduction of Western ideas. Part of the result of the military perfection of Japan during the last thirty years has been that Japan has become largely a European people, and the result of this is that you have a strong Socialist party; as Japanese ideas are being profoundly impregnated with many of the democratic and revolutionary ideas of Europe. If the things which the Japanese desire are modified their conduct is modified in like measure. The Japanese Socialists are saying: "What is all this conquest for?" just as the German Social Democrats are saying the same thing, and are looking much more to the man who is so poor that he cannot buy his blankets but has to hire them as a thing more important than the domination of Europe. The same process is going to act in the Slav world, a modification at least of this desire for world domination because the political objects in the European peoples are becoming more rationalistic, because the people as a whole are saying: What does this domination mean to us?

Moreover, if a power like Germany, with 65,000,000, cannot, as Von Bulow admitted, Prussianise Alsace-Lorraine in forty years, if that is impossible, how can the Slav world expect to impose its civilisation upon the rest of the world? The English, the most successful and most dominating race in history, not excluding the Romans, have accepted as a principle that they do not

dominate and they do not impose their will. These lessons will be clear—Ireland, South Africa, the independent nations of the British Empire, the necessarily growing independence of India—we have barely got a thousand officials in India to-day—these things will become clear and economic forces do bear even upon a problem like that, because the Slav people need our capital; but if Russia is to come to London or Paris for money we should have something to say as to how it is to be used. If we see the Western world confronted with a great Slav peril, Russia won't get her capital. These are the kind of forces which will operate to break up the solid aggressive opinion which now exists in the Slav world.

Mrs. MEAD : What would be the effect on the Russian problem and the general problem if she had an ice-free port and if Constantinople had become a free port after the Russian War ?

NORMAN ANGELL : It would have contributed to the solution of the Russian problem. If we had never gone into the Crimean War, if we had co-operated with Russia for the settlement of these problems, we would not have had this last Balkan War. Russia would have established herself on the Bosphorus, which would have given her what she wants there. It is one proof more that if Englishmen sixty years ago had listened to the despised pacifists, Cobden and Bright, many of the problems of to-day would not exist. Our main work and most useful work is the dissemination of principles. If we bring home the principles of our work let us hope that we may be able to apply them to particular cases. All good work in the past, whether it be, as I have said, in medicine, or sociology, or politics, has been too much dominated by the desire to find a patent remedy that will operate

in twenty-four hours. Only to-day is medicine beginning to be really useful, because medicine is realising that there is only one way in which it can act—prevention. The modern doctor says : These cures we have been believing in are foolish. We applied them for 2,000 years, but we recognise now that we were applying a cure that could not cure. If one twentieth of the energy that has been devoted to attempting to find an immediate cure had been concentrated on preventive work there would not have been any more consumption. Remember this illustration, give them always this illustration, that here is the greatest expert on phthisis in the world who has told the profession that he will not see an advanced case of consumption. He has nothing to suggest, nothing to do, and when it is said : “What is the use of our work, if you cannot cure this man your work is futile,” he would say, “If you had been listening to us for the last twenty years consumption would be as obsolete as leprosy. Act now for the disease which will attack you five years hence, then you have some chance of doing useful work.” That should be our view.

DEBATE ON "THE ABOLITION OF THE RIGHT OF CAPTURE AT SEA"

Tuesday Evening : July 21st

PRO : Mr. Charles Wright

CON : Mr. H. H. O'Farrell

MR. G. H. PERRIS IN THE CHAIR.

MR. CHARLES WRIGHT : The human race has painfully built up, in some degree at any rate, the art of living together, generally known by the name of morals or ethics, and we feel that in this business of war, the structure we have so painfully built up has toppled over. War consecrates murder, arson and theft, and calls them noble. Now, if I were asked why particularly I attack that department of war which I am attacking this evening, namely, the custom—I won't call it right—of highway robbery on the sea, my answer is that, throughout the world, there is such a consensus of opinion unfavourable to the policy of capture, that it forms a most hopeful department for advance against the whole miserable business of war. Now the practice of capture at sea, I think, is foolish even as a military

operation, because it is almost impossible for a captor to determine that the blow which he inflicts injures the party whom he wishes to injure. Mr. Angell has taught us that this uncertainty applies to most of the operations of war, but it especially and markedly applies to this operation of capture. Those who wish to maintain the practice always assume, and frequently assert, that it only affects belligerents. They seem to be under the impression that the consignee of goods in transit on the ocean is the only person who is in the least affected by those goods being seized. They ignore altogether the fact that for every consignee there is a consignor, and, therefore, when you wish to injure the consignee, it is highly improbable you can do so without injuring the consignor. In no department of commerce are the facts to which Mr. Angell has drawn attention so unmistakably clear as in sea-borne trade. Excepting in the coasting trade, every cargo represents the interests of citizens of at least two nations, and liners, especially Eastern liners, often contain during one voyage the property of many nations. Moreover, the ownership frequently changes during the voyage, and the destination is often uncertain at the commencement of a voyage. Maritime property is so curiously held that the mere flying of the flag is but little criterion as to the nationality of the property. Many British ships are financed by foreign capital; many more foreign ships are financed by British capital. There are British limited companies, with fleets of steamers under the British flag, in which there is no British capital whatever, and that is the sort of problem which we set the commander of a naval vessel when he sets out on his marauding expeditions. There is not only the fact that the capital of certain companies registered under one flag is entirely owned by the subjects of another flag; there is also the fact that

large sums of money are lent by the citizens of one country upon the security of the steamers of another country. It follows that, when those steamers are captured, not only are the registered owners of those steamers injured, but the foreign capitalist is also badly injured because his security is gone. It would be quite surprising to you to know to what a large extent this goes on, and how many interests of diverse nationalities are involved in the ownership of sea-going vessels. The fact of this community of interest is so greatly felt throughout the world that the law of the sea is gradually becoming denationalised, conferences are held, projects of law are formulated, and at the present time, over the whole of Europe and practically over the whole of the world that counts, a large part of the law of the sea is international, and we have, in this country, given up some of our most cherished customs of the sea in order to bring our law into line with that of other countries. What seems to me to be a most valuable effect of this internationalism is that foreign ships all over the world who save ships belonging to British owners, and sometimes to those of other countries, very frequently leave their remuneration to be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Corporation of Lloyd's in London. There is, for example, a salvor owning a most valuable plant in a region so remote as South America who I suppose for twenty years has rendered most important services to British vessels and their cargoes, and has released these vessels on merely receiving a cable from an association in London reading something like this :—
“ We guarantee to pay you whatever is found to be due.”
On receipt of that cable, the ship is released without any other legal formality. Not only that, but the custom is to say to the secretary of that association, who is a man of remarkable intellectual power : “ I will leave

my remuneration for you to determine personally," and in that way very large sums of money are awarded, and great interests on the sea are protected. It is, in fact, quite impossible, if you think it out, to protect British trade without protecting foreign trade as well; conversely, it is quite impossible to protect foreign trade without protecting British trade as well.

When we get to a proposal such as this for the abolition of the historical practice of capturing private property at sea, we at once come up against the view of experts. Now I submit that experts are indispensable servants, but impossible masters, and that we must have civilian control. We should listen to their advice, and form our own conclusions. Is that, after all, unreasonable? Consider the present plight of naval experts. A few years ago they egged on the crowd to shout: "We want eight, and we won't wait." They have got the Dreadnoughts they wanted, and now they are anxiously scratching their heads to discover whether the Dreadnoughts are any use at all. What is the position of experts in regard to this great question as to whether all the enormous expenditure which we have devoted to Dreadnoughts is useful or not? Their position is one of uneasy assertion on the one side, and of confident denial on the other. One expert gives what appears to be some sort of reason for the existence of these tremendous machines, another testifies that they are useless, and says we must spend as many millions over submarines as we have already spent over Dreadnoughts. And then in ten years' time another set of experts will say that the Dreadnoughts are no use, the flying machines are no use, and the submarines are no use. I submit, therefore, that we must not pay too much attention to them.

I want to draw attention to the following paragraph from an article by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge :

“I am forced to doubt if the people who ask us to give up the right of capturing our enemy’s merchant vessels (in return—it is only charitable to assume—for like immunity for our own vessels) have ever heard of the Emperor Napoleon I., or of his Berlin and Milan decrees. Those who are acquainted with them should not require to be told that it is possible to do enormous mischief to the oversea trade of the British Empire without capturing a British merchant vessel. There are accessible ample statistics to show the amount of harm done to our trade in the earlier years of the last century by all the navies of Europe and that done by Napoleon’s ‘Continental blockade’; and no one who studies the statistics will have any doubt as to which of the two made us suffer most. Every Continental Power with seaports and a big army can treat us as Napoleon did, if it thinks that by doing so it will bring us to terms. This, possibly, it can do, though it may have solemnly promised, and though it may keep its promise, to leave our merchant vessels alone in war. This is what we shall have given up our rights for, if we are unwise enough to abandon the military operation which has been dealt with in this paper.”

On reading this paragraph, I turned to my Cambridge Modern History, for information as to these decrees. This is how Dr. Holland Rose sums up the views of the greatest military expert in all history, Napoleon :—

“At first the trade of Hamburg suffered little from the French occupation which began in 1806. The French minister was open to bribes. . . . He is said to have received altogether 558,000 fcs. from that city, besides a million more from merchants for immunities and licences granted by him.”

But what I want especially to draw your attention to is the summary of the whole matter by the authority I have quoted.

“Very characteristic was his (Napoleon’s) reply on March 24th, 1811, to a deputation from the General Councils of Commerce and Manufacture in France. . . . After twitting the deputation with its lugubrious opinions, he proceeded to justify the Continental system, and stated that in about six months his sword would pierce England to the heart. As for his tariff, it would remain unchanged, for it did the utmost harm to British trade. The French Empire would soon produce enough sugar, indigo, and perhaps cotton to do without imports of those articles, and Europe would no longer need trade with England and the Colonies. . . . As for England, she would soon be bankrupt. . . .

“The whole address illustrates his proneness to illusions on the subject of Commerce. That wise Counsellor, Mollien, often noted that his master had failed to grasp some of its essential facts; and the Emperor’s letters yield proof that he believed the extreme dearness of colonial wares in Europe to be more harmful to the English vendor than to the continental consumer—a notion as mistaken as his suggestion that the confiscation of these products would be a good way of replenishing the coffers of Prussia, Westphalia and Naples.

“The course of events was to prove that nothing could shake his belief in the efficacy of these suicidal devices. State after state was flung into the crucible of his mighty experiment; yet the looked-for result never came. Finally, in his constant straining after the one final expedient that must assure the ruin of England, he came to the death

grapple with Russia. It is difficult to believe that this was the man who in other domains of thought sneered at *idéologues*. He himself was the chief *idéologue*, the supreme dupe of the age. As he looked round on the Europe of his day, he took no count of the mighty forces that were girding England with the strength of youth, and were connecting all parts of the world by indissoluble ties ; what he beheld was a mirage conjured up by his vivid fancy and boundless egotism."

Now that is what you get when the greatest expert intellect of history applies his military mind to commerce, and it is to that authority Admiral Bridge refers ignorant people like myself. I am reminded of what was said to me by a very distinguished surgeon—"When the doctor tells you to take physic, don't you take it without asking him what are the results that are going to flow from it. If you get the plumber into your house, you want to know what he is going to do. Apply a similar test to your physician." This surgeon was himself extremely ill ; he lay dying in the house of a friend. The doctors were doing their best for him. One doctor, musing over the unconscious patient, could not think why it was this man was dying, could not understand it at all. Then the thought suddenly struck him : "By Jove, perhaps it is our remedies !" He cut off one of the remedies, and the patient revived immediately. Europe is dying under the remedies of its experts, and if the result of removing some of these remedies is to make war difficult, and even impossible, and if the military spirit is essential to the life of a nation, I do not at all see why our Beresfords and our Bernhardis should not indulge in mortal combat before the audiences who now delight in the exploits of Gunboat Smith and Bombardier Wells.

We are constantly asked in this controversy to consider the effect of this proposed reformation on different countries. How it is going to affect Germany? I rather deprecate too close a scrutiny into this question. Here is an opportunity for a great advance in civilisation. Is it for the highly civilised peoples of the world to say: "We won't have this advance unless we can get the best of it"? If it is a bit more favourable to France, Germany or Austria than it is to ourselves in England, should we say we won't have anything to do with it? That is a miserable line of argument, but if we are forced to take it, I suggest that the power which has hitherto been the strongest opponent to this abolition is the one which will undoubtedly most benefit by it. I need not go into the enormous amount of our ocean-borne commerce. The facts are so well known that I need not dilate upon them, but will proceed at once to deal with the two other aspects of the subject. We have first to consider the effect of this reform on us when neutral. Now we have the most widespread carrying trade of the world. I do not know whether you realise that there are quite a number of British steamers that go away from these shores and do not come back again, perhaps, for some years. They will be trading about the coasts of America, of India, and China; they will be on what is called "time charter," and will make voyage after voyage in which this country is not directly concerned. When war in which we are neutral breaks out, everyone of these vessels is liable to search, and even to capture, and experience shows that they are sometimes captured, destroyed, or grievously detained without any proper cause, and yet, in the magnificent system which obtains in international law at present no real redress is forthcoming. There were numbers of cases of that kind in the Russo-Japanese war, and very disgraceful cases they were. This country

is usually neutral (in all the last century we have only broken the European peace once, and then it was the silliest war we ever undertook). We suffer very badly by this practice. We are liable to capture because of the extremely loose manner in which the question of contraband is dealt with, and vessels in ballast have been destroyed. In the Russo-Japanese war a steamer without cargo was sunk, as was also the "Oldhamia," with a cargo of oil certified to be non-contraband. In this case both ship and cargo were uninsured, but no redress was obtained.

Let us consider the effect when we are belligerents. I am going to put it to you in the first place that the mere fact that we should be stopped from doing damage ourselves—supposing there were nothing else in it—that fact would be an immense gain to Great Britain. I believe we suffer enormously—we should suffer enormously—by the very damage that we ourselves do. Then the question of our food supply and our supply of raw material, which gives so much anxiety, would be solved. I do not know whether you realise the enormous values which are now involved in ocean-borne traffic. If you consider the values of the cargo in the case of those great liners, it becomes almost incalculable, and it is quite impossible for the insurance community to stand the strain which capture would involve. The insurance community bases its premium upon ordinary marine risks, and when it comes to war, it is almost certain that in the first two or three weeks of war, underwriters in this country would be in great part ruined, and where not ruined tremendously shaken.

I would like now to deal with the arguments which Admiral Bridge has adduced against abolition. He says to begin with that as we concede the right to blockade, we, in principle, admit the right of capture. My answer

to that is that, if it were true, even then I do not see there is any principle at all involved. You may say that the question of war or no war is a question of principle, but the question of how war is to be carried on is merely a question of expediency, and I do not agree that we need maintain the practice of commercial blockade. If the business of war is to go on, I think we should have to permit the operation on the sea which corresponds to a siege on land, but you would not lay siege to an unfortified town, and although this is a matter for more thought and discussion than I have been able to give to it, I suggest it would be quite reasonable to abolish altogether commercial blockade; that if we admit the highways of the sea should be free, we should also admit the freedom of the termini of those highways. But it seems impossible to abolish the practice of the military blockade.

Then he says that this practice of capture is more mild and humane than land warfare, and I agree that it is to those who are blind to consequences. If, however, you follow out the economic effects of capture, I think you would find the misery inflicted by it upon non-combatants greater than that inflicted by the actual bullet and shell.

Admiral Bridge says we permit the use of merchant ships in war. Quite obviously if we are going to abolish capture we should have to abolish the whole practice of using merchant ships in war, or strictly limit it by careful rules. You might still want merchant ships to coal your vessels at sea, but all the merchant ships would have to be unarmed. Then he tells us in a passage in answer to the suggestion that the abolition of capture might lead to a reduction of armaments, that the navy is necessary to keep communication open to different parts of the empire which otherwise would cease to exist. It

is a very odd argument against the abolition of capture that it would prevent communication between different parts of the empire. If anything would induce to the strengthening of the very slight bond which exists between us and the rest of the Empire, it would be the abolition of this practice, with the result that our communications would thus be effectively kept open. He also thinks that our geographical position is conferred upon us by God in order that we may do the maximum mischief to our neighbours. And also the same Divine Providence relieves our maritime trade of molestation, and enables us to molest that of others. I have already explained there is no such thing as our trade and others trade, but that all trade is one. If it be true that our geographical position offers advantages, I sincerely hope we shall find a better use for our advantages than Admiral Bridge suggests. Lord Sydenham urges us not to abolish capture because it is the greatest deterrent against war that the merchant and shipowner possess. He then advocated the practice of gratuitous insurance against the risk of ocean-borne traffic, not perceiving that if you leave to our merchants and shipowners all the profits of war and relieve them of all the risks of war, you will certainly remove a great deterrent influence. It is necessary for the trade of the world that this practice should be surrendered. Surely that will tend not to the increase of land warfare, but to its decrease. Surely every advance in pacific intercourse must be, not an impulse to war, but a deterrent from it.

Mr. O'FARRELL: Mr. Angell once said to a very unsympathetic audience that the man who did not know the other fellow's case did not know his own, and it seems to me that the other fellow's case is not by any means well understood by most popular advocates of immunity. A recent writer stated, for instance, that capture at

sea was useless to Great Britain unless she was determined to wage war without previous declaration, as otherwise the enemy's commerce would be kept in port or transferred to neutral bottoms. This stagnation and dislocation of the enemy's commerce is the very result at which modern strategists aim. "Capture at Sea" in the course of the centuries has passed through a process of evolution, and now no more resembles the practice called by the same name in the times of Drake and Frobisher, than modern man resembles a Barbary pirate. Its object is no longer plunder, but economic pressure.

The efficacy of economic pressure is abundantly illustrated in "The Great Illusion." I need only refer to the case of Germany in 1911, when a slump in national credit prevented Herr von Kiderlen Waechter from precipitating war with France. It is permissible to ask whether that slump would have been so serious, or, indeed, if it would have occurred at all if German commerce was immune from capture at sea.

The legitimacy of economic pressure—I mean its legitimacy so long as war is allowed to continue—is to a great extent admitted by advocates of immunity. They are practically agreed that commercial blockade, which is really the most stringent form of capture at sea, must continue. This is a very remarkable fact. Investment of great cities like Paris, too, is a form of economic pressure which the Hague conventions never attempted to prohibit or even to regulate. And recently there was a proposal, which the advocates of Immunity greeted with much enthusiasm, to reduce armaments by putting economic pressure on a special class, largely composed of non-combatants, namely the income-tax payers.

Economic pressure is doubtless barbarous, in the sense that all war is barbarous, but in no other sense. Lord

Loreburn said that "there is no operation of war that inflicts less suffering than the capture of unarmed vessels at sea." Mr. Wright, it is true, strongly dissents, and thinks that the privation and possible starvation of non-combatants, men, women and children, is more horrible than the horrors of the battlefield. The loss of the nation's manhood is also an economic loss, and involves possible starvation for the dependents of the killed and wounded. Capture at sea can be largely alleviated by insurance, as the horrors of the battlefield cannot. The contention that economic pressure is more barbarous than bloodshed, is, moreover, not consonant with Mr. Wright's further assertion that "where war is most barbarous, it is most incessant." A curious result flows from the two statements, that Great Britain which adheres to this crowning barbarity of capture, must be more frequently at war than, say, Mexico, with its relatively milder methods. In fact, Mr. Wright uses the word "barbarous" in two different significations, as happens to suit his argument for the time being.

It is probably untrue that "where war is most barbarous it is most incessant," in the sense evidently intended, that the barbarity and the frequency are cause and effect. Modern war is probably less frequent, not because it is less barbarous, but because it is more costly. The modern commercial interdependence of nations has wrought the change, by revealing to all classes the vast material injuries that war inflicts on business and daily life, and the small results, if any, to which it really leads. In consequence, there is a growing dislike to war, and commercial interests combine to avert it. Of all foreign trade, that which takes place over the ocean highways is the most important, and the losses that result from Capture at Sea—not the mere loss of ships and cargo, for that is the least part of capture, and the most readily

alleviated by insurance—but the indirect losses resulting from the stagnation of industry and the shock to national credit is the most serious and the most obvious.

That is what I mean by asserting that the abolition of capture would cut at the roots of Norman-Angellism, and that argument is not met by saying that both belligerents and some neutrals would suffer less. The wider the area of the injury, the stronger will be the pressure to avert it. If both belligerents suffer, then war has two enemies instead of one. There is a double instead of a single check.

The only possible answer to this line of argument seems to be that if immunity abolishes some checks against war, it would substitute others more powerful. If that were the case, I should certainly welcome it. But it is the very point at issue. It is always said that it would lead, not perhaps at once, but ultimately, through the atmosphere which it would create, to a reduction of armaments. If it did, that would, of course, be a very welcome relief, but it would not do away with war. The nations would be in the same relative position unless armaments were not merely reduced, but abolished, and *kept abolished*. War cannot be got rid of, except by getting rid of its motives, and capture at sea is not a motive but a means. At any rate, if a motive, it is not the sole, or even the most powerful motive. The lust for territory, for dominion, for so-called markets, would remain.

Mr. Wright's attack on the experts seems hardly reasonable. Mr. J. M. Robertson puts the common-sense of the matter in a very clear light on page 49 of his "Letters of Reasoning." "Where authority clearly turns on special knowledge, in a region which we have not the time to explore for ourselves, we all accept authority as a working principle. . . . Experts may err ; there-

fore I must not be their partisan against those that appear competently to criticise them, but subject to that reservation, I take the risk of being misled." That is the point. Mr. Wright does not criticise the experts, competently or otherwise: he simply denounces them. This is not reasoning but rhetoric.

I contend that Mr. Wright has also exaggerated the risks run by underwriters, and I have taken the trouble to look over the bankruptcy statistics, including the Russo-Japanese war, in which many underwriters were involved in heavy risks.

Mr. WRIGHT: I do not suggest that underwriters would be ruined in a case in which this country was not a belligerent.

Mr. O'FARRELL: I have looked up the bankruptcy statistics. I admit it is very difficult to trace the bankruptcy of insurance companies because the registrar does not give marine insurance separately from other forms of insurance. Over a series of years all failures of insurance agents generally, which I suppose includes marine insurance, are so absolutely insignificant in comparison with other businesses that I really wonder whether a Lloyds underwriter ever fails at all. In this way we can restore the public opinion of the stability of Lloyds. I found, then, that whereas in 1904 eighteen shipping firms failed for £177,000, there were 29 marine insurance agents who only failed for £33,000 and none at all of the marine underwriters failed. As regards bankruptcy statistics, they do not appear in the registrar accounts at all. I endeavoured to look up the profits of some of these companies which specialise in marine insurance and I found one marine insurance company, whose capital is not particularly big, for a whole series of years from 1904-10 paid a dividend, including the years of the Japanese War, of 44 per cent. An armament firm which we all know—Armstrong-

Whitworth—paid on an average a dividend of 15 per cent., so it seems to me that if we are looking about for a policy to suppress war that the most hopeful is a crusade to make armament firms give up their nefarious trade and take to marine insurance.

As one of the rank and file of this movement I should like to utter a word of warning. I foresee that the movement will be in a position of great delicacy and difficult if it allows itself to become seriously entangled with such questions as these. It is a cardinal point in Mr. Angell's propaganda that nothing should be said or done to diminish the power of the country for defence, and rightly or wrongly, there is a great body of opinion, not by any means confined to naval or military circles, that the abolition of capture at sea will greatly lessen that power. This question may well be left to be advocated by its professed supporters or by the older school of pacifists. We are not out to attack this or that operation of war but to attack war itself. Our business is not to lop off the branches, but to lay the axe to the root of the tree. This method, so opposed to Mr. Wright's ideas of progress by one step at a time, has been astonishingly successful, though it has only been tried systematically for four or five years, as against the century and a half in which immunity has been advocated with very little results.

Mr. BENSON: Mr. O'Farrell scored when he came to the insurance question. But we are not underwriters. Mr. Wright was dealing with the whole question of capture at sea from a national point of view. Mr. O'Farrell rests the whole case for the capture of private property at sea on it being a deterrent. He says it may reduce armaments, and asks "What of that?" If it will reduce armaments it is a big step in the direction of a deterrent to war. As a matter of fact the question of the capture at

sea is one of the greatest Anglo-German controversies. "What is Germany going to do? We fear that our commerce is in danger." Put that out of the sphere of war and you would immediately find that the feeling against Germany would begin to decrease. The decrease of armaments is one of the most important factors in the abolition of war.

MR. MARTINDALE: I invite Mr. O'Farrell to speak to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce. We have the united opinion of the Manchester merchants at the present on this matter. The success of the Norman Angell views has been due to the Manchester merchants who lost such a lot of trade in the Russo-Japanese war that they have questioned the whole basis of war. Why when we are neutral should our trade be seriously in danger? It means that our commerce is disturbed when we are not interested in the slightest degree.

MR. HILTON: The gentlemen from Manchester have supplied one of the most effective illustrations of Mr. O'Farrell's arguments. Manchester merchants are being brought in crowds to the Manchester Norman Angell League by the practice of capture of private property at sea. Then it would seem to follow that if the practice of capture at sea were abolished their interest in the Norman Angell League would begin to wane.

MR. TOULMIN: The great difficulty of this subject is its extraordinary complication and Mr. Wright failed to convey that extraordinary complication. We have volumes of history and discussion of a complicated character on this subject. Mr. Wright and Mr. O'Farrell dealt with the fact of capture at sea but not with contraband. In the Russo-Japanese war everything was done under the law of contraband. If the Declaration of London had been in force in 1904 these things would

have been absolutely unthinkable. The Declaration of London was opposed by every Chamber of Commerce in the country. Mr. Martindale represents commercial experts who passed a strong protest against the Declaration of London. When you go to war you have got to trust the experts. Therefore do not go to war. Mr. Wright has not followed out the economics of land warfare. In land warfare the enemy advances through a country. Bit by bit the enemy lines go forward, and bit by bit the country is taken. There is no dominion over the sea and therefore in order to enforce that interference with transport that is necessary for the carrying out of the purposes of war you have to have the seizure of private property which is imperative in land warfare. The whole business of improving war is futile. People have been trying to improve war for 300 years. My own view is that we have to go straight ahead and we must go against war.

MR. KNOLLENBERG: The crux of the argument is, according to Mr. Martindale, whether or not the abolition of the right of capture would or would not result in bringing about a difference in the attitude of merchants towards warfare in the carrying on of their business while war is in progress. Because merchants of England are afraid of war with Russia the merchants will see that no money will be given for this purpose. Therefore the right of capture should be retained.

MR. O'FARRELL: I have received a great deal of support and there is really nothing to reply to. The only point on which I would have had something to say has been answered by Mr. Toulmin. If, as Mr. Martindale has contended—no doubt correctly—we suffered as neutrals in a war with which we had no concern, the remedy would seem to be to modify the rule as to capture rather than to abolish it. Mr. Toulmin had, however,

very aptly pointed out that the cases of which the Manchester Chamber complained had to do with the rules relating to contraband with which the advocates of immunity did not propose to interfere.

Mr. WRIGHT: I do not agree that there is so much difference between the proceedings of Drake and his friends and the modern practice. They both result in the wholesale destruction of property. I quite admit that what Mr. O'Farrell says may be true in regard to the objects of this maintenance of capture. Similarly with the objects which the experts set before them, but so far as I have been able to discern the objects which they set before them are not attained. I quite agree that it is absurd to suggest that the proposal for the abolition of capture is logical. Of course it is not. No proposal for the modification of war can be logical. What I suggest to you is this: that the abolition of the practice of capture is as far as it goes, and it goes a good long way, the abolition of war itself. It seems to me that if you encourage peaceful commerce you destroy the causes of war. The very fact of reducing armaments gets rid of some of the waste and misery of war. I said that experts are very good servants but bad masters. I regret to find that when I have enunciated a rather striking argument in rather a striking form Mr. O'Farrell said: "This is a copy-book argument and you must not take any notice of what you read in a copy book." This is a most dangerous thing to suggest to the young. Then Mr. O'Farrell tells us that this idea of abolishing the practice of capture has made comparatively small progress. It has not made the progress I should like to see, but it has made very great progress after all. It has been advocated in all important countries and by many Chambers of Commerce. It is one of those proposals which seem to be practicable.

July 21st

115

The Manchester Chamber of Commerce has been twitted with inconsistency because they opposed the Declaration of London and supported the Abolition of Capture. It must be remembered however that under the Declaration of London it was feared our food supply might be threatened and therefore the action of the Chamber was not perhaps so inconsistent as would at first sight appear.

QUESTION TIME: THE YELLOW PERIL AND THE UNEMPLOYMENT ARGUMENTS

First Session : July 22nd

MR. NORMAN ANGELL IN THE CHAIR

NORMAN ANGELL : So far these morning sessions have dealt a little too much with one particular phase of the problem. We have had one phase of it and stuck to that. It is a good one if we were to remain here for six months, but we are only here for ten days, and we must spread over a larger field. This morning I thought of firing at the selected victim a question, and asking him to reply. That question comes to him as a question from a member of a large audience. After giving definite questions with a clear note, or as clear as you ever do get it from an audience, after giving you actual questions, I will give you an objection, in the shape of a paragraph from Mahan, or Homer Lea, or some other military writer. When you get a question, one difficulty is solved, for you know what the question is, and you have to see into what category of our Grammar the question falls, but when you get an eloquent passage from Bern-

hardi, or when you get an eloquent speech, your mind has to say, "What the blazes is this man driving at?" to see what really is in his mind, and then, in order to gain time, you have to say, "The question in the speech of the gentleman who just sat down appears to be this," and then you reframe your question as best suits the reply in your mind. While framing the question, you get time to see into what category it goes, and, when you have reframed it, you get the question in the form which is easiest to answer.

Of course, in a reply it is far better to give a clear reply on one point than to give a muddled reply to his whole speech. The ideal form of reply is this kind of thing:—Colonel Ingersoll was once delivering a lecture on Special Providence and the fact that miracles do not happen in our time, and a member of the audience got up and said that he did not at all take Colonel Ingersoll's view. On one occasion he had been going to take a ship at New York, and, by an accident which made him very angry at the time, he missed his connection and lost that ship, which went to the bottom with five hundred souls. "What has Colonel Ingersoll got to say to that?" Colonel Ingersoll said, "I want the opinion of the five hundred." There was the whole case. If he had lectured for half an hour, he could not have bettered it. It is rarely that you can deal with a thing in that way. But I will give you one or two questions which lend themselves to that sort of reply.

Granted that an European opinion might be educated up to the point of the abolition of armaments, what about the attitude which may be taken up by the great empires of the East, which are now waking up? Mr. Bedford, please.

Mr. BEDFORD: My good friend, the problem we are discussing to-day can be divided into two parts: What

is immediately necessary to be done ; and what will have to be done when we have accomplished the first part of our intention, and for the moment the empires of the East need not enter into our conclusions at all. In the first place, we want to get a real sort of European opinion. Supposing I assume that the attitude of the Eastern Empires on this problem does concern us, I should like to point out to you that the very problems which we are dealing with in Europe to-day have corresponding phenomena in the East, and that what is good for Europe is good for the East. To illustrate that point I should take the case of Japan. It is quite conceivable that a real China-Japan problem analogous to the Anglo-German problem might conceivably arise in the East, and then the principles of Norman-Angellism will be the very best antidote to the arrogant ambition of the Japanese or Chinese statesmen. But Norman-Angellism is more immediately concerned with the facts of European diplomacy, and when we have succeeded in composing the difference between the European Powers we can go on to that problem, and not till then.

NORMAN ANGELL: Some of our American guests are interested in the problem of the Asiatic nations. Granted that an American opinion might be educated up to the point of the abolition of armaments, what about the attitude of the great empires of the East, which are now waking up ? Will Mr. Fraser answer ?

Mr. FRASER: The gentleman asked if the Western nations composed their differences what will happen to the nations in the East ? Well, the answer would seem to be that the very first thing to do, if there is such a thing as a Yellow Peril, is for the nations of the West to settle their individual differences and amalgamate, and form a steady front against these. Our proposition is not absolute disarmament, our proposition is

reconciliation between the Western nations, and the maintenance of sufficient armaments to repel attack which may come from another direction. If it is true that the Western nations cannot gain anything by aggression, how is he going to prove that the Eastern nations are going to gain anything by aggression ?

NORMAN ANGELL : The first thing to bring home is this : If we are really threatened by the Yellow Peril, then it is high time we composed our differences between ourselves.

Mr. HILTON : It is sometimes said that, although there are no essential differences between the European nations, it is well they should keep up their squabbles because otherwise they might not maintain large enough armaments to repel the East.

Mr. FRASER : It is a pleasantly metaphysical doctrine that people who ought to defend themselves should fight each other.

NORMAN ANGELL : The lecturer in his reply to my question, as to what the Yellow race would do when European disarmament had taken place, said that the Yellow race would wake up to the futility of war just as the Europeans would have done ; but he overlooks this fact : there is a great difference in the position of the European races and the Japanese in relation to your own country of America. You allow the European races in. The German desiring to find a livelihood in the New World goes to your country and is welcome. The Jap and the Chinaman desiring to enlarge his opportunities are not allowed to enter the New World. Would not the Yellow races say : " We will agree to the futility of aggression like the German and Englishman if you will place us on the footing of the German and Englishman."

Mr. FRASER : I should say that it is very sad that the Japanese and Chinese cannot come in ; but what are they going to do ? They cannot fight their way in ; they cannot bring over seventy-nine battleships and shoot their way in. They have to face that hard fact. The other answer is that there are other places on the earth besides Germany and France and England, and to those places, South Africa, South America and so on, they can go. They simply cannot help themselves by force.

NORMAN ANGELL : Why cannot they do it by force ? The military experts tell us that a Japanese army could land on the American coast, and make their way even to Omaha before the American army could oppose it the least in the world.

Mr. FRASER : If the gentleman had been in the Boer war he might possibly be able to answer that question about the likelihood of getting to Omaha. He might say how the Japanese could get across the Pacific coast, and also what they are going to get to eat.

Herr VON LUBTOW : Did not the Japanese succeed in the Russo-Japanese war ?

Mr. BLYTHE : In the first place, they did not cross the Pacific Ocean. In the second place, they did not have to haul food across the ocean. They did not have to encounter a desert. They did not have to meet a population of ninety millions. I suppose when you get into the main portion of America, that some of these difficulties come up.

Herr VON LUBTOW : Did the Japanese succeed in the Russo-Japanese war or not ?

Mr. BLYTHE : I do not think they did. To-day Japan is burdened with one of the greatest debts of any nation in either Europe or Asia. Her credit is practically

worthless. She cannot borrow any more money. Russia can. It is a matter of fact that France after the Prussian war was able to lend money in a shorter number of years than Germany was. Japan to-day cannot get money in the markets of the world.

Herr VON LUBTOW: Japan did not want money, but to achieve her end.


NORMAN ANGELL: Will Mr. Hugins deal with the question of Mr. Von Lubtow? This fact, that it is all very well to say that Japan cannot fight America, but Japan fought Russia and succeeded.

Mr. HUGINS: Mr. Von Lubtow shifted his ground a little in the last expression of his question. I would bring in the point which Mr. Blythe brought in: They have in that country a debt so tremendous that they are staggering under it. They are nearer social revolution than any other so-called civilised nation in the world. They really gained nothing in the Russian war that might not have been gained by a little statesmanship. They were trying to force a way into Asia, and they thought that here was Russia a great power standing as chief opponent to their world expansion, so they went to war about it. We know at the present time it is a fact that the Japanese and Russians are now working together to accomplish their mutual expansion. Why was it necessary to go to war, to fight each other, to spend millions of their money in order to find out that they were really friends?

NORMAN ANGELL: How would Mr. Pitman reply to "It is all very well to say that the experts are wrong about 500,000 Japanese coming to Omaha, but they fought the Russians and succeeded in spite of what the experts said"?

Mr. PITMAN: What do you mean by success? To impoverish their people, to ruin their own credit, to have some of their men and women so poor that they have to rent blankets because they cannot afford to buy them? Then Japan succeeded. Japan annexed Korea, but all she got in Korea was the right to spend its money for administration. Korea will not belong to Japan until the Korean people are assimilated by Japan, and they could have been assimilated just as well without conquest.

NORMAN ANGELL: The Americans have been learning their lessons one can see. One little point of criticism. Here there are two questions. First, the general Yellow Peril question, which was replied to by the fact that the Western Powers ought to unite if there is really a danger. It was then pointed out that the Yellow people were not in possession of America and that the Western nations were. Japan might challenge the power of America to support that rôle. It was pointed out that the Japs had won in their war with Russia. The first thing was to show that the Japanese problem in the Russian war was not the same as it would be in an American war. The Japanese did not overcome the Russian people and establish themselves there, but if they came to America they would have to penetrate into America, and have to impose themselves on America by this means. Far truer, would it be to say that Russia was trying to penetrate into Asia and Japan stopped her. Japan was rather in the position of America repelling an invader. Japan said that "Korea is racially a part of Asia, and we are going to prevent you Russians coming." If the Japanese war has any lesson at all for Americans it is this. That a small people resisting the advance of a great people operating from a distant base have a power of defence which makes it almost a physical impossibility for an invader to overcome them. At this



For every why he had a wherefore.
Hudibras.

point it would be time to take definite illustrations from the Boer war. When you get this question from the querist about the Japanese coming to America, then say quite briefly: "The gentleman thinks that the Japanese can quite easily invade this country from the Pacific coast, and make their way to Chicago." Now there are certain historical facts which bear upon the possibility of that kind of thing. Some fifteen years ago Great Britain, which has had more experience in the conquest of over-seas territory than any other nation whatsoever, was confronted by the problem of overcoming a little people of 100,000 souls, living in a territory so bare as hardly to be able to support them, not able to manufacture arms and ammunition. The military experts in Great Britain said: "It is a quite simple affair," and the military expert further said that with 25,000 men and ten million sterling they would eat their Christmas dinner in Pretoria. It was then October. The audience know, of course, that it did not take 25,000 men six weeks and ten millions of money to overcome these people. It took a campaign of three years, involved from first to last the employment of 250,000 men, and cost £250,000,000. I ask the questioner to do a little sum in proportion. If it takes 250,000 men three years and £250,000,000 to overcome 100,000 people, how long, and how much money, and how many men, would it take to overcome a population of 100,000,000, occupying not a poor territory, able to manufacture the finest arms and ammunition in the world? I have done that little sum in part. It would take a Japanese army of 47,000,000 men operating fifty years. The money side I have not worked out, but I am satisfied that Japan has not got it. Please do not think this instance is an isolated one. It is the invariable story in recent years since the introduction of the rifle with a flat trajectory.

It is the invariable story of all countries, operating from a distant base, confronted with the problem of invading a territory inhabited by a population even untrained in arms which is determined to defend its territory. In the case of Italy in Tripoli we were told by the Italian experts there would not be a war at all. It was a parade to satisfy the vanity of Turkey. Two years after the opening of the Tripoli war, although Italy was using one of the best-equipped armies in Europe numbering 100,000 men, and was confronted by a small number of Arabs, two years after the opening of the war the Italians had not pushed their lines ten miles from the coast, and the gentleman thinks that the Japanese would be able to push their way something like a thousand miles in two weeks.

MR. BENSON: Suppose the heckler puts it this way. I am not concerned with the possible military invasion from the Yellow nations. Suppose China, with its 400,000,000 people, becomes permeated with Western ideas, so that the demand for better living comes more general, and gradually expands pacifically right over Europe, until the Europeans are crushed into the sea like the nations in the *Volkerwanderung* at the beginning of the Christian era?

NORMAN ANGELL: Again the assumption is that Europe having united herself, will disarm, irrespective of any problem confronting her in the East. Disarmament is not coming by a sort of world proclamation. We hope that we are within distance of a more united Europe than we had before. With a possibility of combined action against any common danger like the Yellow Peril, that combined action of defence and the retention of the instruments of defence would go on as long as the danger was a real one. If Japan acquires Western ideas, that will mean that Japan has to give her people

a scientific education, and to such people we can appeal by reason. China is not an empty country. The Japanese do not need to extend over into Europe. The whole of our development in the last hundred years is proving that with better methods of agriculture, with the greater intensification of the exploitation of the world, two processes stand out. There is a tendency for populations to expand at a lesser rate. Highly developed and highly educated populations are not riotously fertile populations. When you get a high state of living, you get a small birth-rate. All highly-developed countries indicate that tendency. So it would be with China if she became Westernised. On that side you have to take in the growth of education. The other tendency would be a much greater productivity of the soil of China with the more perfected instruments that education would give her. Therefore, you would enormously increase the productivity of the Chinese soil to feed a population which would tend to decrease. By this means you would find in the future the means of settling the relations of the White and the Yellow races without any necessity of conflict.

The gentleman says that the Japanese will not attempt to invade the United States. He has relieved our minds, because I rather thought it was a thesis of military experts that California would be overrun by the Japanese. As regards the Philippines—no American will go to the Philippines unless he is paid. If the Japanese want an outlet for their labour, why should they not come to some arrangement by which they could send their labourers to the Philippines? The Japanese would be a good exchange for the Mahommedan pirates who now inhabit the Philippines. We could come to a working arrangement with Japan by which she could obtain an outlet for her labourers, which is all she needs,

and help in the development of these islands towards self-government.

Mr. COCKS : Suppose they said that, being an agricultural, primitive people, the people of the Transvaal can afford to hold out to the last man, but a highly-civilised country like America, with all its machinery of civilisation, cannot afford to do that. That the problem confronting the American Government is to feed 100,000,000 people, and supply its factories, and that the Japanese would be able to destroy so much of the American wealth that the American Government would not be able to fight because their whole civilisation would break down.

NORMAN ANGELL : The heckler's query would have had a greater appearance of reality if he had applied it to a country like England or Belgium or Germany than to the United States. The industry of the United States is not so developed that the occupation even of California, the destruction of a railroad centre in Omaha, would dislocate the industry of the rest of the country. America is still largely an agricultural country, and most of the states are self-contained. While shares would fall, and so on, the country would still feed itself. Illinois does not feed itself from California, nor does California from Illinois. You have in America a country of large territory relatively sparsely populated. The Japanese would have a proposition in its elements not unlike that which confronted the British in the conquest of the Transvaal. If you care to put that case as referring to a more highly industrial country like Germany, where the division of labour does render Germany dependent on her imports, I would deal with it in another way.

Dr. NASMYTH : What would happen to the industry and credit of Japan while all this was going on ?

NORMAN ANGELL : That is a much more effective answer to your point than the one I have just been giving.

Mr. GRAHAM : Would this be a good answer ?—The only way for Japan to get out of her present bankruptcy is by Western capitalisation, and by becoming a Western nation. By the time your Japanese army is ready to go across to America, Japan is simply bound to be an industrial community, and there is really no industrial problem at all.

Dr. MEZ : We have up to now in our arguments admitted that Japan might have this desire, and we have overlooked the fact that the growing interdependence and the growing literature has created within that country an opposition to this aggressive spirit towards other nations. I think that is very important. I read a book about Japan, saying that the peasants have to sell their rice because they could not pay their war taxes, and have to feed themselves with a bad quality of rice, and, since the Russian war, conditions have changed in Japan itself, and it is important to know what would happen in Japan—would the population of Japan support the Government ; would the population of Germany support the Government ? We have a majority against an aggressive policy.

Mr. ROMANES : Are you not going on the assumption that both countries are not actually prepared from the military point of view ? You are assuming that the Americans are in the same condition as the Boers were ?

NORMAN ANGELL : The population to be overcome is not a matter of preparation. Your Boers were not prepared for war. With the Americans, the militiamen have the same kind of rough training that was given to the Boers. There are men in America quite capable

of handling artillery, very used to shooting, showing great aptitude for handling machinery, far greater aptitude than was shown by the Boers, and with this frontier training, which makes them able to adapt themselves. I think that our Japanese General Buller would make a very grave mistake if he overlooked the fact that the Americans have horses.

Mr. HAYCOCK: The Canadians have the Yellow Peril. The Japanese say the Canadians are the dog-in-the-manger. There are territories in British Columbia, larger than Japan, unoccupied, and nobody defending them, and the Japanese think they should be allowed to get that land.

NORMAN ANGELL: The Japanese would be 5,000 miles from their base, and the Columbians 500. In the days of wireless telegraphy the Japanese cannot pass with their boats 5,000 miles without in a few days these empty territories being in the possession of militiamen.

Mr. BENSON: Is not the great difficulty in getting men across not the great mileage of the water, but the loading and unloading of ships with the food and the men; is it not the getting 400,000 men on and off the ships with all their impedimenta?

NORMAN ANGELL: The military experts assume that all done without anybody knowing anything about it. If the Japanese are going to occupy a part of Canada, they are challenging the whole of the Anglo-Saxon race, and when they have landed their 200,000 men, if they set up a government they would have to face the hostility of the United States. They are challenging the whole power of the Anglo-Saxon world. Australia, England, the United States would say: Are we to allow the Japanese to become successful in wresting away Anglo-Saxon territory?

Mr. HAYCOCK : Do you think the Japanese would obtain economic advantage if they were successful ?

NORMAN ANGELL : It is supposing too much.

Mr. HAYCOCK : They will say that the Norman Angell thesis will be destroyed if you admit economic advantage.

NORMAN ANGELL : Any thesis is destroyed if you admit an impossibility. We are talking in terms of two parties, and we are assuming always that the other man is going to defend himself. You cannot suppose that if the other man would kindly let us do it we might probably get some advantage by knocking him on the head. You have got to consider the problem : What would be the advantage, assuming we have to overcome the resistance of the other man ? The Japanese matter is not in the same category as the aggression of Germany upon England. Personally, since we are dealing with it, assuming I am a Japanese, if I could overcome the resistance of the United States, if I could prise the door of the United States by military means, I would say : The Japanese are justified in doing it. They cannot do it. They will therefore say : Cannot we get what is essential to us in another way ?

Mr. MAWSON : In the middle of last century Japan woke up, and began to look round on the nations of Western Europe, and they came to the conclusion that the foundation of our power was Western science, industry and armaments. They started to build factories, and battleships, and so on. If our movement spreads, we shall be collaterally affecting Japanese opinion on this subject.

NORMAN ANGELL : You have put that point very clearly and very well. And now will Mr. Martindale attempt an answer to this question : If armaments were

abolished, would not the labour markets be flooded by the 500,000 disbanded soldiers and sailors ?

Mr. MARTINDALE : That is a question one constantly gets. The position is an extremely difficult one to place before any audience in an entirely popular manner. Certainly, if you are going to alter the whole basis of armaments in this country, you are going to displace a considerable amount of labour. What we have to remember is that there is an economic consideration underlying the whole thing, and at the present time when you increase your armaments you are displacing labour in other trades. You are taking money practically out of production, and you are applying it to your armaments, and in the same degree you are bound to displace labour by these methods. If we abolished armaments this displaced labour would be employed in a productive capacity by the money which had been spent upon armaments being used in more productive manner.

Mr. BENSON : There is one point I think is well worth consideration. That is this. To begin with, we shall not abolish armaments suddenly. You are not going to throw half a million men on to the labour market. It is going to be a gradual affair. You won't therefore displace a single man, but you will stop recruiting, and will gradually allow your army to die out. Your men will die off, and so your army and your navy will decrease, not by throwing them on to the labour market, but by allowing them to go into the graveyard.

Mr. CALDICOTT : Taking the case of the men who possibly might lose work in the armaments firms, I should say that the firms that make armaments also in most cases make other things in the way of steel, and that where armaments were produced other trades needing

steel goods would probably grow, so that the men would still find employment. With regard to the maintenance of the army and navy, I think we are not going to abolish this straight out, but simply let them grow less and gradually die out.

Dr. NASMYTH : A great French economist has dealt with that question. He says unemployment is affected by the proportion of capital to labour, and he shows that when capital is used in unproductive works such as armaments, only half as many men are employed. When capital is not diverted to unproductive uses, such as armaments, twice as many men can be employed as could be in armaments. The President of the Mexican railroads said that a threatened period of depression in the United States was saved by the declaration of war with Spain, which made the unemployed men go to the army. But the diversion of capital from productive purposes doubled the amount of unemployment.

Mr. HUGINS : The idea underlying this argument is just part and parcel of one of the stalest economic fallacies in the field of discussion. For years we have been told that labour-saving machinery is going to do harm to the working man. Labour-saving machinery has displaced millions of men from their old jobs, but there is just as much work as ever. The question is whether or not it does any harm in the end to put capital and labour from a less productive use to a more productive use.

Dr. BEALE : I should say certainly no, because no government would dare to put all that mass of people on the labour market without finding them other work to do. If England was faced with this problem : How would they propose to disband all these people, they would naturally look about for using these men in another way, and in a more productive way. They have everything

necessary, and it seems to me that such a process would be one of the quickest methods of turning unproductive work into productive work.

Mr. GRAHAM : Your disbanded men and your men thrown out of employment are both producers, whereas while they are in the armaments firms and in the army they are a drag on the working population of the country as a whole. Economically it is simply an increase in the working population of the country when they have gone out of the armaments firms and army.

Mr. BLOYE : Would it not be better to suggest that if the whole of disarmament did not come about gradually, if it came suddenly, it would possibly pay the government of the country to pension off every man at present engaged in armaments work for the rest of his life. You would save, if the taxation was kept at same rate, in the raw material that is used in the construction of armaments something like 35 or 40 per cent. of the expenditure.

Mr. BEDFORD : I should be tempted to answer it in this way : Imagine a man who has been suffering from hallucinations, and has been holding up an arm to ward off an attack of the enemy. He finds out that his enemy is already dead, and so, instead of having to do all the work with one hand, he now finds another hand to help him, and the problem is : Is he going to bring the other hand to help the work without dislocating his constitution? It is merely a question of time before he gets all the parts of his body in working order.

Mr. HOLMAN : I have been asked would it not create a serious labour difficulty if disarmament came, but I am a great pessimist, and I do not believe that disarmament would come in a day. Your labour would be absorbed in the general shipbuilding industries, where

it is actually useful, and actually well-trained for the purpose, such as the case of the recent shipbuilding boom when they could not get the labour they wanted. But if disarmament came in a day, it would be very much cheaper for this country, very much more economical to pension those men, than to continue them in a wasteful industry. Who pays for these armaments, who pays for all this labour? You, from the taxes, from your own pockets. As your taxation was reduced, you would have more money in your pockets, and you would stimulate every industry in the country. Your expenditure being the same as before, the same labour would be needed to supply your needs, while you would have larger quantities of food, etc., than you had before.

Mr. HILTON : We ought to bear in mind that employment is not an end in itself, but only a means to an end. It is not work men want, but products.

Mr. HAYCOCK : This question does not require a two-minute reply—it requires a speech.

NORMAN ANGELL : Sit down! That makes thirteen, and none of you have done it. When you get a question like that—it does not matter what form you get it in—you ought to have worked out in your mind what reply will best explode the illusion which surrounds every question of that kind. Bastiat exploded it better than anyone else, and you have never heard of his explanation. Do not talk about that it is not labour we want. Do not be abstract and indulge in economic terms at all, because a man who has been hunting for a month for a job who is told that it is not work he wants is going to kill the lecturer. In every meeting you get at least a dozen questions which bear on that point, and some of them are given an emphasis that shows they evidently think that they have got you. Do you propose to throw

hundreds of thousands of men who have been engaged in producing armaments and working in the army and navy out of employment? Here was a man voicing the fears of thousands on a matter that vitally affects them. It is no use talking to him about the difference between productive and unproductive labour, but you must give him a definite simple explanation in about two minutes, which I think would enable him to see. I do not pretend to be able to do these things, but I do see what is needed. Say something like this :

The gentleman thinks that because in Newcastle battleships are built costing two million pounds, 75 per cent. of which goes in wages—or assume all of it goes in wages—therefore two millions more of money is circulating among the population. Where did that two millions come from? Did it come from the moon? It came out of your pockets. Would it not have given employment if you had spent it instead of the Government? If you in Manchester had been allowed to spend that two millions on better food, trips to the seaside, the education of your children, would not all that have given employment? You have thrown two millions worth of labour out of employment in Manchester in order to transport it to Newcastle. You may say: Anyhow the labour is only transferred. Oh no, not at all. If you had been allowed to spend that money here in Manchester, you would have been able to educate your children better than you are doing. You would be able to buy pictures you have not got. You would have been able to repair your house, and eat a better dinner, and all that would have created just as much labour as the construction of these battleships, the only difference being that you have employed a man, paid him £1 a week or £3 a week not to give you a dinner but to build battleships.

Let us assume, for instance, that the Government, instead of putting that two millions into a battleship, had put it in a dam across the Wash, because the engineers have told us that a good slice of it could be reclaimed by the expenditure of something less than we pay for new battleships, they would use as much work and machinery as the construction of a battleship, with this difference : When you have reclaimed your land, it does not end there. You then have 50,000 acres of good land, and you begin to grow crops on it, you want ploughs and harvesters and houses and railroads for your men employed in ploughing and harvesting the crops. The amount of labour you employ by that productive means is infinitely greater than that which you employ in making the battleships. When you have done a productive piece of labour you have created a market which will go on expanding for all time ; you have created a market which will never end ; and when you have created your battleships, you have in ten years old scrap iron. There is the difference between the two things.

You may say that is all very well in the ultimate working out of the thing, but what about now. Then you can bring in your point. This thing is not going to take place suddenly. We are not going to throw these men out of employment. It simply means that next year, or the year after that, it being a question whether we shall stop this man making bread for you in order to employ him making a ship—which we have not yet made—in Manchester—we will just leave him alone making loaves of bread for you. He will be employed, and you will have the bread, and just as much labour will be employed. Bit by bit, as the taxes are taken from battleships to dams and land-reclaiming, we will make arrangements that that transfer of expenditure is done in such a way that there is no unemployment.

The Labour Party can easily fix that even if it means that men be pensioned at fifty instead of sixty. These arrangements can be made as part of the arrangement for reducing the expenditure upon armaments. That has taken about five minutes. If you polish it up you will find that you can get through the essential demonstration of Bastiat in that. First, that money which has been spent goes out of his pocket ; in order to provide it, he is throwing his shoemaker out of employment. I did not discuss any abstract doctrine, I simply showed a process, and that is what you have to do if you are going to convert lay economists. Is the difference clear ? Is that process clear to your minds ? If it is, you can make it clear to others. Suppose you make him see money goes out of his pocket, that by so doing he is throwing out of employment the men who are feeding and clothing him ; secondly, it is not merely a shifting of employment from Manchester to Newcastle, but that if the money should be spent productively, it is rendering unemployment in the future less likely because in productive work he is creating markets for the future, which battleships are not. Do the whole thing by a concrete illustration, and not by any abstract distinction between labour and production or productive or unproductive labour. Avoid economic principles. Assume that he does not know anything about economics, but hammer the way in which the expenditure on unproductive labour tends to create unemployment.

Mr. FISHER : You forget that at one period a man who was a strong pacifist, a man who was against armaments,—Mr. Will Crooks—had pressure brought to bear that more work should be given to the men at the Woolwich Arsenal, and he pleaded in the House of Commons that work should be given to the men at Woolwich. They thought that reduction of

armaments would cause some men to be put out of employment.

NORMAN ANGELL : The Labour Party have got to see that the transfer of labour does not throw men out of employment. Even if we have to pension these men off at forty, it is far better than there should be increased expenditure on battleships. In order to give Jones a job in Woolwich, he is throwing Jones out of a job in Manchester.

Mr. FISHER : Jones in Woolwich knows that he wants a job for Jones in Woolwich rather than for Jones in Manchester.

NORMAN ANGELL : There are fifty propositions which could be brought forward by the Labour Party. There could be a Bill by which all electrical materials for telephones, etc., should be given to government employees to prevent unemployment from reduction of armaments. So that the two millions of Churchill's armament men should be put into productive work, it may be necessary to send them to a technical school in order to do it.

Mr. BLOYE : In the case of any individual man who lost his job, it might be in a serious position.

NORMAN ANGELL : I keep on saying that it is for them to bring a Bill into Parliament.

Mr. FISHER : The reduction may take place on the next Budget.

NORMAN ANGELL : There is nothing to prevent the Labour Party from supporting that Bill.

Mr. FISHER : They want to know that that Bill is going through.

Mr. GRAHAM : No government would dare not to allow the Bill to go through.

Mr. LUNNON: There would be a large number of labouring men thrown on the market, because labour cannot be suddenly displaced in that way. The money would be spent in other industries, but employment in some districts would be very bad. There is going to be a long and slow redistribution of labour, and in Newcastle there would be a prolonged course of bad poverty while the redistribution was taking place.

NORMAN ANGELL: The thing has got to be constructively met, and what we are doing in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred is not so much meeting the case which has just been stated; we are meeting a universal illusion which people have in their mind that the construction of battleships gives work. They do not see how that is a fallacy. That is the first thing you have to do. Get that home. Make him see wherein the fallacy of that thing lies. You have here a quite definite case. It is a case we have to meet. It is up to the Labour Party to meet it. The sooner we tackle some constructive plans for dealing with it the better. I would put that quite seriously as a piece of government constructive work. If you make any of the explanations or qualifications you have made the man would not understand what you are driving at. It is not possible to put what actually takes place in terms of a principle. In this matter of meeting possible unemployment because of the reduction of armaments, the Labour Party has not met it at all. Why not have a Bill framed in the terms that, when a reduction of armaments takes place, the Government must provide that no men now employed in a Government service should be unemployed, if contracts do not come which were expected. If you come down to the details of advancing the whole period of pensions, of providing a larger amount of governmental work for places now engaged like Woolwich because

armaments firms are manufacturers of other things than ships, well the plant would have to be scrapped, the refitting of a factory for something else itself involves employment of labour. It is far better for us to pay these men to do nothing than that they should go on expanding armaments. The Labour Party ought not to throw this responsibility on the Pacifists. It is the job of the Labour people to make this provision.

Mr. HAYCOCK: I suggest that Mr. Hilton was right, and it is not good tactics to leave in the minds of the working man the fallacy that work is an end in itself.

NORMAN ANGELL: If you were to make that kind of remark to a man thoroughly imbued with the old conceptions, you would go on talking abstract economics all night. You can only disturb a specific fallacy by showing the man how things work, and you cannot do this except by means of actual concrete illustrations. Do not bother his head about labour as an end or labour as a means, I may be quite wrong, but I have made a very deep study of the methods of presentation, and when you talk in abstract terms of labour, productive labour, unproductive labour, and use school definitions, you are not getting home to the mind of the people you are trying to convince how the thing works.

Mr. HILTON: I did not mean that the answer should be given in those terms: my suggestion was, and I hold to it very strongly, that the lecturer himself must have an absolutely clear grasp of that root fact, or he will go astray in his concrete illustration and flounder into all sorts of contradictions. There is hardly a single speaker or writer in the public eye to-day—not even excepting Mr. Angell himself—who does not more or less often fall into error through relaxing his grip on that simple truth. I fancy there was a faint streak of the error in

even the argument you have just put forward. If the reclamation of the Wash means more and yet more work for our artisan classes I should be out against it, for I don't want to see any return of the seventy-hour week. What you mean is that the draining of the Wash would give more food and clothes, more products, for the same or less labour than is now put into battleships. Then why not say so? It is no recommendation to say of any measure that it "makes work." Any fool can make work; it is the making of bread and butter that takes brains. And, believe me, the working man knows that. He may not have worked it out, but he knows it well enough to set down the lecturer who overlooks it as something of a windbag. Indeed, I will go further than my original suggestion and say that the man who will make that plain to his out-of-work questioner will carry both the questioner and the audience with him far more surely than if he talked specious generalities about the superior work-making qualities of peace expenditure.

MR. TINKLER: We assume that two Dreadnoughts have to be built. That £4,000,000 saved is certainly raised from the taxpayer, but with regard to your illustration of the bootmaker and baker being more needed, the difficulty was this, that the money left in the pocket of the taxpayers is spent on luxuries, and therefore tends to become less productive labour. The more you spend on luxury, the less does that produce. For instance, tobacco, drink, and, to take a concrete illustration, if the Duke engages an additional footman, that is unproductive labour.

NORMAN ANGELL: That the money for Dreadnoughts comes from the wealthy classes out of luxuries, and not from the poor classes out of the necessities, is true to a certain extent, but not entirely. If we have to

choose between Dreadnoughts, which means the possibility of war, the possibility of further destruction, the perpetuation of very dangerous vested interests, explosive materials which may do infinite damage, and an automobile for a rich man, even if the automobile may be all for the rich man, it is better than a Dreadnought. The motor finds just as much employment as the other, and even a chauffeur's job is just as desirable as that of a fitter or a boilermaker, and we can deal with that problem of taking the surplus of the wealthier more easily than we could deal with the other problem. In the case of the Dreadnoughts we are perpetuating a condition of things which makes it impossible for us to give our attention to some proper distribution of wealth. The wealthy man may be pleased to pay for Dreadnoughts if he thinks it will be impossible for a poor man to organise his energies so that he may be able to find a way to get a better distribution of wealth.

Mr. BRACHER: A brother-in-law of mine is the managing director of a factory in Somerset which has been engaged in manufacturing skin rugs. Of recent years prejudice fostered by doctors and hygienists against skin rugs caused the sales to begin to fall off. My brother-in-law did not wait to have his factory standing idle. He did not sack a single man; he started manufacturing children's perambulators, and the growth of that department is more than counteracting the decline of the skin-rug department. The armament people will not wait for their men to be thrown out of employment—they will provide against it . . . Capital does not want to be unemployed any more than the labour does, and the armaments firm will do something with its capital. With regard to the Bill providing against unemployment, it would be a perfectly business-like and simple arrangement, and simply what every business man in the same position would be doing.

WHAT IS CREDIT?

PAPER BY MR. JOHN HILTON

Evening Session : Wednesday, July 22nd

Perhaps the most important of the half-dozen or more basic propositions on which Mr. Norman Angell rests his case for the futility of military power is as follows :—

“Wealth in the economically civilised world is founded upon credit and commercial contract. . . . If these are tampered with in an attempt at confiscation, the credit-dependent wealth is undermined, and its collapse involves that of the conqueror, so that if conquest is not to be self-injurious it must respect the enemy's property, in which case it becomes economically futile.”

Most of us here have at some time or other found ourselves expounding the principles of “The Great Illusion” to ordinary folk whose thoughts have never had much occasion to run on matters of banking and credit-finance, and I am probably voicing the experience of everyone when I say that almost invariably, after explaining that the intricate and sensitive system of international credit-finance makes conquest in the modern world economically futile, one gets the question, “That's all very well, but what *is* credit ?” My purpose to-night is to try and answer that question in a manner and in language that can be understood of the multitude.



I think you're probably right ; but I don't agree with you.
Festus in search of a Formula.

What is credit? The question is not one to be answered in a breath. Right at the outset arises the difficulty that the word seems to be used, even by business men discussing business matters, in half-a-dozen different senses. We hear, for instance, that Jones has obtained three months' "credit," that Brown's "credit" is good, that Smith has a "credit" of £500 with his bank, and that Goldstein has lent somebody his "credit" for £10,000. So far we feel we can just about keep our heads. We hang tight on to the solid comforting fact that the right-hand side of the cashbook is the "credit" side and that a person to whom something is owing is a "creditor"; but when we learn further that the banks are manufacturing too much "credit," that a nation has been exporting "credit," and finally that "credit" has stood in the way of a European War, we are inclined to give up the whole thing in despair as being incomprehensible to mortal man.

Yet it may be that all these kinds of credit have something in common; and if so, it is probable that the simplest credit-transaction will, with careful scrutiny, reveal it. Suppose, then, we take the following dialogue which appeared many years ago under one of Mr. Raven Hill's inimitable sketches in *Punch*:—

BUTCHER: "Well, my little dear, an' what do you want?"

LITTLE DEAR: "'Taint wot *Hi* wants! *Hi* wants a dimind dog collar, an' a bro'm, an' a perminint parse to the Music 'All, an' a seat at the Corinashun. But it ain't wot *Hi* wants, it's wot muvver wants, an' *she* wants 'arf a pound off the scraggy end of a neck o' mutton, on the nod till Monday."

Now "on the nod till Monday" is a credit arrangement.

Of course, the average person knows about *that* sort of credit. He has heard of people who constantly indulge in it, and has even seen, behind the counters of shopkeepers lacking in refinement, notices saying "No

Credit Given"; but it had not occurred to him that credit of that kind had anything in common with that other credit which is said to be influencing international relations. Yet this proposed deal in the butcher's shop is in several of its features an exact counterpart, however paltry and mean, of those countless daily credit-transactions, involving scores of millions of pounds, by means of which the work of the modern world is carried on, and by reason of which the great nations have become one interdependent community in which the good or bad fortune of one is the prosperity or adversity of all; and it will serve excellently to illustrate one or two elements common to all forms of credit.

Let us look into this mutton transaction, and see if it will yield some definitions.

The "little dear" is quite evidently borrowing something, and we may note at once that credit has to do with borrowing and loaning. What is she borrowing? It is obviously not mutton, for she won't take the mutton back on Monday. Neither is it money, for the butcher is not lending money to-day, thank you. Examine it closely, and you see that what she is really borrowing from the butcher is purchasing power—in this case the power to purchase mutton—and she will return that purchasing power on Monday in the shape of coin. Having grasped that, we can frame our first and fundamental definition: "CREDIT IS THE LOAN OF PURCHASING POWER."

I would ask you to keep a tight grip on that definition. So far as I know, it has not been given elsewhere, but it has proved for me so stable a foothold from which to look around on the whirling universe of credit-finance that I fearlessly commend it to your notice—at any rate, until a better can be found.

Now let us look a little further into our chosen incident, to see if it will illustrate some of the attributes that belong to credit transactions. Observe, first, that she is borrowing this mutton-purchasing power "till Monday." From that you will rightly infer that time is an important element of credit. Observe, secondly, that our butcher is not going to hand out good mutton in exchange for a mere promise, unless he has faith in the commercial integrity of "muvver." Confidence is evidently an essential condition of credit. Thirdly, I will ask you to assume that "muvver" has an afternoon's charing in front of her, but is in need of a meal to give her strength, and that her larder and purse are both empty. Without this mutton, the work cannot be done: With it she can earn two shillings, out of which she can repay the loan, leaving a substantial surplus for herself. Granting me that assumption, you will agree that credit, rightly used, facilitates production. You will also let me take it for granted that the butcher is going to charge for the half-pound of mutton not twopence-halfpenny (the cash price), but probably threepence: the extra halfpenny being compensation for risk, and for the loss of interest on the sum of twopence-halfpenny over several days—in fact, it is what the financial man calls discount. These four things—time, confidence, productive use, and discount—you will find to make a part of almost every credit transaction you care to examine.

This goes as far as our original illustration will take us. We cannot carry it further, because the mutton deal is one solely between the butcher and the little dear; it does not rest upon any credit-handling institution. Also the token of the transaction, instead of being a cheque or a bill or a note, is merely a nod. If we could adopt universally a nod currency instead of the present gold and paper currencies, it would save a wonderful lot of

bother ; but unhappily the nod is only suited, in the present imperfect state of civilisation, to small and simple transactions of a neighbourly kind.

But two further common features of credit can be very well explained without going beyond the business affairs of our butcher. You know, of course, that as fast as he sells out his stock of meat retail he must buy in new supplies wholesale. But whilst his retail takings are in coin it would be a great nuisance to have to pay his own larger accounts in coin, for that would necessitate his keeping a lot of money about the house, and would entail much trouble and expense when he wanted to send large sums long distances. So day by day he carries his takings to the bank, where they are received over the counter, and entered to his "credit." Then, as his accounts become due, all he need do is write a cheque for the amount, and send it with a minimum of trouble and expense to the meat-merchant or farmer in quittance of his debt.

So he will probably have at the bank a sum varying between £5 and £200. Whatever it be, it is his ready money, which he keeps at the bank instead of having it in his till, and as ready money he must be able to draw any or all of it out at any time ; and he leaves it with the banker on that definite understanding.

It might very well be supposed, then, that the banker must keep the butcher's balance in actual cash locked away in its strong room ready to be brought out whenever the fateful demand should be made. It would seem so ; yet in actual fact the bank does nothing of the kind. If the butcher's balance stands at £50, the bank, instead of hoarding that sum in gold, actually lends £40 of it out at interest straightway, keeping only £10 in hand against emergencies.

How can it possibly do that, and still be capable of refunding the whole £50 on application? The answer is that it trusts to the law of averages. It pins its faith to normal happenings. It does just what every insurance company does—pools its risks. Let us examine this process, for it is the cardinal principle of banking.

First, the bank regards the butcher as an average sort of meat-purveying person, who is extremely unlikely to come running in one day for fifty sovereigns, and just as unlikely to pay out cheques to the amount of £50 to people who would all bring them to the bank and ask for cash. It can feel pretty sure that most of the butcher's cheques will be paid by those who receive them into their own banks, and will thereupon be cancelled off against other cheques without any coin whatever passing. Altogether, it may feel reasonably sure that £10 in cash will meet any one day's demand on the score of the butcher's £50 credit.

But a bank cannot stake its existence on the normality of a single butcher! No, truly. But the bank has more than one customer—it has hundreds. Not only the butcher, but the baker, the tinker, the tailor, and the candlestick-maker all have their current accounts at the bank. There are a thousand of them in all, let us say, and their average deposit being £50, they have amongst them handed over £50,000 to the care of the banker. Now it is quite conceivable that a few amongst these might suddenly take it into their heads to want all their money out in golden sovereigns, or might pay cheques to a few people who would all come in on the same day for gold; but it is about as improbable as any human contingency can well be that any large number should take such a curious fancy. As a result of generations of experience, the banks can feel confident that not more than one-fifth of the money which they are

holding on call will be wanted by its owners at any one time. Relying on that belief the banker in this case is able to lend £40,000 out of the £50,000 deposited with him, in the almost absolute assurance that the remaining £10,000 will suffice to meet the heaviest cash claims that may, by any series of coincidences, be made upon him at any one time.

The banker must be able to meet all his demands with spot cash, or put up his shutters for good ; and we have seen that, apart from some appalling catastrophe, he is able to undertake to do this, and at the same time lend £40,000 out of every £50,000 deposited with him.

Observe now what results flow from this arrangement. Without the bank's services, the £40,000 would have been locked away in the private safes of the traders, or would have lain hidden under mattresses or in tea-caddies in the good old-fashioned way ; for, since they want it on hand for ready money, the traders in any case could not lend it out at interest, but would have to keep it by them. By using the facilities offered by the bank, not only do the traders gain security and ease in paying accounts, and the bankers profit for themselves ; but three further great benefits have been rendered to the rest of the commercial world ; the first being that £50,000 of purchasing power is out in the world on the strength of £10,000 cash in the bank, the second that otherwise idle capital is productively employed, and the third that small scattered sums have been collected and made available in bulk for productive enterprise.

I said a few minutes ago that the customers of the bank deposit cash there, but of course they do not all hand in actual cash. The great majority hand in simply paper—cheques or bills—which constitute merely a claim on the cash held by other banks, in which case the banks merely cancel off their claims against each other, and only

the balance is actually transferred. Also I have spoken of banker "lending" the sums intrusted to him. You will understand that this includes what is more commonly called investing. About one-eighth of the whole he lends against documents, about one-quarter he invests in high-class securities, and the remainder he uses in discounting bills.

I have already touched briefly on the nature of a "discount," but perhaps it is worth while picturing a simple transaction, involving the discounting of a bill.

Let us suppose that in the neighbourhood is a wool merchant, who has just delivered £1,000 worth of wool to a neighbouring cloth manufacturer. The mill owner is a man of no great capital, and cannot possibly pay for the wool on receipt, but in three months' time he can very well do so, for by then he will have sold his cloth, and got the money for it. In that case he gives to the merchant a promissory note saying in effect, "I will pay you £1,000 in three months' time." But neither has the merchant so much capital to play with that he can wait three months, so he takes his promissory note to the banker, who gives him in exchange credit for £1,000 less the interest on that amount for three months, say, £990. The banker now holds the bill until it matures, whereupon he draws the full amount from the mill owner. The £10 is the "discount."

You will hardly have failed to observe, in that simple illustration, the service credit has rendered to the merchant and the manufacturer, who, being men of small means, could not otherwise have carried on their business; and you will doubtless have recognised in that £990 lent by the banker the sum of many small balances deposited with him by the butcher, the baker, and the rest.

Having now brought into relief the distinguishing features of credit from instances with which everyone

is more or less familiar, I want to make plain what purpose money itself serves in the world ; for until we are clear upon that we cannot assess the service rendered by credit when it multiplies money's effectiveness. Also we must understand just why at a time of disturbance people prefer gold to any kind of paper, and thus why a stable edifice of credit can only be built at present upon a firm foundation of gold.

The germ from which all the marvellous contrivances we are discussing have sprung is to be found, it may now be remarked, in the division of labour ; for if everyone made for himself all that he needed—food, fuel, clothing, shelter and all the rest—there would be no need for either cash or credit or banks or Bourses. Incidentally, too, there would be no civilisation ; and certainly there would be no inter-dependence even of individuals, much less of nations.

But with the division of labour goes the necessity for exchange ; for our needs are many, and we can only confine ourselves to one line of work provided we can exchange most of the products of our labour for those various things which we need to support life, and which others are producing by their special tasks.

Thus arose barter, the direct exchange for one article for another, such as a stone axe for an earthenware pot, or five arrows for a haunch of venison. But direct barter has many inconveniences, and it has almost disappeared from human dealings. Schoolboys still swap peashooters for fag-cards ; one still has callers who will give a handsome pot of geraniums for a discarded pair of trousers ; and there is still the advertiser who wishes to exchange a Persian kitten for Gibbons' "Decline and Fall." But these are only interesting survivals of a by-gone system. The trouble with barter is that one has to go so far to find a person who has a

“Decline and Fall” to dispose of, and who is also longing for a Persian kitten. Moreover, one might want two articles from two different people in exchange for the superfluous kitten, and be unable to get them because half a Persian kitten is no good to anybody.

In the face of these difficulties, it is easy to see how money came to be invented; for money is a go-between which everyone will accept in exchange for his goods. It may be corn, or skins, or olive oil, or salt, or cowrie shells, or even cattle (and it has been each of these things at one time or another); so long as everybody will take it in exchange for what they want to dispose of in order to exchange it again for what they want to obtain, it is money. Once a commodity wins to that position, the advantages that follow from its use are enormous. Not only does it provide a medium of exchange, but it also affords a standard by which the value of everything can be measured, and it affords a convenient means whereby wealth can be stored.

As a result of a long process of trial and rejection, one form of money eventually came to supplant all others in civilised countries—that made from the precious metals gold and silver. They won their place by virtue of the fact that money made from them is intrinsically valuable, easily portable, extremely durable, unvarying in quality, perfectly divisible, fairly constant in value, and not easily counterfeited—these being precisely the qualities which the ideal currency should have.

Of these two metals gold is far and away the most important, silver (in this country at any rate) and copper coins being no more than metal tokens serving to enable us to pay small fractions of a pound.

Gold is the metal that mainly and finally counts, so I shall say nothing more of copper or silver but confine my attention to gold.

Of the several excellent qualities attributed to gold, one is of outstanding importance to our investigation into credit, and that is "intrinsic value." By this is meant that a sovereign is not only valuable as money: it is equally valuable as metal. It is worth £1 not only because the law says that anyone to whom I owe that sum must take my coin in payment: it is worth £1 also to the manufacturer of jewellery or gold-leaf or pen-nibs or dental fillings for the metal it contains. Thus whatever might happen to the bank that issued it or the government that legalised it, it will always fetch its value as metal in the open market in any part of the civilised world.

Now this constitutes a vital difference between a gold currency and the credit currency which we are to consider in a moment. The use of money which has intrinsic value involves no element of belief, trust or confidence. If I buy a pair of boots, and tender the shopman what he considers to be a good sovereign in exchange he does not need to know my reputation, nor even make enquiries as to the solvency of the bank which issued my money; he has got value in gold for value in boots. True the division of labour and exchange of products is in operation—he has been keeping a bootshop while I have been rationalising his foreign policy—and to that extent we have become dependent on each other, and in a general way indispensable to each other; but that reliance in each other's integrity which in larger transactions the credit currency calls into being, and which must of sheer necessity make each of us solicitous for the other's well-being, has not yet been evoked. The use of "intrinsic value" money allows us, when our exchange is made, to drift apart into separate and independent bits of humanity; our dealings have not yet been mixed up with that credit-cement which would unite us with

countless others of our fellows into one organic whole.

This use of "intrinsic value" money, too, puts a premium on robbery with violence, which will speedily become a discount as credit currency takes the place of cash. If Mr. William Sykes learns that I am going to visit the bootman with a sovereign in my pocket, he may waylay me at a dark corner, knock me on the head, and rob me. If he is successful, and gets clear, he is a sovereign the richer for his little exploit. But when I begin to carry a cheque-book or some other bundle of bills of exchange (as I shall for all sums that are really worth risking six months' hard labour for), he will find that, however well he has carried out his exploit, he has got nothing for it but several pieces of paper, which are useless for anything but pipe-spills. The use of credit-money puts robbery with violence at a discount. To this fact, indeed, is due the decay of the profession of highwayman which flourished so exceedingly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The race became extinct, not because a few of its more illustrious members were hanged, but because the rest died in the poorhouse.

And precisely that transit from a cash to a credit currency which rendered the highwayman's profession bootless appears now to have done the same for all other professions which depend upon force as an instrument of social advantage. "Your-money-or-your-life" has become a fatuous formula not only for him but for nations. The pistol which is levelled in the latter case is a larger and more expensive one; but it back-fires even more disastrously and at the best only produces the same blank cheque.

After what I have said about the intrinsic value of the gold coin you will see why credit must always have a

gold basis and why the structure must not be allowed to get too big for its foundation. If we could be sure that the confidence normally reposed by each in all would never give way to a sudden epidemic of distrust we could dispense with gold reserves and let credit rest ultimately on confidence alone. But we have to take account of all contingencies—the failure of big ventures, industrial conflicts, and particularly the outbreak of war. If by any one of these or other happenings public faith should be shaken, paper, which has no value apart from the will and means of men to keep their promises, will lose its virtue; and gold, which has value whatever may occur, will be demanded instead. If the disturbance is but slight the gold reserves of the banks will suffice to meet the demand and allay the distrust; but if a great calamity overlook civilisation the banks would have to close their doors and the credit machine would cease to work.

From the fact that a gold reserve is necessary it must not be inferred that the confidence on which credit normally rests is a thing of no account. As I have said, it provides no safeguard against a complete breakdown of public faith. The normal operations of credit are rendered possible solely by virtue of the faith—half personal and half impersonal—which men have learned to repose in their commercial neighbours, and in society as a whole, and which finds its expression in credit. It is even yet but a weak and nervous faith, one that must be for ever bringing its credit for reassurance to the touchstone of gold, but even so, it is a potent bond between man and man. Credit economy is only in its beginnings. Let those who have to speculate on the future endeavour to forecast what its place and power will be a thousand years hence.

Metallic money may be written down as the greatest labour-saving contrivance the world has seen since

the division of labour began : but the change from a cash to a credit currency has been even more potent as a conjurer of wealth, and has at the same time introduced elements into human society of which humanity prior to the last century had no cognisance, and the ultimate consequences of which it is impossible to foresee. Not only has it enabled an immeasurably greater amount of business to be carried on than could have been the case had gold remained the sole medium of exchange, but it has provided a nexus between man and man, nation and nation, which compels every one of us, whether we like it or not, to be the trustees of each other's interests, and the participation in each other's joys and sufferings. In credit, perhaps, more than in any other social instrument, economics and ethics meet.

When you come to reflect on it, paper money is something of a miracle. There is nothing very remarkable in a shopkeeper giving boots in exchange for a coin containing 123 grains of good yellow gold ; but that he should give boots in exchange for a bit of paper is not merely remarkable, it is astounding ; and if we did not know that such things were done every day we should find some difficulty in believing it to be possible. What makes it possible is men's faith in each other, coupled with their belief that to-morrow will be much the same as yesterday and to-day. In passing from gold to paper, we pass from doubt to faith in the integrity of men and from distrust to confidence in the stability of the social order. Wherever paper carrying the right to receive gold passes in place of gold itself, there a transaction involving some degree of credit takes place. Three kinds of such paper are in common use—the banknote, the cheque, and the bill of exchange. Time will not suffice for a detailed account of these instruments and I must be content to make one or two remarks on each.

The banknote is the first step from metallic to paper money. It is the form of paper that is most nearly "as good as gold." It is usually secured by gold to about two-thirds or three-quarters of its face value kept in the cellars of the bank. Thus when credit paper is being discussed the reference is hardly at all to the bank-note, which carries us but a little way into the domain of credit.

To the cheque I have already referred in some detail. A cheque is simply an order on a bank from one of its customers to pay cash to the person in whose favour it is drawn. It is interesting to reflect that considerably more than £16,000,000,000 worth of cheques are accepted in this country alone in payment for goods and services rendered, and only the most insignificant fraction of these is dishonoured. The sum may serve to visualise for us one tiny part of the confidence which people habitually repose in each other's integrity, and in the stability of the social order.

The most potent of all credit documents is neither the banknote nor the cheque, but the bill of exchange. The banknote is a documentary promise, and the cheque is a documentary order, to pay money on demand: the "bill" is a documentary order to pay money, not on demand, but at some specified time in the future. Time is the essential feature of the bill, and the one which distinguishes it from all other instruments of credit.

The bill serves two main purposes—it enables people to provide themselves with immediate capital for present industry; it also does for international trade what the cheque does for the home trade—cancels off one transaction against another without the need for any but the most trifling amount of money passing.

By the use of this most wonderful of industrial instruments, the entire interval between, say, the harvesting

of a crop of wheat in the Argentine, and its sale by merchants in another country 6,000 miles away, is bridged over. Instead of the purchasing power represented by the profit being hung up for two or three months while the cargo boat transporting the wheat is on the sea, and the wheat itself in the warehouses, it is coursing freely about the markets of the world supplying the daily needs of those who have assisted in its production. Almost from the sowing of the seed, the farmer and all those after him who are to assist in placing the final product where it is needed, are able to look forward to the day when the bread from which it is made will pass into the shopping baskets of London housewives, and are able to coin in the present their expectations for the future.

There is no occasion for me to go into the influence of credit on international relations nor to trace the probable effects upon world-finance and world-industry of a great war. That was done once and for all by Mr. Norman Angell in his already classic address to the Institute of Bankers. I will merely remind you, and you will probably understand the reason why more readily from the simple story I have been telling, that an attack upon any country with a highly-developed credit system would shatter at the first onslaught that confidence in which credit has its being. People would refuse to accept paper; people who held paper would present it and demand gold. There would be a run upon the banks. To save themselves from the final catastrophe of closing their doors and avowing their inability to meet their obligations the banks would call in gold from every quarter where they could set up a claim to gold. They would call in at once their gold deposits at the national bank, which would thereupon find itself in desperate case and would itself call in the gold owing to it in every part of the

outside world. And both the local and the national banks, with a view to harbouring such gold as they could get, would rigorously restrict their loans, would cease to discount bills and to issue credits giving the right to demand gold. From these measures two results would flow. The drainage of gold from every quarter in the world whence a handful could be conjured would weaken the foundations of the credit structure in every great financial centre in both hemispheres and jam the brake on the world's industrial mechanism. By ceasing to discount bills the banks would cut off the supply of purchasing power from every industry and business whose capital was locked up in its stock, and to that extent would bring production to a partial standstill. On the stoppage of discounting, a wave of petrification would spread outward from the banks. It would not check itself at the national frontiers, for commodities under production throughout the world destined for sale in the markets of Great Britain, and in many other markets too, would from that hour be starved of the credit which they would otherwise have enjoyed. The farmer on his land in Argentina or Russia, the cotton grower on his plantation in Southern America, the tea grower on his estate in China, the producers, one and all of that £700,000,000 worth of food, raw materials and manufactures, which flow into the markets of Britain every year, would find as fast as electricity could speed through the cables, paralysis creeping over their industry.

Credit paper, in the view of some critics of the existing order, is entirely fictitious wealth ; a solemn humbug ; a figment of the avaricious imagination of a cunning class who make use of it to enrich themselves out of the fruits of honest labour. It is but paper, dirty paper, and if as a result of some great calamity, the credit-machine

is thrown out of gear, and the paper becomes of no value, why—no honest man is any worse off, for the solid tangible wealth which the paper was supposed to represent remains.

It is plausible, but it is not true. Credit paper is not in itself wealth, but it is the generating force of wealth that is to be, and if it is destroyed that potential wealth does not fructify. It is fields ploughed but not sown; crops garnered but not marketed; bridges prepared but not built; shafts sunk but not down to the seam. Paralyse the means whereby these world-wide labours were going forward, and you do in very fact destroy wealth. Wealth is not a fund, but a flow. Credit is the power behind the current. Destroy credit and the wealth stream becomes a stagnant wealth-pool which exhausts by dipping.

Mr. Angell has given me another image in which to visualise credit, one that for greater clarity frees it from association with money, which after all is no more than a token, an intermediary. Credit, he put it, is the expression of the belief that the other man will do his part. It is what gives John who is building a bridge faith that James will bake bread and Tom will weave cloth for him during the months of building. Probably that goes nearer the inner mystery of credit than anything I have yet said. I pass it on for your consideration.

Herr VON LUBTOW: It has been a very great pleasure to me to listen to this clear and simple exposition of the credit system. We can put the case as put by Mr. Hilton to the Primrose League or the Navy League. One question, however:—If I take a £5 note to St. Petersburg and I want Russian gold for it, supposing there is a war between Germany and France, would I, or would I not, get £5 in gold for it in St. Petersburg. I gather I do not get it in case of war.

Mr. HILTON : I should say in the event of war between France and Germany, the holder of the English £5 note might find some difficulty in getting gold for it in Russia.

Herr VON LUBTOW : Is the interdependence so great that I as a German would lose if I had English money ?

Dr. NASMYTH : I was in Germany last year with the Balkan War at a critical stage. I wanted to get some money I had deposited at Heidelberg. I was not able to get gold at that time. It was curious to me that the Balkan War could prevent me from getting gold up there in a quiet German town. Mr. Angell has told me that attention was first attracted to this whole work by an incident that occurred when he was in America—the crash of a house down in South America swept away the money he had in England. I have been tremendously interested in Mr. Hilton's paper.

Mr. BENSON : We need not take such an extreme case as that of Herr von Lubtow. War, we may be sure, would certainly raise the discount rate, and even if Mr. von Lubtow got his gold he would have less than in the case of peace. Mr. Hilton said butchers and bakers pay in gold to a total sum of about £50,000. Then the banker, having drawn in £50,000 and lent out £40,000, thereby increasing it five times. As a matter of fact, he has decreased it 20 per cent.

Mr. HILTON : Much of the money people pay over the bank counter is in cheques. There is really little cash handled.

Mr. HAYCOCK : You said you could make paper take the place of gold. Therefore, you could save money in the milling and mining. Why do you require this gold, if you could get paper to take its place ?

Mr. HILTON: We can only have credit at present so long as all people have confidence that they can get gold for the paper. Gold has an intrinsic value. That is why your credit must be referred back to gold.

Mr. HAYCOCK: Suppose we had extracted the last grain of gold from the earth?

Mr. HILTON: The governments of the world could say: "We will have one common law in the manufacture of paper money, and we will only manufacture paper to a certain amount." Then the world could be run on a paper currency.

Dr. NASMYTH: It is said prices need not rise because of the depreciation of paper money. If you have the right amount of paper in currency then the prices can be made to remain constant. That is the basis of the scheme for standardising money; do away with gold entirely, and base it on our commodity index figures. You do not need the touchstone of gold. Nations can get on with a paper currency if you do not have too much of it. The question of the ratio is an interesting one. Mr. Hilton says that if you place £10,000,000 in a bank that is a basis for five times as much actual money. In international relations, when you move ten million pounds from Brazil to London, what amount of money do you transfer—that is purchasing power? I think the amount is four times and not five times. When you come to study international trade, you find that a very remarkable thing is the small amount of gold which does move as a matter of fact. It seems as though you could lay down a new law that Nature abhors the movement of gold. All sorts of forces come into play to prevent international movements of gold. There is now going on in Japan a tremendous commercial crisis because Japan finds it necessary to reverse the balance

of trade, which has been an excess of imports ; it finds it necessary to develop an excess of exports in order to pay interest on the tremendous sum borrowed. That takes place through a change in prices.

When a nation changes from the state of moneyflowing in to a state where money must be paid out, the adjustment takes place in the form of a flow of commodities, it takes place by prices becoming lower in that country so that it is an advantage for countries to buy there. Every country goes through three periods—one, a period when there is an excess of imports over exports ; two, a period where there is an excess of exports over imports—when it is paying more interest than it has coming in—three, an excess of imports, when a country is living on the interest of its foreign investments. An excess of imports takes the place of an excess of exports in time of war, and it brings commercial collapse because prices drop very rapidly, and this is a part of the tremendous industrial suffering brought on by war in a great many of the modern cases. There are a lot of interesting questions here, and we ought to take up one of them. In “*International Polity*,” in the chapter on credit, it is stated that “We have in the development of international credit a sensory nervous system for this wonderful organism.” The objection to that statement is based on a misconception as to how far business prosperity represents the real prosperity of the country. It is assumed that the country prospers when stocks are high. Prosperity means rising prices, which is a period of intense suffering for the labouring man.

Another question is the relation of insurance to all this. It is a very important question. It is at the bottom what Mr. Angell calls in “*The Great Illusion*” the higher prices of government securities of small countries over those of large countries. No one under-

stands that fully, but when you examine the way the insurance companies place their money, they prefer the security of small neutral countries to that of large countries which may be involved in war. Mr. Angell's case that these countries are really more secure can be shown to be true, because the government securities of Holland, Belgium, Norway, etc., are higher than the others. Insurance has a steadying effect, and (a very curious thing) they continue to keep their contracts in time of war, and even though they are violating the law of the countries by so doing. If Lloyds insures German citizens, international law says that all contracts are broken when war is declared, but Lloyds must continue its contract with the German citizen for its own benefit, and again and again the precedents of the English insurance companies have given the assurance that insurance contracts would be maintained, in spite of the law on that subject, if war occurs. Also international credit relations must be maintained, even though the law says that contracts are broken. It is to the mutual advantage of the nations concerned, and cannot be avoided. There are a large number of interesting questions which have not been touched on in economics.

Mr. MAWSON : I saw in the paper the other day that the German Government were making an arrangement with some leading banks for an increased gold reserve. Can you explain this action ?

Mr. HILTON : I cannot, except that whenever there are international complications, or when a nation desires to extend its currency, the banks find themselves obliged to increase their holding of gold. I have given five to one as the ratio of gold to purchasing power, but bankers affirm that when gold is transferred from England to Germany the purchasing power

becomes only four to one. The German bankers have a defective "psychological reserve" which can only be satisfied by a credit system of four to one.

Dr. NASMYTH : As a general principle, if you have a 20 per cent. reserve, a movement of £10,000,000 of gold represents a movement of £40,000,000,000 of purchasing power, and not £50,000,000.

Mr. HOLMAN : Is not our credit system in this country too sensitive, with the result that merchants suffer very seriously owing to the fact that the bank rate is not stable enough ?

Mr. HILTON : That is true, but I think our merchants would rather have a bank rate that varied between 3 and 4 per cent. than a bank rate which was fixed at 5 per cent.

NORMAN ANGELL : There is one point which you do not imply or even infer, but which I am afraid some of us regard as a conclusion—that the outbreak of war would necessarily involve, in the terms of our general conclusions, a financial catastrophe. It does not. It is no necessary part of our thesis that the mere outbreak of war or the fact of a war being carried on necessarily involves a financial crisis. I took part in a discussion a year ago, and the question we had for discussion that night was what would be the financial reaction of a naval war in the North Sea. My view was that after the first panic, I did not believe anything at all would happen. There was a howl of protest, for they had been talking about the suspension of all things. But Germany to-day is perfectly well acquainted with the catastrophe that would happen if she did begin to break contracts and seize wealth, and she would not do it. I said : " Now these German credits you have in your German banks—would you confiscate them as the law tells you ? " Every-

one agreed that "No, we would have to leave those balances alone." This would be the endeavour that businesses carried on on both sides of the sea would do their utmost to see their respective obligations were fulfilled, and the soldiers might be blowing the ships up all the while. If the law attempted to repudiate foreign obligations, it would not be obeyed, and contracts would be respected ; there would be no confiscation of property, and there would be no calamity, and there would be only a sort of naval duel between the ships in the North Sea, and when it was all over, everybody would wonder what it had all been about.

Mr. TINKLER : Is not the fall of consols in many cases a sign of prosperity rather than adversity ? There are some interesting figures to show whether it is not more international credit than national credit that has been developing during the last forty years. That question was put to me at a dinner of the Civil Union, and I could not answer it adequately. It was pointed out to me that one development of the credit system has been that the amount paid in dividends on invested capital each year is more than the actual gold in the country. There is only so many million pounds in the country, and yet capital manages to draw more than that amount as interest on money which does not exist.

Mr. HILTON : I did not touch upon consols at all, because they come under a different category. Mr. Tinkler had already indicated the answer to his own query. The price of consols is affected by two factors, the interest paid on government money may go up simply because interest paid on the other stocks in the country is going up, and the price of capital is going up. If people can get interest on their money in private enterprise, good interest, they will not be prepared to pay

so high a price for government stock. Therefore, consols will go down. If the confidence of the people is shaken in the government's stability the price of consols may go down. These facts would amply repay the research of anyone here who would like to take it up. As regards dividends exceeding in annual value the total stock of gold that has no significance; Mr. Tinkler's questioner was confusing wealth with gold.

Dr. MEZ: Mr. Angell said in the case of war nothing would happen, all would go on just as it was before.

NORMAN ANGELL: I did not say that a catastrophe would not happen; I said it would not necessarily follow. I do not know what would happen. I am not a prophet at all. It is at least arguable that when this long-looked-for war between England and Germany takes place, both capitalists and the merchants of both countries, seeing the effect through their bank and other channels, despite the war, contracts will be respected, and pressure will be brought upon their respective governments that raw material should be passed and exports go on, and the whole war might conceivably fizzle into a mere duel between the navies and nothing else. To the extent to which the German government or the British Government attempted to make it anything more, there would begin to result the catastrophe both were trying to avoid. Either it becomes the mere duel in which the industrial and financial lives of the nations are not concerned, or if there is any attempt at confiscation, indemnity or all the rest of it, then to the extent that policy is followed your catastrophe follows. Your warfare is simply sterile in the sense that it is a mere duel, and if you leave the economic life alone, it becomes absolutely futile.

Mr. HAY: Mr. Hilton has said that banking rests upon the basis of confidence. As soon as that confidence fails, we get confusion on every side.

NORMAN ANGELL: You do not get absolute confidence or absolute catastrophe at all. As Mr. Hilton tried to explain these things are on a sliding scale. Our general impression was that the outbreak of war would mark a tremendous falling in values and ruin and so forth, and that this would be immediately offset by the general recognition that this thing must be stopped. The military people would be allowed to hammer themselves to pieces, but the industrial people would not be so mad as to follow the example of the military folk. They would arrange unofficially and through their ordinary channels to respect their obligations; in other words, confidence as far as the commercial communities are concerned, would be maintained. It is foolish to argue that war would instantly ruin us because, when you say that kind of thing, there comes a Balkan War, in which we are not instantly ruined, and trade is all right, and people say this business is all nonsense, but the alternative is this, if either party begins to steal anything whatsoever, then will begin your process of disintegration. And the extent to which you render your military tactics fertile you will begin to lose confidence, and you will have to pay the piper just as much as the other man. If you leave victory sterile, there will be no appreciable economic result.

FUNDAMENTAL POINTS OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
AIMS OF THE GARTON
FOUNDATION AND OF THE
NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE

PAPER BY LIEUTENANT B. S. TOWNROE

Morning Session, Thursday, July 23rd

MR. NORMAN ANGELL IN THE CHAIR

NORMAN ANGELL : Our corpse this morning is going to be a particularly trying one, because Mr. Townroe, as I know from an earlier experience, is going to kill you with kindness. He is going to show you that you and the militarists are in cordial agreement, and that you do not, like Mr. Von Lubtow, have your militarist day on Tuesday and your pacifist day on Wednesday, but that you can be both, at one and the same time. I am quite sure you are going to have a run for your money.

Mr. TOWNROE : Before entering upon the argumentative part of this paper, I must thank the Garton Foundation and you all here for allowing me this morning to take the part of corpse. After what Mr. Angell has

said, I feel a little confused. He seems to want me to be a corpse and also to give you a run for your money.

I have learned a good deal during this last twelve hours, and I feel most grateful to you for teaching me so much. In the present state of affairs there is nothing incompatible between being a supporter of the National Service League and at the same time being a supporter of Mr. Norman Angell. That is going to be the point of the whole of my address this morning. If, of course, you preach immediate and total abandonment of defence, then our positions would be mutually exclusive, but I understand you do not preach immediate abandonment of defence, and, therefore, we can find common ground. In this hurrying world of ours there is always a danger lest the superficial be taken for the real, the shadow for the substance, misrepresentation for the truth. I think this danger is particularly acute in the case of the two societies which you and I represent. In the mind of the man in the street, who would have little time to penetrate to the back of the principles, a grotesque image stands in the place of the social philosophy which we each regard as being reasonable and balanced. For example—I do not want to be unpleasant—but to many men the Garton Foundation and the followers of Mr. Norman Angell appear to be a collection of prize cranks, chiefly vegetarians and Fabians, who wear their hair very long and make abstract speeches on misty economics. And the National Service League conjures up a vision of retired colonels whose speeches are all of war, and whose great object is to make an army of conscript slaves. The speech which I heard—that delightfully lucid address from Mr. Hilton—last night reminded me of the speech which originally drew my attention to the National Service League. Mr. Hilton pointed out that owing to the interdependence of finance,

war might bring about a dislocation of the money markets; and the Secretary of the National Service League in that earlier speech to which I refer told a story of the ruin of a banker in 1872, which was due to the interdependence of commerce and finance, and he worked that out to show how commercial men must guard against their finances being upset by war. Of course, the conclusion he drew was the necessity of defence. Thus the first speech I heard brought one to agreement.

Mr. Angell's speech last night brought to my mind why we of the National Service League have not used that argument that Mr. Hilton used, during the last three years. The German Government about six years ago, realising that war would dislocate the money market, appointed a commission of the leading economists and the leading experts on this subject in Germany to go into the whole question of finance and war. It is only an example of that scientific thoroughness of Germany which we must always admire. I believe they have made various arrangements to try and prevent that dislocation. I felt that Mr. Angell in his speech was only bearing out the wisdom of the German Government in opening that campaign. My part to-day in this peaceful spot is to try and reach this fundamental point which unites us, and to avoid the fundamental differences.

Defence is one way of ensuring national security, another method which needs to be carried on side by side with preparations for adequate defence is the weakening of the motives for attack. Here is the value of Mr. Norman Angell's work, and as a humble reader of his book I pay tribute to him in carrying on this work. This is the value of his work in France and Germany, and our only regret is to hear that it was extremely difficult to spread his doctrines in Germany and on the Continent generally. We can only trust that from this conference, that the

gentlemen from the Continent will spread an influence which will change the attitude of those on the Continent who are behind the ever-increasing armaments there.

Peace is your object and our chief desire, peace is the keynote of the only National Service leaflet which has been signed by Lord Roberts. These are the words from Lord Roberts to his fellow-citizens: "Experience of war has made me realise better than most men the blessings of peace. A country unprepared invites attack. Every man must realise that it is the bounden duty of the citizen to share in the duty of self-defence." Side by side with these words might well be written section six of the objects of the Garton Foundation. This section reads: "The Directors of the Garton Foundation desire to make plain that they are collectively and individually as deeply concerned as any other patriotic citizen of the Empire in maintaining at an adequate strength during what may be a long period of transition the naval and military forces of the Empire." These two quotations make it clear that in the judgment of our leaders we are both aiming at the same objects; not only are they agreed in words but in deeds. I believe you, sir, supported the Boy Scouts, and you have given personal service in the Yeomanry as well. There may be some who do not agree with section six of your objects, and to them this paper does not appeal. On this question of adequate defence there can be little dispute. The principal doctrine of the National Service League has been admitted to some extent by Mr. Angell in these words: "As long as the current political philosophy of Europe remains what it is I would not urge the reduction of our national war budget by a single sovereign . . . I am prompted to this expression of opinion without surrendering one iota of a lifelong and passionate belief that a nation attacked should defend itself to the

last penny and to the last man." One of the wisest sentences in any of Mr. Angell's books is: "What is needed is a type of activity that shall include both halves of the problem: provision for education, for a Political Reformation in this matter, *as well as* such means of defence as will meantime counterbalance the existing impulse to aggression." Perhaps there is in the League a danger of concentrating too much on our side of the problem, just as you may concentrate too much on the political reformation side.

One meets sometimes those who argue that if war will do even the victor more harm than good, therefore, aggression must always fail, and if aggression always must fail, does it not follow that defence becomes unnecessary? Most of you have heard that argument put forward. I do not think that Mr. Angell's fundamental proposition leads to that, for that argument will hasten the very calamities which you strive to avoid, and, under present conditions, for a rich nation to weaken its defences will only be to spread the illusion that aggression is easy and profitable. Thanks to good guidance only a few hotheads have taken the illogical lines leading from Mr. Angell's theory.

If you will look down the list of your principal supporters in this country, you will see how many leading men in the provinces are at the present minute both members of the National Service League and also supporters of the Garton Foundation and Mr. Norman Angell's theories. Take two examples. The other day Mr. Angell was in Manchester, and then he made one of his most eloquent speeches. The chairman, who was a firm supporter, came directly from that meeting and took the chair of the National Service League meeting. That man was Dean Welldon. The Manchester branch sent me their report. I found the chairman of our

Manchester division of the National Service League is a subscriber to Mr. Norman Angell, to the extent of £5. That man is Mr. T. C. Horsfall. This seems to me to bear out my original point, there is nothing incompatible in being a supporter of National Service and a supporter of Mr. Angell. This gentleman and those like him see nothing inconsistent in supporting those two organisations, both working for national security.

This too deserves more ample consideration. While we are fully agreed over working for peace, we have to consider what influence our propaganda will have on the minds of men while we are trying to win that peace. The abolition of international war will not be an unmixed blessing if we replace it by a warfare between class and class springing from a kind of individualism. Nor would the foundation of universal peace be for the greatest good of mankind, if it meant the abolition of nationality, the loss of those moral, political and ethical conditions which are the very essence of nations, and the establishment of a colourless community at a low point of culture. An acute modern Socialist has pointed out that in the purely industrial stage which might be created, should the aim of universal peace be gained, there might be substituted for the warfare of Dreadnoughts, an industrial *bellum omnium contra omnia*. This danger is sometimes overlooked by both our societies.

It is not to be denied that we of the National Service League are often branded as jingoists, sometimes because of indiscreet speakers and writers, emphasising transient relationships. I mention that so that in the discussion afterwards we shall keep to principles as far as possible, and avoid the personal side.

Let us keep to principles. What is the principle upon which our philosophy is based? On July 19th you were studying the work of John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty."

John Stuart Mill shows clearly from beginning to end that the liberty of the individual must to some extent be subjected to the requirements of society, that this is the first requisite of civilisation, and he twice insists emphatically that the State has the right to compel each citizen to bear his share in national defence. As a matter of fact, John Stuart Mill is really the founder of the National Service League. In every way John Stuart Mill was the writer and the man who had the chief influence upon us and the man who wrote the book upon which the National Service League was founded. We have, therefore, to go back to John Stuart Mill to get at the principle behind our society. Let me give you some quotations from John Stuart Mill. During the crisis of 1860, he ardently pleaded that we should adopt a compulsory training after the Swiss system. (Chap. I., p. 24): There are also many things for the benefit of others which the individual may be rightly compelled to perform, such as to give evidence in a court of justice, to bear his share in the common defence or in any other joint work necessary for the interests of society of which he enjoys the protection." (Chap. IV., p. 135.) He specifies two main duties to society. The second consists in each person bearing his share, to be fixed on some equitable principle, of the labours and sacrifices in defending the society or its members from injury or molestation. "These conditions society is justified in enforcing at all costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment." No liberal maxim is truer than the maxim "Measures not men," but at least these quotations do represent the most important and constant conclusions of our greatest philosophic Liberal of the last hundred years.

I emphasise these words of John Stuart Mill for Mr. Angell in his *Grammar* speaks very highly of

John Stuart Mill. He speaks of the necessity of thoroughly absorbing the first half of his masterpiece. In this you will find the principles of the National Service League. He then goes on to say "that is one of the very few books which really help a man to think." Those of you who have pictured the National Service League under a misrepresentation, if you will turn up John Stuart Mill, it will help you to think a little more charitably of us who support national training.

The principle of universal military training has been advocated more recently in France and Germany by the official leaders of Socialism. Jaurés, the leader of French Parliamentary Socialism, is also the most philosophical writer on army questions in Europe to-day. His work on "The Army of the Future" is undoubtedly the textbook with those of us who want to see defence brought forward not in any military spirit, but on really democratic lines. "Democratic" does carry the whole significance of what I am trying to aim at. Jaurés, in his book, puts forward the very principle John Stuart Mill put forward—and our principle. Jaurés has been of great assistance to us in our policy. Going to Germany, I believe that the late Herr Bebel was a great advocate of the National militia, and in more recent times, Belgium—one may learn a good deal there, because there the policy we are advocating, and that you will have to advocate in the future, has recently been forced by the Radicals upon the unwilling Conservatives, a most extraordinary thing from our point of view—going over to Belgium, you find that for thirty years the Liberal party have demanded compulsory military training. It was the Conservatives who fought against this as hard as they could. It was the ideal of the Socialist Party in Belgium, and they help the Liberal Party to have the nation in arms upon the Swiss model, the exact

system which we of the National Service League propose. This democratic principle which we advocate, which Jaurés advocates in his book, which Herr Bebel advocated in Germany, which the Radicals of Belgium forced on the people, that democratic principle has suffered here through the hot-headedness of a few speakers in the National Service League. In the same way, I am afraid you of the Garton Foundation have lost credit in the country through the mistakes of some of your speakers. These mistakes are only typical of inevitable mistakes in stating any social philosophy. I do not believe I am a militarist, I am hand in hand with you in promoting saner ideas in the nations. In fundamental matters we are all striving for a fresh outlook on international notions. So I hope you will forgive my reference to mistakes on both sides, for we are dealing with fundamental principles on both sides. I am sure Mr. Angell will be the first to agree with me on this point.

I now turn to a point upon which I believe there is agreement—the question of the relation of this country with Germany. We must all regret that a great nation, which has been competing with us at sea, should have a large number of men training for a period four times longer than that proposed to be given to our soldiers, and commanded by an officer class. We must all regret that there should not be a general agreement between the two nations to come to a better understanding; but it is sometimes forgotten, especially by those who do not understand the essentially pacifist effect of national military training, from the German Peace Party's point of view, that a democratic system would be a guarantee against the probability of war ever breaking out between these two nations.

The National Service League simply proposes to give the Territorial Army beforehand the training which at

present is postponed till the time of grave national emergency, and this is to be given on a defensive system and with officers that have themselves been through the ranks in every case. Our proposal is that every man should go through the ranks first. The philosophy of the German Peace School is that the personal training to arms of the citizens of a free country is the surest guarantee against the tendency of a stupid and excitable mob in either country.

Mr. Angell, in his "Grammar," Part I, page 15, expresses that fear more incisively when he says "a crowd grows excited . . . and calls it patriotism." Patriotism engineered by the "Daily Mail" is not always of the best kind for peace between two countries. The point of view that universal military training makes for peace is upheld by a great German historian, who dealt with the relationship between England and Germany, deplored the Press polemics which have done so much to embitter the relations between the two countries, and reproduced the programme of the National Service League: "There is no better guarantee of peace than to be armed for defence, and no better cure for jingoism than to make every citizen feel responsible for war," and wished it success. This is the truth that the National Service League is earnestly striving to impress on the people of Great Britain.

This same point of view is suggested in Mr. Brailsford's remarkable book "The War of Steel and Gold." In that new book you will find this passage: "Paradoxical as it may seem, universal service in a citizen army . . . with a minimum number of professional officers is the true pacifist ideal." Mr. Brailsford's book, although it does not weaken the case of the central doctrine of "The Great Illusion," seems to me to prove very fully one point—that conquest may be most profitable to a small

and governing class. This point is passed over a little too lightly in his arguments by Mr. Angell. The values of war are not necessarily values from the capitalist standpoint, especially where unexploited countries are concerned. Mr. Hilton always referred to civilised countries, but we must recognise the point of uncivilised countries. The capitalists of civilised countries owe a great debt to Mr. Angell for showing that war between civilised nations may not benefit them, but they are acute enough to realise that where unexploited countries are concerned and as far as a small capitalist section of the country is concerned, there can be profit out of war. Thus aggression is irrelevant to the end of this paper, which is meant primarily to show that in the abstract desire for peace there is no great gulf fixed between the Garton Foundation and the National Service League. In the relations between Germany and Great Britain, our road may be the road to peace, not less reliable than the road upon which the Garton Foundation is marching. You may assert that the more you prepare for war the more war you will have. That can be proved false from history.

Let me quote from Jaurés to prove my point. "The talk about fighting and the attitude which ends in fighting comes far more easily to the unarmed man than to one who is armed and knows that the business is serious." He also says, "The armed nation means necessarily the just nation."

Felix Michel brought out the same point: "There was no country more opposed to war than Germany, so much so that one sometimes feels tempted to believe that they have seen that the effect of national training is to make every man seek his own interests on the outbreak of war."

There are certain fundamental points, will you not agree, on which we can march together? Would that

that agreement were more solid over the whole field, then indeed the propaganda of our respective societies could be more balanced and more reasonable. Although in principle we could both take a common stand on John Stuart Mill we seem to be drifting apart through faults on both sides. We, on our part, are doing our best to study the literature of the Garton Foundation. I trust that this imperfect paper may, at any rate, show you that the case for universal military training cannot be idly dismissed as militarist, or jingoist, or even as barbaric. We wish our policy to be guided by reason, and I was delighted to accept this invitation to come here so as to welcome most cordially the intellectual force and the fresh vigorous thought which I knew I should get here to-day, in order that this matter of grave concern could be impartially discussed and rationally considered.

NORMAN ANGELL : You testify to Mr. Townroe how very much we appreciate his paper. One of the good results of having a case stated by the man who really believes it, is that we are compelled to believe in the sincerity of the other man and in his reasonableness. It is an old maxim of mine that you must assume the other man to be honest ; and you are not going to make any progress in the study of our case until you understand his case and put yourself into his shoes on the assumption that he is entirely honest in his opinions.

The paper to which we have just listened, however, presents for us this difficulty, that it covers so wide a field that the discussion may be intangible. You may leave aside for the most part the first half of the paper in which he discussed the principles. I agree that in the fundamental principle, the need for defence, we are in agreement. But that does not necessarily imply that we support conscription. All sorts of considerations come into that which have nothing whatever to do with the fundamental

principle that we are in favour of defence. Because one may thoroughly believe in defence, one may be honestly convinced that the "Eight Dreadnoughts and we won't wait" is not a good measure for defence at all, but a measure which will create misgivings in the mind of the other man and create a situation in which your defence may be more difficult. We are not obliged to support every increase in armaments. But in our party, including both groups, there are those who think that the danger from aggression is small and consequently that as a practical measure of defence it is hardly necessary to go as far as compulsory military training. We have also the others who do support the National Service League. Our party could include, and should include, both groups.

I can make that plain by an analogy. We are in the position of the experts in tuberculosis who say there may be something in these cures—inoculation and so on—for patients already far gone in the disease, but we believe that the final abolition of tuberculosis will come only from preventive measures. We do not absolutely reject your curative treatment; we merely say that it is not our job. Our job is to prevent the disease developing. If this is undertaken consumption will disappear, and we are not concerned to judge as between two rival cures. We are perfectly entitled to say that our method is the final, sure method. Is that clear? It illustrates our position to the National Service League. National service may be the best method of defence, but we hold that the thing which will finally settle this matter is a better European mind. That is the first job of the Garton Foundation.

The Garton Foundation was not established as an aid to the National Service League. The job of the National Service League is to push the need for universal service. There are many who believe that they are doing a

very useful work, but it is not our work. The division of labour is that we shall attend to intellectual sanitation and they shall attend to the work of proving that their cure is the right one. We are working for the time in which cures will not be needed because the disease will be prevented.

In one regard Mr. Townroe has gone a little astray in quoting these Continental people in favour of the principle of military service. He does not realise that when Jaurés advocates the militia he does so because it is a step away from conscription and when the National Service League advocates the militia it is a step towards conscription. That is why it was that in Belgium the Conservative people resisted the proposal for a militia, because it was a step away from the more thorough-going military measures which are now there established. You see there are three stages here. Here you have the minimum of military establishment, there you have the maximum—the militia stands in the middle. That you will have to make clear.

In the second half of the paper, where military service is explained to be a pacifist measure, and the creation of universal military service in England a step towards the world's peace, you had better avoid for the most part any discussion of the expert military question as to the military value of the thing, and discuss the political reaction of that measure. Will military service be, as Mr. Townroe is advocating, a step towards the world's peace, a better European condition, or not ?

Mr. GRAHAM : I should like to explain a mistake which Mr. Townroe made in the early part of his paper, which rather throws light on the whole question of the relation of peace and military service. He said something about our work being useless if we abolished war between nations only to substitute class war. He said

that class war was worse than war between nations. We stand for the interdependence of mankind, and when that is realised, when our educational work is approaching nearer perfection than it is now, it will carry away with it the illusions that make for class war, just as it carries away with it the illusions that make for national war. Mr. Townroe went on to talk of nationality and said that we were endangering nationality. We are doing no such thing. The person who attacks nationality is the armed aggressive nation. Mr. Townroe is careful not to be advocating aggression. The aggressive nation imposes on another nation its own ideals. Therefore aggression is an anti-national spirit. The whole difference between Mr. Townroe and the National Service League and Mr. Angell and the Garton Foundation is this—that while we are cutting at the roots of war, they are merely trying a panacea. Peace may be their desire, but it cannot be described as their object.

Early in his speech, Mr. Townroe said that we had had great difficulty in Germany. I should like to point out that we had considerable success with the German universities, but there is in Germany a class which is wholly opposed to our ideals, a class which knows that our ideals cut at the roots of their conceptions in regard to international politics generally. That class is the conscription class. If that class were in England, they would be in the National Service League.

In the most important part of Mr. Townroe's speech he talked about military service and the jingoism of the mob. He said that military training would keep that jingoism in check. The logical conclusion is that if a nation is not trained it is likely to fight; if no one has any arms, war is absolutely certain!

What effect would the adoption of a scheme of compulsory service in England have in Germany, as that is

the country which is supposed to be our enemy? I think it is quite obvious that the only thing that prevents the party in Germany which is friendly to England, the party which, if it were in the ascendant, would remove all danger of war between England and Germany—I mean all the peace forces—the only thing which prevents them from carrying things in Germany is that the Germans are always able to raise an English scare on the verge of an election. If we increase our power, however good our intentions are, they will not be understood in Germany. It is precisely the same as our misunderstanding of Germany's navy. It is there because they are afraid that we will attack their commerce, but of course the people in England say it is to attack us. I wish to point out that between the countries of Europe there still exists much misunderstanding and that we British quite fail to see the point of view of the other people. How will universal military service on our part be interpreted in Germany? I put it that it will be taken as a menacing act.

The illusion at the bottom of the National Service League propaganda is that even if England knows that it can gain nothing by war, yet Germany may gain by war. That I think is Mr. Townroe's position. He feels there is danger of invasion. Why are the Germans coming? Because they think they can gain something by it. Surely the best way to stop them coming is to persuade them they cannot gain by so doing. That is to say that ours is the rational way of defence, not Mr. Townroe's.

Mr. BRACHER: I have listened, Mr. Angell, with immense pleasure to the very charming paper of Mr. Townroe, and I was very pleased indeed to find how well he understood the "Great Illusion." But I have listened in vain for any sign that he understands the

proposals of the National Service League. What is the one essential innovation which the National Service League proposes in the military defences of this country? There was nothing in Mr. Townroe's speech to differentiate his policy from the Voluntary Service Committee, which fights the National Service League. The one essential innovation that the National Service League advocates is compulsion to enlist in some kind of army.

The history of the progress of civilisation is the history of the simultaneous and inevitably connected diminution of the factor of physical force in human affairs and in settling human questions. The whole aim of the Garton Foundation and this movement may be summarised as the substitution of reason for physical force. The National Service League proposes to substitute physical force for reason. So far, therefore, from there being a fundamental agreement between the two movements, there is an irreconcilable difference. The question whether or not you shall be a soldier is a question ultimately for the reasoned decision of the individual. The National Service League would make it a question to be settled by the superior physical force of the Government.

I interjected "Hear, hear," when Mr. Townroe read a passage from John Stuart Mill. I did not intend my interjection to apply to the whole of that passage, but only to the words "on some equitable basis." I may say that I did not think that Mr. Townroe misrepresented John Stuart Mill one bit except that it cannot be quite historical to say he founded the National Service League. John Stuart Mill did advocate compulsory military service. But the condition he laid down is entirely inconsistent with the principle he advocated. There is no equitable system of conscription. Whether it be the army of France, or Germany, or whether it be



K. H.

Brother

*My wife is often very anxious about me.
A Moralist's Marriage.*



K. H.

Maidale—Manchester.

*Crewdon.—I come from Manchester.
Lorrimer.—Manchester, Manchester . . . oh yes!
Somewhere up in the North, isn't it?
Dry Goods—Act II.*

the empire army of New Zealand or Australia, the conscript soldier is a nobody, and the National Service League lays it down, in the pamphlet "A Briton's First Duty," that it is absurd to pay a man the market value of his services when you do not have to compete in a market for him, but compel him to do the service. Is that an equitable system? Moreover, the National Service League does not demand an equal sacrifice from individuals. To the young man of leisure, whose time is not valuable to him, it is a very different proposition from what it is to the young working-man, who is supporting, perhaps, a widowed mother and sister. The only equitable system of national defence is a system under which every man who wants to be a soldier can be a soldier, and every one who does not wish to be a soldier need not, and under which the army is paid for on an equitable system of taxation.

Mr. BENSON: Mr. Chairman, I am very surprised at the effect that the atmosphere of Old Jordans has on the roaring lions of the National Service League. So far as I can see, there are only two points which I want to make; first of all, that it is not Norman Angellism that will emphasise the class war but the National Service League. In order to introduce a little fire into the debate I will accuse the National Service League of being the greatest organ of class war and the greatest danger to the satisfactory settlement of future industrial problems that man has ever conceived. As a matter of fact, the National Service League depends for one thing upon scares. One of the fomenters of scares is Lord Roberts. These scares take place always when there is a prospect of social progress. We have been having war scares recently and they synchronise with the rise of the Labour Party, with the advent of the Labour Party in the House of Commons.

On the Continent, we have seen the effect of conscription in the industrial field. Take, for instance, the recent French railway strike. Why was that smashed? Because they had conscription. What happened? They did not bring out the military to shoot down the strikers, they called out the Reserves to take the positions of the strikers, who had thrown down their tools. Now, who were the Reserves? They were the strikers themselves, and if they had refused to work as good Trade Unionists should have done they would have been put up against a wall and shot. With such a tool, which the National Service League would put into the hands of the Upper Classes, it will be easy to break any strike. Those of us who want to see a class war amicably settled must oppose national service.

Captain Townroe is under the impression that the National Service League is a pacifist body. I say their real object is attack—not defence. Their main object in having an army in the country to defend their shores is that our Regulars may be thrown on the Continent. I quote their President. He came to Manchester and made a speech with regard to Germany's intentions. He is a bit of a prophet. He advocates that England should take exactly the same action that he accuses Germany of taking—that is, building up a huge military organisation, and if it finds some Power insufficiently protected to attack it. These are the objects and aims of the National Service League.

Herr VON LUBTOW: I should like to say that the remarks of Mr. Bracher upon the paper to which we have listened are the most irrelevant remarks I ever heard. He is only referring to details with regard to how to carry out compulsory military training in regard to this country, but he does not mention how admirably the system is working in Switzerland and Holland. The gentleman from

Manchester says that conscription will produce class hatred as it has done in Germany, but the system the National Service League is advocating is not conscription but compulsory military training for rich and poor on the same basis and not as in Germany, where the gentleman class, if they have enough intellect and education, become officers, and there is no chance whatever for the others. It is unfair to say that the National Service League is advocating conscription. It has never done so. Mr. Norman Angell speaks about disease, cure and remedy. In most cases I agree with him, but I think that as long as you have not found the prevention let us take the cure.

NORMAN ANGELL : In the division of labour it is his business to give the cure and our business to get the prevention.

Herr VON LUBTOW : I agree that Jaurés is advocating military training because he wants to get rid of military conscription. It is a fact that the voluntary system as it is in England has not been a success, because of the insufficient number that has been obtained. Therefore, means will have to be found to have a sufficient strength. We all agree as things are at present, especially in Germany, that England must be capable in the case of emergency to defend her shores. The voluntary system has been acknowledged by Colonel Seely to be ineffective. I venture to suggest that you must find something to make the defence efficient. I think that the National Service League will not attempt to bring about war scares in England, but absolutely the reverse. In conclusion, I should like to say that I think we ought to try this morning to think what the paper really is attempting to set out. They are fundamentally agreed that we should all work for peace. From your British point of view you must admit that these principles may

be acknowledged in fifty years' time and then we hope to do away with armaments, but that the National Service League is doing good work now. You do not necessarily work hand in hand, but both will achieve exactly the same end. At present you might convert Germany to change conscription to compulsory military training. Take the remedy after you have contracted the disease, but at the same time do what you can to convert the German and the British nations.

Dr. MEZ : Mr. Townroe was very kind in saying that we aim for peace and that he aims for peace and that is why we can be good friends. I say we cannot because we mean another sort of peace. We have peace now. Is not Germany at peace ? Were not Bulgaria and Servia at peace until the recent Balkan War ? It is not the peace of armaments that we want. Do we think that resolves the problem ? Is it not the armament question that keeps us from using our energies directly in having a happier life, from profiting more from the production of our industry, from doing away with the suffering of the poorer classes, and from creating social reforms ? Do you think that the National Service League in Germany has contributed towards making the world more peaceful ? Has the German Navy League contributed to that effect ? Does the speaker really seriously quote Jaurés and Bebel in favour of the National Service League ? I have great doubts about it. We must keep in mind that in international conditions we must have a sound theory, applicable to both parties of a dispute and not only one party.

Mr. COCKS : In the extremely moderate, pleasant and seductive speech which Mr. Townroe gave us this morning he said the National Service League were working hand in hand with us. Once I had the honour of discussing

this question with Mr. Shea and Miss Murray Bruce, and they did not give me the impression that they were working hand in hand with us. They said they would not be deluded by me into listening to the flutter of an Angell's wing. Mr. Townroe said that why they were working hand in hand with us was that defence was one form of security. He said there was no better guarantee of peace than that of being able to defend yourself. The whole point of our attitude is that absolute security cannot be maintained by the National Service League proposal nor by any form of defence resting upon force, because the whole problem of defence depends upon attack, and a problem which depends upon two factors, cannot be solved in terms of one. What are the proposals of the National Service League? They are that we should maintain in this country a citizen army so strong and well equipped that the Germans may not be able to invade us. What would be the result of that? It would be to make England a harder nut to crack than she would be at present. If that is so, all the Germans would have to do would be to provide themselves with a stronger pair of nutcrackers. In other words, the reply to the National Service League would be an increase in the German navy in order to enable that navy to escort a larger army to England. Mr. Townroe said an industrialised nation might mean everybody against everybody else. I would say that after the spreading of our ideas the State would be founded not on force but on co-operation. Mr. Townroe said it would be a terrible thing to abolish nationality. Nobody wants to abolish nationality in this movement, we only want to abolish attacks on nationality. Mr. Townroe said that a disciplined crowd would be a peaceful crowd; but it must be a mentally disciplined crowd, not a militarily disciplined crowd. Further, he said that conquest may

profit a small governing class. There is far more capital interested in peace than interested in war. Finally, Mr. Townroe said an armed nation means a just nation. In South Africa we have an armed nation, a force capable of fighting and shooting. In a problem that requires thought they use force instead of justice, as is exemplified in the deportation of the Labour Members.

Mr. HAYCOCK : Mr. Townroe, Lord Roberts, and all thinking men want peace, are sick of this silly international quarrelling. We start there on common ground. How are we going to secure peace ? We are encouraged to increase our armaments and depend upon force. The Germans are likewise encouraged. As we increase our strength and they increase their strength we are not more safe but we have more temper than we had at the beginning. The logical conclusion of this armament debauchery will be a catastrophe. It is simply a by-product of that maxim : " If you want peace prepare for war."

Dr. NASMYTH : Before tackling what is the essential point of Mr. Townroe's address I want to allude to just two things. Upholders of this theory of distorted social dynamics, the theory of collective homicide, state that it is the cause of human progress. He intimated that with peace we should have an intensification of the class struggle. I could say a great deal, but I will not say it, about the way in which the class struggle is intensified by war, as in Italy, which entered on a Tripoli campaign to dish the Socialists, or in Japan, where the whole country is suffering with the misery that war brought on. Class struggle is intensified by the burden of armaments, because it prevents nations from paying attention to the causes of social disease. War does not seem to me to be the best way to build up chivalry. If Mr. Townroe



Haycock

of Manchester and
the Dominion.

"It's not you that's talking
— it's that BAD BEER!"

Kapp 14

Mr. Haycock, we observe —
Witty, pungent, cool of nerve :
All that Manchester may say
Haycock told her yesterday,
War and Peace.

and the National Service League are in favour of peace how can they advocate war as a virtue? If they are in favour of war then they are hypocritical in claiming that they are wanting peace. The principal point of Mr. Townroe's address was national defence. He says, while we are working for the better condition of society in the future, we should not forget the great danger of foreign aggression and we should strengthen national defence. I would say that the real dangers which Great Britain has to face just now are not so much by a long shot imaginary dangers from across the channel but the real dangers within its midst.

It is a most childish policy of national defence to concentrate all your wealth and energy in armaments and to exclude these great social diseases within your midst. These are the real dangers, and I do not believe that by armaments you are going really to make your country secure, because if for the next ten years you take all the money from the country and all the attention, all the energy, all that you can do, and concentrate upon armaments, your back is going to break. Germany has not these terrible social evils; Russia is just in the beginning of its youth. I say, if you take a short-sighted view and put all your energy and thought into national defence, in the way of armaments, you are going to leave yourself weak and unprotected when the real test of national strength comes. Armaments are not the way to meet even this one danger, which I hold is not the real danger. I would just make this remark that the analogy of curing the patient and of preventing disease is not quite accurate. If we regard the militarist as a man who believes in force as the foundation of society, I would say that Europe is dying of armaments. We must cure this patient.

It is no good treating a patient dying of tuberculosis by applying stimulation for a little while. That is

the policy of armaments. You have to take him to be in the fresh air. If you wish to defend your country apply real cures. The real cause of aggression is not so much desire for conquest, it is fear. If you increase your expeditionary force, if you go on piling up armaments you may bring on the very thing you are trying to ward off, because you make these other nations fear you. The real national service is the service first against the real dangers of the country, service for sanitation, social reformation, and secondly, and much more important, the real national service is in spreading right ideas and anyone who wants to enlist in the vital work of national service should enlist in the work of the Garton Foundation.

Mr. TOWNROE : After listening to this most interesting discussion, I must thank you for the kindness with which you have dealt with me. The whole discussion, I think, has been very profitable from the point of view of the National Service League. We have had very useful discussion on the aims and objects of the National Service League; in fact, the whole discussion has mainly been related to that question and therefore I will first deal with the criticisms against national service. I doubt whether Mr. Angell has really read Jaurés' book, otherwise he would not have asserted that Jaurés aimed at the total abolition of military training. Jaurés' aim is to prove, from the philosophic standpoint, that in any democratic state you must have a trained militia, and the same was Herr Bebel's standpoint, that in a democratic state a national militia is necessary, and it was expressed like this: "Even if France was a planet, with no other nations round, and no chance of aggression, first it would be necessary to have a trained militia, from the point of view of the training of the race and the public." Now one or two points upon which there is some misconception

about the equitable side of military training. With regard to the widowed mother it is universally provided that the sons of widows should be exempt. With regard to the burden being distributed equally it is universally constituted that there shall be a 1 per cent. income tax on those people who can afford it, towards the cost of running the army. Those who do not serve with their body but can serve with their pocket must put their hand in their pocket. Then I think—still dealing with the special question of national service—I think there is some misconception in the mind of my friend Mr. Benson. Mr. Benson, speaking to me in a confidential whisper last night, said, “I hope we shall have a good slam at those National Service League people to-morrow.” He has done his best and he has done it in an extremely vigorous way. From the point of view of the Independent Labour Party he is departing a long way from the future of labour in this country. It is carefully laid down in the National Service League programme that the civilian army should not be used in labour disputes. If my job had been to talk about national service, I should have put forward the social and educational advantages of military training for all. I suggest now that, from the point of view of the Fabian Society, that is why Mr. Webb is in favour of military training. To get to the point of the paper. Mr. Angell said that “our body should include both groups.” According to the Garton Foundation you cannot get out of it, you ought to have both sides. That sentence epitomises the whole of my address, and finally I can only say, speaking for myself and saying how grateful I am for all I have learned here last night and this morning, all power to your elbow in reducing the reasons for aggression. We are studying your philosophy—many of us are deeply impressed with it, we recognise certain weaknesses and Mr. Angell himself

is developing his argument as the years go by—we are studying it and many of us are with you in the League. I would ask you to look at Clause 6 of the Garton Foundation memorandum and to study, if you are interested in the problems of the future, such a book as M. Jaurés' on the armaments of the future and to see if the fundamental principles of the National Service League cannot march side by side with you. Cannot we study each other at any rate recognising on both sides there is sincerity and real conviction.

CONCERNING STUDY CIRCLES

DISCUSSION INTRODUCED BY MR. HAROLD WRIGHT

Afternoon Session : July 23rd

MR. WRIGHT: Once upon a time there were twelve just men who read a certain book, "The Great Illusion." When they had made themselves thoroughly familiar with the whole subject they went out into the highways and byways, and they brought in all their acquaintances and they formed a society, and the twelve men who constituted this study circle instructed the two hundred men who formed the society. And the discussion went on permeating that way. And the twelve men who were the leaders of the society went abroad into the neighbouring counties and finally into the neighbouring countries, encouraged by the experience that they had had with their own two hundred, and taught the same lessons that they had originally got from the book. Now I have never come across any of the twelve apostles. As far as I know they merely exist in imagination. What I want to ask you this evening is whether a study circle has ever been useful at all. When at Cambridge we first formed our society, which I think has done useful work and will do useful work, we also formed a study circle and we discussed things. A highly enlightened

intellectual set of fellows, of which I see one or two present, used to meet together on Monday evenings and talk about subjects more or less connected with the "Great Illusion," and having instructed themselves they went away and did something else and the study circle died.

We have on our list a number of these circles which exist in different parts of the country, we know the names of the secretaries, but we have never heard anything more of them. I believe that a study circle somewhere in Bradford or Leeds met one day last week, and it was such a novel event for a study circle to meet that the Secretary of the Bradford Society, or the Leeds Society, wrote to the Editor of "War and Peace" about it. What are they for and what use are we making of them? Do the study circles produce any useful speakers? I do not know any speaker on this subject who has come out of a study circle. Do they join together and make a society? I do not know any society that originated in study circles. Do the members of one study circle go and visit other study circles and thereby get some sort of exchange of views? I do not know that they do. I am trying to get some information on this subject. My own opinion, based upon somewhat inadequate knowledge, is that the study circles in connection with our subject are a ghastly failure; that they might be abolished and the energy that has been expended on them would be much better expended on some other activities. I should like to hear that view criticised.

MR. PITMAN: Some of us are not quite so informed on the machinery of things. I would like to ask what is the difference between a study circle and a society.

MR. WRIGHT: It is mainly a difference in size. The study circle meets in a private house; someone, feeling interested in this subject, gets a dozen or half-dozen to



*Coffee which makes the politician wise
And see through all things with his
half-shut eyes.*

The Rape of the Lock.



*Hel-lo ! I didn't know you were there ;
but I wondered how it was that every-
thing was going right.*

A Counsel of Perfection—Chap. IV.

come round once a week and read a book and talk it over. The society is a much more formal thing, where you get some distinguished celebrity in some English town to act as President, probably a Lord Mayor ; and some energetic person, some indefatigable person, to act as secretary. Then he sends round circulars and they have a meeting in the Guildhall, Mr. Angell addresses them and they subscribe several thousand pounds. The study circle meets and drinks lemonade in some gentleman's house, goes home and thinks about something else.

Mr. LUNNON : My views are in diametric opposition to those of Mr. Wright. I have been responsible for the starting and running of a dozen circles at odd times. He entirely misconceives the purpose of study circles. They are not a private propaganda, but they exist to instruct the members. Many men have been acquainted with the facts of "The Great Illusion" from a study circle. The study circle at the London University, of ten or a dozen people, has become a centre of active propagandists. The most valuable duty of a study circle is to stimulate your own study, and it makes you think in some ways that a society does not. Each member gets a particular problem, and that makes him think and gives him an interest in, and capability to deal with, the subject which he would not have otherwise. I am convinced that the study circle is the best way of doing this.

Dr. BEALE : As a matter of fact, if it was not for Mr. Wright, and the study circles, I should not be here to-day. The society in Leeds would never have been formed if it had not been for study circles. None of the study circles which have been formed have yet fallen away. They are all in activity now. Mr. Wright tells us that he never hears of the activities of study circles, and then he tells us that there was one activity

somewhere, and an account of the activity appeared in "War and Peace." What we are to make out of that I do not know. Study circles do exist in Leeds, and I consider it a most important element in the propaganda. You cannot always be forming societies in small places, and if you did they would not have any life and you cannot keep in touch with them unless they have some centre of activity of their own. I should like to hear some suggestions made by which these study circles could be made more active than they are. I feel very confident that if a census were to be taken in this present assemblage, 90 per cent. have learned to study "The Great Illusion" seriously in study circles. If a study circle goes through a course of "The Great Illusion" and breaks up there and then, it has nevertheless done a great work. There is a greater activity for study circles if we could only put our heads together and seriously think over the subject. I believe, for instance, that they should be important outposts of the various societies and the means of demonstrating the activities of that society in the various districts in which these study circles exist.

In my own study circle, we started with a membership of about forty. Without exaggerating I should say we had an average attendance throughout the session of about twenty. I could guarantee to put on the platform six or eight good speakers, people that would be prepared to deal with the question of Norman-Angellism before an audience, and I do not think one of these people could honestly say that they were prepared to do that previously to the study circle session. That is a pure refutation of the statement of Mr. Harold Wright.

Mr. WILLETT: It seems to me that the chief difficulty we have to get over to make these study circles more effective is the difficulty of finding out good leaders for

them. You must have a good leader. He must be prepared to give a good deal of time and a good deal of attention, and he must be a man who can keep the attendance up. The only way these people can be produced is by making them join some centre and conference by which they can get good training. The biggest societies will need some study circles, to produce new leaders for themselves.

Mr. ROMANES : In Oxford, our society, of course, is a study circle. There is another society in Oxford, the Fabian Society, and after running that on the basis of a society for a number of years, they started four study groups which seemed to keep the Fabian Society alive in Oxford. You are always talking about propaganda and the only way to get it is the way of study circles. When they are a success you will get ten or twelve good propagandists.

Mr. COLLINSON : In Halifax we have done no other work except in regard to study circles. My own feeling is that they are of inestimable value in fixing opinion on the subject with which we have to deal. It is not an easy subject. It is not one which people will immediately fall down before and worship. They immediately set to and fight it. When Mr. Hilton came down to Halifax some time ago, he gave an address. As a result of that address, a certain number of people were interested, and we were able to get their names. It was a question whether we should form a society, but you cannot form a society at once. By getting the names of those people it was possible to get six or eight study circles. At the end of the session, every study circle which had been held expressed its pleasure, and expressed a hearty desire that it would be continued next year. In Halifax the experiment was tried of forming an enemy circle. All preaching to the converted is good in its way, but

it is not doing what a study circle should do. You ought to get together some fellows who are deliberate enemies of the movement, and go for them. It is the best possible work for the leader. It does drive one or two elementary facts into these people's minds. In one study circle, about six fellows used to meet every fortnight, first at one house and then another, and each meeting was looked forward to with the greatest possible pleasure by each man because on that occasion each man felt he was going to down the thesis of "The Great Illusion." To get men of that type to read "The Great Illusion" is something worth working for. When Mr. Hilton came down in the spring, every man in the enemy circle turned up to hear him. The last thing they said to me was: "We must have another study circle." Among these men (they were only six) there was a Captain in the Territorials, who is an ardent man for the National Service League and for military training. Now that man is a convinced Norman-Angellist. Another young fellow who is also in the Territorials, said: "If you are going to have another study circle, put me in it." Work of this kind, in a very small way, is something. It seems to me that the important point is to develop these study circles. Get hold of your personal friends, get hold of anybody that is prepared to discuss a thing on a fair and reasonable basis, and particularly the man who thinks that by a little more discussion he will win you round to his point of view. It is unreasonable to expect that study circles in the first year should be developing public speakers. There are a few of us here who could make a really graphic and capable speech on "The Great Illusion." If we cannot do that, we cannot expect those who have just been introduced to the subject immediately to start out as evangelists for the cause.

Mr. BENSON: The whole point is: What use is a study circle to convert ten or twelve men? We have to convince the whole population of England, which is forty millions. We have to form an organisation to change the whole of British public opinion, and the question ought to take the lines of "How to make study circles do that work." We have to produce propagandists, and at the present moment nobody seems to have any clear idea of how to do it. Instead of having a confessional from secretaries of study circles, we ought to suggest some method of producing a live movement.

Mr. COCKS: I have sometimes thought, although I have never been in one, that perhaps the study circles might do something more towards producing speakers if they had that definite object before them. Men ought to be told that as the result of that circle they would be expected to do something in the way of propaganda. They should be told that at the end of the first course they ought to be speakers, and they might all undertake to do something or to write to newspapers on various points. Then nervous members might become fairly proficient speakers if they were supported by all the other members. Speakers must have previous experience.

In the newspapers every day there is something which bears on our movement. I think the local study circles might make it their business to discuss the various points which come up in the papers, and they might write, with the combined strength of the whole circle, a letter to the editor.

I should imagine that secretaries of study circles find great difficulty in making people come to study circles if nothing else is offered them. I should imagine that after a time numbers of study circles tend to drift off. Perhaps something could be held out to members in the way of an opportunity of doing something interesting

by sending some of their best men to speak at some Brotherhood or local debating society.

Mr. LUNNON: Even if some circles are feeble, a part reason is that they have not received encouragement from headquarters. These study circles were initiated by missionaries. Every missionary society has now a study circle secretary, which generally has training circles for leaders. The whole responsibility of this work has been left by this movement to the secretaries. I have been hoping we should get some promise of help in this direction. The problem facing me is: What book shall we take? We have taken "The Great Illusion." "Polity" will do for the purpose, but there are lots of other things in which we want help.

Mr. FISHER: I have really had no experience as to study circles, but I wish I had had the opportunity. "The Great Illusion" has been studied by me in L.C.C. tramcars, and that is practically the only opportunity I had to study the book. I have had the question put to me, "What can we do?" All the instructions we have had encourage us to form study circles. Study circles do not catch on very well with the average man, and your audience has to come with a definite end in view to form a study circle. If you have study circles meeting at your house, the thing dies out after a week or two. Why do we not follow the method of the correspondence schools? Why cannot a man have a course of study at home given him, a certain portion of work to study sent by post every week and encourage him to send an essay of a few hundred words perhaps once a month and offer a prize? We should eventually do more good with a method of that kind than we should do by asking everybody to do something towards study circles. Why not say to a man: "When you are interested give me your

name and address, and I will see that you have help in studying 'The Great Illusion,' and have every encouragement." Every week they could have a small task that would perhaps only take one hour or even half an hour in one week.

Dr. MEZ: Study circles at work influence public opinion more than they realise. It influences other countries. It brings the movement into emphasis, and that is an important fact which must not be overlooked, and it would be wrong to abolish them even if they have not shown very good results. It would be very wrong to think we have only to speak to the unconverted Angellist. Who is a converted Angellist? Nobody really is in the full sense—not even Mr. Angell. We would not have come together at the Old Jordans if we thought we were all converted. We must speak to the converted just as much as to the unconverted.

Herr VON LUBTOW: Cannot somebody take up Mr. Fisher's suggestion about the correspondence system—a very practical one—and also that of the member of the London University?

Mr. MAWSON: There is one characteristic which must be common to all the literature of study circles, the price is limited to 1s. 6d. or 2s. Beyond that they are not open to the general public. If a man is not keen on the subject, he is not prepared to pay more than 2s. for a book he knows nothing about.

Mr. HAYCOCK: The purpose of study circles is to create speakers, and I would suggest that every member of a study circle should get on his feet if he has anything to say. You cannot become a speaker unless you speak. I do not think we should be at all despondent about study circles.

Mr. BARTHOLOMEW: I should like to point out that the greater part of study circles which are in existence are connected with Universities or with already-existing "War and Peace" Societies. The Civil Union made the attempt to form a study circle of a different character. A demonstration was held in one of the public parks in London, an appeal was made to the people there gathered to join a study circle. The point which Mr. Fisher made was well exemplified by that experiment. The difficulty of getting people to come, men having to work late, members having other interests, the I.L.P. and Trade Unions. The study circle in question must on the whole be said to be successful. It did not last very long, but it did its work fairly well. Those who had met to study "The Great Illusion" were sufficiently impressed with what they had read, and their discussions one with the other, to seek to carry that message in their own circles. No great speaker has come from it but sufficient testimony can be produced to show it did very good work.

Mr. RAPHAEL: There is just one suggestion I would like to put forward, and that is as to where the study circles can best be held. I am not at all sure whether it would not be a good thing to have them held at the various local polytechnics. There would not probably be much objection on the part of authorities of polytechnics to having a series of lectures, and the study circle could combine the function of a lecture and a study circle. The experiment was tried at the Regent Street Polytechnic, and it was not quite a success. The hall would have held 500 people, and on one occasion I only addressed seven. The point I make is that polytechnics are a good place for these study circles to be held in because we always get a certain number of people coming in and an advertisement from time to time. At the Regent

Street Polytechnic (we charged 15s. for the course), I heard that if there was another series there would certainly be a much larger attendance. I think that is a suggestion that is worth considering.

Mr. BRACHER: Those who have spoken about the Civil Union have omitted to explain one part of our experience of study circles there. We have had during the past winter in addition to the different kinds of circle one more which was to me and many others very valuable. We got a lady to come along once a week to give us lessons in voice production, called elocution classes. It did some of us a lot of good. The outcome of this discussion seems to be that the object of study circles is first to get people interested, and then to get them into street corners or on the platform or newspaper columns. The best result of study circles is at the street corners. Voice production helps in this materially. This is my own personal testimony, and if I had the eloquence and the command of language of the people who write testimonials about the marvellous cures effected by Mother Seigel's Syrup and other well-known remedies, I believe I could make some very impressive remarks about my own personal experience.

Mr. WRIGHT: I think I have been answered. I have been told of a great many valuable services rendered by study circles. Other people's experience has been more fortunate than my own. Mr. Lunnon says that study circles make people read and study "The Great Illusion." I do not think any greater service can be rendered than that. The Leeds Society and the Halifax Society, I learn, were created out of seven or eight study circles. And Mr. Collinson's achievement of keeping alive a really vigorous hostile circle is beyond praise. Study circles have in some cases produced speakers. It is by the

study circle, leaders ought to keep in view, that their members should be trained so that they may subsequently be able to impart their information to a larger crowd, and I think that is really the reply to Mr. Benson's cynical intervention. The conversion of a dozen people to the "Great Illusion" is of the utmost importance, and is a very real contribution towards the conversion of forty millions. If here and there all over the country there are study circles in which a dozen people are making themselves thoroughly familiar with the "Great Illusion," it is a tremendous contribution towards the work, especially if they are going to be speakers. It also puts up the sales of "The Great Illusion"—which I am sure Mr. Angell will appreciate. I hope also that it puts up the sale of "War and Peace," and I think study circle leaders ought to look out for that part of their business. If it leads people, as has been suggested, to write to the papers, that also is good. One or two important suggestions were made. We had been reproved for not giving more help from headquarters to the study circles. A nasty little pamphlet about the need for study circles and how to form them, has not strayed into the hands of Mr. Lunnon. It can be obtained at the Garton Foundation. We might get Mr. Lunnon's help in arranging a new pamphlet! We should circularise these people, and we ought to get a list of the members of study circles, and some more adequate account of what they have been doing during the session. Mr. Fisher's suggestion about the correspondence circle might very well be instituted almost immediately. I do not know who is going to do the work, but we generally find that someone eventually does the work when it is clear that the work can usefully be done. I have nothing more to say except that these suggestions will be borne in mind, and, if possible, put into practice at once, and it is quite clear

from the discussion, in spite of anything I may have said at the beginning, that the study circles are doing very good work and have done, certainly in Halifax and in Leeds, excellent work, and that what we want is many more study circles. If every one of us who is at present at this school could go away and start a study circle, then I think a tremendously valuable work might be done. I believe some sort of report of the proceedings in this school is to be issued, and there, I think, will be material which would be valuable to study circle leaders, and would enable anybody to undertake the task without any very much greater labour than the actual time given up once a week to conducting the circle. The materials, it seems to me, would be to hand out of the discussions that have taken place in the barn, morning and afternoon.

ORGANISE THE WORLD !

ADDRESS BY MR. EDWIN D. MEAD

Evening Session : July 23rd

MR. NORMAN ANGELL IN THE CHAIR

NORMAN ANGELL : Edwin Dean Mead does not need any introduction to the Americans, neither does he to the Europeans. He is the recognised leader of the peace movement in America, leader by right of seniority in the sense of long work in this cause, and not only is he leader and veteran, but he is one of those veterans who can keep a young mind. He is going to talk to us to-night about organisation, and I am glad of that as it is a phase of the question we are a bit apt to neglect. We are so preoccupied with the destruction of the misconceptions that more constructive work we have in large measure left to others. But we should know all about it, and Mr. Mead, better than any one else, can tell us what has been done and what should be done in the direction of world organisation. I have very great pleasure in asking Mr Mead to talk to us about world organisation.

MR. MEAD : Justice compels me to protest when you introduce me as the leader of the peace movement. I wish to say in turn how glad I am to be here in this



*He of the western dome, whose weighty sense
Flows in fit words and rousing eloquence.*
Absalom and Achitophel.

circle, which is one of Mr. Angell's creation, and to come into touch with the magnificent work he is doing, and I wish to pay tribute also to the very vital influence which he is carrying into the United States. There is no finer contribution upon this great question as it affects our own people in recent times than Mr. Angell's. I rejoice he is associated with the Foundation I particularly represent. I am bound to pay tribute also to such a meeting as that here this morning. It produced a profound impression on me. I am glad you have invited us Americans also to this place. It seems to us almost providentially chosen, a place which is so dear to us by the associations which surround it. Here is the old home of one who is the main philosophic founder of the American Commonwealth. It is holy ground. On one hand is the home of Milton, on the other hand the home of Edmund Burke and the old home of Hampden. I hope this place may be made a permanent centre which will draw America, because of those sacred associations so much entwined with the great causes we had at heart. The man who we primarily think of in connection with this spot was the author of the first comprehensive scheme for the organisation of the world which was a disinterested scheme. "The condition of peace," said William Penn, "and the instrument of justice is government," and in international affairs, that instrument is international government or international organisation.

The great leaders of the international movement in the world have been the great patriots of the world, speaking in the ordinary as well as the most respectful sense. Surely there were no Italians more Italian than Dante and Mazzini, no Germans more German than Lessing and Kant, no Frenchmen more French than Victor Hugo, no Englishmen more English than your great Penn, or any American more American than

Emerson. The reason I hate this pushing spirit, this juvenile spirit which shouts itself hoarse about the superiority of one state over another is that true patriotism is the joy that one people feels in indicating their own special faiths or the things which have been beneficent in their lives to other peoples. That is the kind of patriotism which will last for ever.

I thought perhaps I could not serve you better as an American than by indulging in that kind of patriotism, by showing you the ways in which our own federalisation really offers us hints of the next step for organisation and the influence of our great federal Republic upon world co-operation and world thought.

Dr. Percival gave an address in England some time ago in which he said that he thought the United States was itself the greatest Peace Society in the world for the reason that it demonstrated over the greatest area the principles of commercial Free Trade and inter-state federation which were principles most required in international affairs to give us precisely the kind of organised world we want. Really there is much in that, and it is an interesting analogy of which much can properly be made.

As to freedom of trade, the United States as concerns the outside world is a protective nation, but as a matter of fact the amount of trade that comes under the protective principle, the amount of foreign commerce as compared with the domestic market, is slight. The great possibility of the United States springs not from the fact of this protection, but from the fact that over such an enormous area, covering a wonderful variety of climates and resources and interests, there is complete freedom.

Then consider the matter of the inter-state court, that was one of the most original features in our federation.

Many men prophesied that this novelty would not perhaps be a failure, but that it would be useless. It looked for a long time as if these critics were to be justified because nearly two years went by before that court had any case at all. To-day the Supreme Court of the United States is a mighty power.

What of federation? The conflict over the question, the settlement of the principle of federation so that it should be clearly recognised that the nation was supreme and that a man's primary allegiance and loyalty were not to his native State—that was only settled after two generations of conflict in the Senate and after Civil War. It was the fact that men believed that duty was due to their native State rather than to the country that caused the Civil War. Now my State is Massachusetts. Massachusetts was a great State, which believed in national sovereignty as against State nationality. No Massachusetts man would have conceived that his local patriotism was in any way infringed and prejudiced by his belief that the nation was supreme, and yet that was the theory—the theory of the State's right—which led to these great conflicts.

These are feelings which I find in much of your local life in England. I am deeply impressed by the strength of the county feeling in parts of England, and I find that London is filled with patriotic societies of a local character. I have been invited to address the London Society of East Anglians. I have found that this strong demonstration of East Anglian loyalty and devotion constituted a patriotism almost as strong as those feelings expressed between nations.

I have very strong provincial sympathies and I claim that everybody has a right to them. Everyone has a right as an international man to be a loyal Englishman, American, or Frenchman. Just as in our federal

Republics the nation was nearly wrecked fifty years ago because men did not know that they were Americans before they were Texans or Louisianians, so the great danger of the world to-day proceeds from men in international affairs thinking of themselves in the first place as Americans or Germans or Russians or Englishmen and only in the second place as citizens of this world. Now, the change from the smaller circle to the larger circle is illustrated by things in our own United States.

Every theory that does not recognise that is breaking down. It becomes obvious to all men that any theory of politics, any theory of world affairs which proceeds any longer on the idea that this is a world of two hemispheres breaks down. I wish to say that in this federal Republic whose very constitution and system of government furnishes at least a very helpful analogy for the organisation of world affairs—I wish to say that we are profoundly helped over there also by the principles of our founders. You may sometimes think that Americans make too much of their founders. Perhaps it is because we know them better and they are closer to us than the founders of most nations. The great principle of Washington, Jefferson and Franklin was that in establishing that federal Republic they were also helping to establish a new era, a phase of co-operation for mankind; that was their inspiration and the writings on that subject of all of them can hardly be paralleled in the writings of any other body of men. In the United States it was with the political economy argument we began. It is in the writings of Jefferson and Franklin you find this political economy argument, the relations of nations in their growing interdependence—it is there that the stress lies. That is where we began. If you read the utterances of one whose work is the most significant of all international writers, George Sumner, read his

orations of the grandeur of nations, you will find the appeal is chiefly to thought. The appeal is to thought as to the true theory of the organisation of the relations of nations in international life

Your organised peace movement over in Britain began very largely with the Friends. I cannot pay too high a tribute to the Friends. No man can stand in a place like this without doing it, but one does not need to stand here to do it. While I am not a non-resister, I honour the man who holds that view. In a world where there is an awful emphasis on brute force, I honour a man who throws the whole strength of his reliance on ideas. It was out of that body of men that your English peace movement was very greatly built up. That was not true of us. The great stress has been laid in the American movement upon the recognition of the interdependence of nations. A great deal of this economic argument dates to a much earlier time, to the time of Jefferson and Franklin. The first president of one of the peace societies, William Ladd, was the subject of an oration in Boston by James Brown Scott, the international law expert. He said that the Hague programme of to-day was incepted and clearly formulated by William Ladd in the forties. His great demand was for the bringing together of the nations into an international congress to develop and codify law to create international concord. In the great International Peace Congresses of the middle of last century, the most historic of the Peace Congresses—I wish we could get as big delegations to our congresses to-day—in the congresses of that period the American delegates, while other people were painting the horrors of war were all pushing Ladd's great scheme, known as the American plan. These great thoughts, from thinking men of all nations, we have inherited from that great work and in

a time when the world is more closely brought together we are trying to give it a more practical application and formation.

I venture to suppose that in the development of the great movement for the judicial settlement of disputes, for supplanting war by law, by reason, that no single effort, no single method has accomplished so much as international arbitration. It is a very modern thing and it is our countries—it is the United States and Great Britain—who have led the nations in this respect. Nothing perhaps has done more to bring about an organised world, a reasonable world, than this action by arbitration. The Balkan Wars prove that war cannot settle these questions, but leads to further war, but when a thing is settled by arbitration it stays settled. There has been a great deal of criticism and bad blood over the Alaska boundary states between the United States and Canada, in which Great Britain took part. Our Canadian brothers kicked a good deal over the arbitration decision and they had a right to kick, but when nations have become civilised enough to refer their quarrels to arbitration they become civilised enough to respect their umpires.

We have a good right to suppose that the world has come so far ahead that all the authoritative decrees of the family of nations from now on will need no other sanction than the enlightened international public opinion of the world. I believe that is true, and the history of arbitration, at any rate between the United States and Great Britain, has shown that the plea that while simple matters may be arbitrated grave matters cannot be is answered by appeal to the fact that grave matters have been so arbitrated. There was no case which involved more points of honour than the case of the *Alabama*. The thing went to arbitration and Gladstone said that

Great Britain had been assessed too heavily—but if it had been assessed twenty times as much it would have been as nothing compared with war between these two great English-speaking nations. With regard to the permanent sanction of international decrees, it has been constantly urged there is nothing to back them up—they may fail. One of the Justices of the Supreme Court, who gave an address on that subject, declared as a great jurist that he believed that the world would never need any other instruments than the simple instruments of national intercourse. He believed there was no nation of the family of nations once organised, could resist that principle, whether it was some revolutionary nation or some great nation like the United States and Germany. If that family should decree through its recognised authorities that until such nation should play fair that all relations with that nation should be stopped, postal, commercial, and so on, he believed no nation could resist. We believe in the United States there is just one great instrument to bring this thing about and that is the great instrument of education, and education as we conceive it is simply another way of spelling democracy, and I believe that Kant, the greatest thinker of modern times, was fundamentally right when he identified our cause with the cause of self-government. Our cause has sprung up just in that part of the world where democracy has sprung, and so will it ever be and there can be no permanent democracy without the high education of the people. A people may get on in a fashion when they get other men to be kings over them, if those other men are surpassingly royal in their consciousnesses and their wills and their intellects, but when people undertake to do their own governing they have to be royal men in thought and will and consciousness. That is the principle upon which the life of our democracy is based.

A great deal has been said here about our Mexican situation and I have to thank Mr. Angell that his visit coincided with the darkest hour in our Mexican crisis and that he did throw in an immense amount of work to illuminating that issue. That is a part of a big question and it is a thing upon which in the United States the greatest stress of our educational work wanted throwing. I draw your attention to the Pan-American union to which Mr. Carnegie gave an important building in Washington. It is directed by the representatives of all the nations of North and South America and there is this great corps of scholars carrying on this wonderful work of informing all the nations about what is going on in all the rest and what their relations are to one another and what they ought to be. Now it seems to me that is what you want to have over here, when a great question confronts you like the Balkan situation. I believe that that question will never be solved in any other way but by the systematic dissemination of the right kind of information. There should above all be created some international committee made up of men of all nations who shall regard it as their business whenever there is a danger of war in the world that the truth shall be told and submitted to the public opinion of the world and the opinion of the world shall have a chance to get its work in.

There is much to discourage us, but in the general legislative and executive life, we are seeing an advance which none of us had a right to expect. I do suggest to you the idea of a Pan-European bureau to be established at Berne composed of the best and most thoughtful scholars to give Europe authoritative information at the time. That is badly needed. We ought to know of the implications of things given in our papers. It is in groups like ourselves, it is little groups like these,

that are doing a work which you do not estimate enough, which it is not possible for any of you to magnify sufficiently; the things here done and the methods of your members should be heard of all over the world. International work must be internationally done.

NORMAN ANGELL: While Mr. Mead was telling us what the Americans have done, I had a certain feeling of hopelessness. One hundred colleges in America with systematised endowment for work. Two million sterling given by Mr. Carnegie for the Carnegie Foundation, an income of £10,000 at least by successful publishing, £20,000 a year given to the churches, to say nothing of all those huge endowments for educational work, which must do our work for us. What have we been doing here in Europe? It is a curious thing—Americans always brag about the wrong things. They never brag, or don't brag enough, about the real things they are doing. These are some of the real things and these are precisely the things we do not hear about from the Americans. What have we Europeans got to compare with it?

Dr. MEZ: We were all deeply impressed by the wonderful address of Mr. Mead leading us through the great movement of the older pacifists. If we consider all these facts and the tremendous amount of energy and money and organisation displayed by societies, as Mr. Mead has shown us, and if we on the other hand look around in practical politics how very little this old peace movement has done notwithstanding our great belief in the growing spirit of peace that all this militarism and the armament pressure upon the modern civilised nations is so fearfully strong as in Germany and England, we have to put before us the question: Has not there been a certain failure of the old peace movement? We can do it among ourselves to-night

as friends, not criticising too strongly the old peace movement. I recognise what it has done, but in a gathering of Norman-Angellists only, I would like to suggest there has been some failure in the old peace movement, because the underlying principles of the old conceptions have not been attacked seriously by the old peace movement up to now. We recognise the great progress which has been made towards pacifism, but I think the real progress would not have been made unless Norman-Angellism had shown exactly these most important facts and underlying principles which have up to now been wrong.

Mr. QUINTANA: I wonder would you think it worth while to consider the biological aspect of world organisation? In the biological field of evolution you find that organisms spring out of groups of lesser organisms which are called cells. The organic theory of societies is not yet quite accepted, but you may think that a nation may be considered an organism. As a matter of fact now it is not a given nation or a given group of individuals within a nation which must be considered an organism, but the whole of civilised mankind, a state of affairs which the growing interdependence, the division of labour, brings about. Since the middle or beginning of the last century we know that great division of labour has been created between the nations of the world—with the credit system which is created also, all of which makes for the interdependence of mankind. This fact biologically speaking, requires more than a lecture to explain, but this means if we are to consider the societies of men as organisms at all, the process which Mr. Angell describes, such as the division of labour and the growing interdependence of mankind, means the foundation of a world organism and not merely the foundation of the national organism now existing. I think that the real

foundations for the world state of the future, the real foundations have already been laid and the real world state physically speaking is already formed. The task of world organisation in the future means not the foundation of the organism, but the perfection of the organism. It is a very good thing and we should rejoice, we members of this international polity movement, we should rejoice there are people imagining and planning already the superstructure of the world state. We must recognise that while the people are doing this splendid work, and the foundations have been laid, that the process is one with which we have practically no concern ourselves. The greatest work done by Mr. Norman Angell is the opening out to us and to the world of a formation of the real world state upon the division of labour and the increasing interdependence of the nations. This is the great work of Mr. Norman Angell—to show the world organism is already formed.

NORMAN ANGELL : I venture to hope that Mr. Quintana will develop the thesis of the last speech. I am sure you will agree with me that it was a very remarkable exposition, given in clear and precise terms with scientific exactitude.

Dr. NASMYTH : Although our peace case will have to be stated in each generation anew to meet the needs of that generation we should never forget that if it were not for the great prophets of previous ages we should not be here now. We have a new method—we are emphasising the economic case as against the moral case. We have a new method and the usual point of view I think is that in this new method it will be as absurd for us to go ahead and build up the political organisation of the world—the Hague Conference and so on—before we have done the work of laying the philosophic founda-

tions as it would have been for Christ to work in practice the kingdom of heaven on earth before he had changed the minds of men. What are the points of contact? We ought to pay more attention to this work of physical organisation which is going on, although we consider that our work is changing the minds of men in regard to the true rôle of physical force. One way in which the Hague machinery acts is as a sort of shock absorber. If the Mexican affair had developed into war, our peace movement there would have been sent back over fifty years. It is worth while doing what we can do to prevent wars and even the Hague machinery is a method for doing that. One place where it is very much needed is between France and Russia. Secondly all this Hague machinery, political organisations, can be used as a most effective educational instrument. It is a way of pointing out world-interdependence. All these six or seven hundred international organisations which are concentrated at Berne are concrete facts that the man in the street can see sometimes more clearly than he can our economic relations. Moreover, there is a kind of hunger in the minds of men for a constructive programme. An ordinary man wants to see the next step. And, thirdly, the most important contribution we have to make is in the field of international law. This I think with which we are now dealing—the reconstruction of society upon justice—is going to take shape in political machinery later. First, there must be a tremendous development of international law. At present our law goes back to traditions and principles, which do not touch at all vital things, but things with which nations have been concerned long ago. Nations cannot address themselves to a court of justice until there has been the necessary law developed. The whole structure of international law I believe is coming out of the ideas which we are

developing here. In future it is going to be concerned with the vital interests of nations.

Mrs. MEAD : I had the honour of presenting the theme of Norman Angell for the first time to an American audience. I was glad in talking with Mr. Angell to find he agreed with me that what he has said does not apply to America. Mr. Angell agrees absolutely in our presenting to the United States the fact that there is one nation which has never been attacked. We must not sit down when militarist congressmen get up and try and get a three-navy programme. We can bring pressure to bear on congressmen. Some of the congressmen are living 3,000 miles from their constituencies, who therefore cannot get at them, so we must get at these men. The conversion of one congressman is worth the conversion of 100 men anywhere else. The 500 men in the congress are responsible for all our political actions. We must work immediately. There is no need for America to be one of the naval powers. There are other faculties besides reason, namely, imagination, and memory. It is sometimes easier to preach to people through these other faculties. Point out there has never been the breakdown of arbitration. You only need to get at the eight nations of the world and they will stand by each other, they will arbitrate every question that will come up between themselves and after that the others will come in. The international state is going to evolve step by step. Get the Hague Conference started and it will go on. We cannot neglect the enormous opportunity that will be thus given to us .

NORMAN ANGELL : I hinted at the beginning that Mr. and Mrs. Mead would contribute to our conference in showing that we may have neglected organisation. I am in hearty agreement with both that while a better

understanding is necessary for the foundations of world organisations, you can do your jobs in the building way now. The philosophic and building jobs must be accomplished at one and the same time. We must therefore not neglect organisation.

Mr. MEAD: Do not bother too much about your machinery—do not be bothered as to what ultimate form your world-state is going to take. When you get all the international minds and great convictions of things that can be done the method for which is apparent, you will find the international habit of activity strengthens the international mind.

QUESTION TIME: STRONGER OR
WEAKER? THE CONTROL OF
LABOUR BY THE CONQUEROR;
NON-RESISTANCE.

Morning Session : July 24th

MR. NORMAN ANGELL IN THE CHAIR

NORMAN ANGELL : We do not seem to have got to what was the main object of these classes, and that was training and practice in answering questions, on the basis of the grammar ; discussion itself has become so interesting a thing and argument always gets people interested. You may have the most entrancing Music Hall show going on, but if two men of the audience get into an argument about Free Trade, or the Suffrage Question, or War and Peace, the comedian on the stage has not a chance. And that is our opportunity. Part of our job is to find out how to interest people in this matter. It is lucky for us that our general thesis is very controversial—they do not believe it—it is a paradox—it is rubbish—and so forth. The more challenging you can make it, the more useful is your work going to be in the matter of propaganda. I felt this morning that if we did not get these questions tackled we never should.

I have got here as a result of one meeting seventy questions. Most of them are quite irrelevant. The kind of thing is "Will Ireland under Home Rule, having no Army and Navy, be in your opinion an ideal country?" Then you have to deliver a lecture on Irish Nationalism, the history of Ulster, &c. Most of them do not hit the point at all and in answering such questions you have just got to turn them off. Here is one, however: "In the interests of Peace is it desirable to be stronger or weaker than your enemy?"

Mr. QUINTANA: I think it is impossible to be either weaker or stronger than your enemy, because that is considering the question in terms of one party. No two parties could be stronger than the other or weaker than the other.

Mr. BLOYE: I should ask "Who do you mean by the enemy, and which party do you mean by the weaker?"

Mr. HAYCOCK: You show it is policy to be stronger than your enemy and then you show that when the Russians, Germans and French adopt this they have armament competition.

Mr. PITMAN: I do not think it is necessary to go any further than the answer they suggest.

NORMAN ANGELL: There is only one way to answer this question. Here is a man who says "In the interests of Peace is it desirable to be stronger or weaker than your enemy?" I said, "The last time that question was put to me was in Berlin by Germans. How would my friend have had me reply?"

This was in Leeds; I had given an address to the Chamber of Commerce and right in front was a persistent heckler, who handed up several questions. This was

the first one I got. The audience caught my reply immediately. The persistent heckler thereupon got up and walked out.

The advantage of that form of reply is that your own question compels the audience to follow the thing out in their own minds: "How would my friend have had me reply to the German who asked the same question and who is asking it now?" Do not give the audience your rules of grammar about two parties. That is for you. Avoid exposing the stage machinery, if you can. He is compelled to think of it in the terms of two parties if he thinks: "What ought Norman Angell to have told the Germans—to be stronger than us?"

Here is another: "If Germany dominated England would she not then command all English labour?" What is the man thinking of? You have three categories in your grammar, three divisions. Just test that question by your three categories and see into which does it fall.

MR. BARTHOLOMEW: Category No. 3 which regards the government as an employer or controller of labour. As an individual clerk in an office, I am employed by my employer. I happen to be a citizen, but that is nothing to do with the question. If Germany conquered this country the artisans, labourers, clerks, &c., would still be employed by their particular employers of labour and wages would be paid by them as usual.

NORMAN ANGELL: Here is the same question in another form:

"Suppose Germany, having destroyed our navy, or otherwise getting the upper hand, forced us to close down 10 per cent. of our factories in order to stimulate their trade, would we not suffer?" How would you deal with that?

Mr. BLYTHE : If Germany would close down 10 per cent. of the factories of England she would destroy the earning power of 10 per cent. of the population of England and therefore the buying power of 10 per cent., and then she would have a big surplus of things on her own hands and not be able to sell them to England.

Mr. BRANDT : If they shut up 10 per cent. of the factories in Manchester, would they be able to provide the cotton goods for example ? It requires men and resources, and would they be able to do it immediately ?

Mr. BENSON : I should reply that if the Germans wanted to close down 10 per cent. of the English factories they would have to keep an army over here to do it. Are they likely to do that when the French, Austrian and Russian armies would be only too anxious to do the same thing, if they found it pay and would do it to the German factories ? If they blow the factories up, it would not take a very long time to build them again. I should also explain the international dependence of prosperity.

NORMAN ANGELL : You must get behind the question to the mind of the questioner. What that questioner has got in his mind, and he does not realise it, is that Germany can, just by the fact of having blown up a few of our ships at sea, send out orders that factories should be closed and execute such orders. It would mean occupying the country, administering new laws and, therefore, entailing a system of administration which would take years and years to build up. How is all this to be done ? Germany could not do that sort of thing even when she had beaten France to the ground. Nothing short of permanent conquest, absolute military organisation, with a far greater grip by the government upon the life of the people than any existing government

has now, would be necessary. There is no civilised country in the world that dictates that such and such factories are to be closed, and such and such worked. No civilised country has attempted to impose its political authority to that extent over the industrial life of the nation. When you have made that point plain that Germany would have to set up a new kind of state, which no nation has yet been able to develop in the greatest period of peace, show that they would start this experiment in an absolutely foreign country where the control of things is most difficult. It is more difficult to do things in a foreign country than in your own.

MR. HAYCOCK: Would it strengthen the argument to point to a case where a nation has tried to oppress a people, like Poland? Germany is trying to assimilate Poland, but does not dare even there to try to dictate who shall have a factory, or who shall not.

NORMAN ANGELL: It is necessary to show that the man has got out of his head altogether what government can do. We may have a Socialist future in which governments can proclaim which factories can open or which close. Mr. Benson then went on to say that he would introduce the interdependence of groups in the respective nations. That is another important point. Suppose Germany did close these factories here, immediately fifty thousand workmen would be thrown out of employment, who had been buying beef from the Argentines. That would cut off all the profits from those Argentine ranches, the shares of which were held mainly by German citizens. Show him by some similar illustration how Germany could not chop off a bit of the economic organisation and not feel the effect herself.

HERR VON LUBTOW: I am satisfied with Mr. Benson's and your answer with regard to Germany, but it is

possible to transplant Poles to Westphalia and get Westphalian colonists in Poland and at the same time buy property from Poles. I speak now as a British Militarist, with regard to the same question. Supposing England beat Germany, would not England have a great economic advantage in occupying Germany? As we have the arrangement between the Powers, Germany is between France and Russia, and Russia and France are allies of England. Therefore the arguments of Mr. Benson fall to the ground. England could well have smashed Germany with the help of Russia and France, occupied Germany, and she would be surrounded on each side by governments which would support her. I agree Germany could not do it with regard to England, but at the present time, with Russia and France, I do believe in the possibility that Britain would be able to do it with Germany.

NORMAN ANGELL: You have to put it up to the British people that number 45 million, and that have not had a military training, that they have to occupy a country of 65 million people, defended by the very best soldiers in the world. Where are our soldiers to come from? What is to happen in India? Can we depend upon this Alliance between France and Russia? Should we duplicate the story of the Balkans—quarrel over the swag?

Herr VON LUBTOW: If France, Russia, and England were conquering Germany, the French and Russian armies would also be occupying Germany.

NORMAN ANGELL: We should not then get any of the swag.

Herr VON LUBTOW: This occupation might strengthen the bonds between the countries. In the partition of Poland, such an alliance was possible.

NORMAN ANGELL : I submit it has not been successful.

Mr. ROTHWELL : It is suggested that no profit would accrue to England because that proposition leaves out of account the immense reaction that step would have on the trade and finance of the world, which would bring all the finance toppling to the ground.

NORMAN ANGELL : If Germany, France and England attempted the exploitation of modern Germany for a 100 years, these three countries would be doing nothing else but suppressing rebellions, excluding Germans, exiling Prussian noblemen—trade, industry, social development, everything else would go by the board.

Mr. GRAHAM : In the England and Germany case, without going into the details of the amount it would cause, one could show that the unemployment in Lancashire would cause a run on English banks, and then there would be a credit collapse.

NORMAN ANGELL : I was trying to get into the mind of the questioner the political impossibility of the thing apart from the financial effect. Look at the countries to-day—England having all this difficulty in Ulster—all this would be a tea-party compared with any single German province. European civilisation could not stand it. The redirection of energy and attention and so on would be such that European civilisation would simply collapse in the process if three countries attempted to occupy a country like Germany.

Herr VON LUBTOW : They would give Home Rule to the German provinces.

NORMAN ANGELL : England could give Home Rule to Germany without conquering her.

Herr VON LUBTOW : I mean Home Rule in political affairs, but the army occupying the country.

NORMAN ANGELL : The condition of Home Rule in Ireland is that our army gets out of it. If our Home Rule is to be enforced by an army, the Irish do not want it. Home Rule is a process of undoing the work of conquest. You engage upon this hundred years' war, you shatter your European civilisation for a certain end, which you then proceed to undo by giving them self-government, which they had before. That is the point.

Mr. KAPP : It seems to me, in answering that question, you have to disabuse the mind of the man of the notion that one country doing injury to another does benefit that country. Ought you not to state the thing more definitely ?

NORMAN ANGELL : He might have followed his definite illustration by a statement of that kind. The chief thing was to get the illustration. Here is a good rule. Always make your definition an illustration, and always make your illustration a definition. An abstract definition is only understood once in ten times, but when you give a definite illustration of how a thing works, and how and why and in what manner the injury of one country constitutes an injury to another, the thing is clear.

Mr. BENSON : We buy products from Germany without going to Argentina. We buy more, infinitely more, from Germany than from the Argentines or any other country with the exception of India.

NORMAN ANGELL : I suggested the three-corner example because in this you would get over a bit more the protectionist retort, that, if we did not buy the German goods at all, there would be plenty of work for these people, and there would be no need for them to sell these goods to Germany.

Mr. BLOYE : Can we meet this idea by remembering what happened in the Morocco case in Germany ?

I do not think many of us are competent to argue cases like that on military lines, and to take it on financial lines is much simpler.

NORMAN ANGELL: In such a case we do know a historical instance, when Germany could not occupy the whole of France. She could only occupy Alsace Lorraine. What would have happened if she had tried to occupy the whole of France instead of one German-speaking province? It would have been a political impossibility. That is clear to all but expert military thinkers. Your average man does not know much about finance—what you tell him about the collapse of credits is dogmatism. But he has an idea that the bankers and governments can fix that somehow. By going into the division of labour, in the way Benson suggested, you show him how credit is not something existing apart from the ordinary work of the world, how it is merely the expression of definite facts—that it is not a device, a machinery invented by the bankers—that financial interdependence is merely the visible evidence of an actual and concrete interdependence, consequent upon the exchange of things, and so forth. If you can show the real vital industrial interdependence which makes this credit, I think you have given a picture to his mind which is more real than a dogmatic assertion that credit would collapse.

As for credit, you have men like Lawson who wrote "*Modern War and War Taxes*," who would say that the bankers could fix that, and who have all sorts of arguments about gold reserves and credit. In the other way of answering you show there is nothing in this political occupation; when you have got it, you cannot produce the wealth; that wealth depends upon exchange, and war prevents the exchange. In dealing with credit, about which your audience will know nothing

whatever, they will accept your dogmatic assertion that the whole thing would collapse, and that we would all be ruined, but an assertion accepted dogmatically is a very different thing to an explanation of a process which the audience does understand. The force of the two things is very much in favour of giving, however imperfectly, a hint of the process and then your questioner sees how society works. I am afraid in going immediately and forthwith to your credit question, you base it upon a dogmatic assertion of which your audience will not understand the full meaning.

MR. ROTHWELL : Would it be a useful thing to turn the question upon the questioner and ask him to state, step by step, what would be the sequence of such a military occupation. Our friend suggested that England, through her allies, Russia and France, would occupy Germany. What would be the first outcome of that occupation ?

HERR VON LUBTOW : I did not speak from conviction. I know that militarists in general conceive of three united countries—England, France and Russia—having worked out the possibility of smashing Germany and Austria. Being successful at sea and on land, they would occupy Berlin, forcing Germany and Austria to peace on the strength of the vast majority of the Russian and French army still remaining over the Prussian army. They say that the Allies could force Germany and Austria to do everything they want. The Allies' object would be to have perfect control of German finance, commerce and trade. That is acknowledged by certain authorities to be actually possible.

MR. ROTHWELL : You say that they would then gain control of German finance ? But who owns the treasure

of Germany ? In whose hands is it ? How can the Allies get hold of the gold ?

Herr VON LUBTOW : They would get hold of the actual amount of money existing. Supposing England owed Germany a loan, and suppose they conquered Germany, they would not pay that loan.

Mr. ROTHWELL : How should we get actual hold, in the sense of controlling it, of the actual wealth of Germany ? The wealth of Germany remains in the hands of the Germans.

Herr VON LUBTOW : The German traders will become traders in the interests of France and Russia.

Mr. ROTHWELL : The wealth is still in the hands of the traders in so far as it has not evaporated, as a result of the financial situation. It still remains in their hands, and I do not see how the officers in the army can take it out of their hands.

Herr VON LUBTOW : That is the point. We do not care a hang about the financial profit or not. We say it is possible for this to be done.

Mr. ROTHWELL : If they do not care a hang about it, they need not go to the trouble of trying to control it.

Herr VON LUBTOW : I venture to say that occupation by an army is possible in France. You agree that, in one sense, war broke out between the French population and the German army. Supposing France had not been able to pay off the indemnity within two years, the occupation would have lasted ten years. Do not talk about your silly finance, but answer me the military question whether the occupation is possible.

Mr. ROTHWELL : I should think the military occupation is possible, but I cannot quite see what are the

results to be obtained by this military occupation. I have not yet seen one single end that is achieved by military occupation. The German dynasty may be overthrown but no other ends have been obtained.

Herr VON LUBTOW : I cannot answer you because I agree with you. I say that occupation is possible, but no benefit can be obtained.

Mr. ROTHWELL : Therefore questioner and objectioner show it is a piece of futility.

NORMAN ANGELL : When following out, push the responsibility on the questioner's mind. Ask your questioner to tell you what would have happened.

Herr VON LUBTOW : I am a convinced Norman-Angelite, but militarists who want to down you would put much more difficult questions.

Dr. BEALE : I would like to take you back to another question which we have already been asked in Leeds. It was a question that was very much discussed and there were a variety of answers to it from the members there. The question was : " This is all very well, but supposing Germany occupied India and she took over the national railroads of India, would not one of the results be that Germany would carry the contracts for future engine-making to Germany, and would not that react disadvantageously to English makers ? "

Mr. CALDICOTT : If Germany is going to occupy India, she has first of all to conquer England, or meet the resistance both of England and all the Colonies, which most probably she would not succeed in doing. Then if the contracts for engines could be better placed in Germany, they would go there now. India is not bound to place her contracts in England, at the present time, so that it is quite as likely that Germany could get the

contracts now without going to all the expense of a war.

MR. HUGINS: The idea is that Germany should go into India and take over the national railways. I would say that the English would not lose their contract, and I would show the questioner that if Germany took over the railroads of India she would be taking over a financial proposition. Germany would try to buy its engines in the cheapest place. If the contracts go to the German manufacturer he must show that he can sell them as cheaply as the men in Leeds. If Germany is going to pay £50 more to Germany this would increase her own expenses.

NORMAN ANGELL: He would reply this: Germany would immediately impose a tariff on all foreign goods entering India and enable her own to go in free, and that would enable the German locomotive manufacturer to obtain contracts by virtue of these preferential terms.

MR. HUGINS: I would say that it is not proved that it is a financial advantage to Germany. They might say: "We prohibit all goods coming in from Germany."

NORMAN ANGELL: The Leeds manufacturer would lose his contract.

MR. ROTHWELL: We could show that, as a matter of principle, the argument is watertight. To attempt to remove trade from one place to another will have a reaction which would adjust such removal. If it be granted there would be no loss of efficiency in transferring the contract for those engines from England to Germany, and England will have worked these on the most efficient lines, and if they did favour their own industry it would be possible in an isolated case to benefit an isolated individual. We have not a particular individual in mind.

We might usefully admit that in a particular instance the benefit might be individual, but not national.

Mr. BENSON : It seems to me that you people are trying to prove that if Germany did this it would not harm England. We are bound to admit that England would be injured, but that it would not benefit Germany.

Mr. HAYCOCK : I would give the history of Spain and show that that game does not pay.

Mr. BLYTHE : I suggest you are assuming that India will allow this operation to remain. If Germany has occupied India she will have to give India self-government. India will then make her own arrangements about trade.

NORMAN ANGELL : We are getting nearer to the point. Is the German working man, are 65 millions of the German people going to benefit by a big war of conquest, the result of which will be to give the German manufacturers exclusive advantage in a market like that of India ? The German working-man will not benefit from these two things, preferential terms in the Indian market and the war, which is the necessary price of it. He cannot get one without the other and if he has to take both, it is infinitely better he should have neither. France has been trying it the whole time in her colonies, with the result that, after having given it a trial, she finds that the principle does not pay the people as a whole, and the French colonial ministry is reporting against the whole principle. Then come in with our Spanish illustration. We do not urge that the trial of this foolish experiment—the revival of this foolish experiment—might not injure isolated manufactures. As a matter of fact the German Government has laid down the principle of the open door and it is the French who have laid down this preferential principle.



Russell of
Rouen

In a rapt ecstatic way.
Patience.



Bill S. K. G. '19

I wish I were a hippo-
potamus.
American Student Song.

Mr. HAYCOCK: I wish to make a suggestion. We are not covering enough ground. I want to get answers to these stock questions. We must limit our time on particular questions, as there is a big danger in doing this sort of thing, as our experience shows, there is sometimes a heckler who will corner the whole discussion.

NORMAN ANGELL: Surely the questions which have arisen are questions we get.

Dr. NASMYTH: On the Continent there seems to be a tendency towards Socialism and national ownership. A man said in Sweden, "We know you cannot annex the wealth of territory without annexing the inhabitants. But the object of Russia in getting a hold in Sweden is to get the iron mines in the North of Sweden. Could not Russia then gain?"

NORMAN ANGELL: Did not Chile gain by the annexation of the guano fields which were the government property of Peru?

Mr. GRAHAM: Those are two special cases which English people do not know anything about.

Mr. BENSON: What is the value of the iron mines? It would probably be very much cheaper to buy them.

Herr VON LUBTOW: The Swedish Government would not sell them to the Russian Government.

Mr. BENSON: If the Russian Government want iron, Lancashire merchants are willing to sell them iron and mines. People thought in the Boer War that they would get diamond mines, but it cost them two hundred and fifty millions to conquer the country, and they did not get a solitary diamond.

Herr VON LUBTOW: Has not England got the mines in India by conquest?

NORMAN ANGELL : We have not got them. They are privately owned.

Herr VON LUBTOW : But in the beginning ?

NORMAN ANGELL : No, the native owners were paid for these things. Even in the old days in India a man could not annex a province and work it as his estate.

Mr. BEDFORD : The Swedish Government spends the money it gains from these mines on administration, and the Russians will have to spend it in a like purpose.

NORMAN ANGELL : Such a reply is subsidiary to the other. The idea was that the extra administration and the political difficulties made by a conquest would absorb the profits of your mines. The costs would be very greatly increased by the resentment of Sweden, by the resentment of the smaller Powers, thus increasing the armament difficulty of Russia and the difficulty in obtaining capital.

Mr. HAY : How much would the different factors exist in the case of Chile ?

NORMAN ANGELL : A good deal I should say.

Mr. HAY : Is the Chilean Government gaining a good deal from the guano fields ?

NORMAN ANGELL : Taking the situation as a whole, if you think of the immense sums which the American Republics spend on their military establishments, there is nothing in the annexation of the guano fields to compensate for the present armament burdens. Now here is another question : " If Great Britain were to disarm now, would not Germany also do so, seeing that their Navy would have nothing to attack ? If not, what would be done with the German warships " ?

Mr. COLLINSON : If Britain were to disarm, it would be because people had come to realise the futility of force. And if they have come to realise the futility of force, it shows there must have been a very large educative work going on, and that educative work would have affected not only England, but other countries as well. Not only so, but if England were to disarm, it would immediately take away from Germany her fear of England's deceit and jealousy of German power. And that in itself would automatically decrease the German feeling of hostility to us. I myself believe that military force of all kinds, whether for offence or defence, is futile, and that if Britain were to disarm she would require such moral force that no Power would dare to attack her; now I put it to you that if Britain were unarmed, that there would be a greatly less destruction of wealth than if she were to resist, because we know that where there is a resistance battles show a large destruction of absolute wealth. Not only so, but the arrangements of trade and the arrangements of communication would be in less danger of disorganisation, and they would be able to go on much better than if a war had occurred. If Germany did not need her navy against England then, according to the German point of view, the main object of the German navy has disappeared. It might be argued that the German navy is used for other purposes than defence, but I would point out that if the German navy is not required for its main purpose, it is not required of the size it is at present, and if peace could be obtained it would be a very very small price to pay for peace to put the instruments of warfare on the scrap heap.

Herr VON LUBTOW : It does not answer the question whether Germany would disarm and would scrap her

fleet. Germany would think of the Russian and the French fleet.

Mr. COLLINSON : The first remarks I made touch upon the subject—that if England were disarmed she would give such a tremendous example, that it could not but have its effect on every other part of the world.

Mr. HAYCOCK : I believe we want to be particularly careful in answering this particular question. You must not give the audience the idea that we are “peace at any price” men. When the time comes—and we have to do our work in the meantime—then the nations which are strongest had better make a start, but if we are to choose between the policy of blindly building up armaments, and disarmament, I think the most dangerous course would be to increase our military budgets year by year.

Mr. COLLINSON : I am quite aware that what I have said is not in strict accordance with Norman-Angellism, but I feel there is a certain inconsistency in the doctrine, insomuch that it postulates that force for defence is good and force for aggression is wrong, and if it could be discussed it would be a help to some of us—we Norman-Angellists who feel there is a tremendous case for non-resistance.

Mr. BLOYE : From conversations, I have found how interesting that point of view is, and I too think it would be helpful, because there are always people in our audiences who take that point of view. I cannot take the non-resistance attitude, but I think it bears on our question, in this respect, that I think Norman-Angellism will lead us in time to a view like that. One of the things which Mr. Angell has put very clearly is this : he has taught us that we must not postulate the

idea of robbery as belonging only to other nations. Here we are in this hall this morning sitting quite at peace unarmed, because we presume that other people are just similar to ourselves going about their ways, and, therefore, we are content to sit at peace. Once the English people believe that the other nations are not burglars, but just similar people to themselves, then something along these lines may be arrived at.

Mr. BENSON: I think this question of disarmament almost invariably arises as a subsidiary question to the one "Who is going to start first?" We have not at any rate tackled that yet, and we get that at every meeting.

Mrs. MEAD: There is only one nation which can start first—it is the United States, which has no dangers. Every American must make that prominent in the United States. If the United States cannot afford to start no other nation can. It means, first of all, calling a halt, and then proposing disarmament. After an economic talk like this, the average American man would say, "That is all right, but just as long as we have got our police in our cities we are going to need a national army and navy, which is our national police. If you are a big and rich country, you have to have a big army and navy." That occurs in the newspapers, and it is a favourite talk of Mr. Roosevelt. That is his first and main proposition. The average man is very keen on this question of police.

NORMAN ANGELL: What are we going to do with the logical inference that if aggression is not profitable, the best way is for us not to resist.

Dr. NASMYTH: Mrs. Mead's case comes into the second category. Referring to the original question: "What about Germany if England starts to disarm?"

although the German navy was built in fear of England, it is not going to be disbanded now until these illusions are removed from the mind of the German people, because they feel very intensely that their navy does secure them commercial fair-play. I believe we have hit there upon the chief obstacle to any international agreement for the limitation of armaments, because all these countries would be relatively as strong if they devoted half as much money to armaments. The hazy conviction in the minds of people that in some way armaments are a source of national strength is one which prevents the Powers which are the strongest from considering any disarmament. In regard to this question of non-resistance, I am not a non-resister myself, but I have begun to see a tremendous field for rationalism on the basis of non-resistance on the economic side. Mr. Quintana suggested a very important point, that while perhaps the interdependence of the world has now gone so far as to make military aggression futile when it is opposed by military resistance, that interdependence continuing may very soon go so far as to make military aggression futile when not opposed by military resistance.

Mr. QUINTANA : These thoughts were suggested to me by Mr. D. Robertson's article in "War and Peace." He says, "Why resist?" Is it because by means of resistance we are going to secure more welfare to our people than if we did not resist? He says, "If you do not resist, that may mean immediate economic disadvantage to our people. If it does not mean immediate economic disadvantage, it may mean later economic disadvantage." That is a ground for enquiry, and Mr. Robertson wants us to enquire into the subject. He says, "If an invading army is not resisted it is more likely not to destroy property and destroy the trade of a people, of a nation." He gives that as an example only. Really, I do not

know anything about the subject, but the thing is worth discussing. Do we want by resistance to secure the welfare of our people, or do we want simply to keep to a principle that force should be opposed?

Mr. ROMANES : Norman-Angellism says that no country can gain by aggression, but we think that a country can lose by defeat.

NORMAN ANGELL : . . . Can suffer by the injury inflicted by invasion.

Mr. ROMANES : But that injury cannot be inflicted by the transfer of any material wealth from the defeated country to the conqueror.

Mr. LUNNON : Mr. Romanes said, if we were to allow Germany to capture England by non-resistance, Germany would not gain. The Angell thesis has only proved this when resistance occurs.

NORMAN ANGELL : You state the case quite simply and rightly. My own impression is that the Norman Angell thesis could be proved, so far as non-resistance is concerned, in terms of two countries.

Mr. MAWSON : Disarmament would require a great deal of moral courage, otherwise the first war scare that came along would make a worse state than before. The only thing we can do, if we have in view disarmament as an ultimate step, will be to continue our process of the gradual permeation of our principles, taking in all nations.

Mr. GRAHAM : I quite agree with what was said about its being impossible and ineffective to employ non-resistance until we have a whole nation which is convinced of it. That does not seem to me to be any argument against advocating it now.

NORMAN ANGELL : Well, you believe in non-resistance, you do not counsel those gentlemen who do not so believe to be non-resisters ?

Mr. GRAHAM : I would counsel those who believe in resistance to believe in non-resistance. I believe the effect of a nation adopting a non-resistance attitude would be an example which would affect all the nations. I think it would be generally agreed that the moral influence of England as a nation would be very great, and such an action on her part would produce a wave of similar feeling in every nation in Europe, and I do not feel that by advocating resistance in this movement we are doing quite the right thing. It makes the position very much more subtle to have to say that as long as people believe in force you will have to use force to resist force. I cannot but feel that we are taking a lower attitude when we say " We will resist force by force " and it does not seem to me that it is either the right or the effective way of dealing with force. Numbers of instances might be brought up in which people might use force. They are mostly false hypotheses. It is quite impossible to answer some of the quite wildly hypothetical cases.

NORMAN ANGELL : The question, in the mind of your hearer, would not be the military problem, but the police problem. How would you deal with the question, if someone in the audience said : " What about the police ? "

Mr. GRAHAM : I would point out that the police are in a country which does believe in resistance. If we believed in non-resistance we would be able to deal by moral influence with the burglar.

NORMAN ANGELL : But you must indicate to us practical policy. Yes, we agree with you that if people were moral and reasonable there would be no police but the

point is: "What are you going to do in the present circumstances where the police are necessary?"

Mr. GRAHAM: I should answer: If you do not believe in non-resistance you can go and vote for your Dreadnought for defence. I believe in non-resistance and I will vote against it.

Dr. NASMYTH: We have an actual case in Finland. There we have non-resistance to the most barbarous military aggression. These people in Finland—the most enlightened people in the world, judged by the standard of Leo Tolstoi—are suffering this semi-barbarian nation to dominate them. If they resist it would be futile. Russia can bring up millions of Cossacks and simply swamp them. But in my travels through Russia, I was surprised to find that all the democratic elements of Russia, which are the great revolutionary elements, are in favour of Home Rule for Finland. So that Finland, by a policy of non-resistance, is not only saving its people immense suffering and destruction of wealth but is actually gaining—hastening the time when its deliverers will come, by not giving the bureaucracy the chance to force this democratic element under.

Mr. BENSON: I think, Mr. Chairman, this whole question of non-resistance ought not to be discussed at the present moment, except in so far as Norman-Angellism shows that we do not advocate non-resistance. Our whole position is dogmatically that we do not advocate non-resistance. If we do that we go back to the position of the older pacifists.

NORMAN ANGELL: But what about the objector who says that the logical conclusion of your arguments is to have no navy.

Mr. BENSON: We are not dealing with him. We have not had a single answer to the question: "Why

don't you advocate non-resistance ? " Mr. Graham has been giving us an eloquent appeal for non-resistance.

NORMAN ANGELL : I want to get sufficient data in order to decide in our minds *why* it is we do not advocate non-resistance. We are clear in our own minds that we *are not* advocating non-resistance.

Herr VON LUBTOW : May I say I agree fully with Mr. Graham's point of view. I had been attracted to Norman-Angellism and studied it, after having been in contact with Quakers, and it still seems to me that if I thought it out for myself and if I was consistent I ought to become a non-resister. My difficulty is and I put the question to you, if I go to Germany to-morrow and go to my officer relations and friends, supposing I try to convince one of them of Norman-Angellism, a colonel may put the following question to me : " Have I to resign my position and secondly—a much more important question—have I to allow my boy, who is nineteen years of age, to devote all his time to military service ? " The last answer of Mr. Graham makes this question the problem of to-day. He says : " I vote against armaments, I believe in non-resistance, but I advise you as long as you are not convinced of it to vote for armaments." I agree with him absolutely. One point more. You believe too much in the moral factor. Supposing the whole of Great Britain believes in non-resistance, it is preposterous to believe that Russia will be influenced by Great Britain to accept the belief in non-resistance.

Mr. SHOVE : We are discussing two questions—one is the immediate practical point : ought we to advocate disarmament as a practical step now ; and the other is ought we to advocate non-resistance ; ought we to advocate the resistance of force by force, or not ? I think the reason why we ought not to advocate disarmament

is that disarmament does not mean non-resistance. If we disarmed to-morrow, nobody would believe that we would not resist. Unorganised resistance is more costly and barbarous than organised resistance. When you have abolished aggression, there will be no need for resistance. The case against aggression is much easier to make than the case against resistance; therefore we ought to concentrate our efforts on the case against aggression. When we have established the case against aggression, the need for resistance is gone, and therefore the question of resistance won't arise, and we have settled the question of resistance in settling the question of aggression.

Mr. QUINTANA : I think the question in my mind was not a question of policy but one of truth. We want to know the truth about the thing. It seems to me that we want to know what would do the least harm to the people of Great Britain—to resist the German invasion or not to resist it. We must get at the truth, not in an abstract way, but in a practical way. What would be more practical for the welfare of our people—to resist force or not to resist it? I think it is the truth we must try to find out.

Mr. HAYCOCK : We should discuss tactics, and if we do advocate non-resistance we may as well shut up shop.

NORMAN ANGELL : You fear the outcome of the discussion may be some revolutionary change in the Norman Angell question.

Mr. HAYCOCK : I have had people spoil my platform by this kind of thing.

NORMAN ANGELL : If we are to stop this sort of thing we must have a clear idea of the merits of the case. We must have a clear idea as to why we are not advocat-

ing non-resistance. We do not want to rehearse that on the public, we want to rehearse that on ourselves. If you are not in a position to state clearly why you do not advocate non-resistance you will have your public going away and saying, "This fellow is a Quaker masquerading under some new label."

Mr. HAYCOCK: We do not have that difficulty.

NORMAN ANGELL: In this question here we have a great many dealing with just that point.

Mr. HAYCOCK: We have this question only: "Are we to agree with the naval budget?" We do get that question. If we give them an impression that we are "peace at any price" men, and that we are going to advocate disarmament, they will not listen to us.

NORMAN ANGELL: I agree with you. What I am trying to get at is how are we to give the impression of not being "peace at any price" men. We must know in our own minds why we have this view.

Mr. BENSON: Mr. Graham's confusion is on the subject of the Briton's first duty. People say that "the Briton's first duty is to defend his country." Mr. Graham says "the Briton's first duty is not to defend his country." We say, "the Briton's first duty is not to attack another country."

Mr. HAY: I wonder whether the reason why Norman-Angellism does not advocate non-resistance is because the problem we set ourselves is a problem of principle. We do not say, "What is the best way to resist?" We say, "There is no essential advantage to be got from a war." "What is to be done with the particular weapon I have in my hands?" That is another question. If two men are going to fight, do not talk to them about

what weapon they shall use, but show them they have no interest in fighting.

NORMAN ANGELL: That begins to get near it. Here is a man who says to me "When I go to town next time, X is going to shoot me at sight. I think of tackling him with a 49-bore, but I have a 51-bore. Which shall I use?" I say, "I do not know the respective merits of these weapons, but I might point out to you that the fellow you think is going to attack you is dead. I do not know whether that bears on the question at all." That is our point. Cannot you keep that clear? He is going into a philosophical argument as to the best calibre for dealing with Jones. You listen with great patience to the heat of his argument, and you try very patiently to explain that Jones is dead. This fact does not bear on the problem as to whether he takes a razor or a six-shooter, but it has some relation after all to the problem he has in his mind. There is the clear distinction we want to get at. When you are dealing with this question give some illustration of that distinction. The illustration, like most illustrations, does not fill the whole bill. I have thought of a great many. You try and think of a few which will fit that case. Put it this way—I say to him: "You really think Jones is going to shoot you at sight?" He says, "Sure of it." I say, "You are quite wrong; He is not going to do anything of the sort. If you were to come down and not flourish that gun at all, that would be the safest thing you could do." He says to me, "Have you some reason for what you say." I say, "No absolute reason, but that is what I would do in your case." He says, "Do you know as a matter of fact that he is not going to?" You say, "My reasons are these." He says, "You do not quite convince me." I say, "Well, if you are not convinced by all means, take your gun. My reasons are very strong, but I am

not going to take the responsibility of urging you to come down without your gun if you yourself are not convinced. I will not take the responsibility of advising you to leave your gun at home unless you believe as I do."

MR. LUNNON: Beyond my duty as a Norman-Angellist, it is my duty as a citizen to examine the condition of naval and military affairs.

NORMAN ANGELL: There are three of us going to town. I say, "It is the safest thing not to parade this gun at all. Leave that at home." And the other two say, "We must not do that." I say, "Well, whatever we do we must stand together." And they say, "What are your reasons?" I give my reasons, and they say, "We are not sure." Finally, two of them say, "We have to take our guns, and we have to stand together." In that case, I take my gun too.

MR. BEDFORD: Could you not say, "Your enemy will not shoot you because he has married your sister, and is in partnership with your father."

HERR VON LUBTOW: I speak now as a Quaker. You said yesterday to the representative of the National Service League, "We want to prevent the disease. You have the remedy—the National Service League." I speak as a Quaker. I have found the prevention of the disease and you Norman-Angellists are only trying to cure the disease. The Quaker is absolutely consistent and right to say, "I have found a means of preventing the disease which you Norman-Angellists have rejected. You say you wish to prevent the disease, and all the time you are only using your remedy for the disease."

NORMAN ANGELL: We do not go in for the cures. In the case of the advice to our friend about his six-

shooter, one of these friends of mine says : I am always being shot at by this fellow. What must I use to tackle this fellow ? ” I say : “ I do not know anything about rifles but I could join you in clearing up all this nonsense. I do not say go without any gun at all, but if you feel you must take the gun, take it ; but do for heaven’s sake find out what the quarrel is about. Don’t you see you have not explained to him such and such ? See if you cannot compose this quarrel ? ” We do not choose between two rival cures.

Herr VON LUBTOW : If you have convinced the public would you then come to the conclusion of the Quaker ? After you have convinced all the nations of Norman-Angellism, you would necessarily arrive at the Quaker idea.

Mr. BLOYE : As far as the British Empire is concerned, if the six self-governing states of the Empire were the only countries in the world, we might agree to non-resistance in the form of disbandment of our armies. But we have some real or imaginary enemies. Our work is to weaken the motive for aggression. Suppose we succeed in Germany, then we destroy any possibility of the burglar notion as concerns Germany. Therefore the weakening of the motive for aggression destroys the idea of a burglar. When we reach the end of that process, we all come to the Quaker position, not on moral grounds so much as on business grounds.

Mr. COLLINSON : I wish to clear up a little misunderstanding which has arisen in the debate this morning. Mr. Haycock and Mr. Benson seem to think that this policy that I have briefly outlined is one intended to smash up the Norman Angell League. I am a Quaker, I am interested in Quakers and I take it that this organisation wishes to get the help of everybody it can. Now

then, I put my position. I am a non-resister. I believe that is a higher ideal. I came to this conference wishing to learn. I have learned a lot, and my position is this : Can I put to my fellow Quakers the position that if you will join in with Norman-Angellism you will be doing the best possible thing *at the present time* in order to get to the ideal you feel to be the higher ? That is my position, and I should say that, as an ideal, Norman-Angellism is bound to work eventually towards non-resistance, but, as a policy, at the present time it is useless to advocate non-resistance to a man who is not sufficiently educated to appreciate even Norman-Angellism. I say that is a step—it is the finest thing that has come before the peace people in this centry, and, as a Quaker, I shall be exceedingly pleased to say everything I can to show to Quakers and to those with whom I come in contact that Norman-Angellism cuts to the very root of the militarist evil.

Mr. WILLIAMS : The argument we have had is extraordinarily interesting to me, because I represent a large number of people who, whilst absolutely believing in the doctrines you are preaching, at the present moment are convinced that some form of defence is necessary and from our point of view we want to know the attitude of Norman-Angellists on this particular question. Our views are not the views of the National Service League. Mr. Angell pointed out that voluntary service might be looked upon as aggressive. On the other hand, it is possible to take defensive measures which shall not be aggressive in any way at all, and personally I should be sorry to see Norman-Angellism tainted with any idea of non-resistance, because there are a very large body of people who feel like myself that it is legitimate to defend, and we want to be in a position to defend without giving

anybody cause for thinking that we are aggressive. I think it is a question of policy at the present minute, and if Norman-Angellism were to advocate a policy of non-resistance we might as well shut up shop. The legitimate outcome of Norman-Angellism is the ideal of non-resistance, but it is impracticable at the present moment. I am extremely glad to hear that the general view inclines to that end.

Mr. LUNNON: There must be cures and there must be research men. You have in practical life to decide whether you are going to be practitioners or research men. I feel now that to be both a research man and a medical practitioner is not the wisest thing. We can get the best results from our energies by being one or the other. We Norman-Angellists have decided to take the research department and the Navy League has taken the practical department.

Mrs. MEAD: In the United States the fundamental question is this question of police. There are two classes of force. One is the minimum of force represented by the police and militia, whose business is to accommodate justice. Now, the business of the police we have had for three hundred years. Then we had a body of men whose business it was to use force simply to take a man to court. The court consists of a body of men impartially settling the question according to legislation. The police are not rival bodies, and the militia are essentially the same thing. If you could make clear there is one class of force which will resist force—that one always needs the State police to bring about justice—but to use the minimum of force to secure justice. If we could make that clear we should help the cause a great deal. If we could say we are not non-resisters, but we are aiming to secure justice, the force we are going to

have eventually is not a rival army, but an international police, to do what is necessary to police the world.

Mr. GRAHAM: I should like to clear up a little misapprehension. I want to see co-operation between the Angellist and the Quaker. I think of myself both as an Angellist and a Quaker, although I may say that I can only reconcile Section 6 of the Garton Foundation's statement of principles with my position by saying that no defence is perfectly adequate. I should like to reassure Mr. Williams and Mr. Haycock we are not out to revolutionise the advocacy of Angellism. In answer to that question, I should say: "We are not discussing non-resistance. You may draw your own conclusion as to whether the facts which we are putting before you make you, who agree to them, a non-resister. Opinions may differ on that point. We are not a sectarian body, but the point which I wish to put before you is that war is futile."

NORMAN ANGELL: Mr. Collinson and Mr. Graham have very well stated their position. The position I have taken personally—that we should resist the employment of force against us—and their position are not mutually exclusive. We are not discussing whether the Germans should resist or whether we are non-resisters. There is a definite fact which bears on the problem even if we were not both agreed. I know Mr. Haycock has been remarkably uncomfortable. He feels that as a matter of policy these things should not be discussed. I do not like the word "policy," because if people feel that we are avoiding the necessary logical outcome of our conclusions, merely because it is not politic to discuss them, you will create the impression that we people are sailing under false colours. Someone said that the National Service League spoke here in a way that was not the way they talked to the National Service League

audience. We do not want that kind of thing said about us. The position of the Friends who have spoken here is perfectly clear. I think, if you will keep in your mind the illustration I have attempted to give, you will see they are two absolutely distinct things, and that you may come to two absolutely contrary conclusions, and still want to know what the truth is about these things ; that one may conclude either that the likelihood is that Germany is coming to attack us, and that we have to have a big navy, or that the likelihood is so small, that we need not have a navy at all. Both people equally are concerned with the factors which we attempt to make plain. Get your illustrations rehearsed—all of them which happen to fit the particular case with which you are dealing—and show that we are quite honest when we say, “If circumstances point to the fact that Germany is likely to attack us, from notions mistaken or otherwise, we say to you : By all means, obey the dictates of your conscience, and resist.” Some of us—I am leaving the position of the Quaker—are able to say : “That is not a mere question of tactics or policy ; we do not say that because we think you will be in favour of our cause if we happen to tell you that, but because it is the essence of the doctrine in which we believe.” Norman Angell may be mistaken, but at least he is a man who tries to thresh these things out, and his impression is that we shall arrive best at peace—national and international—the elimination of force, by resistance. I may be wrong, but at least that lies at the philosophic foundations of our movement. I do believe that. It is a very elusive point, but I believe that with a little more leisure, I could make it plain that it is through resistance that we can get best at the true ideal. The point raised amounted to this : That the armaments themselves constituted a factor militating against education. Quite

true. But armaments themselves only constitute that factor to the extent to which they are able to act through public opinion, and I say that the most effective way in which you can offset that influence is by getting at the public mind, rather than by going direct to armaments.

Supposing that you can in some way check the activities of the armament people, you have done nothing to ensure that some other clique, some other form of illusion, will not be able to exploit the relatively ignorant public mind. You have a double security in preaching that through the public mind, by rendering that soil unfertile for those ideas, rather than by getting at the armaments first, your end will be most surely achieved.

The point is that if you draw attention to that, you do get a dissipation to some extent of energy, and as we like to think the other fellow is to blame, necessarily you are likely to go off on a side issue which is not our main business. Do not let us be led off on side issues from the main attack. Mrs. Mead raised some interesting points in reference to police, but I assume that most of us have read one chapter of "Polity" and two or three in "The Great Illusion." There I try to deal with the distinction between police and army, and in "Polity" I carried it further. It hardly touches the dilemma which was confronting us here.

The people we are dealing with are, I think, philosophically, far more hostile to peace than the Americans, and they are apt to think first it is no use talking about your international police because if the Germans think they can collar our trade, they will do it. And even if you get your international police, how are you going to prevent the Russians and Chinese overrunning your international police and re-starting the old condition of things. Again, it is a question of the particular job we happen to be on. We do not say that the other men

are not doing a useful job—your arbitration men, your man who concentrates on the armour ring, your Hague Court Convention man. Our point is this: There is a tendency, and has been a tendency in the past in all this work to neglect the state of mind which renders the general public sceptical of the whole thing, and that state of mind arises from a failure to understand the strength of the social and co-operative forces at work, and if we can render plain the immense weight of these social and co-operative factors, we shall create an attitude of mind which will immensely facilitate their work, and an attitude of mind which will facilitate many other things as well. In the division of labour, that is the task we have set ourselves. We do not claim that no other work has to be done, but we have assumed a special task of rendering that work as efficient as possible.

Many of the difficulties which confront even the educated man, in this matter of world organisation, arbitration, and so on, are illustrated by Mr. Hay's remarks last night. Now I did not think that anyone who had studied the things we have been studying would have felt that difficulty. It flashes to your mind that we have already a federation which has got over all those difficulties—the British Empire. We have States operating without this federation. All that has been solved, when you get these co-operative forces freely at work, as we get them in the British Empire. We need not have a paper scheme and we do not need to reconcile the working of this paper scheme with the analogies of present states. When we get the attitude of mind, as we have it throughout the British Empire, these difficulties clear up themselves. All these machinery and administrative difficulties, that Mr. Hay talked to us about last night, will clear themselves up. Where you are dealing with a very educated audience, I do believe

it is worth while to go a little deeply into the philosophic foundations of our view. Take the case of the two political parties in England; the fact that these two political groups have abandoned the use of force, and only manage to carry on their work by the realisation of the futility of force is significant.

We take non-resistance and non-armament as a vague possibility of the future. In the case of Canada it exists. Then you get a quarrelsome acquisitive people like the Americans, having lived these hundred years at peace with Canada, and Canada has adopted the non-resistance line, and it happens to have paid. I think that finishes the rough notes I have got. I do believe that this discussion has been useful despite the dubiousness of our Manchester friends. I want you to feel this, that the line we have taken—"resist"—is not a mere matter of policy. We have arrived at it from a rational examination of the facts and possibilities confronting us.

THE MOVEMENT AND THE UNIVERSITIES

ADDRESS BY PROFESSOR J. E. WEISS

Afternoon Session : July 24

MR. H. H. O'FARRELL IN THE CHAIR

MR. O'FARRELL : Professor Weiss is going to speak this afternoon upon the movement in the Universities. He is the Vice-Chancellor of the Manchester University.

PROFESSOR WEISS : Mr. Chairman and friends, I should like, in the first place, to say how gratified I was to be asked to speak at your meeting. I had the greatest enjoyment in listening to a debate this morning. I hope that what I may say may, to some extent, stimulate criticisms and observations this afternoon. I do not see why I should have been selected, as I represent only one University, and I feel a great hesitation in speaking about the university movement to other men connected with other universities and with perhaps a greater knowledge of what the universities can do for the movement. I am really only speaking as an individual member of a university, which I should say is neither the oldest nor the youngest, nor the largest nor the smallest, nor the best and certainly not the worst. If

we look at the subject from a quite general point of view it is obvious that it is most important that any movement which is to have influence over human beings generally, should find some recognition in universities. The universities are training our ministers and clergy, training lawyers, doctors, teachers, training the captains of industry, and they are attracting, in large measure, the civil servants, the administrators, and the officers in connection with the Officers' Training Corps. All these people are having a large and growing influence on civilisation, because all of them are endowed with special knowledge and information gained while at the university and therefore, being educated men or women, will in the world at large have an enormous influence. If they can take with them from the university some inspiration in connection with any particular movement whatever, which may have entered the world, they will be an important and ever-increasing factor as year by year they are added to the sum of humanity. It is therefore very important that such a subject should find recognition in the universities. Of course, if the professors at the universities had not been so deeply engaged in their "ologies," or engrossed in their libraries, or peeping down microscopes, or doing the other things which seem to be of little importance to the world at large, they might have been so open to receive the message of Mr. Norman Angell that they might very readily in their various outlets have influenced the students in this respect. Unfortunately, that has not been the case. The people at the universities most interested in Norman-Angellism are the young people with the open minds and not those who had got hard and fast theories of the world or the best relationship of nation to nation. It is really among the students that one has to look for the propagandists of the future.



*"The last time that question
was put to me"*
Norman Angell at Leeds.



*I grow old learning many
things.*
Solon.



*The pacifist, the lover, and
the poet are of imagination
all compact.*
Midsummer Night's Dream
(amended).



*No rule is so general which
admits not some exception.*
Anatomy of Melancholy.

If the professors at the universities were all advocates of the doctrine of Norman-Angellism they would have many opportunities of improving the occasion and interesting their students in this movement. Particularly so the professors of History. If, instead of dealing mainly with the causes of war, they were to deal largely or mainly with the economic effects of the war when it has taken place, we should probably get a clearer understanding of the importance of war—not in helping, but in hindering the nations. The historian, however, is, in many instances, not an advocate of either peace propaganda, or indeed of the particular form of the peace movement represented by Norman-Angellism, and consequently the student hears very little of that side of the question. Indeed, there have been complaints made, and justly made, that too much stress is laid on warfare as a whole in history. That is true. That is a great fact, but if stress is to be laid on warfare, let the emphasis be laid on the right side. If lecturers and historians must talk about the wars, let them look at them from every point of view and consider the conclusion as well as the beginning of the war. There have been criticisms made by teachers on some of the questions that have been set generally in connection with entrance examinations to universities and matriculation examinations. Head mistresses have complained that questions have been set on the distribution of troops and so on. If you are teaching military history to experts that is important, but it is utterly devoid of importance to the ordinary man in the street or to anyone who is studying history as a whole. An appeal has been made to those who are concerned in the setting of papers for entrance examinations to universities that that sort of question should be left out. I am afraid historians are not people who can do very much in helping at the present time.

The professors of economics might help on this movement, if they were converts to our cause. They have many opportunities, not only in discussing the indemnity question, but there are many other questions which show that a connection might be made and illustrations drawn between some of the questions dealt with in economics. The whole question of the international dependence of one nation upon another, which must come out in the teaching of economics, is one of fundamental importance to this movement, and I think that probably we shall find that a growing number of economists will dwell in the future upon this fact, and if that is thus driven home to all students of economics, I think we shall have an easier task in pushing the movement everywhere.

In connection with the conflicts which exist between capital and labour, the enormous damage which is done by even successful strikes between the interests of capital and labour, when the parallel is drawn between the comparative uselessness of strikes and the uselessness of aggressive warfare, will show that Norman-Angellism is not merely a principle which is involved in the relationship between competing nations, but also in the relationship between capital and labour, whenever they find their interests are not identical, and that it would be far better to get at some other machinery which would prevent strikes than even to run a successful strike.

The psychologists might also give interesting problems in the aberration of mind during war scares. Psychologists have not yet explained how it is we are sometimes on the best terms with a nation and sometimes our temperament and temper is changed and we see everything in a very distorted way—in fact, Norman Angell has called his book “The Optical Illusion”—and that is a subject which the psychologists should take up from the individual and from the collective point of view.

is extraordinarily interesting to see what sudden changes of mind will come over a nation in the very shortest time from one very slight political incident.

The biologist ought to use this opportunity in dealing with such subjects as the struggle for existence. So many of those who differ from us and think that warfare has a useful purpose in the world, base their assumption on the Darwinian theory of the struggle for existence. That such a struggle for existence exists no one will deny, but the inference which has been made often from the biological point of view is entirely false and has been proved to be false by many of the keenest minds. It has been shown that forces that are entirely contrary to the operation of forces in warfare are very important factors in natural selection ; that co-operation of animals like the co-operation of man has caused many animals, not very formidable, to survive on account of the fact that they have combined and been thus able to work better economically and even defensively. The animals which have survived to the present day are not the largest, the largest animals have disappeared. If the struggle for existence was always on the side of might and size we should see the larger animals at the present day. If you go and look at some of the extraordinary monsters in the British (South Kensington) Museum, you will see animals larger than any existing at the present day, and provided with defensive armour and aggressive horns to an extent which is not rivalled by the elephant at the present time. The whole course of evolution, and particularly if we introduce the question of the evolution of man's consciousness, the gradual survival of brain over muscle, the intellectual over the physical side, and the fact that man has been able to subsist comparatively defenceless, indicates that survival of the fittest does not mean the survival of the strongest or

of the most aggressive, but that it means fit to survive for many reasons, and most fit if the intellectual activities are capable of enabling the organism to fit itself to the particular condition of its environment. It is a curious thing, which was pointed out to me by one of the biologists, that in some of those extinct mammals which we see—extraordinary armour-plated organisms like our Dreadnoughts, and monsters provided with excrescences in many groups of animal life—one can see the organism getting more complicated and then it disappears altogether. It dies out and is superseded by an organism which is more plastic and which is able to subsist owing to mental superiority or greater power of adapting itself to new conditions of life. Whether that is what is going to happen in nations when they get more and more protected by armies and Dreadnoughts one does not know. Might not some small nation which is not doing that, but which is using its brains to good purpose and becoming agriculturally the most self-supporting or industrially the most efficient—might not that small nation sweep away in ultimate development the nations which waste their time and energy in armaments.

I would urge, therefore, that all who are interested in this movement should take an opportunity to find out, in the different subjects, what illustrations can be used to indicate that the course which is being pursued by the great nations of the world is not to the benefit of nations as a whole. As we have not got in the universities, unfortunately, professors of the different subjects who take this view and who can give these illustrations to their classes, the question arises: Would it be good to have some professorship or lectureship endowed at the universities which should be for the purpose of considering national relationships and the best way of carrying this idea into effect? You have lectures and

courses on government, on politics in the non-party sense, which are important and are given at many universities, but there are few on this side of the Atlantic which deal exclusively with International Polity, which we now know is becoming more and more important day by day. In America the beginning has been made and we shall be very glad to hear what is being done and what is the result of the institution of such professorships and lectureships. All universities should have some such teachers on the subject, who would definitely lay themselves out to find and discover what is the consistent and best course of international relationship and intercourse between all nations. I believe, if he were seriously to consider the subject, he would arrive at the conclusions Mr. Norman Angell has arrived at.

It is an interesting reflection, and one of which university men cannot be proud, that this movement has not had its origin in any university but outside the universities—it may be from the fatal conservatism of universities. I think that universities have not been the birth-places of much reform in this world. At any rate, I speak for the British universities; I do not know what is the case with others, but I do not think we are responsible for much of the fresh vigorous reform in any direction which has taken place in the country. I think reform has come from the outside, but the universities can be led that way. It devolves upon those who are young and active to lead the universities where the universities have not themselves been able to lead.

In considering the appointment of such a lecturer, or professor, we have to meet the question: Would he attract students, or would he not? Should such a course be made compulsory, so that all students of the universities should have the benefit of thinking clearly on these matters, or should they go there of their own free will?

It is no good to put in any professor or lecturer on that subject unless he is the right sort. To put in a man merely to repeat certain truths, to go on, year in and year out, to new sets of students, preaching a perfectly formal doctrine of what is the proper attitude to take, with no enthusiasm, such a man would be no use in doing good to the students or beyond the university walls. You want to get the right man. As to whether the course should be compulsory or not—speaking as one who has a great deal to do with the university courses, I would deprecate making it compulsory, for the reason that if you make it compulsory that in itself takes away a good deal of the interest of the students. I am sorry to say so, but I find it is so. If you get the right man the students will go. Unfortunately, to make any such change as would be really useful in all the universities would be enormously costly. Whether the Garton Foundation has endless funds I do not know. I am quite certain that whoever might do this and if the universities were able to secure the right man—I do not know whether we can secure Mr. Norman Angell, but I consider he would be the right man—it would have enormous influence on university life in general.

For that, perhaps, we must wait some time, but here is a great deal that can be done in the meanwhile, which is being done by many of you in your various universities. If we cannot get all we want in the way of definite teaching, great movements have done good work by the voluntary work of those who are really keen and interested in the subject, and I have advocated before the establishment in every university of some club or society, some league which deals with this subject—whether it be a Norman Angell League or International Polity Club or War and Peace Society—some society which takes up the study of this subject and will bring it before the fellow students

in the universities. I think it is enormously important at the present time. The universities have almost all opened their doors now to the Officers Training Corps and its work. I can speak quite frankly in the matter—I was the only member of the senate at the Victoria University in Manchester against the introduction of this Corps. I may have been wrong and probably was wrong, because the single man is not generally right. Now for my sins I have been made the Vice-Chancellor of the University, though I had doubts at one time whether I could stay. I am glad we have the War and Peace Society there. I have no quarrel with those who advocate conscription; I know they are doing it because they think it is the right thing for the nation to be on the defensive. I have no quarrel with those who enter the Territorial troops or the Officers Training Corps, because if they consider it is right to defend their country when their country needs it, I should despise them if they did not enter the Territorials. If they have and hold strong views, they ought personally to do the best they can to further them and that is why I advocate a War and Peace Society, because that gives an open platform on which they can all meet. I am on the best of terms with the Officers Training Corps and they have more than once offered me a commission. I am one of the non-resisters, but that does not mean that I would like a society or even a Norman Angell League to take up that attitude, because if that attitude is taken up it prevents good work being done in indicating to our friends who take the opposite view that there are two sides to the question. The War and Peace Society I have thought myself able to join. On the basis of the War and Peace Society we can discuss the question impartially without holding the same views, and see what can be done in the way of getting a better under-

standing which will prevent the warfare that we both deprecate so much.

How can a War and Peace Society best fulfil its objects? That is one of the topics I hope we shall discuss particularly. We have a War and Peace Society and I do not like to criticise it in any way, because we have here Mr. Brandt, who has been a very ardent and able Secretary of it, and if I make any criticism of it it must be understood that I make it purely as being myself concerned in the society and its working. I think the best work that can be done is in having joint meetings with kindred societies and other societies who are working on different subjects and on different lines. If we can get a joint meeting with such a society as a Sociological Society or the Historical Society, or the Economic Society, or the Educational Society, or the Biological Society—if we can get a joint meeting, then we get a discussion which is much more fruitful than if we have a War and Peace Society which is made and supported by its own members only. The question as to what kind of papers we should have, and what kind of discussion we should have, is one upon which I hold fairly strong views. I believe that a student society should be a student society and should be addressed by students. When we get people down to address the society—some eminent person on the subject—the discussion is very generally apt to be of a very poor kind, lacking in fire, because a student does not like attacking an eminent person freely. There will be a much better discussion when students address students. Great stimulus would be given if a student were invited from a different university to come down. Students get rather tired of their own members and they know exactly what he is going to say when he gets up and they have the same arguments to refute him with when he sits down. A new

man is a dark horse and as he is one of your own kidney, you can knock him down afterwards. This suggestion is very important and I urge that that should be done whenever it is possible.

Other things can be done. We have had in our society a very successful trip last year to Germany. I should advise these student societies to undertake visits to their confrères in other countries, to see that the Germans are not all fire-eaters who are going to slay them, but are as hospitable and genial hosts as can be wished. I believe that some members of the society are arranging a visit to France. I hope very much our society will invite the kindred society from abroad to visit Manchester.

One point which we have always found a difficulty and which we shall always find a difficulty is the question of getting opportunities for study. We want, of course, to have, in connection with the society, study circles dealing with various subjects; but we in Manchester are not well provided with books and literature on the subject, and it is nobody's business to see that literature connected with Norman-Angellism is put in the library. That is a matter which wants serious consideration, either a donor or an organised request to the authorities to provide certain books which are not in the libraries. I am speaking, too, as one of the authorities, and should welcome such a request. Something should be done in regard to providing prizes for essays and papers, and it is important that the students should have the necessary material with which to study. I hope the Garton Foundation will continue to offer prizes for student's work in connection with the movement of War and Peace. I am quite certain it is a useful outlet for their money, and I hope it may be rather increased than diminished in amount. Of course, probably the most useful thing is the organisation of a summer school such as has been

organised here. It seems to me that nothing could be better for the movement than to bring together the active minds of the various universities from various countries to discuss this question. I do hope that this movement will keep its grip on the universities. It must fasten its grip on the universities like a bull-dog, and shake them up and never let them go. I am quite certain that as long as we get real interest aroused—and the question is how to get the real interest—the movement will derive the greatest benefit from the work that is done in universities as well as all that has been done outside.

MR. O'FARRELL: I do not know whether—to use his own words—Professor Weiss is a dark horse, but certainly he cannot be anything but an eminent person, and I hope the results that generally follow the address of an eminent person to a society will not happen in the present case.

DR. NASMYTH: I have been tremendously interested in Professor Weiss' discussion, the more so, perhaps, because it is exactly that kind of problem I have been turning over in my own mind in respect of America. We have now Norman-Angellism firmly planted there, and plans for the next two or three years definitely arranged. I think we can look forward to a development of Norman-Angellism so strong in America that, in the next two or three years, if it should die out in Europe, we in America should be sending missionaries to you over here. We have five international polity clubs, the latest of them some four or five months old, in some of the most important universities in the east, in some of the conservative institutions, and we know that, if we succeed there, we shall be able to carry it on with great success in our middle western colleges. These clubs are in the colleges Hereford, Yale, Columbia, Toronto and Cornell.

The Hereford Polity Club is really a federation of nine Students' Clubs all having an international interest. We follow the method of holding joint meetings with different clubs, giving one of them the responsible direction of the organisation of meetings in one month of the year. I expect to devote the next two or three years to travelling through the universities one after another, and in organising a hundred of these clubs. This problem of getting the instruction in the regular course to contribute to our movement is a very important one, and it seems to me that the prospects there are most encouraging in regard to America, and they must be here also.

We have three movements along the lines of the lecture courses bearing on the subject of international relations. There are courses in international law which are tending to become more and more accredited. Then there are courses in international relations, and in connection with these the Columbia University is working out a series of extension courses in New York State, and they have begun with one professor of international law, who is to give extension lectures next winter, and that will be developed to give places to a staff of half-a-dozen or twenty teachers of international relations and law in that State, and provide a direct opening for young men who are studying those subjects. Then there are very interesting courses in the history of civilisation. The first one was established in Cornell, which solved the problem of interesting students of law. These courses in the history of civilisation have been given by half-a-dozen professors, beginning with the Abyssinian period and going up to the Greek and Roman civilisation, giving in one or two hours the outstanding facts of the history, and dealing with the question whether human nature does not change. Then there is the problem of getting our teachers of economics and history to do it in the

right spirit, a problem which we have been discussing. In America, we find that the professors of history are the great jingoes of the university, but we have very interesting beginnings at Cornell. A professor there is editing a series of Century text books, which say nothing about the glory or barbarism of war, but which deal with the permanent elements of civilisation. In Germany, there is a great school centering at Leipzig, with Professor Lamprecht, dealing with the history of civilisation, which is carrying on the work which Freiburg began. The method which we are hoping to use is to try to get a conference of professors of economics to try to show the American Society of Economics how economics should be taught. One more suggestion in regard to affecting other student organisations. I am looking forward to the Norman Angell movement taking over the whole peace movement of the world by absorption. There is a great opportunity there in the International Federation of Students of which my successor, Dr. Mez, is President this year, which includes some 65,000 students in different countries. The programme of that International Federation of Students includes the study of international relations, but if all our War and Peace Societies and International Clubs could join with the International Federation, that would be able to give a definite direction to the somewhat vague object, which is, however, a perfectly parallel object, and be able to influence in a very important way the whole student bodies of the universities of the world.

Herr VON LUBTOW : I should like to take a few points raised by Professor Weiss. The first is the teaching of history. It seems to me that he thinks it would be better not to teach the history of war at all—and may I humbly suggest that I differ from him. I do not see that the teaching of military history in the right spirit does in any

way produce jingoism or a desire on the part of the students to become militarists. I think it is a very good suggestion to have a Chair or Professorship for our movement, and the great thing is, of course, to have a fit person. I think Norman Angell would be a very fit person. The great difficulty that arises is that I believe the professors of Cambridge, who give lectures on economics, are against our movement and most of them would undoubtedly have a little objection to that lectureship. Compulsion is used in the colleges for lectures. I venture to say that compulsion in our case will probably be necessary too. Then with regard to the society, I think we ought always to invite friends of ours, who do not belong to the societies, to take part in the debates and discussions, and, even if they do not accept everything Norman Angell says, we anyhow make them read "The Great Illusion" and, perhaps, even "War and Peace."

In regard to visiting foreign universities, there is a danger with students who are interested in the movement of having no idea whatever in regard to the opinion of the greater mass of students in their own university. I have to go to Toronto as a lecturer at the Toronto University on German language and literature, and it has been told me that in teaching economics and history and literature there is a great chance to bring in, in a Jesuitical sort of way, our great principles. I decided at first to take, as a kind of reading work, the history of the Franco-German war, but instead of that I shall try by compulsion on my students to make them translate certain easy pages from "War and Peace" and from "The Great Illusion." Whether they like it or not, they hear about it, and some of the more intelligent ones may get interested. I have been informed that most of those who will come to my lectures will be lady students. I was naturally shocked. I shall devote my

life not only to teaching literature and the German language—and even there I could do a great work in showing the interrelation of the different literatures—but especially I shall get these people to know something about Norman-Angellism.

Mr. SHOVE: I want to begin by disagreeing with the lecturer on his suggestion that we should have lectures established in the universities for the specific object of spreading information about international polity. I think that would be a great mistake for the present. I think so for this reason: that as soon as you make international polity part of your official curriculum, whether you make it compulsory or not, it becomes shop, and undergraduates are very much averse to talking shop in their spare moments. They are apt to be bored by the subject at the outset, and they are not so likely to discuss it among themselves as if it was a thing of their own. To my mind, by far the most valuable educative influence on studies of this kind, which are more or less controversial and speculative—by far the most valuable influence is the discussion between the students themselves, and by establishing the thing as an official subject you will choke off a great deal of that discussion. I have a further reason against the establishment of the International Polity professorship. It is this: by going straight against the prejudices of the ordinary man you are very often much less effective than by working at them and undermining them indirectly. You do not want to go straight off and try and ram your Norman Angell theories down a man's throat, but you want it to tinge your teaching in other subjects so that gradually his whole state of mind is altered. I remember, in my Fabian days, I once heard a lecture by Mr. Sydney Webb, in which he dealt with the policy of "hitting the bump." If you have a sheet of iron with a bump on it,

the right way to reduce it is to tap the iron all round the bump. If you hit it very hard with a hammer, the bump will come out on the other side. This subject of International Polity touches an enormous number of subjects. There are an enormous number of subjects all round the fringe of it, and we should get to work from the fringe to the centre. That has already been done with much success at Cambridge. I was surprised to hear Von Lubtow say that most of the teachers of economics were opposed to Norman Angellism. My impression is that the whole economic school at Cambridge has been completely captured by Norman-Angellism. There is not a single man who has taken economics in the first or second class who is not a convinced Norman-Angellist. Even the professor of political economy himself went so far as to devote a whole lecture to Norman-Angellism. It is too much to expect him to say he entirely agrees with anything. He said that, although he did not agree with Norman Angell's thesis, if you substitute the word "improbable" wherever Norman Angell said "impossible," he would accept it. More important than that, all the young students have been captured, and that carries me on to another point—the influence of the universities on working-class education. I have just taken up a branch of work in the Workers' Educational Association. Five or six of my friends have already done it, and they are all economists and all Norman-Angellists. That is a very important branch of university work which the members of War and Peace Societies in the universities ought to take up with enthusiasm. It is a tremendously important thing to get at the thinking section of the working classes, which would be got at by this method better than by talking at street corners.

Mr. ROTHWELL: The University War and Peace societies might do some very useful work if they would

as a student, and a man who by some chance was passing through. The British Empire was represented by us two, and there were really picked representatives, some selected by their governments, from every other nation in the world. It is a real opportunity for all our War and Peace Societies to do what they can. All students' societies can all come in, by the mere asking, into the *Corda Fratres*.

Mr. BRANDT: I should like to say a word as to the importance of capturing students from foreign universities. It is very important to capture the foreign students for those are men who are going back to their countries, and are going to tell their fellow countrymen of what is going on. We do our utmost to capture them in Manchester. We must have as many joint meetings as possible. Mr. Rothwell brought up the point of training speakers. Mr. Haycock has given us great help in regard to our study circles. Three or four of our men have attended his lectures and have spoken themselves. With regard to courses in foreign universities, we in Manchester allow certain members of the French department to pursue their courses at French universities and that counts as part of their degree time. This practice should be extended as far as possible.

Mr. BEDFORD: Professor Weiss implied that you should not be a member of the Officers Training Corps and a Norman-Angellite. I myself suspect the reason I was chosen to succeed Mr. Brandt as the secretary for the Manchester University War and Peace Society is because I am in the O.T.C., and can reach these people.

In regard to the suggestion, made by Mr. Rothwell, that the universities should send its speakers to the street corner, I think there is a great danger in that. The feeling of the university is snobbish, and for the members

of the University War and Peace Society to speak at street corners would be a disadvantage. You must not frighten off members by discrediting the society. I should like to speak at street corners, but if I did it I should diminish my usefulness in the university. Professor Weiss has said that the universities might well pursue their propaganda work in connection with Norman-Angellism in common, and that is what we are going to do in Manchester. I have arranged with Mr. Lyttleton and Mr. Romanes, and we have arranged to have an Inter-University War and Peace Meeting.

Mr. HAYCOCK : Mr. Bedford has suggested that the organisations that come on my platform will lose prestige thereby. If people like Lady Barlow, etc., will go on our platform, then some of the hopefuls at the universities can go on the platform without disgracing themselves.

Mr. BEDFORD : It is the university spirit.

Mr. HAYCOCK : I have yet to discover the university spirit in Manchester. It is a minus quantity and your union is more like a neglected graveyard on a rainy day. You want some college spirit and I suggest that those boys who are going to take part in public life would gain if they could be knocked into shape in their college days, and if they spoke at street corners they would learn something. I suggest that the ordinary student wants something for nothing. If you can persuade him he is going to have a cheap trip to Germany and a good time, if you can make him see that advantages will accrue to his belonging to a society, he will join. Why the Officers' Training Corps is a success is because you are going to have a good time next year for nothing. My advice is therefore : (1) Make the student think it is worth while to join ; and (2) do not disparage the open-air work.

Mr. ROMANES : You must keep out the dons—at Oxford, at any rate—because the dons at Oxford are conservative with a stiffness that suggest *rigor mortis*. The students may be amateurish in their work but they are at least keen. You will get one or two keen people, and although they won't be popular with the university dons, they will be useful in the world. You must keep out the dons. At Oxford I advise any future secretary to exclude them altogether. I am not in favour of a professorship of International Polity, because I do not wish this movement to become academic. It is a new movement and must have new minds, and if you establish a new professorship it will sink down to academic discussion like political economy, and whoever you have for a professor do not have Norman Angell, for if you tie him down to a university he is lost to the world.

Mr. WILLIAMS : I am chiefly interested in the professorship. I take it that the universities are chiefly engaged in training men for administrative posts of some description, either Government, or local affairs, or business, and I remember at Oxford there was one compulsory subject. I am rather in favour of compulsion. There does seem to me that here is a subject where one might have compulsory lectures. The lecturer mentioned matters affecting industrial intercourse and the question of the interdependence of nations. A knowledge of these two subjects seems to me absolutely essential to any person who is engaged in any administration. I found myself, in the course of my work, that the ignorance of employers on the subject of Trades Unionism is simply appalling. If our big business men, for instance, had a greater knowledge of the theory underlying Trades Unionism and the aspirations of the workers, I think it would be much easier to adopt salutary methods. The interdependence of nations is a subject which everybody ought

to know, and if they did understand the subject there would be a much better feeling all the way round, and I cannot see why there should not be a course of compulsory lectures.

Mr. GRAHAM : I have agreed with those who do not want a professorship, because it does seem to me a minor point. You cannot tell how it may work out. You may get a fossilised professor and if you make it compulsory you are pretty well bound to get it fossilised. A much better way of proceeding is to make economics or some kindred subject compulsory and see it is taught properly. If economics does get this fossilisation into it, it will not be much good. Mr. Haycock quite failed to meet the point that active open-air speaking in the town in which the university is, is very bad for the position of university men. Our main objects in the university are two : One, to get a good many people into the War and Peace Society, and that will be obviously affected by the amount of public speaking. And the second thing is, actual instruction and learning, and it seems to me that men at the university learn very much better by private discussion than they do by giving out stuff, which they only half understand, at street corners.

Mr. BLYTHE : I want to say that I believe in American universities at least there is room for a professorship in some line of this work. I do not know whether it should be entirely devoted to this one subject or not, I am inclined to think it should not. It might be made a valuable supplement to politics. Since coming here I have been thinking that a valuable course might be given on these lines. We are not so hidebound as to what courses shall be given in our universities. If we find a problem which is receiving national attention we are inclined to get a good man and let him give a good course of this

subject. I am speaking for the West ; the East is more conservative.

Mr. O'FARRELL : I think it is a little doubtful whether a professorship of International Polity would be altogether desirable, for this reason, that there only exists one Norman Angell and the universities are many, and the subject is so very wide that it would be extremely difficult to get a man with the qualifications with which he is endowed. He must be a psychologist versed in the psychology of the crowd, and he must also be a biologist, and I would also add that he must apparently have something of an imaginative and poetic disposition ; he must be able to tell you about the analogies between the disappearance of the gigantic lizards of a previous age and Norman-Angellism.

Professor WEISS : In the first place I am very sorry that I gave the impression to Mr. Bedford that I considered the War and Peace Society was not a society which a Territorial might join. On the contrary, my idea was that a War and Peace Society is just a society in which all, whatever their profession in regard to resistance or non-resistance, can join—that is why I welcomed the society, because I do not wish to deprecate the work which is being done by the Officers Training Corps. There are various methods which can be added to that of defence and we are here to work it out. Then, with regard to the professorship, I was extraordinarily interested to hear the different views—the difficulty of getting the right man is the one which is most apparent. What it would cost is a matter which might take some long time to discuss. You could have a small professorship, which is established for a limited number of years, or the work might be spread over a limited period and the funds for that would be much smaller than for a complete endowment. An ordinary endowment stands

at £10,000. I feel pretty well convinced that it would not be desirable to make the lectures compulsory. It may be that in the future it may be unnecessary to have such a professorship. When the professors of economics and of history generally are permeated with Norman-Angellism we can do without any special professorship. I do not wish to say that all historians and economists are not friendly to Norman Angell doctrines. I do not wish to suggest that in history all wars should be ignored; on the contrary I should like the wars to be emphasised if the proper lessons are drawn from them. After all, Mr. Norman Angell's books are based on the deductions made from cases in which warfare has been carried out, and he has shown that the victorious countries have not secured the victory after all.

REASONING

ADDRESS BY JOHN M. ROBERTSON, M.P.

Evening Session : July 24

MR. NORMAN ANGELL IN THE CHAIR

MR. NORMAN ANGELL : No summer scholar who knows his grammar needs to be introduced to John M. Robertson. We are here studying the grammar of War and Peace, and the department of logic is left to Mr. John M. Robertson. Those of you who have read "Letters and Reasoning" will understand readily enough why I counselled you to disregard almost entirely formal logic in favour of that book. When I came to London some four or five years ago I had an opportunity of bearing witness to my own debt to Mr. Robertson. I did so in rather unfortunate terms—a very nervous young foreigner coming from the wilds of California and Paris to the National Liberal Club, I said "But for John M. Robertson there would have been no 'Great Illusion.' " That was not quite the way to put it, but you will understand. I am glad to be able to emphasise that debt to-night.

MR. ROBERTSON : Probably through my own negligence or pre-occupation I only to-day realised that I was down to-night to speak on the subject of "Reasoning," and I confess I read the title with some alarm.

The subject of reasoning is one which is so alien to the atmosphere of the House of Commons when Home Rule is the subject that the title seemed to promise something in the nature of exact psychology and analysis for which I was not in the least prepared. But I bethought me, we have a rule in the House of Commons about the titles of Bills. If you want to exclude undesirable amendments, you are very careful about the titles of your Bills, framing them in such a way as to keep them out. On the other hand, some titles admit of a very wide range of meaning, and I grasped that the subject of reasoning might let in a great many things, and among others the theme I had in my mind been meditating for discussion here to-night. The subject of reasoning is raised both directly and indirectly in the matter I had been meditating.

You have all probably had occasional experience of being told as peace men that you made a mistake in bringing reason to bear on the matter at all. I have had the experience often enough. They say you must not think to apply logic to a matter in which other men do not apply logic. That proposition is a contradiction in terms, for it turns out really to mean that you must apply, in the opinion of the critic, a wider logic than he thinks you are applying. The true application of logic to any problem consists in taking due account of relevant facts, and the critic thinks you have not been taking account of all the facts, and he proceeds to call your attention to some you have overlooked. That kind of fallacy is possibly on a par with a kindred one which occurs in the frequent proposition that you must not rely upon reason for this and that purpose. That proposition inevitably turns out that you must rely on reasoning, for this form of proposition is itself a form of reasoning. The man who tells you you are not to rely

on reasoning is himself giving you a form of reasoning which he claims you must rely on. In this way he is sawing through the plank he sat upon, and you cannot have much faith in his general reasoning, although he may be on the right track.

As regards this great question of War and Peace in particular, you are all well accustomed, I have no doubt, to be called sentimentalists, and particularly to be called sentimentalists by a class of men who themselves are sentimentalists of the most absolute order, in the sense that they are guided and mastered by one sentiment alone. Sentiment, of course, enters necessarily into every process of human discussion, and in a sense, those who warn us of the importance of feeling in all opinion, warn us how feeling pervades all subjects, and how it governs all conduct, have got perhaps a larger truth than they themselves realise. You cannot dispute the force of the fact that feeling is an aspect of every part of life and conduct. The trouble of those who call peace men sentimentalists is that they do not realise that the only cure for sentimentalism considered as a distinctive mode of thought is bringing another set of sentiments to balance the set with which the given reasoner sets out. The one who criticises us as peace sentimentalists is a sentimentalist himself. There are two kinds of sentimentalists, and I should be within sound psychology if I said that reasoning is merely the checking of one feeling by another feeling until you have brought into play all the forms of feeling that the problem admits of. It is for us as conscious sentimentalists—as men who are really ruled by a humanitarian and civilised sentiment—it is for us to be steadily conscious of it, and to make clear to the other man that he is at least as much of a sentimentalist as we are to start with, but probably lags behind in not taking the further step of weighing sentiment

against sentiment which we try to take. When people of that point of view talk of the importance of feeling, both as regards belief and conduct, the trouble always is they forget other kinds of feeling than their own. They do not always realise that there is a feeling for truth as well as against it. They are apt to lay their whole case on their primary feeling against it. There is a feeling for civilisation, as well as a feeling for savagery. There is nobody here who need hesitate to say in a discussion with any form of war maintainer that he does rest very strongly indeed upon his feelings. I doubt whether you will keep up any kind of peace movement for any time among people who have not present to their consciousness the sense of the utter damnableness of war, and that is feeling pure and simple. But a speciality which we associate with Mr. Angell consists in a determined pressing on from the temporary position of feeling to the further position which consists in checking the primary feeling by others, and in taking into account all the feelings which come into play: that is, in applying the spirit of reasoning to the problem in all its phases.

Now it has been a rather curious experience with me that among some people who are friends of mine—themselves of a distinctly ratiocinative cast of thought—there has arisen a kind of alarm lest your economic method of handling the problem of war and warfare by concentrating men's thoughts on utilitarian considerations should have the effect of in some way lowering the moral level of the peace movement in general, and should in some ways tend to impair the kind of enthusiasm which you have both utilised and generated. I daresay most of you here have seen some expressions of that particular most surprising form of moral alarm. Well, I have thought about it a good deal, and I have found the

feeling in more quarters than I should have expected to find it in, and I have sometimes wondered whether there can be anything in it that I have overlooked. Somebody suggested that you yourself have been impressed by this kind of criticism. I suppose you have in your Catholic way admitted that habitually utilitarian contemplations of the problem of war might lower the levels of moral feeling or might deflect the activity of the movement from some paths that you see indicated. You may have used some expressions on some occasions to critics that admitted there was something in the criticism. I take that particular criticism to be an unconscious variant of the kind I began by mentioning—the kind of criticism which protests against what is thought to be the undue prominence of reason in any form. Without the rationalistic bias, people have been possibly all coming to this point of view: if you accustom men to consider the ideal of peace in terms of the realisation of the economic madness of war, of the economic stupidity and futility of war, that is, if you touch men in this way to see that peace is (in terms of the old formula), the best policy, you will in some subtle way impair the moral quality of the whole movement.

I have been striving to find whether there can be anything in that criticism. It is very difficult for me to believe there is. I have never been conscious of finding a scarcity of feeling in the world. There may be a little lack of good feeling, but there is always plenty of the other, and the whole atmosphere of the discussion which reaches men and women in general, no matter what way you like to turn, is rather overcharged with feeling than otherwise. I cannot imagine any case in modern times—any interests or ideals that stir large numbers of people—I cannot recollect any case in which a movement of that kind seemed to need the special and express cultivation

of feeling that is often prescribed by anxious people in regard to various forms of propaganda. I have been told many times in my life there is a necessity of cultivating feeling—the proposition not being put in the strong teleological sense of trying to get your feelings in good order, but that you should devote a large part of your time to feeling, that you should stop the rational use of your mind for several hours of the day in case it should dry you up, and cultivate feeling instead. I have even been called hard names and names implying I have been dried up in that sense, yet I have never known any day of my life in which I should not feel rather inclined to curtail feeling than to increase it. Again, I do not say good feeling or all feelings, but still feeling.

I have thought a good deal on that, and the longer I think about it the more nearly I am convinced that this new theory is a bugbear, that the danger is a chimera. I take it the cultivation of any conviction whatever, the cultivation of any form of faith—I use the word in the broadest sense—the cultivation of any form of opinion invariably generates some form of feeling. I think it would be safe to say that if your position were carried far enough it would generate some new feeling in you if there were any shortage. On the side on which the criticism is most specifically put, on the side of the propagandist activity associated with your own movement, I am unable to see any such shortage. Even if we regarded this threatened drought of feeling as a possible thing, I even then can see no serious danger of the kind ahead or around me. You have no doubt heard the case put in this way: That if you go over the world telling people they must stop war because it is destructive and wasteful, that war between two great nations will cause the banks to fail, the victor will find the collapse of finance in the defeated country will tend to

create financial trouble in his own country, that moral feeling among the people concerned is likely to be much lower than before. I fail to see why that should be. If you want to stop war, why on earth should you hesitate to influence people who could only be influenced by this kind of appeal when in the very terms of the case they have not any good feeling to lose. If that is the only way you can get at them, if there is a certain number of people who can be induced seriously to set their faces against militarism only by a clear cold demonstration that war spells bankruptcy and ruin as well as cruelty and barbarism, if there are people in the world who can only be influenced in that way, how can it seriously be contended that to influence them in that way can lessen the good feeling in them? If militarism is to this day going on growing, it must be because there is a very decided drought of feeling at the moment—that is, feeling of the right kind. There is plenty of feeling for the pomp and circumstance of war. The feeling for the horror of war, the moral and physical damnableness of war, is a feeling of a more advanced kind, and that feeling must be distinctly in the world, but you are not losing that kind of feeling in opening the way for it by bringing reasoning to bear upon a man who is not influenced in any other way.

But those critics of whom I spoke are haunted by this conviction, that when you have reduced a peace propaganda to this rational utilitarian form you will lower the levels of feeling among those who are engaged in it, and that brings us back to the fallacy that I glanced at at the outset, that the conception of the habit of reasoning tends in itself to lessen the intensity of the feelings that are correlative to it. It will be granted by those friends of whom I spoke, what is I submit agreed to by all psychologists, that there can be no mental

process without an emotional correlative. That means that every form even of mathematical conception has some form of emotional correlative, and in some cases a very powerful emotional correlative. It is in terms of that truth that I am satisfied my friends are on a totally wrong scent. There is one sense in which feeling may be said to decline with the cultivation of the ratiocinative side of the mind ; that is to say, the tempestuous rush of feeling is no doubt modified and controlled. That is one of the features of advancing age. You are not quite so fanatical over things at sixty as you are at twenty or thirty, and that may be declared to be the result of the larger and the more constant use of the reasoning faculties. The mere decline of the stress of feeling is no true measure of the real diminution of feeling in life. It is admitted by those who study the medical life that perpetual familiarity with pain and disease, which is the experience of the medical man, in the great majority of cases does not induce callousness as we might suppose, and as perhaps on a limited view of the case you might be able to prove. It is true that a measure of self-control which might pass for callousness is the result of a familiarity with pain and disease. If the medical men were continuously in the state of mind of the first student to whom the sight of blood is disturbing, the work of the medical man would in itself suffer, but with all his self-control a medical man who has witnessed thousands of cases of suffering, disease and death is more sympathetic than the young student. There may be cases of a contrary kind. There may be a certain number of cases of men who do become hardened and callous. There may be some operating surgeons who may lose the sympathy they started with, but in the majority of cases I am satisfied that it does not happen because the life of a doctor means an intellectual life, and an intel-

lectual life instead of having that drying up and fossilising effect that is so often imputed to it widens all possible areas of feeling in terms of the truth that every form of thought has its emotional correlative.

It is notable that the savage has very violent excesses of feeling, and can pass to each extreme with extraordinary rapidity. A dog by the mere sight of another dog in the distance can be seen in the space of three seconds to go through all the stages between absolute quietude and extreme passion and anger. The human savage is similarly able to pass from one end to another of his pendulum range with great rapidity. But who would say that the range of feeling of the savage is greater than that of the civilised being. He has a narrower area, and on that narrower area the play of passion is more disturbing (when he is feeling that play at all), but on the larger area of the life of the civilised man there are a hundred varieties of exercise of feeling which for the savage do not exist at all. It is in terms of that principle, which cannot really be disputed on scientific grounds, that I am perfectly reassured when for the twentieth time I go through the problem.

Another instance of the same faulty reasoning is the conception that good causes can be ruined by having a good income. None of the causes that I was connected with ever suffered seriously in that way, but it is, of course, arguable just as men argue that primitive Christianity was corrupted when a large income was available for the clergyman. But even if it were true, it is only a statement that this movement, like every other, will indicate some play of the average laws of human nature. To take an illustration I once used, there can be no greater influence in civil life than that of education, but it is quite certain that when you set up a State system of education and recruit men and women in thousands

as teachers you get a large number in who have no true vocation for teaching. The true vocation for teaching is as rare as any genius in human activity. It is irrational to hope that a movement which gives remuneration for its propaganda should always be staffed by the most ideally minded persons. Every hundred human beings must show a very wide variety, a very wide range of character and quality. That is no argument against the endowment of a movement any more than it is an argument against putting education on a State footing. That is perhaps the simplest form of the argument of the danger inhering to the rationalistic treatment of all great modern ideals like that of peace. If you put aside the commercial aspect of the matter there is no ground for disquietude on the other. I should have thought that the mere consideration of the enormous importance of stopping war should for any rationally minded person outweigh any other possible theories. Tennyson gave us a picture of the powerful demoralisation of the life of peace. Adulteration and drink and wife-beating—these were the evils of peace, and Tennyson seemed to suggest that if you once got up a jolly good war you would eliminate these evils. But a little application of the utilitarian method would convince even a poet that there is just as much as evil life in the slums when there is a war going on, except that some of the inhabitants may be deported to the scene of the war, as there is in peace time. Tennyson actually suggested that people who went about preaching peace were on lower moral levels.

I should hope, however, that there may be somebody here to-day who shares that view which has been put by people for whose minds and character I have every respect. It is not put by stupid people, but by people abundantly inspired by ideals, and who have done much disinterested work. The matter has for me a really

deep interest, and I hope there is somebody who may bring up that point of view. Since you are likely to be faced by that kind of criticism, it cannot be useless for you to search your own hearts on the subject, and to debate it here. I hope I have not given anyone the impression that I have been closing my mind to any of the ideas involved. After searching my own heart, after considering the propaganda from the outside as closely as I can, I remain satisfied to maintain to-night the thesis that the danger which has been suggested is an imaginary danger. I should not wonder if the discussion to-night should perhaps vindicate even too triumphantly that feeling has not been eliminated—good feeling, ethical feeling—from the minds of any of you concerned in the Norman Angell movement. If anyone does feel that there is any element of unworthy aspiration in the criticism I have been dealing with, I am expressing the hope that even if we do feel there is any unworthiness in the aspiration, we need not be unduly worried to-night.

MR. NORMAN ANGELL: You could not have chosen an aspect of our general problem more interesting than this. We do meet this criticism, we do want to find just what its value is. We have all hammered this thing out in our minds, and most of us are searching rather for this—the right explanation of a conviction which many of us have, that this charge of the economic consideration being in some way a sordid one is essentially false. We feel that our attention to utilitarian and economic considerations in itself shows signs that we are on the right track, and really reveals a finer feeling than is found in those who disregard utilitarian and economic considerations altogether.

DR. NASMYTH: The distinction does not seem to me so much one between an economic and a moral standard,

as between the rational and the intuitive methods of looking at the peace question. Bergson has put it something like this : "There are some things that reason alone can understand, but which by itself it will never seek, and there are some things which intuition alone will seek, but which it cannot reach." The relations between these intuitive feelings and the rational process is something of tremendous interest to me, and it is a relation which we must understand more and more.

I hope that Mr. Robertson will have time, perhaps in his closing address, to tell us something about the real essence of the reasoning process, how he would apply rational processes to things which we know intuitively are there. It is time we began to study society rationally. It is a surprising thing to a good many people that social problems can be so studied, and I think that is part of the basis of the charge of sordidness. People who have been spending all their lives in the historical or in the ethical or religious field are not accustomed to deal with the facts of economics, and when they find the people of the rational side of the peace movement talking about things like bread and butter they think because it is material it is sordid. We had the same charge against economics. I think that the fact of forty or fifty young men giving themselves to this movement is the best proof that it appeals to the higher motives, for I am fairly certain that young men will not give their lives to a movement which is on a low level. I think it was Bernard Shaw that said that any man who is under thirty and is not a Socialist has no heart, and any man who is over thirty and is a Socialist has no head, and it illustrates this fact that it is the ideal side of the peace movement which appeals to young men especially. Mr. Angell's position on the matter is that we cannot separate the two.

Morals are crystallised economics and sociology, and they represent the precipitated experience of mankind through the ages. When we are guided in our conduct by certain moral principles it means that those principles lead to the best interests of the race. It is a wide application of course. If it is true that economics and the material factors are inseparably connected with the moral and physical factors, then it reaches into all departments of human life, and means a revolutionary change in our conception of Christianity and of religion. Religion becomes then the great survival factor of human society. Christianity becomes a method of reconstructing human society, a method of securing the fulfillment of the prayer, "Give us this day our daily bread"—a method of securing the essential bases of the physical life, so that we can go on and develop the higher vision of the spiritual life.

MR. ROTHWELL: I have searched my mind about this question and I think the view commonly taken is that it is not so much a deduction from ethical feeling that is to be feared, but rather a loss of potential feeling; that our appeal is dangerous in the fact that we are missing an opportunity of calling upon the deeper ethical feelings of men by presenting to them this movement as simply one which is directed to producing the ordinary necessities of life. Most of us will have arrived at a satisfactory answer to that—which is Mr. Angell's answer. Even if it be granted that I have by addressing this appeal deflected ethical feeling, I have not thereby dealt any injury to progress, for, in urging consideration for the welfare of the race (understood in its fullest sense) I am not taking a lower line. It is a deflection of ethical energy from one direction to another, and not a loss.

PROFESSOR WEISS: Like many others, I have had searchings of heart with regard to this new method of

peace propaganda, because when I first contracted my love of peace and began my advocacy of peace it was through what Mr. Nasmyth has called the intuitive motive or the moral motive; but I do not find now when I make the appeal to the pocket that I have lost anything in ardour in doing it. In adopting rather more rational methods of propaganda one need not necessarily be at any loss of enthusiasm over it. But there is this point: we must treat different people in different ways. We tell a child that it must tell the truth because it is wrong to tell an untruth. If I were to address myself to a grown man, I should not probably put it in the same way; I should try and show him why he was really hurting himself by telling an untruth. If I said to a child, "You must not tell an untruth because you might be found out," that would be going the wrong way, but if I said "If you were found out, nobody would have confidence in you," I should be taking the thing to its rational end. So with the question of war and peace; we must take it back to its initial stages. If I were to say to my son: "You must not hit your friend John because he might hit you back," it would be a very wrong way of advising right conduct. But if I should say: "You must not hit John because he might hit back and in any case he would not like it and you would lose a good friend," that is really an application of the golden rule. If you take it to the last step in the reasoning you are perfectly right in using that argument, and it will have no evil result in the way of reducing the moral effect of the argument.

Mr. QUINTANA: I think this objection that has been raised arises from a misconception as old as the world that interest is in some curious way dissociated from morality. No one can deny that in certain cases self-interest in the individual may be opposed to the interest

of the race ; if he is selfish enough to fight his fellowmen, then his interest may be opposed to the interest of the race and *vice versa*. When we talk of interest in this movement we mean national interest as well as human in the higher sense. Let us come to the realm of reality. We preach this doctrine that owing to the interdependence of the nations in the modern world national interest and national morality are identical. Where does this lead us ? In preaching this we assume that the benefit will come to the classes that really are in sore need of well-being. We say, then, to the other classes who have well-being : " All men's actions must be designed to give well-being to the classes who sorely need it." How can this be an immoral appeal ? We cannot expect any spirit of self-sacrifice in people who have not enough to eat, and who cannot educate their children and keep them clean. We preach to the classes that have well-being that they must aim at the welfare of the masses—those nine out of ten who have not well-being—for that is the only means by which higher national welfare can come. If we preach material well-being to the masses, are we going to lessen their moral well-being ? I say that national welfare or national interest, which we preach in whatever class of society we may find ourselves, if you analyse them scientifically, are shown to be identical with morality. You cannot separate them.

Mr. TINKLER : In coming to your work in the first instance I did feel some of the spirit that has been indicated by Mr. Robertson to-night, but I feel now that it was only a transitory uneasiness born of incomplete understanding. It was simply telling us that war was worse than crime—it was a blunder. I felt at that time that it seemed almost sordid to pretend there was any higher ideal than right or wrong, that a blunder could not revolt those to whom a crime was not a matter of concern.

But now I feel that underlying this teaching of "The Great Illusion" there are the highest ethical motives. I see that the contradiction we have always felt between the ideal of brotherhood and the sordid facts of life is non-existent. The more man has utilised the forces of nature, the more the brotherhood of man has become a biological fact instead of a dream of the religious reformers.

MR. DENIS ROBERTSON: Mr. Robertson in his address has confined himself to the relations between rationalism and one stream of emotion, the pacifist stream of emotion. It is also worth while to discuss the relation between our movement and the other stream of emotion—the militarist stream. It is worth while for this reason: You have been discussing how far your emphasis of reason is likely to alienate the feeling of the people who are already imbued with the pacifist emotion; now that is not likely to be a serious problem in practice. What I would ask you to consider is how far your emphasis of reason is likely to strengthen the nature of the militarist appeal; how far it makes it easier for them to pose as the repositories of emotional virtue. I do feel that there is a great deal more to be said for militarist intuition than Mr. Robertson was able in the few moments to devote to it. I hold no brief for Tennyson, and of course his argument is a fairly easy one to dispose of, but I do think it is true, as a matter of fact, that militarism has been able in the past to make people do things which other systems of thought have not. One of the things which seems extremely valuable is that it has held out a prospect of rationalising not only pacifist emotion but also militarist emotion. That is made possible by the fact that more and more is war becoming a matter of careful mental discipline. I hope everybody here will make the most of it, and will take some trouble to study the

psychology of the militarist. I am sure it is worth working upon. You get here a rationalist movement which might be supposed to be going to destroy militarism altogether, but I think its effect will be to synthesise the two streams of emotion which have hitherto been knocking against each other, both of which I believe to be intrinsically valuable.

Mr. BLOYE : We have touched a very real issue this evening. A sentence of Mr. Angell went to the bottom of my mind. He said : " We have to analyse our intuitions." That is exactly what Mr. Angell stands for the world at large. We all wanted peace. I was a pacifist of the old school, and I knew I wanted peace but did not know why I wanted it until Mr. Angell explained it. That is where we have to meet the intuitionists who charge us with sordidness. We can meet them by asking why they want peace and by showing that they want peace on the same terms as we do—on material grounds, because we both know that that must be the basis of all that is desirable in the life of a people.

Mr. BEDFORD : War is the tragedy of those who feel and the comedy of those who think. Are we to be described as sordid merely because we think, and think that which people before have only felt ?

Mr. BRACHER : Could we not have a treatment of war and peace even more empty of emotion than has been suggested by anyone in this discussion to-night. War is irrelevant and futile, and if we had not got our minds so full of the horrors of war we should realise the absurdity of it much more quickly. The horrors of war have a fascination. If we could lay our own emotions aside and get the militarist to lay his aside we should realise the absurdity of the whole thing. All we can do is to set him the example.

Mr. LEVY: I think the outstanding impression of Mr. Robertson's speech was that he wanted to get from us some conception of the mental attitude which should enable one to deal with any charge of sordidness in this movement. A speaker said we should analyse the psychology of the militarist. Everyone of us is a militarist inasmuch as he wishes to fight the enemy of mankind, and Mr. Norman Angell has shown us that our enemies are not those of our own kind, and we are only futile and wasteful in directing our energies and life blood to killing off one another. If we consider that all this energy, time and money can be used for social amelioration, for the prevention of disease, when we think that what we are doing is to get the inhabitants of the earth to see this, we are fully satisfied in our own minds it is a cause far more ideal than the slaughter of our fellow man.

Mr. HOLMAN: First of all it seems to me that feeling is of an extremely genuine character in its essence and in its expression in our individual lives. It goes in certain grooves, owing to the effects of our environment. Intuition results from obtaining a number of ideas that sink into our subconsciousness, and come back to us, and it may be right and wrong according to the rightness or wrongness of the ideas. We have, therefore, come to a stage in morality where we get this general feeling operating once again, and expressing itself in all sorts of emotion. Thus certain principles are gradually evolved which are changing from day to day. They have no absoluteness in them. The continual change is due to the continued application of rational processes to our moral ideas, and therefore, if there can be any charge of sordidness at all, it is equally applicable to our morality as to any other idea we may have.

Mr. ROBERTSON : I think I have at least realised one aim with which I came down here, which was to bathe in the living waters and to come into contact with the stream of the pacifist movement. Dr. Nasmyth at the very outset made a suggestion which cut rather deep that I should have gone into the fascinating problem of the nature of the ratiocinative process, and the challenge is so fascinating that I am half inclined to give all my time to developing it. That would not do, so I will simply say that I suspect intuition only to be a primordial influence, that intuition is really a deduction. Certain kinds of intuitions more common among women than among men, are really deductions—when a woman has deductions about certain things in that case she has really noted a number of small phenomena that the man has not noted, and she has suddenly combined the perceptions in the intuition. As regards Bergson's formula, which I think was rather a reactionary and a mystificatory piece of work, he was really obscuring truth in the whole of the argument, which he carried to the point of elevating intuition over reason. Suppose it be true that certain notions come to you only by a process called intuition, they are none the less demonstrably real reasonings of a more sudden kind. Anyone who has worked out any subject he has made in some degree his own knows when he is seeking for inspiration a theory, a thought, may flash upon him which may be the true solution. But that is not apart from the flow of orderly intellectual action, it is the result of a whole series of previous observations. The final answer to Bergson is this: When you have that intuition you proceed to test it. You test it by the process called rational. How can the test be lower in value than the perception? You can get your new ideas only by their coming into your head, but you get others in exactly the same way. There

is a false intuition, as there is a true, and the false intuition are really more numerous than the real.

I cannot attempt to deal with all the principles dealt with to-night. I will take Mr. Tinkler's idea. He set up in my mind this reflection. That old formula which has so often been deemed as sordid: "Honesty is the best policy" may stand for a very good perception. It looks, too, the very essence of sordidness, but the perception may be a very great one. If I slay my brother—two of us on an island—I discover I have not merely broken a common law but I have struck a blow into my own life. That is one of the most utilitarian perceptions and perhaps one of the most moral perceptions that I could have. You elevate the moral when you show it has a utilitarian basis. Those who recoil from the utilitarian propaganda of pacifism may have been taught that all moral laws come from the skies. All religious systems put forward morality as something supernaturally given. It is quite true, however, that if you have been taught that this very simple perception which you can see between two dogs with a bone, the dog who defends the bone is conscious of a greater moral fervour than he who takes it away. If you have been taught that the law against thieving came from the skies you will be shocked with any creed which shows that the thing is a little simpler than that. That may, perhaps, be an explanation of this particular line of thought. I think the criticism of sordidness comes from folk who do not think of being mean. It is agreed that this may be a perfectly sincere apprehension on the part of perfectly disinterested people, and it has been put forward by people who have the ratiocinative habit of mind.

Mr. Dennis Robertson made a very interesting suggestion only I was not able to follow out his application of it.

It is quite true that in the case of the militarist you get a play of the two factors, the feeling and the rational control of it, but I could not quite follow what seemed to me to be the leap of reasoning by which he got to the conclusion that Mr. Norman Angell's movement would be able to combine both of these sides of militarism. I am afraid the analogy was not quite so hopeful as Mr. Robertson made out. He put it rightly enough—Mr. Angell's movement can combine the two factors of peace sentiment and peace reasoning, but if the same thing is going on in the military side it means that war is carried on as rationally as Mr. Angell's case. The typical militarist when he gets really in action is like Moltke, who tells us that peace is a dream, and it is not even a beautiful dream. Your rationalist militarist is a man who I should regard as a man who has not only the impulse to fight, and the capacity for national hatred, but one who philosophises for himself. I do not know how Mr. Angell is to get rid of him except by taking people away from him. The true militarist will always be your enemy, and as long as he is your philosophy will always be opposed to his. You must take the support of the people away from him. You must cultivate another mind so that he is regarded as a sort of dangerous lunatic. It is a danger I find among progressive societies, the difficulty of keeping an enemy in.

I would suggest that Mr. Bloye should reconsider his assertion that when he was a pacifist of the old school he did not know why he wanted peace. He did know why he wanted peace, but Mr. Angell has given him some fresh grounds for wanting peace. This would be an unfair criticism of what you call the intuitive pacifist. The idealist knows why he wants peace, and Mr. Bloye only knows now there are several other reasons why he wanted peace. In conclusion, I would only say that

a number of the remarks made remind me of fifty things I forgot to say. We can usefully reply at least to the militarists who use the charge of sordidness against us that, however sordid we may be, we will at least give better utilitarian results than their idealism has yielded in the past. Our problem is to get at some habit of mind that may be trusted to work against the insurgence of the primæval beast in man if it should again come into operation, as it may at any time. It is a law of history that every generation repents of its particular war. It is our business as pacifists to set up some form of habitual vibration on the minds of men, some process which will tend to resist the recurrence of the impetus to war. Reasoning as against feeling is only the service of second thoughts, and that is the great service which Mr. Norman Angell has rendered to his generation.

SOCIALISM AND ANGELLISM

DISCUSSION INTRODUCED BY MR. GEORGE BENSON

Morning Session : July 25th

MR. B. N. LANGDON-DAVIES IN THE CHAIR

MR. LANGDON-DAVIES : In the absence of a representative of the British Socialist Party, Mr. Benson, as "Devil's Advocate," will put the position of the extreme Socialist.

MR. BENSON : I should like to say that the Socialist I am personating is in no way representative of the English Socialist movement, which to all intents is summed up in the activities of the I.L.P., 99 per cent. of whose members probably accept Angellism. I am personating the hopeless extremist. His criticisms run as follows :—

I first wish to deal with the personnel of the Angell movement to showing how utterly useless it is to the workers. Take the Garton Foundation : I find that the Directors include Mr. Balfour, Lord Esher and Sir Richard Garton, and that its three main organisers are Messrs. Raphael, Davies and Wright, all college men. The main organisation outside of London is the Manchester Norman Angell League. On its committee I find one viscount, four

baronets and three knights, and also many of the richest men in Manchester. Even this Summer School that I address is made up mainly of Oxford and Cambridge men, including two sons of Viscounts. I put it to you : Are men of these classes likely to lead a movement for the benefit of the workers ? Figs do not grow on thistles.

Now let us turn to the actual movement. Capitalists are realising that war is bad for trade and for profits. They are like thieves who fall out. They wish for peace in order to exploit the workers more efficiently. From one end to the other Mr. Angell only mentions the interests of the workers in a casual and incidental manner. The whole of the movement is aimed, so far as I can judge from what its speakers have said, at getting rid of the Navy. They never mention the Army. And for good reason. This is to be retained for the capitalist to keep the workers in subjection. The use of the Army, as in the case of the French and English railways strikes, is too valuable to be given up. Conscription will "dish " Trades Unionist activities. Does Mr. Angell oppose conscription ? Not he ! He says that a conscriptionist can and should be an Angellist.

What concerns us Socialists is not the horrors of war but the horrors of peace. We protest against the industrial death-rate, not against the war death-rate. Will the Manchester capitalists and all the Oxford and Cambridge swells help us to put an end to this, or will they raise the usual cry that any attempt to make industry safer will ruin it and make it unable to compete with foreign nations.

We are told that Angellism will reduce taxation. It will—but only of the rich. The Angellist has given himself away in advocating the earmarking of the income tax for armaments. This is a subtle plot to slide the whole burden of taxation on to the shoulders of the



*I wish I were as cock-sure about anything
as he is about everything.*
Lord Melbourne on Macaulay.

workers. Armaments roughly take half of the Government income. Also the rich practically pay one half and the workers the other half. Reduce and gradually abolish armaments and you reduce income tax and leave the workers who pay no income tax to shoulder the rest of the burden. The iron law of wages, which results in the keeping of the workers at mere subsistence level, shows that war and peace will make no difference to the worker. Even if taxation on the worker be reduced wages will fall, for the capitalist will be able to screw more profit out of him. Socialism is the only solution to all our social and international problems. Why should we bother about one hundred millions of taxation when the workers are robbed of one thousand millions through rent, interest and profit ?

Mr. LANGDON-DAVIES : The points raised in Mr. Benson's speech are exactly the things we have to meet in the hall and in the street. Will anyone follow his lead ?

Dr. NASMYTH : I wish to point out the consequences of Mr. Benson's speech. Any Socialist can see that this movement is a capitalist plot to divert the attention of the working man from the problems of peace, and we ought therefore as working men to go in for war, and as much war as we can get.

Professor HUDSON : I am thoroughly convinced that the foul plot of the Norman-Angellists has been properly shown up. I believe it is a plot to divert the attention of the working man from the things that matter. And yet I cannot help thinking there may be some good in it. The labouring classes produce the capital of the world. As long as this capital is spent on armaments the working men cannot get any benefit from it. Is not the Norman Angell movement in favour of the Socialists in so far as it means the expenditure of the wealth

where the labouring men can seize it and get something out of it.

Mr. FRASER : Norman-Angellism is not leading towards Socialism. What we want is social reform. War is bad for the capitalist. The way for us to get social reform is to smash the capitalist. Therefore we want war.

Mr. HAYCOCK : We very often wander across the argument that this movement is simply a red herring drawn across the path of those who are desiring to see the equitable distribution of wealth. The way I tackle that criticism is this : You want Socialism. You can only get Socialism through agitation and public speaking through your meetings at the street corner. How many public meetings did you hold on Mafeking night ? Trace modern history over the last hundred years. During the Napoleonic wars there was nothing doing to ameliorate the conditions of the working classes in this country. After the Napoleonic wars were over we got our Catholic Emancipation and Reform Bill, we got factory legislation, we got the rise of the Chartist movement, we got the repeal of the Corn Laws. In the fifties we got the Crimean War, and it brought another dark age. After that, popular education and great reforms, and extension of the franchise. And then we had the South African War, and night came on again. The other argument of Mr. Benson is that the expenditure on armaments does not matter, it is only one hundred million ; but the Labour Leaders in this country have been very anxious to get a shilling rise in wages, and they would go into a disastrous labour war in order to get it. If one shilling per week is worth while, the expenditure on armaments is something like four shillings per week per family is more worth while. The actual expenditure of one hundred million per year does matter and it does affect the working classes.

Mr. BLOYE : As an honest British workman I have listened to the mob-orator who has been addressing us this morning. I do not know much about Mr. Norman Angell and his movement—I know less now than ever I knew—but one thing does strike me about it. Norman Angell does refer to things as they are to-day, and does realise that whatever may be the ultimate scheme of Society, whether our friend's dreams of Socialism may or may not come true, it is not true to-day. To-day Mr. Angell is perfectly right when he states that the interests of capital and labour are inextricably wrapped up in one another, and anything which touches the great financiers—the credit of the banking houses, the condition of the Stock Exchange—must inevitably filter right down to the lowest class of society.

Mr. ROTHWELL : It is quite true that this kind of objection does emanate sometimes from what might be called Socialist quarters, but it is not true that it represents in any essential way Socialistic philosophy. It has been very plainly shown by several speakers that this talk of the red herring is sheer claptrap. Of course, the real red herring is war and all that is associated with the war system. What we might do in dealing with this kind of objection is to show that it does not in any real way represent Socialism, that, as a matter of fact, Norman-Angellism is entirely congruous with Socialism, that really it is an amplification of Socialism. Our view as to the solidarity of mankind involves it—and the necessity of conserving the economic resources of the world—that also surely makes it quite congruous with Socialism, because it also is an attempt at conserving the economic and material resources of the world. What Mr. Benson has not done is to show us any single respect in which the two things are incongruous. Personally I am not aware of any single element in Mr. Norman Angell's

teaching which could be said to be hostile to the philosophy of Socialism. We could show, therefore, to the Socialists that in a very real way this movement is promoting the ends that they desire, because what is necessary—assume you want Socialism—in order to promote Socialism is that you should reach that level upon which men's minds will be receptive to the doctrine of Socialism. Does it not imply a certain level of moral conception? Is it not essential that men should admit standards of justice, that they should be seeking justice; and is not this whole military system one of the greatest obstacles in the way of the enlightenment of the people? Is not one of the great evils of the military system the fact that it hinders the development of those spiritual forces and spiritual conceptions that are necessary to the realisation of social reform? That, in fact, it draws men's minds and men's allegiance away from justice. That it rather sets them into reposing their trust in mere material force—in might rather than in justice. And it is because of this great damage to the spiritual conceptions of our race that many of us feel very enthusiastic about the Norman Angell movement.

Mr. LANGDON-DAVIES: Mr. Benson attacked the movement on the ground that it was endeavouring to draw the attention of the working classes from the things that really matter. Then he went on to the accusation that peace is a capitalist plot. He noted we did not lay any stress upon the Army, because we knew well that conscription was a good thing for strike-breaking. He then said what guarantee had we that the hundred million saved from armaments would be spent on social reform. Then he touched on that point of the constructive programme which recommends putting the taxation of armaments upon the income of the rich, and said our movement was designed to put the taxes

of armaments upon incomes of the rich, and the taxation for the whole of the rest of the national budget upon the labouring classes, and then we proposed to get rid of armaments! Last, and most important, was the point that economic rent, interest and profit was infinitely more than the amount we spent on armaments, and so a more serious matter. All these points were worth while meeting in one way or another.

Mr. WILLIAMS: We have rather treated this subject of Mr. Benson's as a rag. I am a Socialist myself. I know that the arguments brought forward by Mr. Benson are the arguments which are brought forward by the Socialist all over the country. They will have to be met. The Socialist believes that the interests of capital and labour are not identical, and never can be identical, and the consequence is that when he sees titled gentlemen supporting this propaganda he is immediately suspicious. He says at once that "if these people are in this show, this show is not the slightest use to me." You have to meet that point. The obvious reply is that Socialists prior to this peace propaganda of Norman Angell were always against war, and that the mere fact of these gentlemen giving their support to the movement does not necessarily mean that the Socialists were wrong when they considered war was wrong. It is more reasonable to believe that both are right.

Mr. HUGINS: Our friend, who comes disguised as an enemy this morning, says that peace is a plot of the capitalist. Then are we to infer that war is the plot of the working man? No, the working man has realised that peace is his interest. Socialism is not hostile to Norman-Angellism; the two are compatible with each other. Socialism is simply a part of the proletariat speaking for the whole of the proletariat. The Socialists in Germany were protesting against Germany going to

war over the Morocco incident when the bankers, working along the lines of Norman-Angellism, put in their protest to the Chancellor. That is one of the first occasions on which the capitalists have worked with the Socialists.

Mr. HAYCOCK: Try to bring home to the self-righteous British Socialist his responsibility for past wars. If it were not for the leaning of the British working men toward war, there would not have been any South African war. The man who lifted his voice against the South African war went in fear of his life from the working man. Both capital and labour have an interest in ending this military saturnalia. Norman-Angellism has a very much wider application than merely to the European situation. It is quite possible to prove that the interests of capital and labour are identical. I believe that the same thesis can be applied to social wars. You can point out to the Socialist heckler, first that capital and labour can unite to stamp out war, and secondly that Norman-Angellism can season public opinion in the matter of industrial disputes.

Dr. MEZ: We Socialists have been aiming to do away with armaments and warfare since we existed, and now comes in this new movement of Norman-Angellism. I think we must be glad to get this support as things are at present. Norman-Angellists must not take away the belief of the Socialists in their cause. The Socialist thinks he can settle the war question sooner than Norman-Angellism can. It is difficult to convince him that Norman-Angellism is better than Socialism, for this particular purpose, but we can persuade him that at the present time the Norman Angell movement is able to help in the common task of doing away with armaments.

Mr. BLOYE: Are we meeting this morning philosophic Socialism? Are we not rather meeting the objections

of the ordinary British Socialist orator? What we get in England is very different to that which is met in Germany.

Mr. BENSON : The Socialists in England are very much the same as those in Germany.

Mr. SHOVE : I have only got two things to say. First, do not say that the interests of the workers and the capitalists are identical in the industrial struggle. It is not true. Secondly, show if you can to your Socialist audience that Norman-Angellism is compatible with Socialism by explaining to your audience what Socialism is in your own terms.

Mr. HAYCOCK : It is the truth in this particular question that the interests of capital and labour are identical.

Mr. SHOVE : I was dealing with the point that in the industrial struggle the interests of capital and labour are not identical.

Mr. HAYCOCK : I think the interests of the capitalists and workers are identical. Without healthy intelligent working men with a fairly decent standard of life, the employers cannot make prosperous businesses.

Mr. LANGDON DAVIES : We must meet the points of the Socialists. There is a certain wing in the audience that is bringing forward these points, and we must find answers to these arguments that will convince the "middle" man that we are right, and that the extreme Socialist is wrong.

Mr. ROMANES : I should say that, although there may be any amount of war between the capitalists and the labourers, there is no war between capital and labour. You cannot do without either capital or labour. War destroys both capital and labour, and produces poverty.

Mr. KNOLLENBURG : Mr. Benson has told us that the capitalists are operating the Norman Angell movement,

and they say "Abolish the navy ; but keep the army and conscription." I deny that statement, but even accepting it as he has given it, let us see if the thing is true. Are the capitalists upholding the army to keep down labour disputes ? If the capitalist is keen on having the control of the working man, would he not extinguish that control if the labouring men are trained as a body in military things, trained to work together and organised together on military ends, can he not see that as soon as working men are the great majority in the country that this conscription system which binds working men together can be wielded in their hands to tear down the entire capitalist system. If the capitalist's work is unaltruistic, he would abolish the conscription system.

Mr. HOLMAN : Mr. Benson claimed that if armaments disappeared, the savings would go to the capitalist classes. That point has only in part been met by the talk about the amount representing four shillings per week to every family in this country. We must remember that we should have freed in this country this additional eighty millions of capital to utilise how we like. When the reduction in armaments takes place, there will be a larger sum to be utilised for social legislation, and we all know that the driving force in the attempts at social amelioration in this country far outweighs the desire for the reduction of taxation of the wealthier classes. It depends upon the democracy of Great Britain as to how these reductions should be utilised. You may also remember that if you have this greater capital your policy should be—whilst definitely preferring to tax the rich in preference to the poor—not to tax the rich for the sake of taxing the rich. Whatever your system, you want as much capital as you can get under modern industrial conditions, and the more capital you have the cheaper will that capital be, and the smaller will the item

be in the shape of the price of capital, and the greater will the surplus of wealth be. The struggle of capital and labour will be over the remaining surplus. There must be a guerilla warfare over the surplus, and this surplus will increase as our capital increases relatively to the amount of labour.

Mr. WRIGHT: I am going very briefly to put Mr. Benson's arguments in another way. We are told that you ought not to listen to these ideas, because they are supported by Peers and members of the British army, and so on. Well, everybody had better consider any arguments that are put before them wherever they come from. Incidentally, Mr. Angell is supported just as strongly, just as vehemently, by men like Keir Hardie and Ramsay Macdonald. They are not Peers, and their opinion is of as much value as that of anybody else. Are you going to consider this case put before you of Norman-Angellism on its merits? If you are, and if you find the case holds water, all the better that these people whom you hate in another connection are working with you. Now you turn to the actual case. You say that capitalists are realising that war is bad for profits, and bad for trade. Did not your Socialists realise that war was bad for the workers? Is not war bad both for trade and for wages. I think you must agree that however war affects the capitalists, even if it benefits some of them, it never benefits any working man. You have told us that the interests of the workers in all the countries of Europe are identical. That you have got more in common with the working man in Germany than you have with the owner of capital in England. I do not know whether that is true, but you have often said so, and if you have said so, had not you better take any means you can for getting rid of the position in which a whole lot of British working men are sent to

fight German working men. You say that the iron law of wages which results in keeping the workers at subsistence level will prevent their getting any benefit from any change we may make, except the particular change you advocate. I will put two things to you about that. One is this—that this change which we are advocating is a necessary precedent to any other change whatsoever, the sort you are advocating or any other. Until you have left off fighting the German with whom you admit you have no quarrel you cannot possibly attend to your own affairs. Until you leave off scrapping about things which are not real and things which do not matter, you have not got the time or the sense to attend to the things which do matter. You have got to do that to begin with. About your iron law of wages I do not know how many of you here believe in that. I do not know whether any of you think that you are paid as poorly as you might be if it were merely a matter of just keeping you alive. Apparently you require more to keep you alive now than people required fifty years ago, because you are, in fact, getting higher pay. What we are suggesting is not that if you get rid of war you would get as a result of that a higher rate of wages. What we say is that if you get rid of war the British statesmen will then be able to turn their attention to putting the affairs of our own country into proper order.

Dr. NASMYTH: Mr. Benson says that the Socialist looks upon this Norman Angell movement not only as a very important movement, but as a very dangerous movement. I think the real reason or intuition in the Socialist mind is not in all these things that have been given, so much as an intuitive realisation of the truth that we have here a rival theory to the Socialist theory of social reconstruction. Up till now, in modern times, the Socialist has been the only one to give us a rational

programme in social reconstruction. They use in their method certain political machinery. Here comes along another plan for social reconstruction, dispensing with all machinery, relying solely upon a change in the minds of men; and the Socialist does feel that that is a danger to his propaganda. But we can point out to him that it is not really a danger. In the first place, the essential things aimed at—a change in the minds of men—are the same, namely, replacing competition by co-operation. We might possibly go a little bit further, but we ought to have it clear in our own minds that with all the fine and true things in Socialism, there are certain very serious errors due to the historical manner in which it arose. It is a part of social Darwinism. It arose at the time when the distorted theories of Darwin had full vogue; when Banditism from on high was answered by Banditism from below. The emphasis laid on class war is wrong. It is not because the capitalist is wicked that the Socialist is oppressed, but because he has wrong ideas. Norman-Angellism is working to remedy that.

Mr. ROTHWELL: It seems to me that there is a certain amount of uncertainty upon this question of the identity of interests of the capitalist and the worker. I think it is a logical difficulty and a real one. You cannot persuade the man who believes in Socialism that his interests and the interests of the capitalists are identical, because you cannot persuade him that you can reconcile fire and water. He is entitled to say that anything which will entrench the capitalist is necessarily hostile to Socialism. You argue that this teaching of yours will, among other things, benefit the capitalist. The important thing to us, I think, is to work out for ourselves the answer to this dilemma, and I think the answer is that in that form the dilemma is a real one, but it overlooks this—that we have to draw a distinction between immediate

interests and ultimate interests ; that, whilst this movement may have as one of its immediate results that of benefiting the capitalist measured in terms of immediate, results, it will ultimately more benefit the worker than it will immediately benefit the capitalist. Obviously, if Socialism be a true philosophy, it must in an ultimate sense embrace the interests of all, so that what we have to work for is that which will serve the ultimate interests, and if our movement really will serve these ultimate interests, we need not be afraid of the unequal distribution of immediate gains.

Mr. COLLINSON : Mr. Rothwell said that fire and water cannot be reconciled. But capital cannot get on without labour. You have the executive section of a business, the financial section which provides the capital, the producing section which makes the things, and the selling section. If you eliminate one of your four elements, that business goes to the ground. It cannot be successful without any one of those four sections. Business is entirely co-operation, and the business which is most successful is in itself the best co-operator with the social fabric.

Mr. LANGDON-DAVIES : First the subject of personnel. You do not want to emphasise any antagonism between this aristocratic personnel and the British Socialist, and suggest that the aristocratic personnel is the better. As to whether peace is a capitalist plot—the answer to that is the question “Then whose plot is war, if peace is a capitalist plot?” What is our position? We want no plot either for peace, or for war. We know there will always be plots, and our sole business is to prevent plots—for peace and war—by laying the cards of diplomacy and international affairs on the table. Mr. Holman got the answer to “How do we know that the hundred

million when saved shall be spent on social reform ? ” “ That, sir, rests on you. It is for the people of this country to decide.” There is one other point which Mr. Harold Wright dealt with ; that rent, interests and profits are a heavier bill to pay than armaments. Then as soon as you get rid of armaments and the destroying in the energies of this direction the sooner will you be able to concentrate on the problem of the proper distribution of wealth. We are addressing ourselves to the problem of how to prevent your casting away the wealth you have. When we have solved that, then it is for you to say how that wealth shall be distributed.

Mr. BENSON : Instead of replying to other speeches I think it would be more useful to deal with my own as Mr. Wright and Mr. Langdon-Davies are the only two who have really summed up the whole subject. The first point which might be dealt with is the whole question of the past conflict between capital and labour. There is not the faintest reason why we should not admit that Norman-Angellism would benefit the upper classes. The error of the Socialist is in supposing that by benefiting the upper classes, you are bound to injure the lower classes. That does not follow at all. Where does the identity of interests come in between capitalist and labourer, and where is the division of interest ? You find on the productive side only that the interests of capital and labour are in any way identical. When you come to the division of wealth, the division of the actual produce, the interests are totally opposed. Peace may enable the capitalist to exploit more, to get more of the wealth produced, but it also enables the worker to fight against that exploitation more. As a matter of fact, you can show that peace increases the resisting power of the worker considerably more than it increases the exploiting power of the capitalist.

Mr. Holman said that it is the working classes themselves alone who can give the guarantee that the reduced taxation will be taken off the shoulders of the working classes, but no one seems to have noticed the complete contradiction in the first half of my subject and the last half. The Socialist says: "Here you have a capitalist system. If you reduce the taxation, the wages fall, through the iron law of wages." If that is the case, what is the use of worrying about taxation, if the iron law of wages merely means they cannot be improved in any shape or form. That is what the Socialist never sees. The iron law of wages is the whole position of the Socialist in regard to his antipathy to reform. He conceived sixty years ago the idea of the "increasing misery theory" of social development, that gradually matters will get worse and worse until you get a social revolution. The Socialist still hangs on to the idea that conditions will get worse and worse. What you have to do is to smash in his mind the belief in the iron law of wages. He says that wages are forced down to the minimum, that the working classes only get the amount that will keep body and soul together, and allow them to bring up their children. If this were true in a town like Manchester you have at least forty different species of human beings because you get forty different species of wages. The Socialist believes in the iron law of wages, and all his hostility to social reform is based on the idea you cannot improve the condition of the workers under a capitalist system, and you have to show to him that he is wrong, and that it is the evolutionary theory and not the revolutionary theory in its best sense that is going to make for progress.

NORMAN-ALCHEMISM

PAPER BY MR. DENNIS ROBERTSON

Second Session : July 25th

DR. NASMYTH IN THE CHAIR

Dr. NASMYTH : At our morning sessions we divide our time between diagnosing different forms of the disease of militarism and dissecting very various corpses ; in the evening we are fed with mental pabulum ; and in the afternoons we devote one or two hours to heart-searchings. The leader of the heartsearching process this afternoon is going to speak to us about Norman-Alchemism. I imagine it is intended to represent to us the transition stage in which the peace movement is at the present time, comparable with that of the science of chemistry when it passed from alchemism which was the intuitional search after the philosopher's stone to the scientific philosophy of chemistry itself. But we shall see.

Mr. DENNIS ROBERTSON : My object in speaking to-night is to emphasise the importance of having fitting names, titles, labels and tickets for the Angell movement. I have to make a few words of destructive criticism on the terminology of Norman-Angellism, its names and

titles as they exist at present, and secondly some suggestions as to the kind of lines along which it would be well to look for labels and titles meant to show the distinguishing marks of this particular system and that of the pacifist movement. I do think that in looking for names and titles for this movement we are in a strong position as compared with most parents who have to christen their babies, for, as the baby is of riper years we have something to go upon in looking for its name. In such case it is worth while trying to get down to fundamentals. A question I want to ask is what the most distinguishing, the really new feature about this particular line of pacifist study. My personal opinion is that the important thing about Norman-Angellism is not its emphasis upon economics, is not its emphasis upon reason, is not its emphasis upon the various new developments of internationalism at all—it is something rather more subtle and rather more fundamental than that. I suppose reformers of the world have roughly been of two kinds ; those who have been afraid of nature, and those who have not ; those who have been ascetic in their outlook, who have despised the emotions and the instincts of men as they find them, and wanted to root them out, and those who have not wanted to root them out as something fundamentally evil, but to canalise and transmute them. That is what I meant to convey in the metaphor implied in my title. I will try to develop this metaphor from physical science, because I do not think it an accident that the physical problem before the world at this moment is of the same nature as the moral problem. The physical problem before the world at the moment is this : we have during the last three hundred years, and especially during the last one hundred and fifty years been living upon our capital. We have attained to our modern civilisation by living on heat



*Finding the riddle of the Universe insoluble, he kissed
his hand to Destiny and bore no malice to his Creator.*
The Evolution of Clovis.

energy which has been stored up in our deposits of coal and oil. We are seeing now that we are getting to the end of this living on capital, and we are therefore groping for a new way of living on earned income—that is, by freeing the power locked up in the elements themselves. The problem is to utilise the terrific stores of energy embodied in various elements, such as radium, so that we can live on our income of power. I think that the moral problem—the intellectual problem is very much the same. We have hitherto been living on accumulated ideas, on the remains of the traditional ideas. The problem before us is to transmute somehow, to change by the touch of the alchemist the streams of energy which we know exist into fruitful and constructive directions. That is what I mean to convey by this metaphor. It seems to me that Norman-Angellism has in this respect a great chance. It differs from older branches of the pacifist movement in not treating certain instincts of men as fundamentally evil, in treating them as fundamentally good, but needing to be turned into new channels. One such instinct, upon which most of us lay great stress, is the instinct of seeking one's own interest, of not being afraid to own that one is out for material advantage, but it seems to me there are other instincts as well which Norman-Angellism is capable of directing, and among them I may mention the instinct of pugnacity, the instinct of group emotion, and the instinct of adventure. These are three things which older branches of the pacifist movement had been too much inclined to treat as things radically evil. I hold them to be capable of great good. Pugnacity is an instinct that may be good or evil according to the end for which it is exercised. The group emotion or nationalism makes a stronger appeal than the cosmopolitanism of earlier branches of the pacifist movement because it does

acquiesce in Mazzini's dictate that you cannot love all men equally at once, and each of us had better therefore concentrate upon working for his immediate group. That theory seems to me to be one of the important gifts of syndicalism to modern thought. It is on that side rather than on the international side that I think Norman Angell has his best chance of appealing. Lastly, the instinct for adventure because that is a very strong part of what is loosely grouped together as the militarist point of view. As I understand Norman-Angellism a central feature of its doctrine is that we should subdue stubborn nature and tame the wild places of the earth. That is an enterprise which appeals to a large part of the militarist's emotional nature, and it is there among other places that Norman-Angellism has its chance of transmuting the energies of the militarist. That is a line upon which we should lay emphasis in searching for titles which would appeal to the ordinary man. I have noticed among most of my friends (though not in Mr. Angell's work) what seems to me to be a misconception of whom the militarists are. They seem to think they consist of retired colonels and the Chesterton brothers and Mr. Belloc. The militarist exists in each man. Everybody has got it in more or less degree in his nature. Then the question is: What are you going to do with that side of your nature? If you cannot eliminate it, and I do not think you can, you must show directions in which it can develop fruitfully. It is worth while when you are thinking of winning the ordinary man devising labels which will appeal to this very important side of his nature. That is the problem I have chosen to discuss, but when it comes to the practical point of trying to put the idea into actual names and titles I am afraid I have failed absolutely. I suppose that names and labels are of two kinds—intelligible and

unintelligible. That is to say, names which are intended to convey in a precise form really what your movement is, what it stands for ; and a name which is more or less metaphorical, which will try and give an impression of what is going to be done, not by summarising in two words, but by some kind of metaphor which gives an imaginative idea of what you are trying to aim at. First as to your intelligible names, "Norman-Angellism" is that a good name or a bad name ? The great advantage of it is that it is a tremendous saving of trouble, that if you can rely upon people knowing what you mean it is much easier to talk of Norman-Angellism than to try and find a more impressive title. A great many of the great movements of the world have been called after their founders. It is, however, open to obvious objections. Nobody is more aware than Mr. Angell of the danger of personality. In his own words, you must always avoid the impression of a number of small cranks revolving round a central crank. The second danger is that it would be all right to christen a movement like this after its founder if you were quite sure that the people you were addressing had some idea of what that founder's doctrines were. I am one of those who think that there are few people at present who have any idea of what Norman Angell's doctrines are. My advice on the phrase "Norman-Angellism" is to make a free use of it among ourselves, but to be rather chary of using it when you are appealing to people for the first time. The next phrase is "International Polity," and that I think to be a very bad name indeed. Firstly, as a mere matter of pedantry, I do not know what the word "Polity" means. I used to think it meant a State, but the new use of the word seems to be a sort of hybrid between "politics" and "policy." I think that is laying stress on rather the wrong kind of thing. When used

simply as a label, it conjures up visions of a world state which I think you want to keep for the present in the background. Do avoid initials—the world is overrun with them at present. “War and Peace” is the best name which has been invented. It takes no one in that we are going to keep an impartial view. It is a good name because it interests people who might not otherwise be interested. The other name which I think is good is “Civilism.” That seems to me to be a real name with a real meaning. One other matter about labels and titles. I should like to avoid the word “Reason.” Do not let that be misunderstood. Of course, the whole point is to appeal to the reason, and not to be afraid of it—but do not advertise the word because everybody is rather in panic of admitting that they possess reason. It is rather a confession of weakness to respond to the appeal of reason. Call it common-sense and people will be flattered. As regards the new name, I think Mr. Fayle has invented a good one—“The New Patriotism.” I do think that with regard to certain classes of people with whom you are working at present that that name and names like it are worth using. Even the “New National Service” or anything which would lay stress on that idea of transmuting into new channels the old things which still so easily awake response in the majority of people’s minds would be satisfactory. Another rather similar example is the “Double Defence League” or “Dual Defence League,” which lays stress on the fact you are out for defence, but shows that you are also out for something else. There is the question of metaphorical names, and there I think that my metaphor of transmutation of radio-activity—the new science of human nature working side by side with the new physical science—is worth considering. The advantage of this is the advantage of brevity. The next

edition of war and peace ought to bear the name of "The Alchemist." For myself, I think of our movement always as "Sancho Panza," a whimsical person, full of common-sense, yet going about the world picking up knights errant. There only remain one or two minor titles for articles, such as "Fighting in Fun," showing that the real fun is not to be found in modern war. I should like to have an article called "Rivers of Damascus," showing people that though the things you are asking people to do seem rather dull, they are really more worth doing than the old mock-heroical things. I should like to see an article dealing with the "Yellow Peril," called "The Real White Hope." I should like to see an article on the possibility of maintaining national advantages without force called "Bluff without Bluster." I should like finally to see an article on whether Dreadnoughts on the two-to-one standard are more or less efficient as a means of defence than international credit, written by Mr. Langdon-Davies, called "Two to One or Even Money."

Mr. HILTON : Mr. Robertson is rather hard on "International Polity." I will confess that for a good long time I went about using the phrase without knowing what it meant, but afterwards I hunted it up in dictionaries, and concocted a definition something like this : "'Polity' means any system whereby order, liberty, security and justice can be maintained in a community of people. 'International Polity' means any system whereby order, liberty, security and justice can be maintained in the community of nations." So interpreted, the title does convey exactly what we are driving at as long as we confine our attention to the international question. Of course, if we begin to apply Norman-Angellism to other groups than national groups, that title will not apply. I know the title is a big mouthful, but

it has always seemed to me quite probable that if you went on using the phrase people would begin to understand it. It is a title which people inquire about when they hear it, and that often gives an opening for explaining at greater length. Moreover, International Polity is as free as any phrase I have heard from undesirable associations.

Mr. QUINTANA : I think International Polity is a name for English-speaking nations only. In the French language we have only the one word politics, and that word will not convey to the minds of the people the meaning Mr. Hilton hinted at just now. In Spanish we have only the one word, and it is the same in German.

Dr. MEZ : In Germany we might usefully use the term Frieden, but we ought to be careful in all sorts of expressions as "International" and "Peace," as they are highly discredited by former movements. "The New Patriotism" in Germany would be an excellent word. The same thing applies to the other suggestion, "The New Alchemy." These were the best suggestions—better than "Internationale Politik," which is not particularly connected with the Peace movement. "Civilism" does not exist in Germany. It would be "Civilisimüs," which does not give the right sense.

Herr VON LUBTOW : The very worst name you can invent—worse than "International Politik." It would mean military people against civil authorities. I am glad to say I agree with Dr. Mez for the first time. "The New Patriotism," I believe, would be the best for Germany.

Mr. GRAHAM : "The New Patriotism" has advantages over "Civilism." One is that "Civilism" puts us in a

more definite anti-army and anti-navy position than we wish to take up. The second is that "The New Patriotism" takes up an idea which the old pacifists had and which was thoroughly unobjectionable and which has been preached by the more effective of the old pacifists for some time.

Mr. QUINTANA: I think that "The New Patriotism" would be most useful in France also.

Mr. FAYLE: I am going to suggest an amendment to the name "New Patriotism." Although I use the word I am always hostile to the word "New" anywhere. It seems to show a rather patronising tone to the users of the word in its old sense. Why not "Constructive" patriotism. The old patriotism was in a large measure destructive, or in its best form defensive—the maintenance of what you have already secured. I believe what we are out to do is to turn the forces used for attack and defence into constructive work, to use them to build up a better national life and from that a better life of the world.

Mr. LANGDON-DAVIES: The essential thing in our general name is that it should appeal to the people. Suppose we were to become a political party, we must have something which describes a man. One such name is Norman-Angellism. That has a very great objection in that it is not good in any other country. Another is "Civilist" for which I have a pedantic dislike because it is a constructed word growing out by an intellectual and not by a natural method. "The New Patriotism" would be popular in every country. It is broadest because it applies particularly and generally to the country you happen to be in.

Mr. HAYCOCK: You say they would not understand Norman-Angellism in other countries. Christianity was

given the name of its Founder. Darwinism is a name understood in other countries. Norman-Angellism in its catholicity is the best label we can have. The happiest thing we have done in Manchester is to call our League the Manchester Norman Angell League. Norman Angell, we politely tell inquirers, wrote a book which is called "The Great Illusion," and the man thinks: If there is a movement founded because of this book—I must read it. Through this title we have been able to sell a number of Great Illusions at public meetings.

Mr. ROTHWELL: Why should we be so concerned with choosing a name? Why should we not wait awhile at least? The world may give us a name—a much better name than we shall give ourselves. Personally, in the case of a world movement, like this I should be well content to wait.

Lady BARLOW: I cannot see the objections to the word "Norman-Angellism." It has been pointed out other countries have taken names like Darwin and so forth. "The new patriotism" is a beautiful thought, but it does not stand for the clean-cut idea as Norman-Angellism stands. I have had a little experience of how to get this idea into the mind of strangers to it. To talk to them of "The New Patriotism" would be quite impossible, whereas Norman-Angellism you can narrow down the point and get the thing clean-cut as standing over one particular branch of peace work which is totally apart from anything else, which refers to one aspect, one facet of the whole thing. I am entirely in favour of Norman-Angellism.

Mr. SHOVE: I object to "The New Patriotism" as a title for our movement because it is a lie. It is totally misrepresenting our movement to say that the distinguishing feature of it is that it appeals to the patriotic

emotions. My other objection to it is that it is distinctively suggestive of the crank. I think it would be a most disastrous name.

Dr. NASMYTH: I just want to add one or two words. My own experience shows that in America the words "International Polity" stands for the study of the relations which govern the inter-state field. We do meet objections when we use Norman-Angellism, although it has very clearly those advantages which Lady Barlow has pointed out—determining a clear-cut distinction. Civilism is perhaps a term for the future when Norman-Angellism enters upon its political stage. We see the elements of it present in the Zabern incident, the Dreyfus crisis in France and the Ulster Crisis.

In regard to Norman-Angellism do not forget the side of social reconstruction. We are chiefly interested in abolishing war because of the new order of society which is going to arise when the general futility of physical force is demonstrated. It should not be narrowed too much. The abolition of war and the attack on the philosophy of force is one job that is in front of us. All of us here now can see the tremendous reach of this thing into the class struggle, into religious life, into thousands of fields to which it is going to extend. This evening I feel we have covered a great deal of ground and cleared up in the mind of all of us a lot of questions which were stirring there.

DENNIS ROBERTSON: I should like to withdraw my pedantic objection to "International Polity." The broader objection remains that it is laying the emphasis on not quite the right thing. The discussion has concentrated on the two phrases "Norman-Angellism" and "The New Patriotism." With regard to Norman-Angellism the objections are firstly that it is too personal.

Perhaps I was generalising too much from Cambridge. Manchester does not mind how often it is told the same thing. Whether the great world that lies outside Cambridge and Manchester approximates to one or the other I do not know. Secondly that in its reception abroad it would be misunderstood and resented. Cobdenism surely is a case in point where the thing is tinged with English traditions and which is unpopular for that reason. As to the other phrase "The New Patriotism" I quite agree about the word "new." I think "true" is almost worse. It is not an insult to say a thing is old but to say a thing is true necessarily implies false. "Constructive" again, is too long a word. "Commonsense Patriotism" I think combines the two ideas.



*His attitude was that of the
impartial looker-on. It
deceived some people.*

The Evolution of Clovis.

THE POETRY OF THE SWORD

ADDRESS BY MR. G. K. CHESTERTON

Evening Session : July 25th

CAPT. THE HON. MAURICE V. BRETT IN THE CHAIR

Capt. BRETT : Ladies and Gentlemen, I have much pleasure this evening in introducing to you one of the great literary stars of the day, Mr. G. K. Chesterton. I am sure it is quite unnecessary for me to say anything as, although there are representatives present here to-night from America, France, Germany, New Zealand, and South America, I am sure there is nobody who has not heard of Mr. Chesterton. You have, during the week, had the points of view of the Navy League and the National Service League, and you are now going to have another point of view from one who is a convinced and very strongly convinced opponent. Before he leaves to-night I hope you will have given him something to think about and perhaps laid the foundations of a slight alteration in his opinion.

Mr. CHESTERTON : It would be only candid for me to begin by saying that I do not generally lack anything to think about and I have thought about what I understand to be the subject of discussion the greater part of my

life. I am going to make a very short speech at the beginning of these proceedings, because I have always found that nothing is ever discovered except by discussion—that is why I am a democrat—and I have often thought it would be a good thing if the questions could be asked first and the lecture given at the end. I am as far as I can understand concerned with discussing a certain theory of considerable importance which has been advanced in our time by Mr. Norman Angell and I am going to deal with that and not pause over the innumerable other matters that might concern us. Now that theory is an important one, I think, and it probably, to a very considerable extent, can be maintained. It may seem eccentric to say so, but I am going to begin my difference with Mr. Norman Angell by agreeing with him. The main proposition which I understand him to advance and which is the important part of his theory is that the economics and finance of the modern world are so closely interrelated that in any case, whether a nation wins or loses, both the victor and the vanquished are worse off and possibly even exceptionally the victor is the poorer of the two. It is quite true that Mr. Norman Angell advances a great many other things besides that. He has probably some political sympathies that are mine and some which are not mine, but that does not appear to me to be primarily important. We talk of Galileo as having established a certain statement about the solar system. If you read what Galileo actually did say as well as that, you will be astounded. Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood and he also discovered a great many other things now fortunately buried in a kindly obscurity. There is such a thing as a proposition associated with a man's name. Darwin had a thesis, Karl Marx had a thesis, Calvin had a thesis. They had all sorts of other ideals, faults, and magnificences



Kath '14

*They uttered in chorus loud and strong their orthodox persuasions.
With my row-ti-tow-ti-oodly-yow
Their orthodox persuasions.*

The Song of Pelagius.

belonging to them as human beings and I think I am not wrong in saying that what the world has noted in Norman Angell is his theory that war is economically unprofitable. I should like to say that as far as that is concerned I am under a difficulty because if a king or a senate or any other corporation or responsible person began a war for the sake of getting any economic profit it would, morally speaking, interest me very little whether he won or lost ; in either case it or they or he would be a dirty scoundrel.

I am therefore not interested at all in the question of wars waged for profit because I think at the very start that all such wars would be wrong, and if there are in history one or two examples of wars waged merely for profit they were wicked wars and I no more defend them than I would defend cutting the throat of a woman in a lane. As I propose to suggest in a moment, most wars are not waged with that object at all, but for a totally different object. For the moment I am dealing merely with the proposition that it is in the economic sense unprofitable to wage war. Very well. That proposition is a very important one and is very serious for many people, but I suggest it is not at all serious for people who think of war in other terms. Upon that theory standing by itself universal peace all over this planet would not bring about the slightest progress. It indicates no change in the conscience, no change in the intelligence, no change in the motives of action—it is simply considering what pays and what does not pay and going in for what does pay. In other words the first or lower part of Mr. Angell's argument entirely destroys the second or higher part of it. I will take a perfectly simple working example. A friend of mine asked Mr. Angell whether he really blamed Sardinia and the general opinion of Italy for rebelling against the Austrian Empire and the Treaty of Vienna. Mr. Angell replied that when Europe had come

into the state of enlightenment which would be capable of understanding the idea of universal peace, it would by that time have risen above the idea of tyrannising over reluctant provinces. Now, will you answer this question. What is there in the argument that indicates any advance in moral or spiritual qualities? You say: War is a bad investment. Very well. How long is it since it was considered a mark of heroic virtue to avoid a bad investment? If Mr. Angell is right in the first part of his argument he is wrong in the second part. If it be really true that selfishness alone would lead us to avoid war why should we avoid being selfish. Who is there who has heard of anybody saying "How kind and good that man is, he sold out of Bulgarian Rails just before the slump." Who is there who has heard anybody praised as a saint simply because he said, "I think this company is pretty dicky, I am going to clear out."

The theory that war never results in economic increase is a serious theory, but does it indicate that it is any kind of moral advance when a man has discovered on which side his bread is buttered? Why should a man not go on behaving in the same unscrupulous way as he did before, because he has discovered that a particular investment in bayonets and cannon balls is an investment that does not pay? Therefore I eliminate that to begin with. I say that in the exact proportion as Mr. Angell's first theory is sound or at least very tenable and interesting, any further suggestion that it involves, any moral superiority in the people who have accepted it is abolished on the face of it. Show an ordinary man that he will not get money or meat or bread or anything like that from a particular course of action and he does not need to be a Superman in order to avoid that calamity. I therefore suggest to you to begin with that Mr. Angell's theory, in so far as it is very arguable—I think, on the whole, that

particular part of the theory is probably true—destroys and extinguishes once and for ever all possibility of our children being any better than we or of the moral standard of Europe one hundred years hence—supposing Mr. Angell's theory prevailed—being one whit better than ours to-day. Therefore it is still probable, even supposing that war were abandoned, that all other forms of domination and tyranny would continue with probably increased energy.

At this point let me remind you of two or three small facts. First of all one very common phrase used in the discussion about war is: "We have abolished the duel between individuals—why should we not abolish it between nations." Well, there are a great many answers to that which would lead us into a great many things. It is enough to say that we—civilised people—have not abolished the duel. It exists in all civilised countries and particularly in the most civilised centres. As some of the most celebrated philosophers have fought duels I rather doubt whether the absence of the duel from Wandsworth and Clapham is an entire answer to its institution in Paris and Vienna. But we will leave that on one side for a moment. What I want to ask about the duel is this. If the objection to the duel is that it is fighting, upon what does that objection rest? It is usual in these theories or expositions to maintain that it is because it rests upon force, and it is quite true that if your duellist is a bully, if anybody is a bully, and if he uses brute force against weaker people than himself, England should treat him as it did behave in healthier times towards such people. But I want to point out to you that even if you have abolished the duel, that when you have abolished war, one thing you certainly have not done is to abolish force. Force is the whole system which holds the present horrible capitalist society together.

The only difference is that it is a permanent and persistent war of the rich against the poor. But the people who built this building in which I stand, with whose religious ideals I have no sympathy, but who were undoubtedly profound and sincere when the place was founded did, I believe, really carry the principle to its logical extent by refusing to serve coercively, that is to say, to hate or hurt their fellow creatures either by means of the soldier or by means of police. I fear that the modern Quakers who have grown very few and very rich since have not risen to that ideal, but I want to insist, as the next essential point that, where you have wars or where you do not, the practice of brutal bodily violence to your fellow creatures is a part of the existing system of human society, and, as things stand at this moment, is practised pretty persistently by wealthier people to poorer people. When you have removed the duel you have not abolished fighting—you have only abolished fair fighting. Whenever it takes five policeman to take away a coster and only one policeman to tell a lie about him you are certainly using brute force exactly as you use it in war. If your objection is to the use of force you are using it all the time. The only thing you do by abolishing swords and guns is simply to make it impossible for the oppressed to be able to revolt. By the way, I forgot to mention that the fact that the police are actually called "The Force" is quite sufficient evidence of what I mean, but I only want you to understand that the arguments about the duel and all that are irrelevant, because the use of physical force towards your fellow creatures is a fact in all our societies and apparently means to continue to be used, and the only difference is that whatever there is in it of chivalry has been removed.

Now let us look at one or two instances drawn from actual political experience. If you take South Africa,

for instance—I do not think anyone here will accuse me of having been a Jingo about South Africa—but take the actual facts :—A lot of Englishmen lived in Johannesburg—at least some of them were Englishmen—an uncle of mine lived there—and an enormous war was organised which probably did have for its object, in the people who actually engineered it, the getting of the gold mines of the Transvaal, but I am quite certain, first of all, that the people who got the gold mines of the Transvaal were not Englishmen, and secondly, that the people who backed-up the war in England did not know that that was the object. As a pro-Boer I think I have the right to say that. I do not think the ordinary Englishman had the faintest idea of doing anything else than what he called coming to the rescue of oppressed Englishmen. There was a war, in a sense the best example that Mr. Angell could take, because it was a war that was waged for financial objects, and it is a war that has resulted in no kind of financial profit to England, but on the contrary the loss of the whole of the colony to the very people we fought in the war. If you take that, what exactly is the difference, when you come to work it out, between people who were shot by Boers in the South African War and the people who were shot by Boers a little while ago upon a perfectly indefensible excuse about a strike. One is labelled war and the other is labelled peace, but what is the difference? Imagine a poor young fellow in Lancashire who might have taken the King's shilling or might equally have gone into the mining industry. He is the same kind of man in that case who would have gone out to South Africa and been shot as a soldier who went out to South Africa and was shot as a miner. What is the difference? I do not know. Anyhow, that is the situation. You have to face the fact that your peace does not bring you peace.

You can establish legal and political control over a wide area ; you can say "There is no war in this country," but as long as you are in the hands of the rich they will do as they like—as Mr. Rockefeller does in America.

Therefore, I first of all dispute whether any avoidance of international war in the ordinary sense, putting aside all other considerations, would even lessen the list of the dead and wounded. I gravely doubt whether there would not be as many people murdered under any peace arrangement you could make as long as you leave things as they are. Now I will not dwell upon what is the most obvious case—that of Alsace Lorraine—it is enough to say that these provinces were taken with absolutely brutal insolence from a people to whom they belonged. Now a little while ago in Alsace Lorraine, a Prussian officer drew a sabre and hacked about a cripple who was in a mob. I merely leave that fact to speak for itself. It is a sort of test case. What is your morality when that happens? It is quite certain that a Frenchman, though he is quite capable of punching all sorts of people in the eye, would not have hacked about a cripple, nor would an Englishman, nor would a South German, nor would an Irishman. That was because the German had been taught a certain philosophy. I deny that wars have been seriously and in large numbers waged for the purpose of gaining economic advantage or even of gaining territory, they have been waged for the purpose of either imposing or rescuing a certain type of tradition of civilisation and culture. People have fought not because they knew whether they would be richer or poorer at the end of the proceedings, but because they thought that something they loved and admired was in danger. The poor Prussians, even, undoubtedly admire Prussia. It seems strange, but I am sure it is so and they will not give it up, however you may try to make them—you may think

it is obvious that an absurd young North German fool walking about is not the Lord of Creation and is not entitled to hack French cripples about with a sabre, but he does not think so and he is sincere in that. When there is a serious belief on the one side and on the other, that each side represents whatever you like to call the ends of humanity, the purpose of God, the essential definition of human right, when both sides formally believe that is so and that the destruction of their civilisation will be the destruction of man, will you tell me what will happen, except that both must go through that process which no one will talk lightly about, particularly a sedentary and pacific peoples like ourselves—that process of offering your body in the last resort to resist? It is very terrible. It is not more terrible than that many of us may die in our beds, but it is very terrible. But if you tell me that there is not a case in which you would refuse to accept anything else except that final torture and extinction, then upon my living soul I think you slander yourselves.

Dr. NASMYTH: I think that we all agree most thoroughly with Mr. Chesterton that there are a great many things more valuable to us than peace. Civilisation, liberty, all this chivalry, all these higher qualities of the human soul are things not to be weighed in the balance with any economic gain or loss. I think we see, however, another thing. Mr. Angell's work seems to be fated now, possibly for a long time, to the same kind of distortion which Darwin's wonderful work has suffered. Mr. Chesterton is frankly and openly what Novikoff has called one who believes that collective homicide is the cause of human progress. Mr. Chesterton has stated that he cannot see how the abolition of war would contribute in any way to a higher moral code, and argues in the case of the duel and so on that we have lost

chivalry there. He thinks that if we abandoned war we should have to abandon all the things we hold most valuable in our civilisation. I want to confine myself to the direct charges which he has brought against Mr. Angell's work. First he states—I think this is the outstanding impression—that we are putting the whole discussion upon a lower instead of a higher plane. That is not Mr. Angell's thesis at all. Mr. Angell's thesis is this: that military power used for the purpose of aggression is economically, socially and morally futile, and that war is futile for attaining any of those objects for which men strive. He uses economics in the same way that a scientist uses the facts of the physical world. He used physiology and psychology, and it is because his first chapter begins with economics that people who do not get any further think there is nothing else.

If we take the case of the Mexican situation now—if we people from the United States had had a war with Mexico—it would not have been for those oil wells and mines which the Hearst syndicate owned, the whole of the American people would not have gone to war for that purpose, they would have gone to war with a high moral purpose, to restore peace and order and the conditions of progress to the Mexican people. We thought that General Huerta was the chief obstacle to that peace, and the President decided that Huerta had insulted the American flag. He landed the whole power of the American Navy in Tampico, killed two hundred Mexicans who had not heard of President Huerta's speech, and then we saw a curious phenomenon: we saw the whole Mexican people rally to his support. We saw him become the great national hero of the Mexican people. We were defeating the very object for which we were striving, because we employed military force to do it. The analogy is this. In a crude state of society you can

use physical force just as with a crude and simple organism you can use physical force. When you get an infinitely more complex and interdependent society and try to use physical force, then it is as if you have an automobile with its fine mechanism and somebody gives you a crowbar and says, "Smash it with that and it will go."

Take for instance the case of Alsace Lorraine, when the Zabern incident occurred. If France had gone off in a blast of fury and made war upon Germany it would have consolidated the German nation necessarily in the process of resistance. Of the two hundred and fifty-four representatives in the Reichstag, fifty-eight, who were really fighting the cause of Civilism and of the rights of that poor cripple, would have been driven to support the other side and France would have defeated its own friends who were working against the Prussian authorities. So in South Africa, the English people did not think they were going to war for gold mines. They thought they were going to preserve the rights of British liberty, but I submit that military force was not the way to secure the principle of British liberty, and recent history has shown that. Mr. Chesterton says that the real object for which people go to war is to maintain types of civilisation in which they believe, the highest qualities we have developed in our society. Mr. Angell's thesis is that you cannot further that kind of civilisation by aggression against another civilisation; in other words, if you have a high regard for civilisation your first duty is not to attack somebody else's civilisation. The whole thesis is directed against aggressive military power. We, as people who have studied Norman Angell's theories, are not Quakers, not non-resisters, we believe in resistance as the best way of cancelling physical force used for aggression, but we are first of all

non-aggressors. Mr. Chesterton is a militarist, because a militarist is a man who believes that human society is founded upon physical force.

Mr. CHESTERTON : I said modern capitalist society is founded on force which is used against the poor.

Dr. NASMYTH : We must distinguish three kinds of physical force. First, there is physical force used for aggression. That we do not believe in, neither economically, socially or morally. We do believe in physical force used in resistance as the best way of stopping physical force used as aggression, and we do believe in physical force used as police force as the last way of stopping individuals from using force against each other. We believe that society is founded on co-operation ; we believe furthermore that we have here the demonstration of a thing which we have felt intuitively. Last night we had some forty or fifty young men bearing testimony to the way they had found in this rational doctrine the confirmation of the wonderful ideals of humanity they had felt in their hearts before. I find in the doctrines of the futility of physical force the verification in terms of modern morals of those wonderful things which Christ himself laid down—the inevitable victory of spirit over physical force. As to the relation of economic factors to moral factors, I believe this is the interpretation of the Lord's Prayer. He asks for us all to pray that His Kingdom shall come, on earth as it is in heaven, not in some far off age, but in order that we may have our daily bread. We have this material basis of sordid economics in order that we may have an opportunity to realise some of the spiritual fruits of this material progress, that we may know what the beauties and the glories of sunset are and not be entirely overwhelmed in force-restricted civilisation. That



*Oh dear ! I don't know what I am ;
I feel so puzzled.*

Nursery Rhyme.



*I do not love to utter platitudes
In stained-glass attitudes.*

Patience.



*My admiration for his character
is surpassed only by my loathing
for his views.*

"Jingo Publican" in The
Yorkshire Post.



I absolutely deny that.
Jordan's Report.

interpretation of the Lord's Prayer was given to me by Mr. Norman Angell himself.

Mr. SHOVE : I am taking just two points in Mr. Chesterton's very interesting speech. I shall take first the point he made first. As I understood it, his argument was this : If your reason for stopping international conflict, for the abolition of war, is that you think it does not pay in your own interests, there is no moral advance when you have abolished war. I absolutely deny that, and I deny it on two grounds. I deny it first of all for this reason, that when we say war does not pay we mean a great deal more than that. If you take each particular war, and cast up your balance sheet the debit side will be greater than the credit side. What we mean is that as long as there are wars, and as long as there is the possibility of war, economic progress is infinitely retarded, that the whole course and flow of civilisation is checked and stopped, and I believe that moral progress in certain directions depends upon economic progress. For this reason I do not believe that virtue is a negative thing, I do not believe that virtue consists entirely in denying yourself, in self-sacrifice. I believe rather that the right use of pleasure, the right use of leisure, is virtue, that because a thing is pleasant it is not necessarily vicious, and that for an immense number of men, as long as you have only the amount of economic well-being that you have now, the virtues which you can get by cultivated leisure, by a proper use of material instruments that have been placed in the hands of man, to the vast majority of humankind all those virtues are denied, and it is only when you have got an infinitely more advanced state of economic progress that the vast majority of men will have the time or the materials to cultivate their intelligences, their æsthetic perception, and the opportunities of human fellowship. It is only

by the progress, the increased productivity of the human race, that men can get enough leisure or enough physical strength to cultivate these things. That is why I think moral progress depends upon material progress. Mr. Chesterton quoted a remark of Mr. Angell's to the effect that when we had convinced men that war did not pay there would be no more tyrannies, and Mr. Chesterton controverted that. Dr. Nasmyth has already given one answer to that—I want to give another. In order to convince men of the futility of war, either for economic motives or for moral motives, you have got to enlighten the human race to a vastly greater extent than they are enlightened now. You have got to induce them to do a great deal of hard thinking. I think that that advance of intelligence must be accompanied by an advance of morality. Mr. Chesterton thinks thought is the enemy of morals. I do not expect Mr. Chesterton to accept my interpretation of his view. I think a progress of intelligence is bound to be accompanied by a progress of morals. That is my first point. I now come to the second one. He remarked on the use of force for police purposes—he made a great many points on that subject—there are two with which I want to deal. In the first, he said that at the present time force is used by the rich for exploiting and tyrannising over the poor. I entirely agree. I loathe the present capitalist society quite as much as Mr. Chesterton. If I were asked for a short summary of my political programme I should say, “I am out to down the rich.” Mr. Chesterton's first point was that you make it impossible if you abolish armies and navies for the lower classes to free themselves from that tyranny. That strikes me as a remarkable statement. I hope Mr. Chesterton will explain if I misrepresent.

MR. CHESTERTON : I do not think I ever said that about abolishing armies and navies. What I said was that if

you preach this philosophy you are leaving the poor at the mercy of the rich. Would they be right to make an aggressive revolution now ?

Mr. SHOVE : It depends on the prospect of success. If you want to have a revolution, if you are going to carry out a revolution at all, you will find the strike as useful a weapon as a rifle, and the whole history of the last three or four years has been this, that the presence of armies and navies has been a menace to the success of the strike—it is the great instrument of force. Take the strike in South Africa or in France. Those strikes were smashed by the use of the army and navy, and I cannot see how it can be maintained that by abolishing armies and navies, or by preaching to the upper classes that the use of force is futile, you are going to make the chance of the lower classes any more remote. Mr. Chesterton said : Abolish war to-morrow, tyranny and force will remain as long as capitalist society remains as it is. I agree with him. I am not only a Norman-Angellist. I want to abolish a lot of other things, and I want to abolish landlords and the rich, and I am not going to stop fighting for my ideals when I have abolished war. I am then going to abolish capitalist society.

Mr. GRAHAM : I too wish to give an answer to Mr. Chesterton's arguments that tyranny will still continue when Norman Angell's ideas have permeated Europe and abolished war. I believe that Mr. Angell was perfectly right in spite of the very subtle argument which Mr. Chesterton brought forward to try and convince us he was wrong. There are two causes of tyranny as of war. One is the wish for gain which, Mr. Chesterton agrees, was adequately dealt with by Mr. Norman Angell, and the second is Mr. Chesterton and the ideas for which he stands. Mr. Chesterton gave as the cause of war the

desire to defend or impose a civilisation. Well, Mr. Chesterton obviously thinks that a Briton's first duty is to defend his countrymen, and he would include defending national honour. It is always hard to deal with Mr. Chesterton because it is so hard to tell just what he means. I submit that for defending the national honour and all that sort of thing, and for destroying the ideals of the other party, there is no more futile weapon than the sword. Let us take the Russian North Sea incident. We did not go to war over that—even Mr. Chesterton could not be everywhere at once. What would have happened if we had gone to war? It was a case where national honour was concerned. If we had engaged the Russian navy we should not only have shot down people who had nothing to do with the affair, but we should have deified the Admirals who did it. We should not be imposing our ideals on the backward civilisation of Russia; we should be making everybody, especially the poor, more barbaric. Turn to the Zabern incident. If a European war had been engaged in by France on that point, Mr. Chesterton might have been shooting a South German farmer, and he would cause the North German officer who did the deed to be deified. We should not have forgotten the name of him already—he would have been a national hero in Germany just now. If we want to crush anyone in Germany, the way is not to use the sword, the way is to strengthen to the best of our power the elements in Germany who incline to Socialism. If we had a successful war with Russia it would put the democratic party under the reactionary party for another generation. That I think is the real answer to the idea Mr. Chesterton has given us about the sanctity of the sword. Mr. Chesterton did not use the phrase, but I rather think that at the back of his mind is this idea that the sword will revenge the

national honour when it is most needed, and that nothing else will, and that we are degenerates who disbelieve it.

Mr. DENNIS ROBERTSON : Mr. Chesterton's argument so far as I followed it seemed to consist of three main points. The first was that if the world is converted to the abolition of war by Norman Angell's means, there is no guarantee there will be any advance in morality whatever. Without going into the nature of ethics, it seems to be clear that an essential for producing the good is much better economic conditions, much greater volume of wealth than we have at present. For that reason alone the conversion of the world to Angellism is important, and some of us think a necessary condition for the production of morality. Mr. Chesterton seemed to me to slip into the false analogy of a personal action in this case—personal investment. A trustee is claimed as an honest man because he invests wisely the money of the people for whom he is a trustee. That is the point—in a nation each one of us is trustee for the rest of his fellow-citizens. To learn to subordinate your instincts of pugnacity to a wise direction of the interests of the people for whom you are trustee is a moral discipline, and a valuable one without which no army could exist, and without which no nation can exist. The conversion of the world by this apparently sordid argument is in itself a moral process.

The second point was that if we abolished war we should not be abolishing the use of personal force. Because we are not at the same time abolishing every other kind of iniquity, that is not a case for not abolishing this thing. Mr. Chesterton went on to elaborate that point by taking the state of things by which a Lancashire man can suffer in a strike as in war. If you hold the life of a Lancashire miner to be valuable, the quantity of lives is also an important fact, and if you are asked to choose

between the state of things in which many hundreds of men are shot in a war, and five in a strike——

MR. CHESTERTON: The number was very much more than five.

MR. DENIS ROBERTSON: But Mr. Chesterton went further, and seemed to attribute a causal connection between shooting men in war and not shooting them in strikes. He did not offer the smallest evidence for supposing that more people would be shot in strikes when you cease to shoot them in war.

His third point concerned national ideals, which must come ultimately to the test of the sword. That argument at the end of his speech was made by confusing two things. He said, in the first place, that there are none of us who would not offer his body in defence of something he held sacred. I think everybody here would agree with me that there are certain things to which one would oppose one's body in the last resort. We all agree, and it was therefore irrelevant. With that statement was included the other, that certain ideals can only be forwarded and impressed upon the world by means of the sword. That seems to me an entirely different case, which has no necessary connection at all with the other proposition, because the sword is a futile way of imposing these ideals.

MR. SEYMOUR COCKS: Mr. Chesterton's point about morals has been adequately dealt with by two speakers. Mr. Chesterton says there is nothing particularly heroic in knowing which side your bread is buttered. There is nothing particularly heroic in not knowing it either. I do submit that if we believe that things are stupid, and tell people and nations not to do these things which are stupid, it is, from the point of view of reason, an excellent thing to do.

Mr. CHESTERTON : But it does not prove that you have any advance in morals : it may not prove that you have advanced in morals, but it proves that you have advanced towards wisdom. I said in reference to what I believe to be Mr. Angell's theory that by the time we had universal peace in Europe we must have advanced to an extent that we could not tolerate things like tyranny. You cannot argue from one branch of good conduct to another. If it is to our mental advantage not to fight, of course we should not fight. It will not prove that we shall not do anything else that is wrong.

Mr. COCKS : If the people of the earth were only informed on this question they would also be right on other questions. Our whole business is to prove that force is futile, not wrong, in war. Mr. Chesterton says he does not disapprove of force to resist force against us. We are out to prove that all force used for the purpose of gaining any moral and economic end is futile and stupid, and I would say our movement is really for this—to prove that all advance in human progress is due to voluntary co-operation between human beings, or that every advance in civilisation is due to the substitution of the force of argument for the argument of force. This applies to human relationships, and as well as to nations. Mr. Chesterton said wars are fought for imposing, for extending a certain type of civilisation.

Mr. CHESTERTON : Defending a type of civilisation.

Mr. COCKS : In his next sentence he said "because people believe that something they hold valuable is in danger"; if we can prove it is futile for one nation to seek to extend its civilisation by force, this valuable thing will not be in danger, because nobody will wish to attack it.

Mr. HYNDMAN: I do not attach anything like the importance to Mr. Norman Angell's work that has been shown by those here. I have seen something during my long life of war and of peace. The horrors of peace are very much greater than the horrors of war. I have seen both very closely. In addition to that, I take exception to the whole argument. The question simply amounts to this, To whom are wars profitable? I have seen a number of wars for the emancipation of nationality in my life. I have seen Hungary, Italy and other countries emancipating themselves from the domination of those who oppressed them. They have done it by aggression and force—brutal force, in many cases quite justifiably, but still force. I have supported these whenever I could, and I say these wars were justifiable. With Mr. Chesterton I set out against the Boer War, and I had some considerable reason. Very well. I thought the Boers were perfectly right to use force. But in any case, as far as my life has gone, I have observed force has been a very great remedy in many cases, and I shall be very sorry to see it given up. It depends upon who uses it, or in whose instance. It would be a clever man who proved that Russia has not gained any advantage from Poland. Poland has kept Russia's balance sheet from bankruptcy. It would be difficult to prove to me that the upper and middle classes have gained nothing by the annexation of India. The horrors of peace in India are far worse than any of its wars in history. Our friend here is in favour of the strike. I look upon the strike as the worst weapon that a labouring class can wisely use. I have never seen a successful strike. I am a Social-Democrat, our delegates invariably act for peace, but at several international congresses where I have attended we have voted solidly for a citizen force—to make war, and to make war upon



*He burned with hatred for his country's foes,
Including half his countrymen.*
Scopus—A Tragedy—Act V., Sc. ii.

the very classes that our friend has stigmatised, not upon the men, but upon the system. We hate the system which makes the rich and makes the poor. But I was struck more than anything else by the speech of our American friend. He went to Mexico, and talked about Huerta, but he never went to Colorado, where, under the most perfect peace, men have been shot down by the heaps—without any intervention from Norman Angell.

As a matter of fact, in these things we have to discriminate very largely. For example, for my part I should not be at all sorry to see Germany beaten in war. Not at all. But it would depend upon whom it was by. I should be extremely sorry to see Germany conquered by Russia. I should be extremely glad to see her beaten by France, because I believe that would forward civilisation. I think it would be extremely difficult for Mr. Norman Angell to prove that if Russia conquered Germany she would not add to her wealth by so doing, by the taxes she would impose, by the armies she would keep up at the cost of that country, as we so beautifully do in India, with our blessed *pax Romana*, which spreads misery in India. Therefore, the point about that is this: that we are here opposed to war. We cannot be opposed to force in every case, because that is the only way out of some of the class antagonisms. My idea in this country is that there are two weapons that can be effectively used by the workers. One is political action, and the other is a citizen army. At the same time, although we are all in favour of peace, I may say that the arguments that are adduced by Mr. Norman Angell would, if they were carried to their result, simply prove that the capitalist class, if they handled their weapons well, would make it profitable to go to war; and, if they used it well, the governing classes of the country may gain by war, and that it is perfectly clear

that the peoples of every country must lose by every war they enter.

Mr. NORMAN ANGELL : The crux of Mr. Chesterton's argument is of two kinds. First, that wars are not waged for profit. We have never urged that wars are waged for profit. We do know that the struggle for political power is wrapped up with the economic advantages that are supposed to accrue to the possession of political power, and that political power in the last resort is a matter of military force, and the economic value which is supposed to attach to the possession of military force does play a very great part in the production of the military system. That is our case.

It is a curious thing whenever in these discussions that point is challenged there is sure to be someone who immediately gets up to show that a class or a nation can gain by military force, and is astonished that we should ever argue to the contrary. Does he think we have adopted that axiom, and not threshed this question out? It is the very bread and meat of our discussion. I take the points as they come. The horrors of peace are greater than the horrors of war. It is our whole point. We shall never deal effectively with the horrors of peace until we have got rid of war. Take the case of Mexico. I happen to have been to America. The Mexican business was then brewing. I said to the Americans: "You will go to Mexico and be confronted by a guerilla warfare. By the attempt to impose your civilisation by military force upon that nation you will make for yourself problems of the nature of the Ulster problem. It will take up all your time and thought. Your American civilisation is wrestling with all sorts of problems—you go to Mexico, and from the moment the guns begin to go off your attention for twenty years will be diverted to this problem, and better government will

simply be swept away." The day the guns began to bombard Tampico, the Colorado horror broke out; with this result: the most democratic papers gave three pages to Mexico and three inches to Colorado.

We are asked to note what force has done for the small peoples. Surely it is evident that the crushing out of the nationalities of the small peoples is precisely the great crime of the military system. It is the military system of Europe which creates the Polands and Alsace-Lorraines of Europe.

I notice in much that has been said a curious inability to see the relation of defence to aggression; that a man's first duty is not to defend his country, a man's first duty is to refrain from attacking another country. If that duty were fulfilled no young man would be compelled to defend his country, and that is what we want to achieve in Europe; the realisation of the fact that our civilisation has rendered the use of force for imposing a civilisation ineffective in our day.

I come back to the main crux of Mr. Chesterton's argument, that a man who makes a good investment does not improve his morals. Now he does not worsen them, and I am not sure he does not improve them. In my early days I lived some little time among the Indians in Western America. You have there a military civilisation. For as long as history tells us, the Indian's main business was fighting. As intelligence grew—their morals were not very high; the things we value, affection and so on, did not exist very much, and indeed their civilisation was marked by cruelties and bestialities—warfare has become much less popular, and they have risen to a better civilisation and a higher moral standard. An agricultural community is a little better than the community of the Red Indian. Take the case of

the Spanish-American nations. It is roughly true of those people that to the extent to which economic forces tend to prevent them from going to war you do get a better condition of things—that is to say, an Argentina with a well-maintained peace during many years has a greater opportunity for decent family life than a Venezuela which is always at war, and I think it should be quite clear that the operation of just those forces with which we deal does in South America make for better morals. Of course, Mr. Chesterton takes on this point the somewhat special view that morals have no relation to welfare. That is not quite our view. We believe that the moral code is a codification of the general welfare. The more we see how best to invest our energies and our efforts, the more shall we produce a civilisation which gives a chance for morals, a civilisation nearer to that of Canada and Australia than that of Costa Rica and Venezuela.

Mr. Chesterton has spoken somewhat on the right of Alsace-Lorraine, or of France, to resist Germany. Light has already been thrown upon that. It has been shown that if, in the Zabern affair, France had gone to war, you would have had French people killing those who resented most strongly what had happened in Zabern. Your national entity does not correspond to your moral entity, and yet it is only our national entity which can be represented by military force. So that your military method must miss fire.

I think there is one phrase in Mr. Chesterton's address that embodies a point with which I will finish. He said that you get two groups or two bodies which represent a fundamental expression of belief or religious aspiration, for instance, and if they come into conflict in any way, and their ideals come into conflict, then they will appeal to the sword. Our point is not whether they

will, but whether they ought to appeal to the sword, and you get in that illustration of Mr. Chesterton's a certain fatalism—the notion that men are guided by forces outside their control, and not by internal forces which we call passion or temper. That fatalism prevailed about the conflicts between Catholics and Huguenots two hundred years ago, and the view was then that that condition of things must inevitably continue, that the time would never come when men would find a means of protecting and preserving their religious faith without an appeal to the sword. As you know, there were Catholics and Protestants in France who believed that religious wars would endure indefinitely. They have not endured. We have found means by which a man can preserve his faith and point of view without resort to the sword, not because we would not die for our faith, but because we have come to learn that we must not impose our religious faith on others by force. The fact that we have realised the true place of the relation of force to religious belief makes the religious belief of all of us not less, but more, secure. We are trying to enforce that same truth in reference to the ideals embodied in nationality, and when we realise that force is as futile in the domain of national aspiration as in religious aspiration, we shall then be as secure in the things we value nationally as we are secure in the things we value religiously. We are trying to make in the political field that same kind of transformation of ideas which in the religious field gave us security there.

MR. CHESTERTON : I do not think I shall keep you very long, for, by a fortunate accident, none of the questions I asked have been answered and none of the points I have raised have been considered, at any rate, as I imagine, seriously. But let me say, first of all, there appears to be one curious idea which, in the long course of this

debate, has been dawning in my mind, that you seem to think that war is an institution. You talk about retaining it or abolishing it as if it were the General Post Office or Westminster Abbey. War is a contingency. We are not discussing whether any of us want to be shot ; we are discussing what we should do given certain moral conditions. It is not a question of politics or Constitution, because the Constitution presupposes peace within its borders, except for the perpetual harrying of the poor, it presupposes the obedience to law in its borders. This is not a question of politics, but of casuistry. What would a corporate self-respecting society do if certain things happen ? Go to war ! I repeat the challenge with which I ended : What happens when two groups of people, corporate, unmistakable—it is nonsense to say that they are not corporate and unmistakable, we know there are French people with German names, &c., but if anyone says that the Prussians are not a people, that they have not a soul and mind of their own I will not pause to argue with him—supposing two nations of that kind, two corporate bodies, in their soul and consciousness and philosophy, acting together ; what happens when two such groups having two different views of right, views of truth, views of the nature and origin of Europe, of the nature of nationality, when these two communities both sincerely believing in their independent views, quarrel over a thing like Alsace-Lorraine ? I imagine that a German in the war of 1870 did believe that Prussia was the school of learning and science in Europe opening a new era and simply reclaiming a province which had belonged to her in the past. I imagine that the French in the present day feel that a priggish turnip-faced barbarian has taken away from them by brute force something which was theirs and which they desired to remain theirs : that I take to be a perfectly clear statement

of the quarrel in Alsace-Lorraine. I say : What do you do ? Turnip-faced as the Prussian is, or turnip-headed, as I think he is, he has important and stuffy ideals and I say : Why should he not fight for them ? And furious and violent as are the French, why should they not fight for that which they believe has been torn from them ? On the face of it, I cannot see, if the two philosophies are deep enough—and I deny altogether what Norman Angell says about my being fatalistic—I do not say they will fight, I say they ought to fight. If they do anything else one or the other is a coward ; is a person who has betrayed his ideal ; a person who has surrendered something which, if it is sincerely believed, belongs to him, and certainly if he surrenders it for the reasons generally advanced by Norman Angell I can find no words to describe him. That is the real problem about fighting, and you, like most modern intellectuals, have not attempted to face it. You have not faced it, this evening. Doubtless I have come on the wrong night and missed many brilliant discussions, but I say you have not attempted to face it to-night.

What ought to happen when two people do quarrel on a point of honour if neither man is a coward ? Answer something which will decide the point at issue, not something which will not. Obviously erudition does not solve the point at issue. War is the only thing which gives a man the sense of having righted his honour. The man in the right is not bound to win either by erudition or by war. If a man asks from you what you should not give—again, supposing the Sultan of Turkey had a strong opinion that he had a moral right according to the law of the Koran to have a whole girls' school in Brighton handed over to his harem—supposing a man asks that from you which you cannot in honour give, supposing he from some unexplainable reason strongly

believes he has a right to ask, what can happen then ? That is the whole point, and it appears to me that the point is not met. The only way to meet it is to say that the sentiment which I call honour is an ancient superstition which we ought to have outlived by this time. That is to say if a man gives you a five-pound note to take a whipping in Fleet Street you should do it or should arrive at a higher evolutionary plane in order to be able to do it. And my position is that these are generally the impulses and forces behind war. It generally is seen that civilised western peoples with all kinds of machinery and wealth do not go to war until they have got to that frame of mind.

The next I want to say is there has been a great deal of talk about aggression and defence, and it is quite obvious that it implies defence, only there is this application that if you had tyrants on top of you for a very long time the act of recovery has to all ordinary appearance the character of aggression. Let me take the case of Poland. Supposing Poland did consolidate itself suddenly and declare itself a kingdom, it would mean an aggressive war upon three of the great Powers of Europe. There are persons in this room who would not sympathise with it. Russia would not say it is war in self-defence ; she would say it is a war of aggression on the country which the Poles happened to invade.

Mr. HAYCOCK : We should say that would be a war of self-defence.

Mr. CHESTERTON : I cannot have read the infallible scriptures of Mr. Angell so frequently as to know that, but I still think the question is not met. The kingdom of Poland has ceased to exist for an enormous time and there would not be the slightest difficulty for the empires which cut it in three, to urge all Mr. Angell's arguments

against throwing off the yoke. You say it is a state of defensive war. In the moral sense it is. Very few Christian civilised peoples have not waged some war over some kind of pretence they are defending themselves from evil. From that point of view you can defend any war that has happened in history. If Poland acted in that manner she would act aggressively, she would cause war in modern Europe every bit as much as if England invaded France.

There was a remark of Mr. Norman Angell's which I want to deal with for a moment. I do not understand what this means: "that we shall never deal with the horrors of peace until we have abolished the horrors of war." It seems to me unmeaning. Why should the mere fact of leaving these armed forces standing idle and able to order anybody about in any kind of war promote the destruction of what Mr. Angell calls the horrors of peace I cannot say. Most of the horrors of Colorado were done in America, not by the soldiers of the State at all, but by hired detectives with revolvers hired by rich men to shoot poor men. I do not care if you call that war, but why it should not go on as much or more if the United States is at war I do not know.

MR. ANGELL: Is it not possible to turn the attention of the people of the United States to these troubles in Colorado when it is in peace? Attention is diverted in times of war. Because the American war was on the *tapis* at that moment, the most democratic paper in America gave all its attention to Mexico and nobody knew what was being done in Colorado.

MR. CHESTERTON: I have known hundreds of cases of such massacres of workmen in America which happened when America was not at war. You underrate the American millionaire, if he has quite made up his mind

he is going on with this thing, and if you imagine that anything in the newspapers can stop him, you cannot have read American newspapers. Democracy was first imposed in America by a foreign war on Americans and imposed in Europe by the French Revolution, and if you go to history you cannot maintain that the democracy gains nothing by war.

NORMAN ANGELL: Machiavelli's teaching is that if you want to prevent democratic movements from being successful you must go in for war.

Mr. CHESTERTON: Unless the whole American democracy rise and use the most violent methods of war the capitalistic control is as strong as ever. The reason why Rockefeller goes on is not because he does not know that a lot of his fellow creatures hate and detest him, he goes on because he can. In other words he is a type of the tyrant and against the tyrant there is no weapon but force. I want to explain a little bit what I said about wars being intended to impose or to defend a tradition or civilisation. I take it for granted that you are aware that some of them are just and unjust and it also follows that if they are just or unjust on one side they are on another. Can anyone with common morality flee the problem that if a war is unjust on one side it is just on the other. I want to explain that when I say defend or impose I take it for granted that we are talking about wars of the right and wrong. I should say it was in the main quite wrong to make a war to impose your civilisation, but right to make a war to defend it. The German Professor will say that Alsace was a German province, "lots of the people still talk German there and we feel sure that they must love us awfully." The French on the other hand say: "Alsace-Lorraine is a limb which those brigands cut off and I want it back again," and until you have

dealt with the question of the sense of right on both sides you cannot get any further unless you deny the sense of honour altogether. If a neighbour is intensely possessed with the notion that my wife is his a fight ensues. Can you say on the spur of the moment that you can prove to the German he is mad ; to the Frenchman he is mad. You will certainly not do it by telling them that either of them will lose money by war.

THE COLONIAL POINT OF VIEW

ADDRESS BY MR. JOHN ALLEN

Morning Session : July 26th

MR. J. E. RAPHAEL IN THE CHAIR.

MR. ALLEN : The first point I want to make is this: That in concentrating upon questions of economic profit and loss in relation to war you are not getting at the real issue which arises on this question. One particular illustration of it I will suggest at once. As I understand both from reading Norman Angell's "Great Illusion"—which I hasten to say that I have read for, I know someone will say later on that I have not—and still more from hearing himself and his lieutenants talk, I indeed see that you are concentrating upon the question of proving to nations that they will gain nothing by going to war, and that so far as questions of immediate disarmament are concerned and so far as questions of persuading nations to give up their nationality are concerned, you do not at the present time express any definite opinion. It seems to me, with respect, that a policy that does not help an ordinary citizen to choose a definite course of action upon questions which do concern this general principle is not a helpful one. You are saying nothing about the immediate questions of disarmament. You

are saying war is bad and foolish. I think the ordinary citizen is justified in saying that he will adopt a policy and a theory which will be helpful to him in deciding this question which he feels it his duty to decide and which he finds it very hard to decide. That sort of attitude appeals particularly strongly to anyone acquainted with British Dominions. There people have little leisure and decide questions of an abstract character purely upon their eventual merits. They like to have some question of principle but if there is a question of principle, then they want to be able to make an immediate application from that question of principle.

Another point arising out of that is that you seem to be attacking the wrong thing. I do not know the man who would dispute the proposition that there is nothing to be gained economically and materially by going to war. Perhaps Mr. Maxse or Mr. Hyndman might be suggested, but I do not know the man who counts and I certainly do not know a man in a British Dominion who holds that view, but in spite of that he considers almost daily the possibility that he and his country may go to war. He considers it because he believes in his Dominion and he believes in the Empire, and he is right at any time to support his belief in its reputation, in its honour, in its well-being: he is at all times ready to support this, not for a moment thinking of making economic profit, but convinced that it will mean an economic material and every other sort of loss to him except the loss of national honour.

Now let me come to the particular question of the British Dominions. There is in the British Dominions in varying degree—perhaps most strongly in Canada and Australia—the feeling that at all costs the colonial status has got to end, and that is the great pre-occupation of colonial politicians and colonial citizens in so far as they

think about this question at all. I may say that the people in the Dominions are not unlike people in England, or perhaps in any other country. If you were to pick out a million representative people in England and settle them down at the present time in New Zealand they would behave in the main precisely in the same way as New Zealand people do behave. As I say, the great pre-occupation at the present time is for people in the Dominions to assert their sense of nationality and they are doing it. They have determined to do it at any cost ; and what does that involve from the point of view of Norman-Angellism ? It involves that if you are going to make any progress in the dominions you have got to attack not the question of economic profit and loss as it concerns war, you have got to attack nationality.

Now I would endeavour in a moment to explain to you—this is rather a domestic question, but perhaps the gentlemen who do not live in the British Empire will excuse me—how it comes about that at the present time the British Dominions are concerned to assert their nationality. It is quite a recent development. Up till ten years ago it had not shown itself. It is inherent in any colonising nation that the colonies for a time must be protected by the mother country. They go out there without means of defence, and they are entirely occupied in defending themselves against nature, and in getting the better of nature, so that for a considerable time they cannot take any share in the cost of defence. But what does this involve ? It involves this. They are saved from the cost of defence, but they are deprived of the right of conducting a foreign policy and diplomacy. The attributes of a state are two : entire control of internal affairs—that the Dominions have got—but also entire control of external affairs and that the Dominions have not got, and want to have, and I think are going

to get. Well, how will they get it? Certainly not by perpetuating the haze of sentiment under which Imperial affairs have been conducted up to quite recent times. Sentiment has been the great enemy of any movement of this sort in a British Dominion. Not by colonial preference, because colonial preference was a scheme which would have benefited the colonial farmer, and in this matter what we are looking for is not benefit, but taking on responsibility and securing certain rights which this responsibility has always involved. There is only one way that experience has shown in which the dominions can assert their nationality, and that is by taking their share in the task of Imperial defence, by defending themselves. And peoples' minds in the dominions are extraordinarily concentrated upon questions of defence simply for that reason, and I believe if Mr. Norman Angell were to go to Canada or Australia to-morrow—as I wish he would—he would be listened to with the utmost respect, but people would say to him: “We have got to assert our nationality; we care about that more than anything, and we care about it up to fighting point. If you can tell us some means—less troublesome means—of doing it we shall be glad to attempt it. That is the only way we see of asserting our nationality.” They have got to assert it not only against foreign countries, but they have also got to defend themselves against their best friend—England itself. In this sense—that England is at the present moment undertaking the whole of the responsibility for the conduct of diplomacy in the Empire, and until the British Dominions are able to share in that, until then they will not have the full attributes of sovereignty. What have been the chief evils which have followed from their not having the full characteristics of a sovereign state? Very largely they have not been able to make sure of a diplomacy,

especially near them in the Pacific, and in the case of Canada in regard to the United States, they have not been able to make sure of a diplomacy which will always be in their interests. In the Pacific the whole history of the relation between England and the Empire is one of constant conflict upon the ground that the Dominions declined to accept the very niggardly efforts Britain made to assert herself in the Pacific. In the case of New Guinea the Prime Minister of Queensland actually went so far as to raise the British flag over the foreign part of that territory. It is only eighty miles from Australia. Next day the flag was pulled down by Britain herself. At the present time there is an island which lies between the Panama Canal and New Zealand, which will assume a very great importance when the Panama Canal is opened. New Zealand is anxious to get some hold in that island which belongs to England, but in which France has a temporary occupation. Recently, when a representative of the New Zealand Government was in England, he did his best to persuade the British Government to take some steps to assert their latent right in that island. He was told that owing to the present relations which followed the *entente cordiale* with France, it would be impossible to open any question of that sort. Naturally, there is considerable feeling in New Zealand that these questions should be decided on their merits rather than that they should hinge upon some alliance with a European power which New Zealand people never made, and from the effects of which they have to suffer. I should add that New Zealand people do not complain about this—they recognise it as being an inevitable part of their present relationship—their point is that they want that relationship to change. I will refer to a passage in the “Great Illusion” partly to show I have read it, but also because it shows that the writer is not

quite in touch with the attitude of the Dominions towards defence. He says "No foreign nation could gain any advantage by the conquest of the British colonies. Great Britain could not suffer material damage by their loss. Economically, England would gain by being relieved of the cost of their defence." She is going to be relieved of the cost of their defence. When one is dealing with an entirely different atmosphere, it is necessary perhaps rather to overload the point one has got to make, but I hope so far as I have gone I have been clear. I won't say anything about the feeling in Australia and New Zealand, and in Canada about Asiatic immigration, but I just want to say that supposing Mr. Norman Angell were in Australia and speaking there, people would say, "Now, Mr. Angell, does your philosophy stop at a yellow skin because our policy here is to exclude Japanese and Chinese, and we know perfectly well that they do not like it, especially the Japanese, who are rapidly developing a European sense of honour, but we are determined to maintain our integrity, and to do that we have to defend ourselves, and however much progress your doctrines may make in Europe, what guarantee have you got that they are going to make actual progress in Eastern nations. In the meantime we consider it necessary to go on with our protection against this danger which we regard as a possibility. We have to make sure that the type of civilisation we cherish can be and will be maintained."

I will leave that part of what I am going to say there, and I hope you will accept a conclusion with which I clench it, and that is that in the Dominions the growing sense of nationality prevents the acceptance of the doctrines of Norman-Angellism, because the Dominions are chiefly concerned with those national units which threaten his doctrines. But now I turn to what is more

controversial ground, and upon which I know you hold extremely strong views, which I am sure you will not hesitate to express. I come to ask this abstract question: "What do people go to war for?" And I answer it from my own point of view, from a Dominion point of view. I think the answer I give would be the answer that a man in Wellington or Ottawa would give. He would say that we do not go to war because we think it is necessary to keep up the virility of the race, or because we think the force of the Old Adam is so strong in us that it is inevitable that he should want to fight, we don't in most cases go to war because we think there is any economic profit to be got from it, we go to war because there are certain things we treasure more than economic effort, more than economic wellbeing—if we go to war, we go to war in spite of the threatened loss of economic profit.

Let me give you an illustration. I will take the illustration least favourable to myself to start with. Take the case of an industrial strike—about eleven months ago in New Zealand there was a large transport strike which paralysed all industry, which involved enormous loss to everybody—well, the origin of that was the most trivial thing in the world. A large steamship company had got a slip in one part of the town, and the workmen who worked for that company had built their homes round this particular slip, and because the rent of this piece of land became too high because that part of the town became thickly settled, it became necessary to shift the slip about one and half miles from the old slip, so that the workmen had to go into trams and buses to reach the new place. The company did not provide any tram or bus for their workpeople, but the regulation existed that men had to be at their work at eight o'clock. That was the origin of the strike which paralysed the greater part of

the industry of New Zealand for a period of something like six weeks. Before it had gone on very long everybody had forgotten the cause. On the one hand, the employers thought that labour was making unreasonable demands, and on the other labour thought that property was asking an unreasonable right, and purely upon these passionate grounds that contest was waged with immense loss to both sides. Neither party had any gain, and neither party thought they would get any gain. National wars have some such trivial cause. Take the Russo-Japanese war. What was the bone of contention there? It was the desire on the part of Japan and of Russia to have Port Arthur and Korea, but neither thought that would bring them any economic gain whatever, nor has it brought any economic gain. What Japan fought for was the sense that Japan has got to be a nation, and they were prepared to make all the sacrifices they did make for an intangible ideal into which economic profit and physical comfort did not enter. I have a list of likely causes of war which may happen at any time, and another list of causes which are still more likely to happen when that inter-penetration of interest has occurred still more. So long as the people of the world are organised in this way (organised for defence) disputes are certain to arise between them about territory, about the treatment of their subjects and their property, about openings for trade, investment, about policies which affect the nation as a whole. As the world becomes smaller and more interdependent, occasions of dispute will arise from quarrels about unfair preference in railways or cheaper routes, about the inadequate preparations against disease, about the immigration of undesirable coloured races, about the application of labour restrictions to foreign vessels, about legislative or administrative action affecting the value of foreign investments—which I am sure appeals

to all good Angellists—and about justice withheld from individuals. In some of the cases economic gain does enter, in others it enters but to a small extent, but in most economic gain is a secondary consideration. If it were inside one individual country it would be different. If my neighbour makes an unreasonable demand upon me, if he claims a piece of my land which really belongs to him, I county court him, and the county court has a means of bringing him and me before it, and of giving a decree according to a definite code, and of enforcing the conclusion to which it comes. If you had something of that sort in international relationship, you would have some chance of securing international peace, but you have no authority which can bring the disputants before it, which can give an opinion according to some definitely arrived at code of justice, or which can enforce the conclusion to which it comes. It can be got only by abolishing the present national boundaries which are such a strong influence over the people who live in nations. We do think—we who live in British Dominions—that all that Mr. Angell has said is true and good. Much of it is possible of immediate realisation within a certain area—that area is the British Empire. We are in the fortunate position of being able to unite our interests with our ideals; it is our interest to obtain security for our people; it is our ideal to see that the interests of peace may be spread and finally achieved through the factor for peace which the British Empire may in the future be made to be.

Mr. BRACHER: One thing that Mr. Allen said I believe we shall all very heartily agree with, and that is the desire that Mr. Norman Angell should visit Australia and New Zealand, and the other colonies. Mr. Allen has incidentally shown us what a very great need for Norman-Angellism there is in New Zealand and elsewhere. We

may take Mr. Allen's indication of colonial sentiment as very accurate. My impression from my experience in New Zealand would be that the desire for a separate national system of defence is not quite so universal in New Zealand as Mr. Allen suggests it is, but it is on the increase, and it is a great factor which we as Norman-Angellists must keep in mind. As to this question of lower interests and attributes of sovereignty, and that sort of thing, my own feeling has been that the nation that has no foreign policy is very much happier than a nation which has a foreign policy. Entire control over internal affairs—every colony has that—but as to entire control over foreign policy, the nations of Europe have not got that much more than New Zealand. France introduced her three years' law ; she did that to satisfy Russia ; she proposed to repeal that law, and the Russian Press gave her a strong hint she must not do so. Did not our *Times* the other day print an article about Europe's burden of force, in which it was made clear that we in this country have to build dreadnoughts and form army corps because other countries do the same. Should Germany decide to build more dreadnoughts, she decides also that England shall build more dreadnoughts. If New Zealand is out to get these attributes of sovereignty, she will find they will crumble to ashes in her hands.

Mr. Allen explained that the only way of asserting nationality is by defending one's country, by forming an army and navy of your own. There again I differ. Suppose New Zealand does form a real good big army and navy, what will there be in that army and navy which will be specially characteristic of New Zealand ? Dreadnoughts are alike all over the world, and there is nothing distinctive of New Zealand or of England or Germany in dreadnoughts or submarines. New Zealand has adopted the German principle of the army—the German

ideal of conscription has already invaded New Zealand and New Zealand is to that extent de-nationalised already. If a great part of the energy which Mr. Allen desires New Zealand to throw into this cosmopolitan institution were thrown into their industries and their arts, then we shall get something national. New Zealand butter is far more national than New Zealand men in dreadnoughts, and subject to discipline which is pretty much the same in all dreadnoughts. Your New Zealander on his farm, in his shanty, in his study, is different from your German in his farm, shanty and study. So he develops his individuality, coloured as it must be by the individuality of his nation.

I think when Mr. Angell goes to New Zealand he will make this point I am making, and also the point that Norman-Angellism so far from discouraging the growth of nationality, is the philosophical soil, the material condition, in which nationality can rise to its highest possible development.

As for economic individuality, there is no reason why New Zealanders should object any more strongly to Chinamen growing their cabbages for them in New Zealand than they do to other Chinamen growing their tea for them in China ; nor is there any reason why they should like to sell their wool to Japanese in Japan, and object to selling their wool to Japanese in New Zealand, and if anybody will get into his mind quite clearly the principles of Free Trade, which one may say here are bound up with the principles of Norman-Angellism, or at least consistent with them, the economic scare will vanish from the mind of that person like mist on a summer morning.

As to the overwhelming of our white civilisation, I believe that is actually an illusion. The Japanese and coloured people do not come to our colonies now after

the ancient primitive methods of the barbaric swarm. They do not come as armed hordes overrunning the country, massacring the inhabitants and driving them out. They come to get a job, and they can only come in such numbers as there are jobs for them, and they can only stay in the country as long as they make themselves useful to the people already there. They will come and stay so long as it is of mutual advantage to both, and if it does modify a little the racial characteristics, what harm is there in this? Is not the English nation a mixture of other races? No one objects to the mixture of the Maori, and in the New Zealand parliament you have Maori members, elected by Maoris, on the same footing as the white members, and in my time the four Maori members were four of the most eloquent and able members of the House. The only reason why the colour line assumes such a tremendous size in the New Zealand mind is because the Japanese are many and the New Zealanders are few. If the economic arguments were properly weighed and considered by our New Zealand friends, they would not make the Japanese colour line any heavier than the native Maori colour line.

Mr. Allen mentioned the great strike in New Zealand, and he made out that this strike had little or nothing to do with economic matters, but was entirely a passionate strike. That seems to me to be almost a contradiction in words. Do men chuck up their work in huge numbers in a fit of passion? It illustrates the want of clear thinking on the part of the people who deny economic motives in war. If a labour strike can be described by an intelligent man like Mr. Allen as not an economic thing we cannot be surprised by the wildest and most extreme statements of our friend Mr. Chesterton.

NORMAN ANGELL: What is the essence of the difference between Mr. Allen and ourselves in asking this

question? He says that armaments are needed for maintaining the point of view of a given nationality. Here the other day the Prime Minister of South Africa sent a dozen Englishmen home, telling the British Government to go to the devil. If that had been done by a foreign power we should talk about a *casus belli*, but because it was done by one of our colonies England is no longer in a position to defend its point of honour. There is arising in the case of Natal and Australia an exactly similar position. When you have got your empire you give up your power of going to war to enforce your honour and these nations are more able freely to develop than the nations who retain their right of war. England does not accept the point of view of the five nations, but it agrees to differ and because it agrees to differ and withdraws the right of force, the differences between the two points of view can be settled finally by reason instead of by force. In this great congerie of nations which we call the British Empire, in which we do not go to war when a point of honour is raised, you get the spirit of development which the other nations which retain the right of warfare do not have.

Mr. GRAHAM: In regard to our main proposition that two nations would gain nothing by war, I should like to point out that we say that war is futile for the things for which it is fought. It seems to me that the very fact of the over-emphasis of the economic side of our argument by the world at large shows that that side is extremely novel and disposes of his main point that wars are not fought for economic ends. People have the idea that nations can gain by wars and they are being greatly disillusioned. Mr. Allen said these peoples must assert their nationality. What does he mean by asserting national honour? What about this island in the Pacific? Well, you have there a case of extremely

mixed motives. The reason why New Zealand wants England to control this island in the Pacific is merely economic. It can hardly be a point of honour.

Mr. ANGELL : Mr. Allen's whole point is that war arises not from points of material advantage, but from points of honour.

Mr. ALLEN : I said that some material situations do arise, but in this particular case I should say the motive is that the integrity of the Empire should be maintained, and there is no actual material profit.

Mr. GRAHAM : The chief point about this island was that it was between the Panama Canal and New Zealand. We will progress to another point. What about the attack of foreign countries on these colonies. Mr. Allen admitted that they would gain nothing by it economically. Why do they want to attack them ? We are always told that it would be economic gain, and that, I believe, is the illusion under which the people labour who do wish to attack England's colonies.

He gave us a very illuminating phrase about Japan rapidly developing a European sense of honour. That European sense of honour is a very interesting thing. As an excuse for a fight by which people think something is to be gained, it is quite unrivalled. The Japanese are developing this sense of honour along with the illusory belief that they can gain something by war. At the bottom is the belief that economic advantage can be gained and at the top is a sort of veneer—this national sense of honour. We do not in the least ignore the fact of nationality ; what we say is that a nationality which goes to work in the way that Mr. Allen has indicated is under illusions. We do not think that force is a weapon which nationalities can use to attain the ends for which they set out—whatever those ends may be.

In the concluding passage of Mr. Allen's speech he talked about the Empire as something to which we should look for the peace of the world. The Empire is the model of what we wish the world to be. In each of these states which we call the Empire there is a feeling of nationality quite apart from the British Empire. That Mr. Allen would admit. You can see it especially in Canada, and yet there is no conflict. It strikes me there is no reason why a better understanding of our relations with foreign states should not bring that about all over the world, with the British Empire as a model.

Dr. MEZ : The general view of the speaker is a view very important for our movement because the general principles, upon which his view is based are very common in Germany, for instance. At the bottom, the speaker's opinion is that our propaganda is mistaken because nations do not fight for economic gains. But as a matter of fact he came in with several points and showed there was an economic advantage behind the case, or the fear of economic loss, if the strength of the nation would not be maintained. In the matter of the strike the workmen struck because they thought it would be an economic loss if they did not. It is the same case with nations and it is this strike which shows how right Norman Angell is.

Dr. NASMYTH : Mr. Allen's chief difference with us, I think, is that he considers that nationalism has, or can have at times, no relation whatever to national welfare. It is the intuitive view of nationalism as against the reasoned view. When we get down to the roots of nationalism we find it is a very important survival factor ; we know we must stand together as a nation because the nation can give us security, can give a citizen a chance to bring up his children in some comfort and

give them opportunities in life and a chance to enjoy some of the higher fruits of civilisation, and in so far as you get these elements of national welfare bearing upon a body of citizens within the nation you get that nation patriotic. In the case of the Socialist you get them not believing in the principle of nationalism. If you think over the examples he has given—Japan and Korea—there was a very distinct conviction on the part of a heap of the Japanese that the holding of Port Arthur and of Korea meant in some way the increase of the national welfare to Japan and, on the other hand, if Russia should get hold of Korea and Port Arthur, it would affect very seriously the national welfare of Japan. You cannot separate, if you are a rationalist, the sentiment of nationalism from the facts of national welfare and these facts are not only economic facts of money and things like that, but the great facts of opportunity for education and the other benefits of civilisation. Mr. Allen's address has suggested constructive lines upon which we can proceed. The first speaker made the point that the nation was happiest that had no foreign policy. That is because the foreign policy of most nations at the present time is based upon illusions. What we want is a foreign policy based upon Norman-Angellism. Can a speaker point out to me any reasons why these relations which now exist between the different parts of the British Empire where force has been abandoned—why these relations should not exist between the British Empire and the United States and if these relations have not gone in that direction? We have been through a fight in the United States over repealing the Panama Tolls, which were against the view of the people. It is an illustration to me of the most powerful sanction of international justice which Mr. Angell is looking for, namely, of public opinion. You get a country like the United States feeling

that the repeal of this Act is against their economic advantage, but nevertheless repealing it because England has not applied force. Why, then, can these relations exist between places so different as Dutch-speaking South Africa and the Colonies and other parts where I believe the materialism of force is going to be replaced by the materialism of reason—in India and Egypt—why cannot relations which now work between nations in the British Empire not be applied also to the United States, France and Germany? Where are the essential differences? Is it conflicts of trade, economic advantages, race, civilisation? But you have between the British Empire itself conflicts of the same nature and sometimes much more severe. Mr. Allen has maintained they are not all economic, although vitally connected with national welfare. The “Great Illusion” is a study of the relations of military power to national welfare. I believe that reconstructive work is to go on from our destructive criticism, with which Mr. Angell has begun and to outline a constructive programme for dealing with these questions on the basis of the abandonment of physical force. In the United States for over ten years the Pacifists have been saying that the Monroe doctrine in its distorted form is wrong—that those nations of South America ought to be considered as grown up children, that they ought to be taken into partnership. Then comes a crisis like the Mexican affair. We have begun a constructive policy; nobody else has had suggestions to offer and we have had to make an extension of the Monroe doctrine to include Chile, on its way. If we can have a constructive policy on the futility of physical force and test every policy by that touchstone it means that we have prepared the way when this crisis arises for a solution on rational lines.

Mr. HAYCOCK: We hear a great deal more to-day about national honour than we heard three years ago. Mr. Allen evidently imagines that national honour has been the pivot upon which militarists have held all their arguments, and I assure him it is not so. Take this question: What do people go to war for? We all know this, that until Mr. Norman Angell's book appeared every person who wrote on this subject or spoke upon it from Mahan to Rifleman reasoned that aggression bettered the condition of the people who were promoting aggression. If you have a particular love for fighting when you find out that the ground is taken from under your feet one way you try to get something to take the place of it in another. National honour—what does it mean? How can a nation act honestly or dishonestly? A Lancashire man may insult a Yorkshire man, but how can Lancashire insult Yorkshire? How can one nation insult another nation? Supposing Switzerland insults England, what are we going to do about it? Are we going to march across independent countries—we cannot get our Dreadnoughts over the Alps. That does not prevent the Swiss people being decent to our people. They are decent because they want our trade. Now we come to nationality. What is the greatest foe of nationality to-day, internal or external? Dreadnoughts and this military debauchery. Russian nationality is crushed to the dust by militarism. Supposing Canada goes in for a navy. Is England going to be spared anything as far as the cost of defence is concerned? I say "No." Why? What will be the effect in Germany? The Germans will say England is very strong indeed—we are in danger now. The colonies are now joining in this merry game. We have to double our expenditure upon armaments, and as Germany has a larger population than the whole of the British Empire

that is British, they can play the same sort of game and the result is that we shall go on arming without finality, except a catastrophe occurs the extent of which no one can foretell. The best thing Canada can do for the British Empire or the world Empire is not to be drawn into the vortex of European militarism. Canada and the United States have set the best example to the world. They have shown how two people can live side by side and enjoy one hundred years of peace. That is the best service Canada can do for the world.

Mr. BLOYE : I think the most provocative paper we have had has served an extremely useful purpose. I should have hardly thought at the close of this ten days' discussion we could have turned to our problem and found completely new interest, especially as to the light it threw upon the problem of the federation of nations in the future. I rather judge that the lecturer himself leans towards the federal solution. On the point of federalism I put a question : The Dominions were to assert their nationality, their right to complete sovereignty by an army and navy. When that has been accomplished, when they have asserted externally their sovereign rights, the lecturer tells us that the Dominions will come into the Empire on equal terms. When that operation is complete and when they have entered the British Empire, will they any longer have nationality ? Will they not by handing over their nationality losing it—because they have lost direct control of the very means of defence which they called into existence. Would the lecturer tell us, if armaments are the means of asserting nationality, which nationality the Austro-Hungarian army asserts and how does Canada assert her nationality as against her sovereign neighbour ?

Mr. ALLEN : I won't keep you very long, and I won't reply categorically to every point. I shall think over

them in solitude, and they will be constantly with me in my reading. I have done my best to state my point of view, and I am glad to see you do understand what it is. I understand your point of view. I am not convinced by it, but I am extraordinarily interested in it. The questions which Mr. Bloye asked me were of particular interest, and the first one in particular. Will the Dominions not sacrifice nationality when they come into federation is a question which has been very closely thought out in the minds of people in the Dominions. That fear has prevented federation in the past. The old idea of the federationists in the eighties was that it would be possible to secure the federation of the Empire by giving the Dominions representation in the Imperial Parliament. That meant, of course, the Dominions being so very much smaller in population, they would be federally outvoted on all Imperial things which counted. It is because they feel they will be able to work some sort of equal representation in the Upper House, so that nothing could pass without their support, that makes them feel that it will be possible for them in the future to consider federation upon actual terms. Now how does Canada assert her nationality against the United States of America? The answer to that is simple. At the present time through Britain. That has been a historical experience. Britain has not been willing to carry out Canadian interests as far as Canadian interests ought to have been carried out in the interests of Canadians. My point is that diplomatic relations are left to England because England has the force to carry out these relations. I come to Mr. Haycock's interesting speech. He asked this question: How can one nation insult another? I want to say that I think insult is a poor word. It certainly does not convey what I wish to convey. What I mean is this: that there are certain aspirations, or

ambitions, or interests, or whatever you like to call it, which people hold at present, and so far as we can see will continue to hold, and, also at present, these interests are jeopardised by people who hold contrary interests, and my whole point is that people in the Dominions or anywhere else will go to war at whatever sacrifice rather than give up these ambitions, or interests, or national hopes, or whatever you like to call them, and it is no use showing them there is going to be economic loss. This is my whole point: Why do you concentrate upon this point of economic loss which is already admitted? Why don't you say that what you have to give up is these ambitions and aspirations which you are determined to hold? I do not say whether they are right or wrong, but I do say that they are held most strongly by the great majority of our fellow countrymen. These people by tradition and by feeling, and by their reasoning, are ready to make the sacrifice, and you are not setting out to prove that they are wrong, you are setting out to prove they are economically foolish, which they already admit. For my own part, I should be quite ready to support the Norman Angell propaganda as far as it says that war is economically unsound. It is a very fascinating thing. But it does not affect the issue, and until you go to attack the real point, we shall be in the same position one hundred years hence. You do not hold this opinion, but how many people have had your advantages of thinking about these things. Mr. Angell said: Why should not the same relation exist between the foreign countries as exists between the Dominions and the Empire." And other people, I think, repeated it. I should say the reason is simple. For precisely the same reason that the relations between two Englishmen are different from the relations of an Englishman and a German. My general answer to Mr. Norman Angell is

that you get an extraordinarily strong feeling of fellow-citizenship within an Empire, which you have not got between the citizens of the different countries. This question can only be solved by arranging a common Parliament representing every part of the Empire on questions of external relations. Thus there will be an assertion of individual nationalities, and also the loyalty of the Empire as a whole.

STOCKTAKING

The Common Room : Sunday Evening, July 26th

Mr. ANGELL : To-night we will have half-an-hour's stocktaking. If we hold a Summer School again next year, how shall we do it better ? Has no one got any tips ?

Mr. COLLINSON : If we have 3-hour classes again I think we should have an interval in the middle so that we could have a few minutes' rest. Some of us feel that three hours intellectual work to which we are not accustomed gets a little tiring.

Mr. HAYCOCK : I would suggest a 9 o'clock breakfast. We have all been sleepy and tired in the mornings. We should also get our night meeting over earlier. It is the most natural thing in the world to discuss the various topics, after the night meeting, well into the night.

NORMAN ANGELL : How would this do ? A later supper at 8.30, and the afternoon meeting starting at 6.30, and after that nothing ?

Dr. MEZ : I think that next time a number of important points, such as the indemnity question, might be put on the programme. I would suggest that you have different days and have sequences of classes. For instance, the journal question was not very interesting for all of

us, and we might have classes which one could or could not attend to provide for this.

Dr. NASMYTH : I would like to suggest that we have points on the programme, instead of having titles like "Norman Alchemism," so that we get some idea as to what the discussion should be about. There should also be time devoted to the constructive side of our work. Things like the possible causes of war and preventive measures should be discussed. Pretty soon we will be asked what is your suggestion as to the Norman Angell foreign policy. A great work has yet to be done on the point of race prejudice. If a certain day were known to be devoted to that, every man might read beforehand and be ready, not only with the knowledge of the destructive criticism that has been done, but also with a knowledge of constructive measures. We must have a conference in regard to constructive movements afterwards. There are two or three great world movements which definitely go back to conferences as their beginning. It has been a necessary part of great peace movements in America, and I know that, in two or three years from now, we will be looking back to Old Jordan's Conference as a place where new forces were started, and if the next course is organised with that idea we can get the beginnings of the constructive work planned in the conference itself.

Mr. BRACHER : We are all agreed about the destructive work, but when we begin to plan constructive work we shall all begin to differ. It is an awfully fine thing to have us all together and differing about things which are not part of our policy, but we must also agree on our policy when constructive efforts come to be a part of it.

NORMAN ANGELL : I think what Dr. Nasmyth has in his mind is that in a conference of this kind there may be, as a result of it, two or three of us who may do individual

work. And within this conference, for instance, we see that there is work to be done on the indemnity question. A popular pamphlet on the war indemnity question, really finally polishing off this question, would be a very valuable thing to do.

DR. NASMYTH: Chesterton's solution of the Alsace-Lorraine problem is simply eternal war. We might discuss what other solutions there are and we might come to the conclusion that certain plans are possible.

NORMAN ANGELL: Everybody in Europe knows what the solution of the Alsace-Lorraine problem will be. Every educated Frenchman knows he will not be able to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine; every informed German knows perfectly well that the constitution of Alsace-Lorraine is going to be expanded into an autonomy. On that subject, as a matter of fact, Mr. Chesterton was particularly behind the times. Here was Chesterton last night. I suppose we all get what the French call "stair-case wit." After it was all over, I thought I saw pretty clearly the point which was the real crux of Chesterton's contention. It was this—here you have your two parties—either your Sultan annexing the Brighton Girls' School, or your Prussian annexing Alsace-Lorraine—both convinced that they are right; each party determined to defend himself and so forth. You have there an irreconcilable conflict. What are you going to do about it?

We should have said: "You assume that neither can possibly shift their point of view. That their opinion and position is fixed eternally in the nature of things. It is not. We can alter their opinion. And that is the solution we are going for." Then he would have said: "You cannot alter their opinions because both are animated by a notion of honour, morality, religion, what you will; that is unalterable, that exists, is a fact."

Then we come to what is an integral part of our thesis—that morality alters and is modified with the growing realisation of the real method of living together in the world. Now if it is true that that method does not involve conflict in the material sense, still less does it involve conflict in the moral sense, because while in the material matter of a piece of property you cannot both have it—if it is a moral thing you can both have it. If one takes the property, the other has not got it; but if your idea is right and his wrong, and he sees that you are right and takes your idea, you have still got it. We say that, if there is this conflict, it is because they have not fitted their morals yet to what is the best economic arrangement; that is to say, the best arrangement for living together in the world, so that we can exploit the world together. We attempt to show that mal-adjustment by showing how the development of the world has outgrown this conception of nations as rival units. There is a phase which has to be worked out. This is a notion of interdependence, a system based on interdependence applied to morals. The moral Norman-Angellism, if you will.

Chesterton put it this way: "Of course," he said, "if you think a man who will be paid £5 to accept a thrashing in the street is a *man*, I cannot argue with you." He is right there. Why do we revolt at the man who will accept an indignity? In terms of economics, I think I see it. In the little sketch in the introduction of "Polity" I attempt to show why the method of slavery, by which one merely imposes his will on the other, and there is no real partnership, is economically defective. Among the realities of life are things such as bread and so on; but the emotions also are facts to be dealt with in terms of economics.

The science of wealth-economics is the right use of the material things of the world. The science of moral-economics is the right use of emotions.

When one man imposes his will by brute force upon another, that other is a slave, and at that our instinctive perception revolts. He is not realising that partnership in which we believe. If you are really partners with a man, necessarily you do not enslave him. You give him an equal right with yourself. If you impose your will upon him, you are not making the most profitable use of the fine emotions. You are killing the finer emotions by friction. The link between two persons which exists by virtue of association—partnership, mutual respect, affection, what you will—that relationship, which might give rise to so fruitful an exchange of feeling, is destroyed.

There are three states, I think—that of the master, the slave and the partner. You get philosophers like Nietzsche and the Prussians, who are the exponents of the master philosophy. You get others, the Tolstoys and the Quakers, who are the exponents of the submissive philosophy. We are the exponents of the partnership philosophy. We arrive at that partnership, not by accepting the position of the slave, but by refusing to accept the position of the master.

Shaw saw this, but did not see it in terms of economics. When accused of being a humanitarian over something or other, he was very indignant and said: "I am not a humanitarian, I am an economist." In another book of his you will find that: "We shall always be in danger of slavery so long as Britons sing 'Britons never shall be slaves'—we shall cease to be in danger when Britons sing 'Britons never shall be masters.'" I believe that, if you were to work that out, you could show Mr. Chesterton that underlying this philosophy of material

interdependence you have a philosophy of moral interdependence, of partnership, which is infinitely better than his philosophy of mastership or of slavery.

If you start by accepting the emotions as real things, as part of the utilities, you must have an economics of the emotions. If you are to cultivate human society for the best, you have got to work out the economics of the emotions, just as we have worked out the economics of the nations. Somewhere along these lines we are going to reply to Mr. Chesterton as to our philosophy being so damnably sordid. You may be sure that when we get an intuition, as that we do not like the man who accepts an indignity, that there is some biological or economic explanation. A year ago, I would have said a biological explanation in terms of survival factors ; to-day I should prefer to say an explanation in terms of the economics of the emotions.

Dennis Robertson also had it, I think, when he talked of transmuting energy, what he called Norman Alchemism : there he was stating a case for the better use of the emotions—he was also treating of the emotional utilities in economic terms. I think that in the minds of all of us, at this moment, there is a glimpse there of a new department of Norman-Angellism.

That brings me to the analysis of another intuition. When any of you say : “ We are Norman-Angellists,” I get a little shiver. I have tried to analyse that intuition, and I came to this conclusion :—There is no such thing as personal leadership in the domain of ideas. Personal leadership involves personal loyalty on the part of those who follow ; personal loyalty in the domain of ideas is disloyalty to truth. There is only one loyalty in the domain of pure ideas, and that is loyalty to truth. If, however, we were coming to the domain of action—if it were a policy to be executed,

an act to be done, something to be carried out in the field of decision ; I should not feel a shiver if you happened to invest me with the guidance and leadership in that. I do not suppose you ever will, but if you did, I do not think I should feel a shiver, because I should expect it. In the domain of action, you will find me a most autocratic person, but in the domain of ideas do not talk about leadership or Norman-Angellist. If you are not your own leaders in the domain of ideas you are not going to do good work for this cause. I hope the distinction is clear.

Mr. HAYCOCK : Our propaganda is in the domain of action—as propagandists we are Norman-Angellists.

NORMAN ANGELL : Yes ; but I do not think you would want to talk about it if it were the domain of action—you would go and do it. I hope I am not chilling anybody. I do want to say, on this last day of the school, that the sense of comradeship that you fellows have given me I shall value as long as I live ; and that sense of comradeship I shall value very much more highly than the sense or responsibility of leadership, if ever you give that to me. Again there, in the domain of ideas, there is the philosophy of partnership. I do hope someone will work out and be on the lookout for the development of this notion of moral, as opposed to material, Norman-Angellism—in other words, the economics of the emotions, because it is along these lines we shall show cohesion in the whole thing. I may say that it was a particularly happy experience to me the other night, when Mr. J. M. Robertson put his case as to whether the analytical and rational treatment, that we had attempted to give the case, had diminished in any way the feeling about it. I was the more pleased because Robertson himself was a little puzzled at the character of your replies. Robertson

is a frightfully busy man and never happens to have read "The Great Illusion" in full. He read "Europe's Optical Illusion," which was, broadly, a political pamphlet written at a time of panic, for quite definite reasons, in which every consideration except the purely financial and commercial one was excluded, and there was in his mind clearly this distinction between the economic and the moral case. He did not conceive the two as one at all, and when he saw us fellows conceiving it as one he was surprised. It gives me again more pleasure than you can know that you fellows were able to get the undercurrent of what I have written and implied, but not bluntly expressed. If in all our work we can suggest instead of express these things, perhaps, in dealing with our particular age, it will, I think, have a bigger effect.

Mr. HAYCOCK: In regard to constructive policy, we do need pegs upon which to hang our particular ideas. The average man wants something to do. We have not discussed that. We have listened to people debating the right to capture private property at sea, but we do no debating as to whether we should take that on. Nine men will give their time to constructive policy, against one who will tear away at the illusion.

NORMAN ANGELL: We put our emphasis upon the dissemination of ideas, and wherever you see that it is necessary to hang them on the pegs of definite proposal, have this definite proposal ready. I think we have tried from time to time to get a drift towards a definite policy. I agree it is necessary. I would rather put forward definite and simple things like reconciliation between two existing European groups—to go for a European Unity for the first step. There are several forces now at work, including Germany. The French have a phrase for it:

"Reconciliation between the *entente* and the alliance." That will make a step towards European unity; no secret diplomacy, no military alliance with France, and other points, perhaps including capture, but I am not sure.

One other point of detail—this part of O'Farrell's case that the more horrible you make war the less people are likely to go into it. I used rather to take stock in that until we went through the Boer War, and then, as a matter of fact, you see that the thing is not a workable policy, because when people see red they are not affected by war's horrors. They know nothing about them. They wipe a sponge over the whole thing, and after the war is over they only remember its glory. Whereas, by limiting the theatre of war, you drive towards a condition of making war ridiculous. I believe that will happen when you get an Anglo-German war; there will be a naval parade in the North Sea, a lot of property destroyed, but everything will go as before, and it will come upon everybody that this thing is ridiculous.

Mr. FAYLE : Mr. Haycock was asking for a constructive programme, because the man in the street liked to have a practical peg to hang the doctrines on. One of the best pegs is the direct application of the particular international question which happens to have cropped up at the particular moment. If we get together and keep clearly in the minds of those working the particular practical application of our case to, say, the pan-Slavic situation in Austria, this might be a good thing.

Dr. MEZ : A German asked me, Why does not Norman Angell make any provision for the Hague Conference? Why does he not make any references to the cruelty of war, and how does he deal with the problem of national hatreds and so on? I want to suggest to you some lines



*There's but the twinkling of a star
Betwixt a man of peace and war,
Hudibras.*



*He smiled as he sat by the table
With a smile that was childlike and bland,
The Heathen Chinese.*

of thought; the armaments question does not particularly belong to our point, but how shall we deal with practical politics? The Social Democrats take it very strongly that Krupp should be taken over by the Government. The militia is another question and the compulsory system.

NORMAN ANGELL: We made this point the other day. We are in favour of it when it leads away from a worse thing. We support national service in Belgium which leads away from conscription.

Mr. COLLINSON: Might it not be possible to classify a few of the most important questions and give model answers.

NORMAN ANGELL: Yes, I think it might.

Dr. NASMYTH: Another question the public is going to settle is how much of Norman Angell it is going to take up. The matter of the economics of morality is a step in that direction. Publishing "The Great Illusion" with the second part first, is another step. Possibly the great contribution you have to make is the economic case and the moral case is simply a corollary of that, and that is where the great clash comes in between our theory and the accepted theory of the world.

Mr. BRACHER: In the preface to the Grammar you say that from every kind of audience, from Universities down to Brotherhoods, you have got the same question. That seems to indicate that all through society people have much the same kind of mind, and my complaint is that there is in this movement too much of a tendency to differentiate between the intellectuals and others.

NORMAN ANGELL: The difference is only this. All those who do the pioneer work have got to know the way very much better than those who follow.

Mr. COCKS moved a vote of thanks to Mr. Hilton and Mr. Langdon Davies for their energy and kindness during the Conference, and to the Garton Foundation for the hospitality shown to the guests during their stay.

THE CARE OF A CONFERENCE

(Dedicated to John Hilton and B. N. Langdon-Davies.)

IF you want to run a Conference and make it a success
(As you'll all agree the present one has been),

It's a case of "sweated labour" from the opening address
Till the final guest has vanished from the scene.
For an Organiser's duty is to be upon the spot
From the rising of the sun till 2 a.m. ;
And if his flock should scatter, he will find it is his lot
To be everywhere at once along with them.

You must supervise the menus ; you must choose the
rooms with care,
So that everyone will think he has the best ;
You must talk to every stranger with a confidential air
Which distinguishes him clearly from the rest.

There are papers and discussions which must constantly
receive
Special care, lest they should grow too hot and strong ;
There is talent to discover for the social hour at eve
When you call on Mr. Someone for a song ;
There's a programme to be kept to ; there's the Chairman
to support ;
There's the waiting to be properly inspired ;
And the speeches grow too lengthy, and the tempers grow too
short ;
And you find yourself abominably tired.

But you have to make arrangements for the luggage and
the trains,
And you have to see that parties do not fight :
In the morning you're a porter, with a modicum of brains,
But you have to be a diplomat at night.

Yet there's something rather cheering to the philosophic mind

In the measure of agreement that we reach,
Setting out from different bases, with the one intent to find
What the facts, and not our theories, may teach.

For the Garton open platform has a magical effect,
And at luncheon, o'er the chicken and the ham,
Both the National Service Leaguer and the Pacifist elect
Grow as chummy as the lion and the lamb !

You must rule them like a despot, with his sceptre hid
from sight ;

You must guide and cheer and counsel and control ;
You will work like any nigger, you will lie awake at
night ;

But—you'll find it has been worth it on the whole.

MACFLECKNOE.

I N D E X

I N D E X

A

	PAGE
Acceleration—	
Rapid changes taking place	66
Aggression. <i>See also</i> "Defence"—	
Who is the aggressor in Ireland?	18
Futile	63
What is the motive for	79
And non-resistance	241
Alabama case	214
Alchemism. <i>See</i> "Norman-Alchemism."	
Allen, John—	
The Colonial point of view	367
Reply to discussion	383
Alliance, Triple—	
Reconciliation with Entente	43, 44
Alsace-Lorraine	340, 358, 362
America—	
And the Yellow Peril	119-129
Fit to carry on a war of defence	128
The greatest Peace Society	210
Angellism in the Universities	270
American Civil War. <i>See</i> "Civil War."	
American War of Revolution	86
Angell, Norman—	
Summer School Procedure	1, 76, 117, 223
We must not disparage old Pacifists	5
We explain, they do not	6
No profit from power	7
"War pays the other nation"	8
Crimea, Boer, and Civil Wars	9
Criticisms of Fulton's paper	29
We need not convert everybody	40, 41, 42
Russia restrained by economic forces	42, 43, 44
Introduces Mr. Hannan	47
Grasp the crux of the argument	56
How to deal with Mr. Hannan	58, 65, 69
We may favour armaments	60
"Followers of Norman Angell"	78
Why not a peace society?	79

Angell, Norman— <i>continued.</i>	PAGE
Morals and economics inseparable	83
Emotion should be directed	85
Ideas are subject to change	92
Prevention better than cure	95
The Oriental in the New World	119
The Yellow Peril	122, 124, 128
Unemployment and armaments	134
Dreadnoughts or luxuries	141
The catastrophic view of war	164-167
Comments on Mr. Townroe's paper	179
The man with the pistol	194
Introduces Mr. Mead	208
Americans brag about wrong things	217
We must not neglect organisation	222
"Stronger or weaker than enemy"	224
Control of industry by conqueror	226, 227
Military occupation of Germany	229
Audiences do not understand credit	233
Push responsibility on questioners	234
German occupation of India	236
Who owns the Indian mines	238
Aggression and non-resistance	242, 243
49-bore or 51-bore ?	249
Shall we take our guns ?	250
Angellism and Quakerism	255
Introduces Mr. Robertson	283
Charge of sordidness false	293
Replies to Mr. Chesterton	354
Deals with Mr. Allen	376
Stocktaking	387
Emotions are economic factors	389, 391
Three States : Master, Slave, Partner	390
Personal leadership	391
European Unity	393
An Anglo-German War	
Angellism. <i>See also</i> "Pacifism"—	
A study movement	2
A propaganda	3
Questions utility of war	3
Based on national advantage	4
A matter of common sense	4
Sanity in international affairs	5
Norman Angell on.. .. .	6-8
Difficulty of applying it	11, 38
Difficulty about Australia	27
Has to create a public opinion	29
Must be of universal application	39

Angellism— <i>continued</i> ,	PAGE
Will not be accepted in our time	55
And the Navy League	61
The charge of sordidness	62
Should be a universal movement	65, 74
Start right now	67
An interpretation of social action	77
Based on common welfare	78
Aided by retention of " Capture "	108
And non-resistance	245
And the Universities	258
Is the movement sordid	283-304
And Socialism	305-307
A capitalist plot	307
Norman-Alchemism	321
To canalise and transmute	322
The force of argument	351
Moral Angellism	389
Not in ideas, only in action	391
Anglo-German rivalry. <i>See</i> " Germany."	
Annexation	237
Arbitration—	
Over Alaska boundary	214
Armaments—	
Domestic or international concern	15
Goschen proposes reduction	53
Talk of reduction dangerous	56
Will not secure peace	60
Weaken the possessor	64
And unemployment	129-141
And social ills	191
Makers of	256
To keep the workers in subjection	306
And taxation	306, 314
Armies cannot be bought ready-made	22
Army controversy, Home Rule	18
Atrocities, should they be dwelt on?	84
Attack. <i>See</i> " Aggression."	
Australia—	
And Japanese exclusion	27
Austria-Hungary—	
Army for domestic purposes	15
Army not a bond of union	36
Conference with Kaiser	74
And Serbo-Russian affair	89
Race problems and domination	91

B

	PAGE
Balkans	89
A drag on civilised Europe	16
A war of defence	31
Banknote, nature of a	156
Banks. <i>See</i> "Credit," "Finance."	
Barter	150
Bartholomew, Reginald—	
Study Circle recruiting	204
Conqueror and labour	225
Bebel, Herr, and national militia	175, 192
Beale, Dr. A. A.—	
Armaments and unemployment	131
On Study Circles	197
Leeds engines for India	234
Barlow, The Hon. Lady	330
Bedford, R. H.—	
"Die happy extending sovereignty"	83
The love of domination	90
The Yellow Peril	117
Armaments and unemployment	132
"Who is mine enemy?"	250
Universities and outdoor speaking	277
War a tragedy and a comedy	299
Behrens, Leonard—	
What Angellism is	2
Belgium and national service	175
Benson, George—	
What Angellism is	3
People believe war pays others	8
Criticism of Fulton's paper	36
Start now. Ideas international	67
Navy League and international ideas	69
What about atrocities?	84
On capture at sea	111
The Yellow Peril	124
Transporting Japanese troops	128
Armaments and employment	130
Banks and purchasing power	160
National Service and Class War	185
What use is a Study Circle	201
Control of industry by conqueror	226
What we buy from Germany	230
Germany and India	236

Benson, George— <i>continued</i> .	PAGE
Cheaper to buy than conquer	237
Who will start disarming ?	241
Do not talk about non-resistance	245
A Briton's first duty	248
Socialism and Angellism	305-307, 313, 317
Bergson, Henri	294, 301
Bill of Exchange	156
Biology and world evolution	218
Bloye, G. H.—	
Criticism of Fulton	29
The application of Angellism	39, 41, 42
Unemployment	132, 137
Who is the enemy ?	224
The Moroccan crisis	230
Non-resistance	240, 251
Analysing our intuitions	299, 303
The interests of Capital and Labour	309
Socialism, philosophic and otherwise	313
The Dominions and nationality	382
Blythe, Fred B.—	
Japanese conquest of U.S.A.	120
Closing down factories	226
Germany and Indian self-government	236
Angellism for American Universities	280
Boer War	9, 63
Disposes of value of training	26
Regrettable but beneficial	50
Was not fought for African unity	59
Arrest of Socialist leaders	70
Men, money and time	123
Mr. Chesterton on	339
Mr. Hyndman on	352
Bracher, S. B. —	
Angellism is common sense	4
What Angellism is.. .. .	78
" Will you get domination "	91
Capital will not be unemployed	141
Against National Service	184
Classes for speakers	205
Fascination of horrors of war	299
Replies to Mr. Allen	373
Stocktaking	395
Brandt, S.—	
The Manchester University Society	277
Brailsford's " War of Steel and Gold "	177
Brett, Capt. the Hon. M. V.—	
Introduces Mr. Chesterton	333

	PAGE
Bridge, Admiral	100
British Empire. <i>See also</i> "Colonies"—	
Difficulty of applying Pacifism	24
A great instrument for peace	54
" Some rotten spots "	64
A great precedent	257, 378

C

Cambridge, War and Peace Society	195
And Angellism	275
Campbell-Bannerman	54
Caldicott, Leonard—	
Armaments and unemployment	130
Germany and Indian trade	234
Canada—	
Germany does not need	6
Navy controversy	21
The best service	383
Capitalists—	
May profit by war.. .. .	178
Capture at Sea debate	96
Carnegie, Mr. Andrew	217
Change. <i>See</i> "Acceleration."	
Chile, guano fields	237
Cheque, nature of a	156
Chesterton, G. K.—	
The poetry of the sword	332-341, 344, 346, 350, 351, 357
China. <i>See also</i> "Yellow Peril"—	
Five-power loan incident	44
And New Zealand	369
Christianity—	
A universal appeal	12
Provoked by the Roman Empire	13
A social gospel	82, 295, 345
The income of the clergy	291
Civil War, American—	
Economic origin	9, 86
Had beneficial results	50
Civilisation—	
From London to Constantinople	17
Is elimination of force	37
Civilism—	
A good in itself	33
A good or bad title	326, 328, 331

	PAGE
Class struggle—	
Effect of National Service on	190
Angellism refutes	317
Cobden prevented three wars	5, 94
Had not modern illustrations	81
And the Corn Laws	85
Collinson, E. W.—	
On Study Circles	199
If Britain were to disarm	239
The Quaker position	240, 251
Capital and Labour	318
Stocktaking	386, 395
Colonies—	
Arrest of Socialist leaders in South Africa	70
Cannot be "taken"	80
Colonial point of view, the	364-372
<i>Corda Fratres</i>	277
Conquest, futile	80
And control of industry	225
Conscription. <i>See</i> "National Service."	
Consols, movement of	165
Constructive policy	380, 387, 393
Consumption—	
Prevention better than cure	95, 180, 191
Co-operation—	
The fundamental fact of human nature.. .. .	62
Corn Laws. <i>See</i> "Cobden."	
Cocks, Seymour—	
What Angellism is.. .. .	5
On National Service	188
Study Circles	201
Replies to Mr. Chesterton	350
Moves a vote of thanks	396
Credit	51, 81
What is	143-163
A visible evidence of interdependence	231
Crimean War	9, 94

D

Darwinian theory	262
Decadence, national—	
Due to large armaments	64
Declaration of London	115
Defence. <i>See also</i> "Aggression"—	
Our work a part of	69, 183

	PAGE
Defence— <i>continued.</i>	
And education	172
And Dreadnoughts	180
And aggression	355
Democracy—	
Losing its impressiveness	13
Majority <i>v.</i> minority	18
Destiny, "mostly rum"	80
Diplomatists—	
Preoccupations of	12
Disarmament—	
And the Yellow Peril	124
If Britain were to disarm	239
United States should begin	241
Discount	145, 149
Division of labour	150
Domination—	
Futility of	94
Dominions. <i>See</i> "Colonies," "British Empire."	
Duelling	337

E

Economic origin of war	76
Economics and morals. <i>See</i> "Morals."	
Economics of the emotions	391
Education, salaried teachers	292
Education and armaments	171
Emotion—	
Should be directed	7
A blind man at the wheel	84
The Russian lady's coachman	85
Has an intellectual correlative	290
Pacifist and militarist	298
Is an economic fact	389
Economics of the	391
Empire, British. <i>See</i> "British."	
Empire does not spell power	376
Employment and armaments	129-141
Entente, Triple	228
Reconciliation with Alliance	44
And Alliance <i>v.</i> Russia	45
Equality—	
Origin of French Revolution idea	14
Exchange	150
Experts fallible	99

F

Fayle, C. E.—							PAGE
The new patriotism	329
Pan-Slavism in Austria	394
Feeling..	286
Ferdinand, Archduke	89
Finance. <i>See also</i> "Credit"—							
Restraint over Russia	42, 43, 44	
Has not up to now shown its power	51
In Moroccan crisis	71
What is credit?	143-163	
Ruin of a Banker in 1872	170
A visible evidence of interdependence	231
Finland—							
And non-resistance	245
Fisher, Harold—							
Will Crooks and the Arsenal	136, 137	
Courses of home study	202
Force—							
Futile	32, 351	
Elimination of, is civilisation	37
Always supposed to give advantage	49
Of majorities against minorities	88
Holds society together	337, 346	
Three kinds of	344
Friends, Society of	213
France—							
Desire for revenge	10
Russia and Germany	45
Angellism in	66
And Germany	71
Railway strike	186
Fraser, Leon—							
The Yellow Peril	118, 119, 120	
Angellism and Socialism	308
French Revolution—							
Principles and outcome	12
Fulton, E. A.—							
Application of Pacifist doctrines	11-25
Replies to critics	45

G

Galileo	334
Garton Foundation—							
Clause Six	171, 178, 193, 194	

	PAGE
Germany—	
Not "too good to come"	6, 80
And the Russian menace	28, 42, 43, 72
And Britain, reconciliation	43
The Moroccan crisis	51
Angell's tour in	66
And British Navy League	68
And France	71
Must not be put on a pedestal	73
and British rivalry	81
And National Service in Britain	176, 188
Military occupation of	228
And India	234-236
Students' visit to	269
The teaching of history	272
Mr. Hyndman on	353
Gold. <i>See</i> "Finance," "Credit"—	
The ideal currency	151
The basis of credit	154
Goschen, Lord	53
Government. <i>See</i> "State."	
Graham, R. B.—	
Criticism of Mr. Hannan	59
Industrial competition of Japan	127
Armaments and unemployment	132, 137
Reply to Mr. Townroe	182
Credit collapse	229
Non-resistance	243, 254
Fossilised Angellism	280
On titles	328
Reply to Mr. Chesterton	347
The economic motive	376

H

Hague Conferences—	
Goschen proposes reduced armaments	53
Halifax Study Circles	199, 206
Hannan, P. J.—	
Some dangers of the movement	47-56
Let it be a universal movement	65
Navy League and German fleet	66
Replies to discussion	73
Harvey's discoveries	334
Hay, Woodhull—	
Chilian guano fields	238
Non-resistance	248

Haycock, A. W.—	PAGE
G.I. cannot be bovrilised	4
War is a brain disease	4
Be dogmatic and optimistic	40
Mix moral and material arguments	83
The Corn Laws	85
Canada and the Yellow Peril	128, 129
Unemployment and armaments	133, 139
"Why gold?"	160
The armament debauchery	190
Speakers must speak	203
Stronger than the enemy	224
Germanisation of Poland	227
Indian contracts	236
Hecklers who corner discussion	237
'Ware disarmament	240, 247, 248
Open-air speaking for students	278
Angellism and Socialism	308, 312, 313
On titles	330
Chips in on Chesterton	360
National honour forsooth.. .. .	381
Nine o'clock breakfast	386
As propagandists we are Angellists	392
Constructive policy	393
Highwayman, profession of	153
Hilton, John—	
Criticism of Fulton's paper	32
"Fulfil their destiny"	79
"Capture" debate	112
The Yellow Peril	119
Not work but products	133, 139
What is credit?	143-159, 160, 161
Ratio of gold to credit currency	164
International polity	327
Holman, Percy—	
Angellism and Pacifism	5
Unemployment and armaments	132
Intuition and morals	300
Armaments and taxation	314
Honour, national	348
Righted by war	359
An unrivalled excuse	377
What does it mean?	381
History, teaching of	261, 272, 273
Home Rule. See "Ireland."	
Horsfall, T. C.	173
Hudson, Professor M. O.—	
What Angellism is.. .. .	

PROPERTY
OF THE
LIBRARY

Hudson, Professor M. O.— <i>continued.</i>	PAGE
A barbarian invasion	90
Angellism and Socialism	307
Hugins, R. B.—	
Economic fact and moral talk	86
Japan, Russia and America	121
Armaments and unemployment	131
India and engine orders	235
Is peace a capitalist plot?	311
Human nature—	
Will seek war unless changed	52
Hungary—	
Becoming Magyarised	87
Hyndman, H. M.—	
The efficacy of force	352

I

Ideals—	
Do not work out in practice	13
Cannot be forwarded by the sword	350
Ideas—	
Action not controlled by thought	15
Wrong, responsible for militarism	36
Are international	60
International, some examples	67
Are open to change	92
Imports and exports	162
Income tax, armaments on	107
Indemnity	233, 288
India—	
Prestige and profit.. .. .	8
Army not quite a police force	21
Unsuited to Western Democracy	23
Army in part a police force	26
Pacifist consistency	36
And Leeds locomotives	234
Who owns the mines?	238
Mr. Hyndman on our rule in	353
Individuality destroyed by war	374
Industry—	
Can it be controlled by conqueror?	225
Ingersoll and a miracle	117
Insurance and capture	108, 110
And war	163

	PAGE
Interdependence—	
Of nations	79
Of finance and commerce..	170, 226, 227
Adds to occasions for dispute ..	371
International polity—	
Societies	196
Lectureships	265
In the American Universities ..	271
What does it mean ?	325, 327, 331
Intellect, feeling, and sympathy ..	290
International Federation of Students ..	272
Interest and morality	6
Enlightened self-interest	78
Interest, the general—	
The only basis	7, 10
Intuition, what is ?	300
Ireland.. .. .	229
" Whose misunderstanding ? " ..	17
" Ulster will fight "	35
Pacifists all against Ulster ..	45
Dominates England	91
Home Rule to undo work of conquest ..	230
Italy—	
Turkish War	52
Rebellion against Austria	335

J

Japan—	
Growth of Socialism	93
The Yellow Peril	118-129
And New Zealand	369
Fought for independence	371
Motives for war	379
Jaurès, Jean, on National Service ..	175, 178, 181, 187, 192, 194
Jingoism—	
Navy League discounts	55

K

Kapp, Edmund K.	230
Kapp, R. O.—	
Supports Fulton's paper	38

L

	PAGE
Labour—	
And military training	193
Can a conqueror command	225
Langdon-Davies, B. N.—	
Navy League and Kaiser's speech	69
The movement in the Universities	276
Takes the chair for Mr. Benson	305, 307, 310, 313, 319
On titles	329
Lawson's " Wars and War Taxes "	231
Leeds Norman Angell League	197, 206
Levy—	
War on disease and poverty	300
Logic	284
Loreburn, Lord, on capture	108
Lubtow, Von—	
French lust for revenge	10
Criticism of Fulton's paper	28
Russia and Germany	42, 43, 44
Angell's German tour	66
The Servian affair	89
Japan and America	120
Cashing a £5 note	159
Upholds National Service	186, 187
Britain, Germany, France, Russia	228, 232
Military occupation of Germany	229, 232, 233
Purchase or conquest	237
Could Germany disarm ?	240
The Quaker position	246
Speaks as a Quaker	250, 251
The teaching of history	273
On titles	328
Lunnon—	
Criticism of Mr. Hannan	56
Economic factor relevant	86
Unemployment and armaments	138
Study Circles	197, 202
Aggression and non-resistance	243
Non-resistance	250
Practice or research	253

M

Manchester	
Manchester N.A. League—	
Why not a peace society ?	2

Manchester N.A. League— <i>continued.</i>	PAGE
Its members	172
And the University	259
Martindale, J. B.—	
Capture at sea	112
Armaments and unemployment	130
Mawson, E. G.—	
War not made because it pays	8
We can affect Japanese opinion	129
Cheap literature needed	203
Courage needed to disarm	243
Mazzini on nationalism	324
Mead, Mrs.—	
The war traders	67
Russia and Constantinople	94
America and world politics	221
America should disarm	241
Police analogy false	253
Mead, Edwin D.—	
Organise the world	208
Mexico—	
American crisis	25, 63, 342, 353, 355
Mez, Dr.—	
What Angellism is	4
Criticism of Fulton's paper	27
Criticism of Hannan	58
The poverty of Japan	127
Armaments and National Service	188
Study Circles	203
The old peace movement	217
Angellism and Socialism	312
On titles	328
Replies to Mr. Allen	378
Michel, Felix	178
Militarism—	
A profession in England	14
And class hostility	21
And Pacifism	33
A facile solution	37
Its emotional stream	298, 303
Militarists, who are the ?	324
Mr. Chesterton is one	344
Military force irrelevant	63
Military occupation of Germany	228
Mill, J. S.—	
Quoted on National Service	174
Money. <i>See</i> "Credit," "Finance."	
Moral arguments against war	83

	PAGE
Moral code strengthens social fabric	82
Morality and interest	6, 82
Morality changes	389
Morals and economics	83, 86, 287, 345, 390
Moroccan crisis	51, 71, 107, 230, 312
Motives for wars. <i>See</i> "Wars."	

N

Napoleon's maritime decrees	100
Nasmyth, Dr.—	
Criticism of Fulton's paper	25
Criticism of Hannan's paper	62
How far do revolutions succeed	87
The Yellow Peril	126
Armaments and unemployment	131
Getting gold in war-time	160
Gold, paper, and balance of trade	163
Gold and credit	164
Social problems and war	190
The machinery of peace	219
Russia and Swedish mines	237
Angellism in the Universities	270
Is the movement sordid	294, 301
"A capitalist plot"	307
Angellism a rival to Socialism	316
On titles	331
Replies to Mr. Chesterton	341
Replies to Mr. Allen	378
Chesterton's attitude means eternal war	388
Stocktaking	395
National Service—	
Difficulty of officering	21
Directed against Germany	72
Mr. Townroe's paper	169-179
Will dish trade unionism	306, 314
"The New"	326
In Belgium	395
Nationalism—	
In Prussia and Balkans	16
A disconcerting fact	20
And universalism	38
Mazzini on	324
A factor in survival	378

Nationality—	PAGE
Poland, Schleswig-Holstein	89
We want to abolish attacks on	189
British Dominions want independence	366
Nationhood and mammon	51
Nature, fear or control	322
Navy, cannot be used for political oppression	27
British and German programmes	54
The tasks of the British	55
German, and National Service	72
Our prosperity dependent on	73
New patriotism. <i>See</i> "Patriotism."	
Navy League—	
Desires international goodwill	54
Did it create the German fleet?	68
New Guinea	368
New Zealand, desires independence	368
Attributes of sovereignty	373
Non-resistance	240-258
Norman-Alchemism	321-327
Angell on	391
Norman-Angellism. <i>See</i> "Angellism."	

O

Occupation. *See* "Military."

O'Farrell, H. H.—

The abolition of capture at sea	106, 113
Takes the chair for Prof Weiss	259, 270, 281
Opinion. <i>See</i> "Public opinion."	
"Organise the World"	208
Oxford War and Peace Society	199

P

Pacifists, we must not disparage	5, 82
Pacifism—	
Difficulty of applying (Fulton)	11
An English movement	14
A black list of Pacifists	19
Geographical	23
What does failure mean	32
And Militarism	33

	PAGE
Pacifism, the new. See "Angellism."	
Pacifism, the old—	
Not practical	2
Idealistic and intuitive	3
Regards war as a heart disease	4
Three differences from Angellism	5
We ought not to disparage	5, 82
They did not explain	6
Treats war as a moral question	77
Some failure	218
Non-resistance	240-258
Pan-American Union	216
Panama tolls	379
Partnership philosophy	390
Patriotism—	
Based on national well-being	63
An excited crowd	177
Consistent with internationalism	209
" The new "	326
Peace—	
World uniformity must precede	53
Is maintained by power	54
Horror of	306
Penn, William	209
Percival, Dr.	210
Philippines—	
Why not open to Japanese?	125
Pitman, Alfred—	
Criticism of Hannan's paper	66
Japanese conquest of America	122
Poland—	
Polish nationality	89
Germanisation of	227, 228
Russia in	352
Police—	
Indian army	21, 26, 36
The American argument	241
And non-resistance	244, 338, 344
Police, international	256
Population—	
Civilisation and low birth-rate	125
Power—	
Does not confer advantage	7
Prussian, the turnip-faced	359
Propaganda	29
We must state our case briefly	76
Press—	
Creates a national sentiment for war	68

Psychology—	PAGE
Of war	262
Of Militarism	285
Public opinion—	
Statesman accepts, we create	28
We propose to change	57, 69, 388
Pugnacity may be good or evil	323

Q

Quaker position, The.. .. .	240-258
Quakers, Mr. Chesterton on	338
Quintana, Orzabal de la—	
Biological aspect of world evolution	218
Stronger or weaker than your enemy	224
"Why resist?"	242, 247
Material and moral welfare	296
On titles	328, 329

R

Raphael, J. E.—	
Criticism of Fulton's paper	36
Lectures and Study Circles	204
Reasoning	283-293
Reformation. See "Religious War."	
Religion—	
People not agreed on	7
New Testament a social document	82
Religious war analogy	30, 40, 83, 92, 357
Revolutions—	
How far do they succeed	87
Do we approve?	347
Rivalry—	
The crux of the Navy League argument	61
Roberts, Lord, and National Service	171, 185, 186
Robertson, Dennis—	
Pacifist and Militarist emotion	298
Reply to Mr. Chesterton	349
Robertson, J. M.—	
On experts, quoted	109
Reasoning	283-293
Replies to discussion	301
Rockefeller, why he goes on	362

	PAGE
Romanes, E. G. R.—	
America and South Africa	127
On Study Circles	199
A country can lose by defeat	243
Keep out the dons	279
Capital and labour	313
Rose, Dr. Holland, on Napoleon	100
Rothwell, Charles—	
Military occupation of Germany	229, 232, 233
Indian contracts	235
Universities and open-air speaking	276
Angellism deflects ethical feeling	295
Angellism congruous with Socialism	309
On titles	330
Russia—	
A menace to Germany	29, 42, 72
Restrained by economic forces	42, 43
Five-Power Chinese loan	44
A difficult problem	46
Servia and Austria	88
And Constantinople	94
And Swedish mines	237
In Finland	245
The North Sea incident	348
Mr. Hyndman on	352
Japanese War	371

S

Sancho Panza.. .. .	327
Security—	
Not achieved by armaments	64
Self-sacrifice and morality	6
Sentimentalists, are we	283
Shaw, Bernard, on Socialists	294
On masters and slaves	390
Shipping. <i>See</i> "Capture at Sea"—	
Owned by foreign capital	97
Shove, Gerald F.—	
Non-resistance	246
Angellism in the Universities	274
Interests of workers and capitalists not identical	313
On titles	330
Reply to Mr. Chesterton	345
Slave philosophy	390

	PAGE
Toulmin, Geoffry—	
The armament race	61
Nationality	89
On capture at sea	112
Townroe, Lieutenant B. S.—	
National Service	169-179
Trade, conquest of	80
Balance of	162
Triangular	227, 230
Tripolitan War	52
A costly affair	124
Turkey—	
Italian War	52
Tyranny, Mr. Chesterton one cause of	347

U

Ulster question. <i>See</i> "Ireland."	
Unemployment and armaments	129-141
Unilateral illusion—	
Angell at Cambridge	55
Strength is only relative	60
Universities, the Movement and the	259-270
Utilitarian considerations—	
Are they degrading?	286

V

Virtue not negative	345
-----------------------------	-----

W

"Water does not flow uphill"	41
War—	
"Nobody believes it pays"	8
Nations will find a motive	52
And credit	157
Not necessarily "catastrophic"	164, 165, 166
Worse than a crime—a blunder	297
Tragedy and comedy of	299
Horrors of, a distraction	299, 394
On disease and poverty	300
Governing classes may gain by	353

	PAGE
" War and Peace "	206, 242
A good title	326
Wars of religion. <i>See</i> " Religious."	
Wars, are they economic in origin ?	77, 86
Motives not solely economic	84
Wealth, confiscation of—	
Roughwood and Von Lubtow	233
Weiss, Professor—	
The Movement and the Universities	259-270
Reply to discussion	281
Economics and morals	296
Welldon, Dean	172
Willett, Edward—	
On Study Circles	199
Williams, Roland—	
Non-resistance impracticable	253
Compulsory lectures	279
The interests of capital and labour	311
Work. <i>See</i> " Employment " and " Unemployment."	
Workers' Educational Association	275
Wright, Charles—	
Abolition of capture at sea	96, 114
Wright, Harold—	
Navy League and German fleet	68
Concerning Study Circles	195, 196, 205
Socialism and Angellism	315

Y

Yellow Peril	117-129
No peril except from civilised peoples	93, 124
In Canada	128

Z

Zabern incident	340, 343, 348, 356
-------------------------	--------------------

